Arun District Council v The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Ors

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1172 (Admin) Case No: AC-2025-LON-000390 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION PLANNING COURT Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 15 May 2026 Before : HHJ KAREN WALDEN-SMITH sitting as a Judge of the High Court – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : ARUN DISTRICT COUNCIL Claimant – and – (1) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOUSING, COMMUNITIEIS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2) PIERS BRUNTON (3) SUSAN BRUNTON Defendants – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – GABRIEL NELSON (instructed byArun District Council Legal Services) for the Claimant RICCARDO CALZAVARA (instructed by GOVERNMENT LEGAL DEPARTMENT) for the Defendant Hearing date: 26 March 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Approved Judgment This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ……………………….. HHJ Karen Walden-Smith:

1. The Claimant, Arun District Council (“Arun DC”), seeks permission to bring statutory review proceedings pursuant to the provisions of section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (section 288 of the TCPA 1990) with respect to the decision of C Shearing BA (Hons) MA MRTPI, the Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (“the Secretary of State”) to hear the appeal against the refusal of Arun DC, as the local planning authority, to allow for the development proposed at Little Paddocks, Sefter Road, Pagham, West Sussex PO21 3EE (“the site”).

2. The appeal was determined by way of the written representation procedure and the Inspector attended an unaccompanied site visit on 7 August 2025. By the Decision promulgated on 22 August 2025, the Inspector allowed the appeal brought by the second and third defendants, Piers and Susan Brunton, (“Mr and Mrs Brunton”) for the demolition of existing buildings and the erection of seven dwellings with associated landscaping and works at the site subject to conditions. The 6 week statutory deadline for filing and serving the appeal expired on 3 October 2025.

3. This application for statutory review raises an important and novel point with respect to the impact of a failure to serve in time parties to the statutory review who have indicated that they do not wish to take part in the statutory review process. This application came before Timothy Corner KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on the papers. He ordered that the matter be listed for a contested hearing. I reserved my decision as there is no case law dealing with the issue with respect to service and time limits where there is an active party who has been properly served and the party who had not been served has declared that they do not intend to take part in the proceedings. I am grateful to both Counsel for their helpful written and oral submissions. The Factual Background

4. Mr and Mrs Brunton applied to Arun DC for planning permission to develop the site on 27 July 2024. The application for planning permission had been supported by a surface water drainage report for the purpose of seeking to demonstrate “how the development area can be satisfactorily drained without increasing flood risk onsite and elsewhere.” Arun DC’s engineer commented on the surface water drainage and objected to the application on 20 September 2024. It was not a holding objection or a request for further information and consequently the engineer did not request conditions but asked to be reverted to if the local planning authority were minded to approve the application.

5. The OR recommended refusal on the basis of concerns about density of the site, insufficiency of evidence relating to sustainable drainage systems (“SuDS”) and absence of the requisite financial contribution. Planning permission was refused on 30 September 2024.

6. An appeal was brought by Mr and Mrs Brunton on 17 February 2025, accompanied with another SuDS proposal. The statement of case in support of the appeal set out that “The site can be adequately drainaged through storage in subsurface features and subsequently discharged into the adjacent watercourse at a controlled flow rate.” Arun DC’s engineer opposed the appeal on 8 April 2025, and by its statement of case Arun DC indicated that it still had concerns about the density of the site and the insufficiency of the SuDS evidence. A condition was included, should be permission be granted, that “Prior to commencement of development, a site-specific SuDS Maintenance and Management Manal must be submitted and approved in writing by the Local Planning Authority.” The financial contribution had been resolved. Final comments by Mr and Mrs Brunton were made on 24 April 2025.

7. As is set out above, the appeal was allowed and permission granted, with the Decision promulgated on 22 August 2025 and a separate costs judgment on the same day.

8. The Inspector dismissed the concerns of Arun DC with respect to the density of the development: “Despite the proposed density exceeding the ranges set out in the SPD, I do not find conflict with this part of the SPD overall, since it acknowledges density should respond to existing character. The proposal would comply with the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) insofar as it requires the efficient use of land taking into account the desirability of maintaining an areas’ prevailing character and setting.” (Decision Letter para. 10). With respect to surface water drainage, the Inspector acknowledged that a combination of factors resulted in uncertainty that the scheme could drain in the intended manner or that the proposed SuDS would be capable of discharging water from the development at the same or lesser rate as prior to construction as required by the development plan policy (DL para 15). “However, while there is uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of the measures currently proposed, there is not substantive evidence to suggest that suitable site drainage could not be reasonably be achieved, including through other means if necessary, including those others set out in the drainage hierarchy. Overall, based on the information before me and having regard to the scale of this particular development, I consider it to be a reasonable and proportionate response that the matter be addressed by a pre-commencement condition.” (DL para 16).

9. The Inspector noted the concerns of Arun DC that the proposed SuDS would have limited biodiversity and amenity value but she found that those matters did not add to her concerns as the proposal was acceptable in terms of biodiversity and net gains more widely and would provide an acceptable standard of amenity overall. She was satisfied that the requirements of Policy W DM3 of the Local Plan and the NPPF could reasonably be achieved and that there was no conflict with LP Policy W DM2 or DM1.

10. Having lost the appeal before the Inspector, Arun DC challenged the Decision. The deadline for filing and serving the statutory review pursuant to s.288 of the TCPA was 3 October 2025 (6 weeks from the date of decision).Arun DC filed the claim on 3 October 2025 and the claim was issued on the same day.

11. The claim form and bundle was served on the Secretary of State on 3 October 2025. There is no dispute about service having been properly effected against the Secretary of State who acknowledged service on 27 October 2025 and provided both summary grounds of resistance dated 22 October 2025 and a witness statement of Carolyn Southey-Jensen, a lawyer at the GLD, dated 27 October 2025.

12. With respect to Mr and Mrs Brunton, Arun DC purported to serve the claim form and bundle on the planning consultant, James Cross of Cross Town Planning, on 3 October 2025 who was named on the original application for planning permission and the appeal brought by Mr and Mrs Brunton.

13. The covering email to the claim form set out that the legal services of Arun DC were instructed in the statutory planning review under s.288 of the TCPA 1990. The first email from Arun DC on 3 October 2025 was timed at 16:03 and Mr Cross responded at 16.15 pointing out that there were only 2 attachments to the email, whereas there had been reference to 3 attachments, and asking for the third attachment to be sent again. At 16.25 a further email was sent by Arun DC setting out that a voicemail message had been left and that the bundle was being sent by OneDrive and asking Mr Cross to “confirm that your system supports this?”.. The response from Mr Cross at 16.27 confirmed that OneDrive is accepted but “you will need to check with PINS [the Inspectorate] as to whether they accept this, given your claim is against their decision.” The paginated bundle was sent at 16.48. At 17.23 a further email was sent by Arun DC saying that the bundle was not being served on PINS as they were not a party to the proceedings and asking for confirmation that the bundle had been received through OneDrive. There does not appear to have been a response to that request.

14. It is said in written submissions that Sofina Ahmed, a solicitor at Arun DC, phoned Mr Cross at 12:19 on 6 October 2025 and that Mr Cross had confirmed on that date that the bundle had reached him and he confirmed receipt of the claim form and bundle and that he was acting for the interested party. In her witness statement dated 6 November 2025, exhibiting the attendance note of the telephone conversation, Ms Ahmed says that he also advised that the correspondence would be sent on to the Interested Party (that is, Mr and Mrs Brunton). While the attendance note sets out that Mr Cross confirmed receipt of the claim form and bundle and that he is acting for the interested party, it does not record that he said that he has authority to accept service and it is not recorded that he says that he is going to send on the papers to Mr and Mrs Brunton.

15. On 23 October 2025 a further email was sent asking “whether your client intends to acknowledge service so we know the details of their response to our claim.” It does not appear that there was a response to that email. On 3 November 2025, Arun DC sent to James Cook a copy of Arun DC’s Reply to the Secretary of State’s summary grounds of resistance. In response James Cook wrote on 3 November 2025 in the following terms: “Thank you for your email. I am afraid that I do not act for the applicant in any legal capacity, nor have I confirmed as such at any point. I therefore do not need to be copied into this correspondence as I do not comprise an interested party in the legal definition. The owner’s details, and thus their presence as an interested party, can be found on the corresponding s 106 legal agreement entered into with yourselves during the application. Equally, their details are also found on the Certificates of Ownership and corresponding CIL Forms declared as part of the application submission. All correspondence should be served on the landowner directly, whose details are readily available within the timescales set out in statute, which I trust has been duly followed. I have raised this point with the Inspectorate’s legal team also as I do not comprise an interested party. I trust this clarifies matters and would be grateful if you could confirm receipt.”

16. In response to what I assume to be an enquiry as to whether the documents sent to James Cook had been passed on, he responded: “I can confirm that I have not passed the documents onto the interested party, This is, as explained in the previous email, [because?] I do not act and am not instructed to represent them on any legal matters including acting as a correspondence address. Secondly it is the responsibility of the Claimant to ensure sufficient service in any Judicial Review claim and not the former planning consultant who acted for the interested party on planning matters separately.”

17. There is a clear conflict between what Mr Cross was saying on 3 November 2025 and what Ms Ahmed records him as having said to her on 6 October 2025. Certainly, the evidence on behalf of Arun DC is that while he was not in fact instructed to accept service he had confirmed in the telephone call that he acted for Mr and Mrs Brunton. Arun DC say that Mr Cross did not inform them until his email of 3 November 2025 that he was not authorised to accept service.

18. In light of the correspondence from Mr Cross on 3 November 2025, Arun DC served the claim and associated documents by hand on Mr and Mrs Brunton on 4 November 2025. Arun DC also applied for an extension of time for the service of the claim on 4 November 2025.

19. Mr and Mrs Brunton acknowledged service on 5 November 2025. They indicated that they did not wish to take an “active role in defending the claim but reserve their position should the court request further representations.” Planning Statutory Review.

20. By virtue of the provisions of section 284(1)(f) and section 284(3)(b) of the TCPA any challenge to a decision on an appeal under section 78 has to be brought by way of a section 288 statutory review.

21. Section 288(4B) of the TCPA 1990 provides that a claim for planning statutory review must be made “before the end of the period of six weeks beginning with the day after the date of the action”, that is the impugned decision.

22. In Telford and Wrekin Council v SSLUHC and Greentech Invest UK Limited [2023] EWHC 2439 (Admin), Eyre J. set out that the entirety of part 54 of the CPR applies to planning statutory reviews, save to the extent that the section of part 54 or a Practice Direction relating to that part provides otherwise. CPR part 54.1(2)(a) provides that a “claim for judicial review” means a claim to review the lawfulness of (ii) a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function. Part 54.1(2)(f) defines an “interested party” as “any person (other than the claimant and defendant) who is directly affected by the claim.” CPR part 54.7 provides that the claim form must be served on (a) the defendant; and (b) unless the court otherwise directs, any person the claimant considers to be an interested party, within 7 days after the date of issue.

23. Section II of CPR part 54 sets out the rules relating to the planning court. Pursuant to CPR 54.21(2) a “Planning Court claim” means a judicial review or statutory challenge which (a) involves any of the following matters – (i) planning permission …; and has been issued in or transferred to the Planning Court. CPR 54.23 provides that the CPR and their practice directions will apply to Planning Court claims “unless this section or a practice direction provides otherwise”.

24. Practice Direction 54D deals with planning court claims and appeals to the planning court. Planning statutory review includes a claim for statutory review under section 288 of the TCPA 1990 (54DPD.1.2(b)). The table set out in 54DPD 4.8 sets out that the claim must be served on the appropriate Minister or government department and, where different, on the person indicated in the table “who would, if he were aggrieved by the decision, order, relevant document or action, be entitled to apply to the High Court under section 288 of the TCPA 1990”. In Eco-Energy (GB) Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport and Durham CC [2004] EWCA 1566, Buxton LJ held that: “ … persons aggrieved under section 288 are either (1) the appellant in the planning process, or (2) someone who took a sufficiently active role in the planning process —that is to say, probably a substantial objector, not just somebody who objected and did no more about it —or (3) someone who has a relevant interest in the land. ”

25. In the circumstances of this matter, I am satisfied that Mr and Mrs Brunton are “persons aggrieved” and therefore ought to have been served in accordance with the rules.

26. CPR part 6 provides the rules for service, subject to CPR rule 6.15 which sets out that: “(1) Where it appears to the court that there is good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place. (2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service. (3) An application for an order under this rule – (a) must be supported by evidence; and (b) may be made without notice. (4) An order under this rule must specify – (a) the method or place of service; (b) the date on which the claim form is deemed served; and (c) the period for – (i) filing an acknowledgment of service; (ii) filing an admission; or (iii) filing a defence.

27. 54DPD 4.11 provides that the claim form must be served within the time limited by the relevant enactment for making a claim for planning statutory review. That is the six-week period provided by section 288(4B) of the TCPA 1990. Extension of time

28. The Court has power to extend or shorten time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or court order by virtue of CPR rule 3.1(2)(a), whereas CPR rule 7.6 provides for an extension of time for serving a claim form under CPR rule 7.5. CPR rule 7.6 provides: “ (1)The claimant may apply for an order extending the period for compliance with rule 7.5. (2) The general rule is that an application to extend the time for compliance with rule 7.5 must be made – (a) Within the period specified by rule 7.5; or (b) Where an ode has been made under this rule, within the period for service specified by that order. (3) If the claimant applies for an order to extend the time for compliance after the end of the period specified by rule 7.5 or by an order made under this rule, the court may make such an order only if – (a) the court has failed to serve the claim form; or (b) the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with rule 7.5 but has been unable to do so; and (c) in either case, the claimant has acted promptly in making the application (4) A application for an order extending the time for compliance with rule 7.5 – (a) must be supported by evidence; and (b) may be made without notice.”

29. In R(Good Law Project Ltd) Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] 1 WLR 2339, it was held that on an application to extend time for service of a claim for judicial review made under CPR r.54, CPR r.3.1(2)(a) applies but the principles of CPR 7.6 should be followed on the application. Carr LJ (as she then was) made clear the special function of the service of a claim form: “As for the importance of valid service, service of a claim form can be distinguished from other procedural steps. It performs a special function: it is the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court’s jurisdiction. This quality is reflected in the terms of CPR r. 7.6, with its very strict requirements for any retrospective extension of time. Equally, reliance on non-compliant service is not one of the instances of opportunism deprecated by the courts … The need for particular care in effecting valid service, particularly when there are tight time limits and/or a claimant is operating towards the end of any relevant limitation period, is self-evident. [41] The level of care required cannot be divorced from the significance of the procedural step in question. Thus, service of a claim form requires the utmost diligence and care to ensure that the relevant procedural rules are properly complied with… [63]”

30. In Rogers v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2024] EWCA Civ 1554, the claimant wished to apply to the High Court under s.288 of the TCPA 1990 which was required to be made by a claim form that was served within six weeks of the Secretary of State’s decision. The claimant had filed his claim form in good time, but the court office had not acknowledged receipt. Two days before the expiry of the six-week time limit for service, the claimant’s solicitor emailed the court office requesting that it acknowledge receipt of the claim form, but made no mention of the fact that a sealed claim form needed to be issued immediately so that it could be served before expiry of the six week time limit. The solicitor emailed the court office on a number of occasions over the next two months, enquiring about the sealed claim form. When it was issued just over two months after the expiry of the six-week time limit it was immediately served and an extension of time was sought to serve the claim-form.

31. Coulson LJ held that on a proper application of the relevant principles the respondent had failed to take all reasonable steps to serve within the six-week time limit and thereby failed to satisfy the test contained in CPR 7.6 (3)(b), namely the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with rule 7.5 but has been unable to do so. Not only did Coulson LJ uphold the appeal against the first instance judge’s decision on the basis that all reasonable steps had not been undertaken, but he also found that there was a failure to act promptly in applying to extend time. He set out the relevant principles discernible from Good Law: “(a) The approach in Good Law sets out the principles applicable to extending time for service of judicial review claim forms….Amongst other things, that means that neither what might be called the Denton principles, nor the merits of the underlying case, are relevant. (b) There is a six-week period for the service of a claim for a planning statutory review under section

288. That period is “precise, unambiguous and unqualified… The approach in Good Law therefore governs any application to extend that six-week period… (c) … (d) Under CPR r7.6(3) a claimant has to show, first, that it has taken all reasonable steps to serve the claim form within the relevant period. Where, as here, that period started to run before the claim form had been issued, the court must consider all the steps taken up to the expiry of that period. Events after the period of the period are strictly irrelevant to the issue of whether a claimant took all reasonable steps to serve within the period… However later events may shed light on what happened or did not happen during the six-week period, and could be relevant to the overall exercise of the court’s discretion. (e ) The second step under rule 7.6(3) is for a claimant to show that an application for an extension of time made after the expiry of the relevant period has been made promptly. For a case like this, where the expiry of the period in which to serve the claim form is automatic and unconnected with the issue of any documents by the court, the period under consideration starts with the date that the six-week period expires, and runs to the making of the application for an extension of time.”

32. In this case, service needed to be effected upon the Secretary of State and the developers as defendants. Service needed to effected within six weeks of the decision being promulgated on 22 August 2025, namely by 3 October 2025. The Secretary of State was properly served in time. I am satisfied that Mr and Mrs Brunton were not served in time. The claimant, Arun DC, purported to serve on Mr and Mrs Brunton by serving the claim form on the Consultant who had been acting for them in the appeal before the Inspector.

33. At no point did the planning consultant, Mr Cross, inform Arun DC that he had authority to accept service of the claim form on behalf of Mr and Mrs Brunton.

34. Arun DC must show that it took all reasonable steps to serve the claim form in time and that it acted promptly in seeking an extension of time. Service on Mr and Mrs Brunton did not in fact take place until 32 days after it ought to have been. Arun DC knew the contact details of Mr and Mrs Brunton and could have served them directly. There was nothing before Arun DC to establish that Mr Cross had authority to accept service and in those circumstances, it cannot be found that Arun DC took all reasonable steps to serve upon Mr and Mrs Brunton in time, that is by 3 October. In the circumstances, CPR 7.6(3)(b) has not been made out and the court’s discretion to extend time for compliance cannot be exercised in favour of Arun DC as the court may make such an order “only if – the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with rule 7.5 but has been unable to do so.”

35. Additionally, in order to exercise the discretion under CPR 7.6(3), Arun DC needs to establish that it has acted promptly in making the application. Arun DC can properly submit that Counsel acted very swiftly when the issue of non-service of the claim form was drawn to his attention on 4 November 2025. However, as is clear from Rogers, the extension of time is between the expiration of the deadline (in this case 3 October 2025) and the making of the application (4 November 2025) – see Coulson LJ in para 38(e) of Rogers. A period of 32 days is not “prompt”. The Claim Against the Secretary of State

36. Mr and Mrs Brunton have stated that they do not wish to take part in the proceedings and the issue arises as to whether, in those circumstances, Arun DC can continue with its claim against the Secretary of State who was properly served and who has engaged with the claim.

37. The failure to serve on Mr and Mrs Brunton in time, and without an extension of time, means that the Court is without jurisdiction to determine the claim against Mr and Mrs Brunton. After service of the claim form on 4 November 2025, Mr and Mrs Brunton acknowledged service but made it clear that they did not intend to take an active role in defending the claim.

38. The Secretary of State contends that the failure to serve on Mr and Mrs Brunton means that the claim against the Secretary of State, which was properly served, cannot proceed.

39. Arun DC contend that the failure to serve on Mr and Mrs Brunton should not vitiate the claim against the Secretary of State. I mentioned the case of Bailey v Barclays Bank UK Public Limited [2021] EWHC 3698 in a draft of this judgment, as it does give some authority for the failure to serve on one party not vitiating service on the other party. I did not consider the case was of particular relevance, it was a part 7 claim whereas this is a part 8 claim in the context of Part

54. Counsel helpfully provided short submissions agreeing that Bailey v Barclays Bank need not trouble the court and so I will not make any further comment on it.

40. The section 288 statutory appeal is different to a part 7 claim. CPR part 54 applies (Telford and Wrekin Council v SSLUHC) and CPR part 54.7 provides that the claim form must be served on (a) the defendant; and (b) unless the court otherwise directs, any person the claimant considers to be an interested party, within 7 days after the date of issue. There is, therefore, a procedural obligation to serve on an aggrieved party – in this case, Mr and Mrs Brunton as developers. The failure to serve Mr and Mrs Brunton means that there is a failure to comply with 54PD 4.11 which undermines the entire claim. This is a single challenge – not a number of claims against different defendants.

41. As is made clear in Good Law Project, the failure to serve the proceedings means that the jurisdiction of the court has not been invoked. The fact that a party who has not been served makes a declaration that they do not intend to play an active role in the proceedings, does not impact upon whether there is jurisdiction. The local planning authority, Arun DC, may feel aggrieved that the Secretary of State has been engaged in these proceedings and had there been service on Mr and Mrs Brunton in accordance with the rules then there would have been no additional involvement. The Secretary of State has fully engaged in these proceedings and Mr and Mrs Brunton would not have taken an active role had they been served in time. The Secretary of State is effectively obtaining a “windfall” in the sense that the consequence of the non-service on Mr and Mrs Brunton is that the Court lacks jurisdiction against the Secretary of State and the claim must be struck out. The fact that the non service of the claim on Mr and Mrs Brunton has caused no prejudice to the Secretary of State does not assist Arun DC as that is irrelevant to whether the court has jurisdiction and it is not necessary in these statutory review proceedings for an application to made under CPR part 11 to establish the absence of jurisdiction: R(Amalgamated Smart Metering Ltd) v Rotherham MBC [2025] EWHC 97 (Admin). The Section 288 Statutory Appeal

42. For completeness, if I am wrong about the jurisdictional issue, I also deal with the grounds brought by Arun DC for challenging the decision of the Inspector. These can all be dealt with briefly. Ground 1

43. Arun DC contend that the Inspector made a decision that an alternative SuDS scheme could be implemented via a condition without any evidence to support that finding. There was nothing in the appeal statement or Updated Report from Mr and Mrs Brunton providing how an alternative scheme could be adopted on the site within the existing design – there were assurances that the problem could be resolved by condition. The position of Arun DC was that there were flaws in the proposal which should not be rectified by the imposition of a condition as that could result in it not being possible to implement the permission.

44. The Inspector was entitled to reach the planning decision she did on the basis of the evidence before her. The SuDS proposal was inadequate but she considered, as she was entitled to, whether an alternative proposal could be advanced but there was no evidence supporting a hypothetical alternative and she focussed on the drainage hierarchy and the three means by which an alternative solution could be reached. Arun DC had not suggested at any time that an appropriate solution could be reached – the position of Arun DC and its engineers was that reference should be made back to the engineers if permission were granted in order to consider such a solution.

45. The Inspector was entitled to conclude that an alternative proposal could be advanced and she was entitled to exercise her judgment as to whether it was appropriate to impose a condition with respect to SuDS. As the Inspector has provided for a pre-commencement condition, if Mr and Mrs Brunton are not able to provide a suitable SuDS proposal then the development cannot proceed.

46. Ground 1 is not arguable. Ground 2

47. Ground 2 is also not arguable. The Inspector was not bound to refuse planning permission on the basis that SuDS could only be addressed by condition. The Inspector set out that Policy W DM3 requires all development to identify opportunities to incorporate a range of SuDS appropriate to the size of the development, at an early stage of the design process. She plainly had the policy in mind. It does not mean, as Arun DC seek to suggest, that it is not possible to manage SuDS by condition and so this point is not a valid one that can be argued. There was no misinterpretation of the policy – the requirement for early identification was met. Ground 3

48. Arun DC contend that the Inspector misinterpreted the requirements of Policy W DM3 in that it is the developer who is required to provide evidence that they have satisfied the policy requirements, not for other parties to show that there is “substantive evidence” that a SuDS scheme cannot be brought forward. Arun DC highlight the Inspector’s expressed view that “there is not substantive evidence to suggest that suitable site drainage could not reasonably be achieved.” It is said by Arun DC that the Inspector has thereby impermissibly reversed the burden of proof onto the local planning authority (and other interested parties) to show that the policy cannot be met.

49. That summation is correct insofar as it goes, but the issue being dealt with by the Inspector was not whether the proposed SuDS scheme sufficed – which would have been for Mr and Mrs Brunton to establish – but whether there was the potential that such a scheme could be advanced. This was not a reversing of the burden but a different point and, for the same reasons as set out under Ground 1, I am satisfied that the Inspector was entitled to conclude that an alternative proposal could be advanced where Arun DC were not suggesting that could not be the case. Ground 4

50. It is contended that the Inspector gave insufficient reasons for the disagreement with Arun DC that the issues with the drainage report submitted by Mr and Mrs Brunton should not be resolved through the imposition of a condition. South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 provides that reasons must be intelligible, adequate and enable the reader to understand why the decision was made as it was.

51. In my judgment, the decision letter read as a whole satisfies this requirement. The Inspector did not agree with the position of Arun DC that the imposition of a condition may result in permission being unimplementable as there was no substantive evidence to suggest that suitable drainage could not reasonably be achieved. She was entitled to come to that conclusion and be satisfied that it was reasonable and proportionate for there to be a pre-commencement condition and that “the requirements of Policy W DM3 of the LP and the Framework could be reasonably achieved here”. She had referred to both the report submitted by Mr and Mrs Brunton and the response of Arun DC setting out the respective positions of the parties Of course, the Inspector could have put forward further reasons but she did not need to. Ground 4 is unarguable. Conclusion

52. For the reasons set out in detail above, the claimant (Arun DC) is not entitled to an extension of time for the service of the claim form on Mr and Mrs Brunton, by analogy with the test in CPR 7.6(3), I have found that Arun DC did not take all reasonable steps to serve Mr and Mrs Brunton and the application for an extension was not made promptly. In these circumstances, the court declines jurisdiction for the reasons set out in detail above.

53. While I have declined jurisdiction I have, for completeness, considered whether permission would be granted if there were jurisdiction to hear the section 288 application, and have determined that the four grounds are unarguable.

54. The application for permission to bring statutory review proceedings therefore fails.