James Patrick Dean v The Bar Standards Board (BSB)

Mr Justice Sweeting: Introduction

1. This is my judgment in an appeal brought by Mr James Patrick Dean (“Mr Dean” or “the Appellant”) against the findings and sanction imposed by the Bar Disciplinary Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 6 June 2024, with its Report of Finding and Sanction (“RFS”) dated 20 June 2024. The Tribunal found that all charges of professional misconduct, including dishonesty, had been proved and ordered Mr Dean’s disbarment. Mr Dean now appeals as of right pursuant to section 24 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. For the reasons I shall set out, I conclude that the appeal must be dismissed. Background to the Case

2. The Respondent, the Bar Standards Board (“the BSB”), brought two sets of charges of professional misconduct against Mr Dean, heard together by the Tribunal over three days from 4 to 6 June 2024. The D5 Charges:

3. These seven charges, under reference 2020/2047/D5, related to Mr Dean’s supervision of immigration advisers at a firm, Ebrahim & Co, whose registration had been cancelled. They included allegations of: i) Continuing to supervise immigration advisers at Ebrahim & Co after the cancellation of the firm’s registration by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner (“OISC”) in August 2017 and/or from 3 February 2020. This was alleged to be a breach of Core Duty 3 (honesty and integrity) and Core Duty 2 (best interests of clients) and/or Core Duty 5 (diminishing public trust and confidence), and rule C85A of the BSB Handbook. ii) Falsely confirming to the BSB by email on 27 January 2020 and to OISC on 21 June 2020 that he had ceased supervising immigration advisers at Ebrahim & Co after the cancellation of their registration, when he had not. This was alleged to be a breach of Core Duty 3, Core Duty 5, and/or Core Duty 9 (failing to be open and co-operative with his regulator). The D3 Charges:

4. These six charges, under reference 2020/0932/D3, concerned Mr Dean’s handling of a client’s immigration matter. These allegations included: i) Delegating a client’s case to an unregistered caseworker without proper supervision, leading to a poor outcome. ii) Failing to properly inform his client about the nature and scope of legal services, thereby misleading or permitting the client to be misled. iii) Failing to provide his client with acceptance of instructions, confirmation of terms of acting, and information on their right to complain.

5. Save in so far as they were part of the general background the D3 charges were not addressed in the course of the appeal before me.

6. Mr Dean’s evidence in relation to the D5 charges was summarised by the tribunal as follows: “The Respondent said in his evidence that he had known Ebrahim & Co. and Mr E and Ms B from the early 1990s. From 2017, when he knew that they had got into difficulties with the OISC he was concerned about their situation as they were very experienced in immigration and had many clients, and their situation was vulnerable as the result of the cancellation. He therefore agreed to supervise, which he could do under the Bar Standards Board’s then rules. He accepted that concerns arose in relation to the nature of the supervision, especially in correspondence from early 2018 onwards. He accepted he was notified of the rule change that he could no longer supervise Mr E and Ms B in January 2020 and he gave his assurance that he was no longer doing so. He said that the continued use of his name associated with the work came to light in the documentation after February 2020.”

7. Mr Dean further explained that he considered that day-to-day supervision was being carried out by Mr Akhtar who had qualified as a solicitor and with whom he was engaged in what he described as “an entity”.

8. The Tribunal’s RFS detailed its liability findings in respect of the D5 Charges at paragraph

19. In relation to continuing to supervise after February 2020, the Tribunal found Mr Dean had “admitted to the supervision of immigration advisors on or after 2020 in respect of charges 2 and 3” and that this demonstrated a “clear lack of honesty and integrity contrary to Core Duty 3”. In relation to the false statement to the BSB, Mr Dean accepted in cross-examination that his assurance in February 2020 was “not being honest and straight forward,” and the Tribunal was “in no doubt” he failed to act with honesty and integrity and failed to be open and co-operative. In relation to supervision after August 2017, the Tribunal found he continued to supervise despite knowing the firm’s registration was cancelled and being informed he was contravening guidance, which enabled the firm to continue by “providing an umbrella” and lending “legitimacy”.

9. The Tribunal’s conclusions included the following: “As to charge 4, the fact of Mr Dean’s emails is a matter of record. He stated that he had ceased supervising immigration advisers. Any reasonable person reading those emails would understand that Mr Dean was ceasing his association with those advisers. However, in his evidence before us, Mr Dean explained that Mr. Akhtar’s ability to conduct immigration work was not clarified with the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA) until at least December 2020. He accepted that he remained at least notionally supervising Mr A until the clarification. Indeed, by admitting charges 2 and 3, as Mr Dean now has, he has admitted that he did continue to supervise the immigration advisers after February 2020. At the time that Mr Dean told both the BSB and the OISC that he had stopped supervision, but it was clear from his evidence that he knew that he intended to continue his supervision in this way. He said in evidence he had discussed this with Mr Akhtar, Mr Ebrahim and Ms B. Critically, in the course of his evidence, he was asked an express question about his honesty in his dealings with the BSB. In response, he said “I accept to have given the assurance in February 2020 and not taken separating actions, that the assurance I gave was not being honest and straight forward in setting out that at that stage further steps were not taken in relation to the use of my name.” Even aside from this admission, we are in no doubt that the Respondent failed to act with honesty and with integrity in continuing to act in the way he did after 3 February 2020.”

10. Sadly, given Mr Dean’s long experience at the Bar, the procedural history of this appeal reveals a pattern of delay and obscurity in the articulation of his grounds of appeal. His Appellant’s Notice was sealed on 11 December 2024, attaching purported “Grounds of Appeal” which were undated and stated that “Full, better, amplified and verified grounds to follow soon”. Despite repeated requests from the BSB from February to April 2025, no further grounds or an appeal bundle were produced. It was only on 1 July 2025 that Mr Dean served a 40-page PDF titled “James.pdf,” which contained a set of submissions referred to as the “PTA Grounds”. The following day, 2 July 2025, he served another document titled “Grounds of Appeal 30 06 2025.docx,” referred to as the “GOA”. Mr Dean also made a late application for an adjournment of the hearing, acknowledging his delay in providing grounds and documents. By the time of the hearing before me he had not filed a skeleton argument and made his submissions without one. Despite the fact that his oral submissions spanned well over an hour I did not find his arguments at all easy to follow. While some of the points which had been made in the written material received little attention in the oral submissions, I have nevertheless sought to consider all of the matters which have been raised, whether at the hearing or along the way. Relevant Legal Framework

11. The applicable legal framework for appeals of this nature was considered by Calver J, in Owusu-Yianoma v Bar Standards Board [2023] EWHC 2785 (Admin). His judgment provides a comprehensive review of the relevant provisions and case law. My summary of these principles draws directly from that review. i) The BSB, established under the Legal Services Act 2007, acts as the regulator of barristers in England and Wales. Its regulatory objectives derive from section 1 of that Act. The Code of Conduct and Sanctions Guidance (Version 6, published 1 January 2022) governs professional conduct. ii) Section 24(2) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 provides for a right of appeal to the High Court in relation to matters concerning the regulation of barristers. CPR Part 52 applies to such appeals, with Rule 52.20 conferring power on the appeal court to affirm, set aside, or vary the Tribunal’s order, or to order a new hearing. iii) Crucially, Rule 52.21 provides that “Every appeal will be limited to a review of the decision of the lower court unless… the court considers that in the circumstances of an individual appeal it would be in the interests of justice to hold a re-hearing”. Furthermore, the appeal court will generally not receive oral evidence or evidence which was not before the lower court. iv) An appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court. The appeal court may draw any inference of fact which it considers justified on the evidence.

12. The nature of an appeal by way of review is flexible. As Lang J stated in Bar Standards Board v Stephen Howd [2017] EWHC 210 (Admin) at [16]: “an appeal against the decision of a Disciplinary Tribunal is by way of review, not re-hearing. However, the nature of an appeal by way of review under rule 52.11 is flexible and differs according to the nature of the body, which is appealed against, and the grounds upon which the appeal is brought.”

13. The review will engage the merits of the appeal, but it “will accord appropriate respect to the decision of the lower court”. Aldous L.J. in E I Dupont de Nemours & Co v S T Dupont [2003] EWCA Civ 1368; [2006] 1 WLR 2793, at [94], clarified that: “A review here is not to be equated with judicial review. It is closely akin to, although not conceptually identical with, the scope of an appeal to the Court of Appeal under the former RSC. The review will engage the merits of the appeal. It will accord appropriate respect to the decision of the lower court. Appropriate respect will be tempered by the nature of the lower court and its decision-making process”.

14. Deference to specialist tribunals is a significant consideration. Pepperall J in Hewson v Bar Standards Board [2021] EWHC 28 (Admin) observed that: “Appeal courts should not lightly interfere with decisions of specialist disciplinary tribunals as to the appropriate sanction for professional misconduct. First, the appeal is by way of review and not re-hearing. The discretion as to sanction is therefore reposed in the tribunal and not the court. Secondly, the court should accord deference to the evaluative decision of the specialist tribunal”.

15. An appeal court should only interfere with a Tribunal’s evaluative decision on sanction if it made an error of principle or if it fell outside the bounds of what it could properly and reasonably decide. This principle was reiterated in Bawa-Garba v The General Medical Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1879, where the Court of Appeal said there was “limited scope” for overturning such decisions, stating that an appellate court should interfere: “only if (1) there was an error of principle in carrying out the evaluation, or (2) for any other reason, the evaluation was wrong, that is to say it was an evaluative decision which fell outside the bounds of what the adjudicative body could properly and reasonably decide”. Heather Williams J in Farquharson v BSB [2022] EWHC 1128 (Admin) stated at [§63] that the Court would interfere if the sanction imposed was “clearly inappropriate”.

16. The process for determining sanctions involves assessing the seriousness of the misconduct, keeping in mind the purpose of sanctions (protection of the public and maintenance of public confidence), and choosing a sanction that most appropriately fulfils that purpose. This staged approach to sanction was also endorsed by Kerr J in Wareing v Bar Standards Board [2024] EWHC 2946 (Admin) at [3]. Issues on Appeal

17. As the BSB submitted, and I accept, the grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows from the Appellant’s PTA Grounds and GOA: i) Ground 1: The Upper Tribunal (“UT”) has made findings favourable to the relevant immigration case workers. ii) Ground 2: The Tribunal erred by refusing Mr Dean’s application for an adjournment in light of the UT proceedings. iii) Ground 3: The Tribunal erred as Mr Dean had not in fact been supervising the old firm but rather a “new entity”. iv) Ground 4: The sanction of disbarment was disproportionate. Submissions of the Parties and Conclusions Ground 1: The Upper Tribunal Decision

18. This ground appears to contend that the UT has made findings favourable to the immigration caseworkers in relation to their appeal against cancellation of registration, and that this should have had a significant impact on Mr Dean’s own disciplinary hearing. This appears to be the “positive part favorable [sic] decision from the UT” referred to in his PTA Grounds at [5].

19. The BSB submits that the premise of this ground is incorrect. While the UT did grant permission to appeal against a decision by the FTT (UT Case No UA-2022-001805-GIS), UTJ Jacobs, on 10 December 2024, held that the relevant paragraph of the FTT’s decision was otiose and dismissed the appeal. The FTT’s decision, upholding the OISC’s cancellation of registration, therefore stands. Furthermore, the BSB argues that the prohibition of the individuals was neither here nor there, as Mr Dean’s charges relied on the OISC’s cancellation of their registration, a fact that cannot sensibly be disputed. Even if the Tribunal referred to “indefinitely prohibited unregulated people” in the context of sanctions, this was correct at the time. Accordingly, the UT proceedings are of no assistance to Mr Dean and provide no basis for disturbing the Tribunal’s findings.

20. I accept the BSB’s submission in its entirety. The material before me confirms that UTJ Jacobs dismissed the appeal, with the result that the FTT’s decision upholding the OISC’s cancellation of registration stands. Mr Dean’s contention that there was a “positive” decision from the UT is fundamentally mistaken as to the outcome of the proceedings. More importantly, as the BSB correctly points out, the charges against Mr Dean did not primarily concern the individuals’ prohibition but rather the cancellation of the firm’s registration, which Mr Dean does not dispute. His positive reliance on the cancellation for his own argument that “advisers or firms which were cancelled could plainly not be supervised because they were no longer regulated as advisers” reinforces the irrelevance of the UT’s ultimate decision in relation to the prohibition. Ground 1 is without merit. Ground 2: Refusal to Grant an Adjournment

21. Mr Dean appeared to argue that the Tribunal erred by refusing his application for an adjournment on 4 June 2024, especially as a positive PTA decision on the case workers would have had, he argued, a significant impact on his matter (see above as to my conclusions on this). He acknowledged his own delay but sought an adjournment to secure representation and allow time to prepare. This was not a ground that he pursued in his oral submissions.

22. The BSB contends that the refusal of the adjournment application was a case management decision, well within the generous ambit afforded to the first instance Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that while the subjects of the UT proceedings were relevant to the facts, “it is not their conduct which is being considered and the outcome of the appeal actually does not change the facts which we must consider”. The Tribunal’s reasons for refusal – irrelevance of the UT outcome and Mr Dean’s delay – were plainly the relevant considerations in the circumstances. The BSB further relies on the public interest in expeditious disposal of disciplinary proceedings and the waste of time and resources involved in losing the trial listing. In any event, the BSB argues, no prejudice or unfairness was caused because the UT proceedings’ outcome was irrelevant to the charges, the charges were largely admitted, and the UT ultimately dismissed the appeal anyway.

23. This was plainly a case management decision, falling squarely within the Tribunal’s discretion. The Tribunal’s reasoning that the UT proceedings did not alter the facts it needed to consider, and that the outcome would not change the facts underpinning the charges against Mr Dean, was sound. Furthermore, Mr Dean’s significant and acknowledged delay in preparing for his appeal and seeking representation was not conducive to a request for an adjournment. The BSB’s argument that no prejudice was ultimately suffered, given the irrelevance of the UT outcome to the charges and Mr Dean’s admissions, coupled with the eventual dismissal of the UT appeal, is clearly correct. To have granted an adjournment would have needlessly prolonged proceedings and wasted resources. Ground 2 therefore fails. Ground 3: “New Entity” Argument

24. Mr Dean appears to argue that the Tribunal’s decision was wrong because he could not have supervised “Ebrahim & Co” as the firm had ceased trading following its suspension on 31 August 2017. Instead, he asserts that he was acting on behalf of a “new entity” formed by himself and Mr Akhtar. He states he was not dishonest, nor did he fail to act with integrity, because he did not supervise a firm that no longer existed.

25. The BSB describes this argument as both “hard to understand” and “hopeless”. The very essence of the D5 allegations was that Mr Dean continued to supervise immigration advisers despite the cancellation of the firm’s registration. The Tribunal found that, on Mr Dean’s admission, “the firm essentially carried on as it had before the August 2017 cancellation of its registration”. The harm, in the Tribunal’s words, was that “indefinitely prohibited unregulated people were able to continue to practise and thereby circumvent regulatory control”. The BSB points to the evidence supporting the charges, including letters from the BSB expressly directing that “supervision by a barrister should not be used to circumvent the OISC regulatory regime,” letters bearing Mr Dean’s name and signature, and Mr Dean’s own representation to HMCTS that “Ebrahim & Co were incorporated by J.P. Dean on 31 August 2017”. The BSB argues that this amounts to a finding of fact, which was the Tribunal’s province to make, and was based on Mr Dean’s admissions and corroborating evidence, suggesting it is doubtful any other conclusion could reasonably have been reached.

26. I agree with the BSB that this argument lacks cogency. The Tribunal’s findings were clear; Mr Dean admitted to continuing supervision, and ample evidence supported the conclusion that he effectively allowed the firm to continue operating under his “regulatory umbrella” despite its cancelled registration. The Tribunal’s conclusion that Mr Dean’s conduct demonstrated a “clear lack of honesty and integrity” was a factual finding, well within its remit and supported by the evidence, including Mr Dean’s own admissions. Mr Dean’s attempt to redefine the entity he supervised does not alter the fundamental finding that he facilitated unregulated immigration advice after the firm’s registration was cancelled, a core breach of his professional obligations. I note that his own letter to Mr Akhtar was addressed to Ebrahim and Co.

27. His letter of 27 January 2020 to the BSB states: “I am attaching a letter sent to the solicitor at the office of the former practice, withdrawing my supervision of the suspended practice of Ebrahim and Co with immediate effect.”

28. This statement is predicated on the fact that Mr Dean had been supervising unregulated immigration advisers essentially operating under the name of a firm whose registration had been cancelled. This ground of appeal is therefore unarguable. Ground 4: Sanction Disproportionate

29. Mr Dean asserts that the sanction of disbarment was disproportionate.

30. The BSB refers to the established legal principles that professional regulators are “expert and informed tribunals” and their decisions on sanction should not be lightly interfered with. The Sanctions Guidance (Version 6, January 2022) states that “A finding of dishonesty will almost invariably lead to disbarment in all but the most exceptional circumstances”. The BSB emphasised that the primary issues for a Tribunal panel in such cases are maintaining public trust and confidence and addressing the risk of harm to the public, which outweigh the individual barrister’s interests. While there is a residual category for “exceptional circumstances” justifying a lesser sanction, the BSB submits that in a case of prolonged, deliberate dishonesty, it was “plainly open to the Tribunal to conclude that the starting point of disbarment should also be the end point”. Mr Dean has not pointed to any exceptional circumstances on appeal.

31. I remind myself of the significant deference to be afforded to specialist disciplinary tribunals in matters of sanction. The Tribunal found Mr Dean guilty of dishonesty. The overarching principle, as articulated in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 and cited in the Sanctions Guidance, is that dishonesty almost invariably leads to disbarment. The central purpose of professional regulation, in relation to sanction, is the protection of the public and the maintenance of public confidence in the profession. The Tribunal found Mr Dean’s conduct involved a “clear lack of honesty and integrity” and was in breach of various core duties. Mr Dean’s assertion of disproportionate sanction is unsupported by any specific arguments identifying exceptional circumstances, which might suggest a departure from the strong presumption of disbarment for dishonesty. The Tribunal was entitled to find that no such exceptional circumstances existed. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal committed an error of principle in arriving at its decision on sanction, nor that its decision fell outside the bounds of what it could properly and reasonably decide. Therefore, I cannot find that the sanction of disbarment was “clearly inappropriate”. Ground 4 thus fails. Conclusion

32. For all the reasons set out above, I find that Mr Dean has failed to demonstrate that the Tribunal’s decision was wrong, or unjust due to a serious procedural or other irregularity. The grounds of appeal are without merit. The findings of professional misconduct, including dishonesty, and the sanction of disbarment imposed by the Tribunal were appropriate and correctly applied.

33. The appeal is therefore dismissed, and the sanction of disbarment remains in place. END