London Borough of Ealing v R & Anor
His Honour Judge Willans: 1. Introduction 2. S was born on 20 May 2025 and is now aged 9 months. His mother is [ ] (R). These proceedings are to decide whether he should remain in her care or be subject to a final care order with a plan of adoption. The applicant local authority seeks care and placement orders....
57 min de lecture · 12,422 mots
His Honour Judge Willans:
1. Introduction
2. S was born on 20 May 2025 and is now aged 9 months. His mother is [ ] (R). These proceedings are to decide whether he should remain in her care or be subject to a final care order with a plan of adoption. The applicant local authority seeks care and placement orders. In this regard they are supported by S’s guardian, [redacted] (“the Guardian”). They ask me to dispense with R’s consent to the making of a placement order. R opposes this plan and argues she can continue to meet S’s needs. She would accept a supervision order to support her care.
3. Threshold is not in dispute. There remain issues around contact should I agree with the applicant. I heard the evidence and submissions over three court days. I heard from a parenting assessor, [redacted], and from the previous social worker, [redacted]. I also heard from R, a member of her family [T] and from the Guardian. Finally, I heard submissions from each of the respective counsel in the case. I then reserved judgment due to a combination of limited residual time available at the hearing and out of a wish to fully reflect on the evidence heard before reaching conclusions. In the course of preparing this judgment I was informed as a to a further incident. I sought additional short submissions and I am grateful for the same. I have borne all the evidence in mind together with the documents contained within the hearing bundles and some limited additional documents forwarded to me during the course of the hearing.
4. Procedural History
5. Due to R’s background history (see below) the applicant instituted care proceedings on S birth and sought an interim care order. At the first hearing the applicant sought to separate mother and child but this was opposed by R and the Guardian. The Court made an interim care order but did not agree the test for separation was met. The matter was adjourned for a further hearing to find a mother and baby placement and in the interim R and S returned home subject to a robust safety plan requiring professional and family oversight. This situation continued until 19 June 2025 when a placement was found and R and child moved into the placement under the continuing interim care order. This placement has not endured and R is now in her second placement.
6. The case is in week
38. The delay in the case is largely due to a late family assessment in around September 2025 and to the need for a final hearing. Within the proceedings family members have been subject to assessment but this has not produced an option for placement, although such family are identified as support for R. R was subject to a pre-proceedings assessment (which reached a negative conclusion) and an in-proceedings assessment (also negative). She has also undergone updating psychiatric and psychological assessments (neither challenged). Threshold was established on an agreed basis at the IRH on 1 December 2025 at which point this hearing was fixed.
7. The options for the Court
8. R does not pursue a family placement and there is no suggestion S should be placed into long term foster care. This is a realistic position having regard to S young age and his need for permanency. R argues the evidence supports S remaining within her care. Whilst she would accept any conditions on the same she formally accepts the making of a 12-month supervision order. She argues such an order will address any and all the concerns raised by the applicant. The applicant argues that any supervision plan would, to work, require an unacceptable level of oversight. It argues the historic concerns in the case which have led to previous proceedings and final orders remain live and that S can only be appropriately safeguarded and have his needs met by way of a care and placement order. The Guardian shares this analysis.
9. The issues in the case
10. The central issue is as to whether there has been change since previous proceedings and as such whether the previously identified concerns remain valid and continuing. These concerns have within this hearing focused particularly on; (a) risks associated with domestic abuse; (b) challenges R faces when she feels overwhelmed by circumstances, and; (c) whether R has the capacity to properly meet S needs as he ages and becomes more challenging.
11. Legal Principles
12. S’s welfare is paramount. I must consider his welfare throughout his life and will have regard to s1(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002. I can only make a public law order if the legal threshold for doing so is crossed – it is as agreed. However, the crossing of the threshold opens the door to a public law order but does not mean the same should be the outcome to the case. Care proceedings commence on certain worries set out within the threshold. However, even if these worries are established this does not mean they justify the interference in family life arising on the making of a public law order let alone the extreme interference in family life arising on placement. Furthermore, the proceedings are a dynamic and permit a party to demonstrate change and show positives that justify an outcome other than removal.
13. In care proceedings each option will come with positives and negatives. As a result, it is important the realistic options (those which are genuinely available to the Court) are rigorously scrutinised in comparison to each other in what is referred to as a holistic manner. This approach prevents the alternative of a linear approach under which an option is selected as a result of another being rejected rather than that option having its own intrinsic merits. A plan of adoption is a very serious step to contemplate. The phrase that ‘nothing else will do’ has been coined to reflect this. But this does not change the essentials of the analysis. Rather it is geared towards ensuring the analysis is robust and holistic and that alternative options have been subject to appropriate consideration. It reflects both the significance of the decision making but also the basic principles that should be brought into play when analysing the evidence.
14. The Court does not presume a child should be raised by their parents. The Court is looking for good enough parenting. The Court is not seeking perfection from parents and recognises it is no part of the role of the State to socially engineer the style of parenting received by children. This means the Court will sanction placement with parents where care is inconsistent and at times outside of ideals. The Court has to take a rounded and realistic approach in its appraisal.
15. In this case I am asked to engage in a degree of fact finding. Whilst this is relatively limited in doing so I will require the applicant to prove the allegation it seeks to make and will not place any evidential burden on R. I will consider all the evidence and will have particular regard to the evidence from R. I will find the allegation proven and therefore a fact if the applicant establishes it on the balance of probabilities. If they do not the allegation will be wholly disregarded.
16. Case law sets out the care the Court should take in assessing allegations and evidence in general where a party has been shown to have lied in some regards. It is not appropriate to use the established lie as a foundation for disbelieving all the evidence of that party. The Court must examine the lie and reason through its probative value to the issues in dispute. At all times the Court must keep in mind that people may lie for various reasons, many of which are not related to seeking to avoid the truth of allegations placed before the Court. As Peter Jackson LJ observed F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 : close attention must be paid to the true significance of lies and lack of insight in the context of assessing welfare. Lies, however deplorable, are significant only to the extent that they affect the welfare of the child, and in particular to the extent that they undermine systems of protection designed to keep the child safe. However, as noted by Macur LJ in Re Y (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1337, they cannot be allowed to hijack the case.
17. In submissions I was referred to the case of T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93 and particularly the questions set out in §33 of the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ. These questions have been repeated in a number of cases in recent times and act as a sensible structure around which to build a judgment so long as they are appropriately tailored to the facts of the case. I consider it sensible to set out §§30-34 of that judgment:
30. The separation of a child from a family can only be approved after a process of rigorous reasoning. That is essential where there is a plan for adoption, but it is also necessary for any significant decision where the outcome is not obvious. A structured process is of real benefit for these important and often difficult decisions, as without it there is a greater chance of error, leading to children living unsafely at home or being kept unnecessarily in care. The fact that the underlying principles are well-known to specialist judges does not relieve the court of its duty to the child, to the family and to society, to explain and justify its decision.
31. This court’s recent decision in Re L-G (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 60, reiterates the guidance given in Re F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761, [2018] All ER (D) 94 (Dec). The risk of harm, important as it is, is one of a number of factors in the welfare checklist and it has to be carefully assessed, particularly where it may be decisive.
32. The Children Act 1989 provides a framework within which the court assesses whether a child has suffered or is likely to suffer ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of the threshold for intervention, and ‘harm’ for the purposes of the welfare assessment. Section 31(9) defines harm in this way: “harm” means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another; “development” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development; “health” means physical or mental health; and “ill-treatment” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.
33. Accordingly, the court had to address these questions in relation to each of these children: (1) What type of harm has arisen and might arise? (2) How likely is it to arise? (3) What would be the consequences for the child if it did? (4) To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed? (5) What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account? (6) In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’swelfare? (7) If the preferred plan involves interference with the Article 8 rights of the child or of others, is that necessary and proportionate?
34. A structured analysis of this kind, adapted to the facts of the individual case, is of benefit to those who make decisions and to those who are affected by them. The analysis need not be lengthy, but it ensures that undue weight is not given to one factor, however notable, and that other important factors are not overlooked. It must be remembered that risk assessment is about the realistic assessment of risk, not about the elimination of all risks. Likewise, the assessment of actual or likely harm is not the same thing as an all-round welfare assessment.
18. I intend to utilise the suggested structure within this judgment.
19. Background Features
20. I neither need nor intend to provide a comprehensive background history. Within my bundle I have a judgment of Recorder Philips dated 26 August 2021. In that judgment the Recorder sets out a history involving 5 previous children of the R being, I, A, H, P and O. The ages [redacted] are updated to the date of this judgment. At the time the Recorder was concerned with the three youngest children and concluded by making care orders with respect to H and P and a special guardianship order with respect to O. The Recorder set out in her judgment that earlier separate proceedings had arisen with respect to the two older children with both children being placed with separate special guardians. It can be seen R was assessed over a sustained period to be unable to meet the children’s needs to a good enough standard leading to these outcomes.
21. The Recorder summarised: There has been a long history of concerns about R’s parenting reported by the Local Authority over the years involving all of her children. R has had her fair share of trauma, being neglected and suffering physical and emotional abuse during her childhood, resulting in her spending some time in care herself. She was a young parent and was unable to care for I who was placed in the care of her great maternal aunt, [redacted ] at the age of 5 in 2013. Because of ongoing concerns and allegations of physical and emotional abuse in October 2019, A was placed with her paternal grandmother, [redacted] and a special guardianship order was granted to [reacted] in March 2020. The concerns have centred also around the mother’s relationships which at times have been destructive and unhelpful in her capacity to prioritise the children’s needs. She was considered to have her own unmet emotional needs. She struggled with maintaining boundaries for the children and needed considerable additional support to meet their global needs. On at least two occasions within the proceedings, R has been overwhelmed by her circumstances. The first following the death of Mr L in September 2020 where she descended into a state of depression and anxiety and was unable to meet either her own or the children’s needs. She asked for the children to be accommodated and they moved to foster care which they did at short notice for a period in November 2020, returning to their mother’s care with support from family members and the Local Authority.
22. This summary is supported in the assessment evidence placed before me. It is noteworthy that aspects of this trauma relate to loss and bereavement with two of the children’s fathers having committed suicide in the period prior to the Recorder’s decision. In her final analysis the guardian fairly summarises the history: R experienced physical and emotional abuse from her mother as a child and was accommodated by [Redacted name of local authority] when she was 12 years old. R spent a period of time in an adolescent psychiatric unit after she “self-harmed by throwing herself down the stairs” and attempted to hang herself. She was diagnosed as having a Reactive Attachment Disorder, and one of the symptoms of this is a tendency to form inappropriate friendships. In previous proceedings psychological and psychiatric reports were completed on R and these raised concerns about her cognitive functioning. This is discussed in more detail under my analysis of parenting capacity. In addition to the concerns raised above, R has a history of forming relationships in which she has been subjected to domestic abuse. I have considered whether this might result from the Reactive Attachment Disorder. Ms H [redacted] reported that for many years, services have offered significant support to R, but it seems that R has had difficulty in understanding concerns that are raised and consequently, in making and sustaining changes that would have been necessary to ensure the safety and wellbeing of her children.
23. At the time of the last proceedings it is noted R was attempting to engage in therapy to address her long-term issues. The judgment records some challenges faced in completing this work. It is accepted that following the proceedings R continued with this therapy albeit she continued to do so with mixed success so far as engagement was concerned. She told me, and I accept, this was due to the impact such engagement has upon her emotional state
24. Thereafter there is little detailed history until a point at which R is 10-weeks pregnant with S and there are concerns as to the nature of her relationship with S’s father. I have police disclosure and there is an agreed threshold which indicates a growing concern around domestic abuse in the relationship. The relationship appears to have ended in November 2024 and in the following period the applicant commenced pre-proceedings work including a parenting assessment. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to join the father to these proceedings and assessments have been undertaken of family members. Whilst there are background concerns around mental health stability the current evidence does not focus on that as a concern. There have though continued to be unsettling events. At the same point as these proceedings commenced it was notified A’s special guardian had died and in the interim she was placed with her [redacted] as a short-term holding position. A re-entered proceedings and these have concluded with the making of a care order and placement into a residential unit some considerable distance away. This had impacted on R who would wish to care for A but understood her priority needed to be S.
25. Analysis
26. What type of harm has arisen and might arise?
27. See the quote from the Recorder at §21 above. The professionals argue these concern remain at the heart of my assessment. The principle concern is the risk of R entering risk laden relationships. One which includes elements of domestic abuse and harm to both her and to any child in her care. Concerns around such relationships have been ever present within previous proceedings (see above). I have a threshold document which is agreed and which accepts the relationship with S’s father was a further such occurrence: Domestic violence in R’s previous relationships with the fathers of her elder children was a concern. “It is essential to also consider her history of unhealthy relationships, where domestic violence has been a feature and created risks to the safety and stability of her and her children’s lives” (E5). On 29th May 2024, Mr X kicked the door to R’s property and he elbowed R (C38). On 27th August 2024, there was an argument between Mr X and R which led to a call out to the Police (C38). On 6th November 2024, Mr X attended R’s address and smashed property. Mr X threw R’s property down the stairs, pushed her sofa over, and broke a tin of paint. Mr X grabbed R (3 months pregnant at the time) and pushed her. After the incident on 6th November 2024, R did little to protect herself from Mr X (paragraph 13 on E6). She did not wish for Mr X to be arrested in spite of that being the second occasion when he assaulted her (C39).
28. A second concern relates to R struggling to manage her own emotions at times of stress and responding in a manner which is not child focused and likely to leave a child in her care at risk of both emotional and physical harm. The history (again see reference in judgment quote) includes occasions on which R has simply felt so overwhelmed by her emotional state that she has either abandoned a child temporarily or sought to place her children into the care of the local authority. I make clear I understand the abandonment occasion amounted to her leaving her oldest child unattended and took place many years ago. The placement into care occurred within the last proceedings on more than one occasion. However, it would be wrong to simply approach this issue through the restricted prism of a risk of abandonment or relinquishment. Rather the concern is that in moments of immense stress R is unable to think through a reasoned and sensible course of action. As such the manner in which this then plays out is less predictable.
29. The final concern of direct relevance for these proceedings is the concern that R is able to meet the needs of a single child when that child is young and wholly dependent (although subject to the first two concerns) but that as the child develops and becomes less pliant so she struggles to meet the child’s needs on a consistent and good enough basis. In reality this is a point which interacts with the second point above. There is found within the evidence and the judgment referenced clear evidence of such difficulties. Again, I note the response that these previous difficulties need to be understood in context. Previously R was a single mother of a number of children, she was experiencing the surrounding challenges noted above and there was evidence of her children having their own personal developmental issues. This concern is forward looking and rests on a professional view as to likelihood of harm as circumstances change in an expected manner. These are the identified concerns which lead to the professional viewpoint that R cannot safely meet S’s needs to a good enough standard on a consistent basis.
30. How likely is this harm to arise?
31. As with many cases this case shares a worry as to the likelihood of harm arising in the future based upon evidence of it occurring in the past. That it occurred in the past is not disputed. Whether it will in the future is not agreed. The foundation for such a future looking assessment is set out within section 31 of the Children Act 1989 and is caught by the concept that the past is ‘the best’ or at least a sensible predicator of the future. But this of course comes with challenges where these events may not yet have occurred and may not in fact occur and in circumstances in which the Court is being asked to make profound decisions of a lifelong nature. The Court cannot carry out an experiment to see what happens but is obliged to carry out an assessment based on current and past evidence to estimate the likelihood of the harm arising and then to factor into its analysis, if such risks are found, the balancing features which are present and those safeguards which might be applied to safeguard the situation.
32. Domestic abuse
33. There has been no domestic abuse arising in the course of the proceedings and no evidence of any since later 2024 when R separated from S’s father. Yet there was clear domestic abuse in the preceding period and this itself followed a long history of abusive relationships. The settled period during the proceedings has limited evidential value given that R was through this period living within a supervised setting full time. The concern is plainly as to her likely choices when she has full freedom and opportunity to act without oversight.
34. In considering this point there is weight in the concern of the professionals that R has engaged with a number of protective courses to both inform her and arm her against the risks associated with abusive relationships yet nonetheless found herself in a further abusive relationship with S’s father. This has led the professionals to make the point that R can both engage with such work and can demonstrate an understanding of what is taught (as she demonstrated before me) but is unable or finds it challenging to implement the learning. I accept this concern which is well evidenced.
35. The pertinent question is to ask why this is the case and will it change within S’s timescales? Within the evidence there is a professional view which amounts to a suggestion that R through her life history has developed a need for relationships and struggles to discriminate between abusive and non-abusive forms given her high demand for such relationships. The guardian drew on this line of reasoning and was somewhat criticised for doing so by R’s counsel. I felt she was entitled to do so in an attempt to understand why this pattern reoccurs. For R it was suggested there is an unmet need for a bespoke domestic abuse course in the light of her learning difficulties. The suggestion is that only through such a route will one understand whether she can implement learning.
36. I listened with care to the evidence around recent domestic abuse notwithstanding this was not a matter of real dispute. Having listened it seems to me the concerns expressed are justified and indeed that the threshold underplays the level of concern. I make the following points: i) Listening to R I was struck by the language she used about this relationship. She spoke of the father being charming at first. She spoke about believing how she could change him once he became abusive. This language was the common language that one often finds in such relationships. It is important to note that at the same time R describes feeling frightened of him on occasions. Her evidence was of separating but still allowing him access to her property leading to further incidents. Finally, she demonstrated an inability to self-protect against him and was not supportive of any police action. ii) I consider the pleaded matters are not an exhaustive list of the behaviours in the relationship. Listening to the evidence I was concerned as to what I heard. On the first occasion of police attendance in May 2024 the police carried out standard questioning to assess the risks to R. In her answers R described previous occasions on which the father had held a knife and threatened to self-harm. She spoke of him talking about monitoring her phone. In her evidence to me she described the relationship lasting about 18-months and the abuse starting at about the half-way point. This would have been in about February 2024. It appears to me that the actual events on the ground were more concerning than the manner in which they are phrased in the pleadings. iii) An example of control and the level of abuse is found in the first call out in May 2024 – although not referenced in the evidence directly. At the end of the event as the police are about to leave having escorted the father from the home R discovers he has smashed her television screen before leaving. iv) Ultimately I found R underplayed the level of abuse and the impact upon her within her written evidence and it was only on questioning that I gained a clearer understanding of the nature of the relationship. In her evidence she set out: When the domestic violence incident occurred, I called the police immediately and ended the relationship. I have never looked back. At that time, my priority was protecting myself and my unborn baby, and I did not want the added stress of court proceedings by seeking a non-molestation order. There has been no further involvement with him and we do not share any mutual friends who could pass information to him. This was not an accurate account of what had occurred. Indeed, it is clear for some time the relationship was abusive without any reference to support services. It was only 6-months later in November 2024 that the decision to separate fully was taken. Through this period the relationship remained abusive and R felt she could ‘change’ the father. v) It is also concerning that during this period R (a) failed to seek any meaningful support from the family she now relies upon as her source of support and (b) accepts part of her reasoning for keeping quiet about what was happening was a combination of shame and fear as to what would be the consequence for her then unborn child with regard to professional involvement. vi) It is also concerning as to R’s openness about being in contact with S’s paternal grandmother given the risks this might bring of re-establishing contact with S’s father. It was not entirely open of R to state (see above) they had no ‘mutual friends’ when she was at the same time in contact with his mother. In evidence it was claimed R had been open and it was her email which led to the applicant contacting the grandmother. By the end of the evidence, it was clear her email had in fact postdated the point at which the grandmother was traced. I am left with the sense her email may have been a late step to camouflage the fact she had not been entirely honest in her account.
37. I do have regard to the following points advanced by R. I agree there is no evidence of the relationship continuing or of her entering a new relationship. I do though consider the limited opportunity for the same whilst living in a mother and baby placement. I also have regard to her evidence that she is now ‘child focused’ not ‘relationship focused’. I consider this was genuine evidence. The issue will be the extent to which this commitment stands up if R returns to the community with S.
38. In my assessment there is a real likelihood of this risk materialising in the foreseeable future whether R is either alone or in company with S in the community. Her history demonstrates a high need for relationships and it is likely this is a function of her own trauma which needs to be addressed before she can fully develop the awareness and strategies for guarding herself against such risk. My assessment is that pending this any work undertaken is likely to have superficial impact being learnt but not implemented as hoped. The evidence for this is clear and strong and found in the relationship with S’s father. It is quite clear R was wholly unable to exercise the learning she had obtained to take her out of the relationship when it became obvious it was abusive (by at least May 2024). Rather her own unmet needs left her within an increasingly abusive relationship. Through this period, she kept this reality from her family who remained in the dark as to what was happening. Furthermore, she made active choices to conceal matters to avoid protective steps being taken and choose not to take protective steps available to her. I have no safe basis for considering this risk has simply faded away. I do not consider it safe to simply accept R’s account in this regard given the struggle she has historically had in maintaining self-protection.
39. Becoming overwhelmed
40. I have regard to the evidence relating to the two mother and baby placements into which R has been placed during the proceedings. There is good evidence that the first placement was poorly suited to R and she struggled to build a good working relationship with the foster carer. This is not intended as a criticism of that foster carer but recognises a reality shared by the foster carer herself. However, the evidence is that the second placement was a positive and nurturing placement and the relationship between R and the carer was positive.
41. It is in this context that the applicant expresses concern as to two separate occasions on which R has felt the need to leave S and the placement. The applicant argues this is clear evidence of a continuing difficulty on the part of R to manage her emotions and her poor decision making in the moment to leave S behind as she addresses her own needs. The first occasion occurred on 12 November 2025, the second on 9 February 2026 shortly after the conclusion of the final hearing. On both occasions R left the home notwithstanding encouragement not to do so and the active support of the foster carer to remain. R on each occasion felt unable to stay and at the point of leaving there was a sense that this decision might be a permanent decision to leave.
42. In considering these incidents I am acutely aware of the stress experienced by R as she travels through these proceedings and has to contemplate on a daily basis what the future might hold for her and S. At the time of the November incident, she had received the applicant’s final care plan with a plan for adoption. Further A’s updated proceedings had just ended and A was emotionally distressed. By the February incident R had sat through the final hearing and heard the cases put by applicant and guardian for adoption. She was bound to be affected by these events. Yet a proper consideration of these events is still required. They cannot simply be explained away in context and approached on the basis they offer no indication as to the risks for the future. The applicant entered these proceedings with just this concern and events have arisen which appear to support the concern notwithstanding the supports in place. It is therefore hardly surprising the applicant is concerned as to what care S might receive were R to come under different but similar stresses whilst caring for S alone in the community.
43. R sought to explain the first incident as being a consequence of suffering a migraine. I heard evidence in this regard and accept she has a history of the same and I am willing to accept that at that point in time she was experiencing a change in medication for her migraine which may have had a less than satisfactory outcome for her. Yet I do not consider this properly explains what happened, although it may be part of the picture. It is quite clear from the contemporaneous notes (as it is for February) that the pressing issue for R is the stress of the situation she finds herself in. It is noteworthy she does not reference a migraine when liaising with the carer around leaving the placement. It is noteworthy she does not seek an option of remaining in the placement whilst leaving the care of S to the carer for a period whilst she recovers. It is noteworthy in such a context that she chooses instead to engage in a journey across London to her family – a distance which I understood to take about 90 minutes on public transport – rather than simply retreat to her bedroom to recover. I have struggled to accept that this event was a consequence of a migraine impacting R. Rather I am satisfied the operative cause was a sense of being overwhelmed by the accumulating stresses. I note that although the applicant’s evidence had been served I do not believe it had only been recently received. My sense is that R was experiencing a build-up of stress to the point she became overwhelmed. In that state she was unable to listen to or act on the sensible advice and support of the foster carer despite this being a positive relationship. She was unable to seek out support from her family so as to enable her to remain in placement. Equally she was unable to focus on S’s needs and the impact upon him of her leaving. Finally, she was unable to focus on the impact on her case of such decision making. In the moment everything was secondary to her own pressing needs and emotions.
44. The second episode in February is even clearer. The rationale for leaving is a clear sense of futility in remaining notwithstanding the sensible counter observations made by both the carer and social work team. There is no suggestion of a migraine. Finally, this happened only days after R had sat through a hearing at which the significance of such decision making had been brought to the fore. The language of the log note is that she was giving up and not intending to return. I note she has modified her position and returned. That is positive for S.
45. A question for me to consider is to what extent these risks are situational / contextual. As seen are they a consequence of the proceedings and is there a real likelihood of the same dissipating once the proceedings end. In a changed context absent a risk of removal is R unlikely to experience these issues and attendant risks. I have considered this potential but on balance of probability consider this is not a concern which is likely to end with the proceedings. There is good historic evidence of R struggling in the moment and whilst the stress of proceedings may end I question whether that will alleviate R of a range of continuing stressors including the likely level of supervision and oversight that will exist; a modified role as a sole carer for S without support in the absence of the foster carer; possible health complications around migraine and less predictable but likely factors relating to future relationships and other challenges of daily life. I do not consider it sensible or safe to simply assess this as a risk restricted to leaving the child whether attended or unattended. In reality this is how the issue has materialised within the proceedings but there is no logic for limiting the outcome in this manner. When overwhelmed this is on the evidence a predictable response but it is not the only response.
46. General care issues
47. It needs to be recognised that R has essentially provided a good level of care during these proceedings. She is motivated to keep care of S and has fully engaged in the assessment process. Furthermore, there are many positives noted in her bond and attachment to S including her clear warmth and love for him. On my understanding of the evidence this may mirror the experience of R’s other children’s early life experiences. The sense of the evidence as noted above is that fractures and problems have arisen as the developmental needs of the children develop and R has been unable to meet these changing needs on a consistent basis.
48. As previously noted it is very difficult to accurately predict how matters will develop for S. The context is bound to be different. R is a more mature mother and her life experiences have moved on. S is likely to be the only child in her care and thus the stresses will be different. Finally, there is some evidence to suggest the older children individually had their own developmental challenges and these may not be exhibited by S. But the applicant is entitled to point to some limited factors to suggest concerns exist even at this stage.
49. I was asked to consider an incident when a fire started at the first foster placement as a result of R failing to properly extinguish a cigarette when she went to attend to S. This was one of the significant factual disagreements in the case. I have not struggled to determine the dispute. It is clear R was smoking in the garden and using a plastic container as an ashtray. It is clear she did not have S in her direct care. At some point S needed her attention and she left the cigarette in the ‘ashtray’ and went to attend to him. In her absence the plastic ashtray caught alight and in doing so caused some meaningful fire damage to a surrounding pergola frame and plant pot. It seems clear the site of the fire would have for a short period been relatively significant to cause this damage seen. It seems R returned to the scene shortly after and found the situation alight. She felt unable to deal with it and summonsed the foster carer who put the fire out.
50. I wish to make clear that this actual incident was in the circumstances unlikely to lead to the potential fatality suggested in the social work statement. That is not to say it was not serious or might not have caused greater damage if left for a longer period. I do not entirely accept the manner in which the event is described by the social worker. I am also not entirely persuaded the flames were 4 feet high as suggested by the ISW (who it seems was told this by the foster carer) although they may have been.
51. But I reject the suggestion that this account was catastrophising on the part of the professionals. In leaving the cigarette alight R caused a fire and the real concern is as to the potential for a similar event to occur were she to be at home. If this exact event had of occurred within the property it would have been a far more serious incident. In reality the concern I have to address is the poor decision making or perhaps lack of active decision making when required to both deal with the cigarette and meet the needs of the child. An easy solution was possible and yet a fire occurred.
52. Aside from this I was asked to consider an occasion on which R either ‘slammed’ down a pot in frustration or it perhaps slipped from her hand when she was a little frustrated. For my part little turns on this event and I draw no conclusions. I am also asked to reflect on recent reports of R requiring help from the foster carer with weaning and with a suggestion that she withdraw to her bedroom with the child (both noted by the guardian from a recent meeting). I have to say I draw little from the first point as it is difficult to determine the overarching significance of the same. I consider the latter point is probably captured by a growing sense of the stress which ended with her leaving following the hearing. In that sense it has resonance with my assessment above.
53. What would be the impact on the child if the risk materialised?
54. I am in no doubt a resumption or engagement in an abusive relationship on the part of R would be significantly damaging for S at both an emotional and physical level.He is an entirely dependent child at his age and will be significantly dependent on R for many years to come. If she is impacted by abuse and is thus emotionally unavailable then he will likely suffer real harm as a result. Further he is likely to suffer significant emotional harm (and direct or indirect physical harm) if his lived environment is one in which the adults are engaged in physical confrontations as evidenced in previous relationships. The emotional instability that would likely accompany the same will have a very significant impact on S.In short S’s welfare needs are wholly contrary to living in a home in which domestic abuse (at the levels identified in the history) is arising. I distinguish between domestic abuse and generalised disagreements even those with some volatility that may be expected in many households.
55. A further complication is the potential for this to be a consistent but episodic process. A pattern of events with heightened emotions and perhaps police involvement followed by calm but then repeated. Such a process of instability is likely to leave S constantly emotionally on edge and this would be bound to impact on his educational needs and life chances. It would be a matter of natural concern as to the modelling he would develop for his own life arising out of such experiences.
56. In my assessment such a scenario would likely feed into the second concern of R becoming overwhelmed. Relationships characterised by such behaviour and linked to a likely risk of discovery and further agency involvement are obviously fertile ground for stress to build up leading to a point of R becoming overwhelmed and unable to manage without emotionally absenting herself from S’ life.
57. I also find the potential for these two interlinked concerns to directly feed into the prospects of S’s needs not being met as R struggles to divide her residual available attention and focus over the developing needs dictated by S.
58. In my assessment the three component worries can be seen to have a likely inter-relationship should one of the three develop. In each case the impact on S is likely to be significantly damaging.
59. To what extent can these risks be reduced or managed?
60. I was directly addressed in this regard. For the applicant and guardian, it was felt nothing less than wrap around care (as found currently in the foster placement) would suffice to safeguard S. This was rejected by R who considered the combination of a supervision plan, further work and family network support would meet the concerns adequately to enable her to maintain care of S.
61. I heard evidence from the [family member]. She impressed me as a sensible and well-intentioned individual. I accept her evidence which was frank and open. As a matter of record, she has taken over the care of the mother’s oldest child who is now approaching full independence. I have no doubt she is ready to stand by and offer support when able to do so.
62. I accept further work could be offered to R. I appreciate previously the advice has been as to some form of therapy to address trauma-based issues. I know R sought to engage with this recommendation during the previous proceedings but failed to fully complete the course as it was too painful to do so. This recognition on her part was honest and is to her credit. It fits with evidence often received as to the challenges to parents of both caring for a child and addressing their own deep-seated difficulties. I appreciate this was not part of the advice given within these proceedings. For my part I consider there remains an issue to resolve around the factors which have continued to push R into unhealthy relationships and around her difficulty in managing her emotions effectively when overstressed or rather managing her emotions to prevent her becoming overstressed.
63. I appreciate a supervision plan would by definition include social work support by way of visits and oversight. I appreciate family support might be offered and over time supports such as nursery support might become part of the picture. It is important to recognise R has maintained her own accommodation and so this is not an additional area of difficulty.
64. But there are challenges which should not be overlooked. The question for me is not as to what could be done but rather as to whether what could be done would be effective and further to what extent the oversight would be beyond that which can be justified.
65. I would start with family support. I accept this exists as noted above and is genuinely offered. However, there are three issues that arise.
66. First, the assistance is not immediately to hand if required. The [family member] was honest in explaining she could not always be available and was plainly not available ‘at the drop of a hat’ referencing requiring 24-hour notice. As can be seen from the findings above that would not be sufficient to deal with R being overwhelmed in the moment. I heard about the grandmother being closer to hand but the reality is that she has not been the focus of the support suggested and I cannot overlook that much of the trauma experienced by R is found in her own upbringing.
67. A second concern relates to the extent to which R will actually seek out and benefit from the support offered by family. It was very clear that she did not do so when in her last abusive relationship. The family were not aware of what was happening and details were not shared with them until too late. The [family member] was open in her evidence as to the extent to which R would or would not share information. I recognise R was open that she did not share out of a sense of shame and/or fear as to what would happen if she did share information. The question for me is as to why this would likely change post-proceedings?
68. A third issue relates to the ability of the family to act to effectively ‘talk R down’ if required. There is good evidence in the recent logs of efforts made to persuade R to take a different approach when contemplating leaving the placement. Yet notwithstanding this support and encouragement she still acted as she deemed appropriate. I am left recognising the real positives that family support can offer but questioning the extent to which it will be utilised when required.
69. The situation with respect to further supportive programmes is not so different. I am confident R will engage with support as she has done in the past. Non-engagement is not the concern in this case. That is not to say she may not struggle to complete a programme which raises associated stress and trauma. However, a more pressing challenge relates to the ability of R to implement the learning from the courses undertaken. Having heard R, I was not of the view she was struggling to understand the principles in play. I make this observation cognisant of the issues raised as to her cognitive difficulties. The evidence suggested she could articulate the points learned. The problem is as to implementing this learning in the real world. For the avoidance of doubt these challenges are not unique to R. A gap between learning and implementation is sadly more commonplace than one would hope. It largely reflects the embedded difficulties faced by adults who have lived their lives in a certain context and now find it very difficult to modify these behaviour patterns.
70. I appreciate other approaches may be taken. I was referred to DVACT as an organisation that carry out bespoke programmes. I was also referred to VIG support work which utilises video recording and learning to address parenting styles. I am confident if available R would engage with each. I am less confident that this would materially alter the situation.
71. This leads to the assessment of a need for 24/7 support to guard against the risks in the case. I am always cautious when I hear such a suggestion to investigate it to ensure it is not simply being raised as a justification for opposition to a support plan without real justification. In this case it is clear to me 24/7 care would not be required in the sense that for every minute of every day there is a present safeguarding risk. Indeed, it is likely for sustained periods no risk will in fact materialise. The point is that the risk in question is unpredictable in nature, arises without warning and when in place could lead to very serious harm. The recent episode leaving the accommodation is on point. The concern is that without support R might have left S unsupervised or retreated from his care within the accommodation. There was no reason to believe this was about to happen or that it would escalate so rapidly. The notion of 24/7 support reflects this factor rather than an active ever-present risk.
72. A similar point arises with issues of domestic abuse. Regular visits will not safeguard against this risk if the relationship is developed and maintained outside of the supervisory visits. Absent significant presence the applicant would be entirely dependent on the decision making and choices made by R to ensure S is safeguarded. In reality whilst R might act protectively utilising Clare’s Law and accepting other safeguards it is as likely she will unilaterally form a relationship without any notice and then be the sole arbiter of its continuation. It can be seen in the case of S’s father how this relationship developed without any outside oversight or protection.
73. It would be incorrect to suggest the risks cannot be reduced by a package of support. Self evidently support of any nature will have some impact on reducing risks. However, my conclusion is that this will still leave real risks present given the features I have outlined above. To proceed and leave S in his mother’s care would require me to conclude the residual risks are either sufficiently lacking in level of concern or remain concerning but are to be accepted when balanced against the risks associated with removal of S from his mother’s care.
74. Other welfare considerations?
75. The above sections focus on the element of risk contained within the welfare analysis. I accept this is but one of a number of essential components in any assessment. I also accept that all children to an extent grow up surrounded by some level of risk in their lives and that a proportionate approach is required when considering a stark question such as posed in this case (see quoted §34 at my §27 above).
76. I must have regard to the wishes and feelings of the child impacted by my decision making. Whilst S has a good and loving bond with his mother he is not of an age at which he can express any wishes let alone wishes based on an understanding of the issues in the case.
77. I have regard to S needs indeed I have already referenced the same in the paragraphs above. His principle need is for emotional stability and consistency from his care giver and out of the environment in which he is raised. This is why I have highlighted the potential damage arising out of a domestically abusive environment. His needs can still be met where such events are limited and only very occasional. There is after all room in all positive relationships for moments of crisis and heightened emotion. It is no role of the state to intervene to guard against all and every risk.
78. But the need is captured by consistency. It is consistency of care that would enable S to successfully navigate moments of crisis. And so, there is a balance to be struck and an inflexion point at which that which is unacceptable becomes permissible and that which is acceptable becomes impermissible.
79. Here I have recognised many positives in the care being given to S but I have also noted real worries that exist outside of the compartment of domestic abuse. I have reflected on the potential for the negatives to be addressed or minimised through further work but I have cautioned against the possibility that such work will not have the impact intended. I have considered the role family may play in contributing to needs being met but I have regard to the reality that this is likely to be only effective where all that is required is occasional but important support.
80. I consider S personal characteristics. I have reflected on his age and the vulnerabilities that flow from this. I also reflect on his wider family and cultural connections and the real value his mother and family bring by keeping him connected to the same. These are important positives that balance in favour of the mother’s case if the mother’s care of S is itself good enough. However, they are unlikely to carry the same importance if her care is not good enough.
81. I have regard to the impact on S of becoming an adopted child and being severed legally and to a considerable extent factually from his biological family. A decision of this nature requires a high level of justification. In part this reflects the entitlement S has to be raised within his birth family and the likely significant impact upon him of losing this connection. It will be S who will need to address this issue should it occur and it will be his emotional well-being that is impacted as he develops a growing understanding of what has befallen him. I accept R will suffer a similar emotional fate but my focus is legally on S.
82. I accept the ability to address the fall-out from severance may be managed by a loving and supportive adoptive family. But this is an impact which directly flows from the decision I am being asked to make and cannot be understated or downplayed on the basis that things will turn out OK. In reality S will have an emotional need to understand why he could not be raised by his mother, among his family and around his half-siblings. He may look to failings in himself to explain this outcome. Whilst this would not be warranted it is something that needs to be contemplated as a potential when considering such orders. In due course he may be entirely unsatisfied with his life history and may seek out his own answers in an unmanaged way. All of this has the potential to be as destabilising and impactful as the consequences of the risks identified earlier in this judgment. But here I am not linking these impacts to decisions likely made by the mother but rather conscious decisions made by the Court.
83. I am obliged to reflect on S relationship with relatives (his mother in particular) and to consider the likelihood of this relationship continuing and the value to S of it continuing; the wishes and feelings of the relatives, and; the ability of the individuals to provide a secure environment in which S can develop / have his needs met.
84. For obvious reasons my focus here is on R. She has an important established relationship with S. It has real value to both her and S. She has shown an ability to maintain a relationship with her older children notwithstanding their life histories and this must lead me to conclude there is a likelihood of her relationship with S continuing if I permit it to do so. I think it is important to make clear that nowhere within my reasoning have I attributed any malice or misconduct to R. To the extent I have been critical it has not been due to any absence of love for S on her part. I think it is also important to pay regard to wider family interest in S. As with R, but to a lesser extent, I consider these relationships have value and are likely to endure if given the space to do so.
85. But this factor also asks me to reflect on elements of capacity to meet S needs. In this case there are no family placement options and whilst support is offered to assist R no other individual is placed to provide S with the secure environment referenced in the extended checklist.
86. The focus then is back onto R. It is supplemented by any support that is available to her from family and outside actors. In this case I have both a pre-proceedings and in-proceedings parenting assessment which has used the appropriate Parent Assess model and has reached the conclusion that R cannot provide good enough parenting within S’ timescales. The social worker agrees with this conclusion and is entitled to rely on these assessment which have been commissioned to inform both the Court and the applicant. The guardian likewise relies on the reports but also brings to the assessment her own professional calibration.
87. For my part I found the guardian a professional and insightful witness. Her evidence was clear and cogent. It was clear to me she had reached her own conclusions and had not simply been led by the assessments. Her reasoning was explained and logical.
88. The ISW gave clear and professional evidence. She was challenged as to aspects of the evidence but I do not consider any of the criticisms went to the heart of her assessment.
89. I was less impressed by the social worker as a witness although the foundation for her conclusion is found in the separate assessment evidence. There were a number of areas where she appeared to trip up in her understanding – most particularly around her contact proposals. I also agree it was unfortunate that further work was not offered to the mother until after the assessment came in, and then not offered on the basis of the assessment. In my judgment an applicant should not tailor the support it offers to that consistent with its own conclusions. After all it does not know what the Court will conclude and it will want the case to be ready to conclude if possible whatever outcome is reached. However, I am not persuaded these failures necessarily impact on the ultimate conclusions reached by the social worker. I bear in mind the challenges of giving evidence, which apply to all witnesses and I note the evidence of the guardian that she found the social worker to be properly and actively engaged throughout her involvement in the case.
90. It was harder to form a view of R and I am cautious in any assessment based on demeanour influencing outcomes. When not giving evidence she appeared to be very flat in her mood and at times appeared not to be engaging with the hearing. I offered breaks when this was the case but could see the concern for her on the part of the [family member] (who I permitted to sit in support) and the attending solicitor. I share these concerns. I strongly suspect the mood present was the very same sense of futility that led her to leave the placement only days later.
91. That being said when she gave evidence she was more engaged and appeared to lift herself to do so. In fact, I was surprised by the change in presentation at that point. Much of her evidence was heart felt and genuine. She gave me a very strong and truthful sense of her love for S and her wish to get this part of her life right for him. I recognise she has tried very hard in circumstances in which I consider she feels she has little chance of succeeding.
92. But there were also times in her evidence when she struggled to provide an answer. On occasions having been given time she completed what she wanted to say. But there were times in her evidence, and particularly around the issue of domestic violence where my assessment was that she was struggling to provide an answer helpful to her case. I do not intend or wish to be particularly critical in this regard but it did leave me with a strong sense of realisation on her part that she had previously failed to properly manage the relationship that brought her into proceedings.
93. Which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare?
94. As has been noted at the outset the realistic options in this case comprise placement with R under a supervision order (an outcome without a public law order is not suggested) or care and placement orders. There are no family-based options in the wider family and there is no suggestion of a final care order and placement into long term foster care. I record that would be inconsistent with S’ need for permanence and this is not a case in which this order might be made on the basis it would be of short duration as a result of expected progress on the part of an alternative carer.
95. Placement with R will preserve family ties and will avoid the severance associated with adoption. It would leave open the opportunity for inter-sibling relationships and a close tie to culture and identity. It would avoid any later emotional harm as S becomes aware of his life story. The concern is as to whether it would likely be associated with the dislocation and instability experienced by his older half-siblings. This is aggravated by the absence of a family option for S and by his very young age meaning that any failure in this placement might lead to S experiencing the very life in foster care which has been identified as inconsistent with his welfare needs. A key aspect of the balance is the extent to which these risks simply have to be accepted as part of a proportionate exercise and the extent to which they might be reduced by reason of support and change.
96. Placement for adoption as always raises the very opposites to the points noted above. It would sever family life and restrict contact whilst de-linking S from his identity and likely from his cultural ties. It would leave him at risk of future emotional harm. Against this it would be expected to safeguard him against the risks identified in this judgment (although not all risks in life) and also to provide a stable and permanent upbringing. I accept it would likely provide a home in which S would be loved and wanted and whilst I do not wish to compare this with the love R would undoubtedly wish to give it is right to recognise this would also be a component of his life if placed for adoption. The current care plan is for there to be an opportunity for direct contact. This would go some way to addressing some of the concerns noted above but the concerns would still remain.
97. The question for me is in the balancing of these options. I continue to approach the analysis recognising that one option comes with a stark interference when compared to the other. I am conscious that while the concerns are evidenced in the history a significant part of this assessment is forward looking. I appreciate that some level of risk must be accepted and that risk per se is far from a foundation to justify adoption.
98. Having balanced these options, I have nonetheless sadly concluded the option of care and placement best meets S’s welfare interests when viewed both now and throughout his life. In reaching this conclusion I have placed weight on the enduring nature of R’s difficulties. I would certainly not place great weight on issues which confronted her many years ago if it were not the case that some of the very same issues have been present in the recent past.
99. The issue around domestic abuse is very troubling. This is both in the reality of the experience of R in very recent times but also in the clear evidence of little progress made by her despite the work undertaken. Her evidence illustrated an individual who can appreciate the learning but then fails to implement the same. To hear her frank evidence as to a belief in the ability to change her partner, a partner who had been destroying her property, who had held a knife and threatened to kill himself and physically assaulted her is very troubling. I bear in mind that the manner in which such abuse plays out will be a function of each relationship. But this was a relationship in which she was self-admittedly scared but did not act to self-protect. I have been left with the conclusion that there is a real likelihood that this will in fact be repeated in some form and will be an important aspect of S's likely lived experience if he continues in the care of his mother.
100. Further, I have also accepted that absent some reparative work it is likely R will continue to experience moments of profound emotional upset when her reasoning and focus on S is lost as she turns inwards to deal with her own despair. This has been seen in the past but it has also been demonstrated within very recent times and within the context of these proceedings. That harm did not arise due to the presence of the foster carer is inescapable but the evidence does not suggest this was a particularly meaningful part of the thinking on the part of R. On balance I consider this is also likely to be a characteristic of R’s life into the future until such time as she can address the life history that has shaped her. During this period the manner in which such moments develop must be speculative but they include the potential for S’s needs to be unmet and for him to be placed at risk of very real significant harm. On balance the support is positive but it does not adequately address the issue sufficiently. It can be seen in these moments R has simply been unable to properly prioritise S’s needs above her own.
101. I am less moved by the third feature around challenges as S grows older. I consider assessment of that is out with the available evidence.
102. In the ultimate balancing equation, I am left to accept these features as an acceptable aspect of keeping S within his family. I say this as I am not satisfied they will be addressed by way of support. I have reached the conclusion the same are simply not acceptable. I consider the risk to S is too great. I consider if S remains with his mother then he will face instability and emotional physical harm through a likely domestically abusive household for too much of his time and this is likely to be linked to his mother being emotionally unavailable to an extent which is significantly harmful to him.
103. Had this been a case in which a default option was available should my concerns have materialised then the outcome might have been different. It might have been a proportionate outcome to place S with his mother knowing the likely impacts would be tempered by the availability of an alternative placement option. However, here I am assessing S’s lifelong welfare and there is no such default. If as I find these issues arise in due course then it is likely S will face himself back in care proceedings and at that time his options will have changed in a manner inconsistent with his lifelong welfare.
104. Is this Article 8 interference necessary and proportionate?
105. There is no question this outcome amounts to an extreme interference in S life. But as I have explained the alternative is to accept a likelihood of instability and significant risk in his life. Whilst this is inevitability a speculative risk there is a sound evidential basis for concluding it is likely to materialise. Furthermore, on materialising the impact on S is likely to be significantly harmful and enduring in nature. My conclusion is not that S may experience a single episode of such risk but that in all likelihood such risk will be a feature of his life with the consequences that flow from the same. The evidence as to domestic abuse is strong given the history – past and recent. The evidence as to emotional availability is found in only the recent days.
106. For these reasons I consider this interference is necessary. It is also proportionate. I have considered lesser forms of interference but identified no other lesser form of interference which would address the concerns whether by extinguishing them or reducing them to an acceptable level. I have therefore sadly reached the conclusion I should make both care and placement orders. I also dispense with parental consent on the basis that whilst it is understandably withheld S’s welfare requires me to do so.
107. Contact
108. This was not an issue of particular dispute before me. The care plan for S envisages a search for carers who would be open to an annual session of direct contact and I further understood the parties to agree this should also extend to an opportunity for sibling contact.
109. I am clear R is not an individual who would actively seek to undermine the placement. She has worked co-operatively with the placements for her older children and there are positives in the ongoing relationships. S is likely to benefit, as will any placement from direct contact at a reasonable level which permits that placement to be stable whilst allowing an understanding of S identity through limited contact.
110. I am of the view there should be an active consideration of a meeting between R and prospective adopters. Such meetings are often very positive for all attendees and can shape a future relationship. If nothing else they allow carers to talk to S about the meeting with his mother and what she said.
111. I am also of the view there is merit in at least 1 session of direct contact each year post-adoption. I consider adopters should be sought who are willing to implement this and if this is the case that consideration should be given to starting this process in the interim period between placement and adoption. It may be on review a slightly higher level of contact might work best but I would suggest the adopters would be an important component of such a discussion and would be the real decision makers in that regard. It may be the best outcome for S would be one direct and one letter box contact per annum.
112. I also suggest consideration as to sibling contact is considered. I am mindful of the number of siblings and their differing positions so I do not wish to be prescriptive in this regard.
113. I expect the applicant to be active in this regard and to encourage the search for those open to such an arrangement. However, I do not go as far as to say only such options should be considered. That should certainly be the first priority and one must assume there are grounds for optimism as attitudes to open adoption change. However, should an open option not be available for S I would nevertheless continue to be supportive of an adoptive placement as I consider his need for permanence will be the overriding concern.
114. I have agreed to hand this judgment down remotely at 9.30am on 20 February 2026. I apologise for the slight delay in sending it out which was caused by the events post-hearing and my need to receive additional submissions. I would welcome any corrections, requests for clarification and proposed redactions for publication by 10am on 19 February 2026. This judgment can be shared with the lay and professional clients including R prior to handing down. His Honour Judge Willans
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