M K v S K

Peel J: Introduction

1. In these financial remedy proceedings I shall refer to the parties as W (the wife) and H (the husband). W attended the hearing in person, H attended (with my permission) remotely. Both were represented by leading counsel to who am I am very grateful for their assistance. I express my gratitude also to the solicitors for the general preparation of the trial, including the bundles which were well ordered.

2. It is W’s case that H is guilty of non-disclosure and that his presentation of almost nil assets is false. She submits that his accessible resources include, but are not limited to, the A Trust which holds either 40% or 50% in a group of technology companies to which I shall refer, in shorthand, as the Group. She submits that the trust and/or potentially additional trusts and/or other persons or structures, are likely to hold further assets (i.e in addition to the shares in the Group) which have not been disclosed. She submits that the totality of the evidence enables the court to conclude that, whether held through the trust structure or in some other way, H has substantial resources which he is concealing in order to defeat her claims. H denies any legal or beneficial interest in assets within the A Trust, or in other trusts, or held by other persons/structures. He says that the Group is on the verge of insolvency and worthless, and he has no other meaningful resources.

3. For completeness, it is not submitted by W that the A Trust is a sham, nor that it is a reviewable disposition within the meaning of s37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

4. The main focus has therefore been on the computation stage of the s25 criteria: Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ

503. Once I have determined, to the extent possible, the quantum of assets, I must go on to consider the disposition of the parties’ finances under s25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

5. The combined costs stand at just over £850,000 (W £498,100, H £354,092), reflective of the detailed inquiry into H’s financial affairs. Open proposals

6. On 22 January 2025, H offered W (i) the mortgage free house occupied by W in England, which is in her name and valued at £837,500, and (ii) £1 million which he said he would borrow from his late mother’s estate and from his brother.

7. On 25 September 2025, W sought (i) retention of the house (value £837,500), (ii) a lump sum of £5m (being a Duxbury calculation to capitalise £175,000pa for life), and (iii) a further lump sum to clear her liabilities.

8. On 31 October 2025, H’s updated offer was for (i) a sale and equal share of the house (£418,750 each, less costs of sale), and (ii) equal division of any inheritance from his mother (£77,211 each). The change in his position was, he says, principally driven by the increased legal costs and decline in the financial health of the Group. The background

9. W is 47 years old. She was not born into a monied family; her father was a firefighter and her mother an administrator. H is 57 years old. His father, who died in 2018, was a successful entrepreneur in the field of plastics and composites. Both W and H are North American nationals.

10. W has been diagnosed with (i) osteopenia after a fall from a horse many years ago and (ii) anxiety, depressive disorder, and (iii) PTSD. Last year, H was diagnosed with prostate cancer; the medical evidence is cautiously positive about his prognosis. Both parties, I am quite sure, are emotionally drained by these proceedings.

11. From 1995 (when she was 16 years old) to 2001, W was a rider and groom, which seems to have been the start of a lifelong passion for horses. H at that time was involved in a number of business projects.

12. In 1997, a trust was set up. H in evidence referred to it as the A Family Trust although this sems to have been his generic description and the precise name is not known. He says it was intended for the benefit of grandchildren of his father, although none were in existence at the time. H says that funds emanating from his father were settled into the trust, including shares from his business. He has no recollection that the trust deed made mention of any family members as settlor, trustee or beneficiary. He thought there was a professional beneficiary. There is some suggestion it might have been a Jersey based trust, and it seems likely that there were corporate trustees. It is not clear whether the trust has come to an end and, if so, when. There is, surprisingly, no documentation about any of this. H says that no distributions were made by the trust (including to any of the six grandchildren who were born after the inception of the trust), which begs the unanswered question of what happened to the monies within the trust.

13. H describes himself as a serial entrepreneur. He attempted a number of ventures, none of which were of particular note until he realised over $10m USD (the precise figure is unclear) on the sale of his shares in a company in North America, an internet start-up, in 1990s.

14. At about the same time, H and his friend, Mr CD, co-founded the Group (it had a different name on incorporation, but for convenience I shall refer to it as the Group). They were equal 50% shareholders. H’s 50% share was held via Holdings Ltd (“HL”), the holding group for a number of subsidiary companies. The HL shares were, H told me, placed in the AB Trust in 1998. Mr CD’s 50% share was held via his own structures. H became the CEO and the driving force of the business.

15. H has three siblings. His sister E developed an independent career, but occasionally was involved in advisory work for the Group. His brother F has worked full time in the Group since his divorce in 2019, and before then had an advisory role. His brother G has worked full time in aspects of the Group business (I am not clear for how long).

16. In 1998, H loaned $10m USD from his monies to HL. He describes it as a sum to “provide liquidity and advance good business ideas”, and to influence the Group business. The loan was not documented. It was not secured and no interest was payable. There was no running balance of the loan in the form of a ledger or director’s loan account. Two documents from an accountant who acts for the Group show the outstanding amounts at the end of 2023 and 2024, but without a breakdown of usage.

17. Between 1998 and 2005 (when the parties married), H was involved in other businesses as well as the Group, and it seems likely that he received sufficient remuneration to meet his outgoings, without needing to draw down on the loan. With effect from about 2005, when the parties married, a process took place where, at the end of each year, personal expenses incurred by H and met by the business were attributed to H within a bookkeeping process, and treated as drawn down against the loan.

18. The parties met in 2001 and started cohabiting (according to W) in 2001 or (according to H) in 2004. Nothing, in my judgment, turns on this and I make no finding on the length of cohabitation.

19. W from 2003 to 2004 was an equestrian competition coordinator. Meanwhile, H was developing the Group, taking the lead in the business while Mr CD had a number of other interests and played a more minor role.

20. H and W married on 26 February 2005 and separated in January 2024, so that this was a marriage of some 19 years. They had no children. The loan note stood at $10m USD at the time of marriage. By the end of the marriage it had nil remaining value.

21. After marriage, W worked as an intern for a magazine in North America in 2005. In about 2005 the parties moved to England. W became an intern for radio companies in England in 2006. After a period as a riding instructor in London, she was a full time journalist from 2007 to 2011. Meanwhile, with H’s encouragement, she developed her interest in horses and equestrianism. In 2007, her first horse was acquired. In 2011, she started to take competing, breeding and training seriously, with H’s support and funded by him. She became more involved in eventing competitions and ran an equestrian business in her sole trading name. She was able to combine the business with some freelance writing which ultimately came to an end in 2018.

22. In 2017, IJ Ltd was incorporated. W is the sole shareholder. It was the vehicle for her various equestrian activities. At one point, W/the company owned 24 horses. Through equestrianism, (i) W was able to pursue her passion, (ii) H was able to access networking opportunities in the eventing community, and (iii) they both were able to enjoy the social aspect, including international travel to watch and, in W’s case, take part in competitive equestrian events.

23. The Group continued to grow. HL, via an intermediate holding company, now owns six subsidiary companies which in turn own about 60 technology companies in the UK, USA, Canada, Germany, Singapore and the Netherlands. The Group’s business model was to acquire IT companies, build them, integrate them with other businesses and then sell. Latterly, aggressive leveraging was used to fund the initial purchases. On the face of it, the Group has enjoyed strong success. H, in replies to questionnaire, said that global revenue for 2024 was forecast to be $1bn USD with EBIDTA of $40m USD. There are no consolidated group accounts, and no SJE report on the group’s activities has taken place. It has been difficult to piece together a clear picture, but I was referred to individual transactions each netting many millions of dollars for the Group which were just a fraction of the overall activity, and I am confident that, particularly in the latter years, the group was highly income generative, albeit very reliant upon leverage and with no tangible or other material assets beyond the acquired companies.

24. On H’s case, and somewhat surprisingly, he worked 80 hour weeks as CEO of the Group but “never had a contract of employment or any service agreement”. When companies were grown and sold, he says he received no direct benefit. He says: “I did not need a salary. I just needed to make sure my work expenses were covered. As so much of my time was spent working, that meant the vast majority of my expenses were covered”. In a written answer to a question he said: “The Respondent did not receive a salary, consulting fees, bonuses or any other payment of remuneration for his time and effort. He received significant energetic, emotional, reputational, community and branding benefits from his strategic insights, advice and involvement in these companies, and they covered his expenses when he did work on their behalf.” He told me that when particular deals were successful, he could have withdrawn monies by way of salary or substantial bonus but elected not to.

25. H told me that the aim was to make the Group bigger and more valuable and at some time to extract funds, but I note that over twenty years he says that he did not in fact extract any monies. I asked him why he did not take equity personally in any of the acquisitions, and again he suggested he could have done, but decided not to do so. By contrast, Mr CD and H’s brother G took positions in acquired companies in their own names or through their own structures and subsequently realised considerable funds (measured in millions of dollars) for themselves.

26. The growth of the business, which operated internationally, required H to undertake a significant amount of international travel. W’s equestrian business also involved time abroad. The parties’ base from 2005 onwards remained in England, where they lived in rented accommodation until 2017 both in London and the country. In addition, properties abroad were also rented. Thus, they had use of multiple properties in England and around the world. All the rentals were paid for by the Group as corporate rentals; some of them were available for executives of the Group to use, as well as H and W. The parties seem to have lived in or had access to: a) Properties in Central London from 2005 to 2017. b) Properties in the English countryside from 2005 onwards. c) Properties in Toronto for the duration of the marriage. d) A property in New York for 2-3 years. e) A property in Singapore for 2 years. f) A property in the Caribbean from 2016 onwards.

27. The parties’ standard of living was not really in dispute. W points to the following as evidence of their lifestyle: i) The various properties in England and around the world which were paid for by the business. ii) Frequent luxury international travel. iii) Regular eating out in high end restaurants. iv) Significant charitable donations made by H, such as: a) $100,000 USD pa for a scholarship at a University. b) Donating $300,000 CAN to an equestrian team. v) H’s generosity to friends, such as: a) Paying the rent of J and D S at $25,000 USD per quarter for a period of time. b) In 2023, H hosted a 21st birthday dinner in London for the daughter of friends at a cost of £26,000. vi) True, they did not have expensive cars, art, jewellery or the like, but their expenditure on horses (their shared passion and source of business contacts) was substantial.

28. The parties’ lifestyle was paid for in two ways: i) H drawing down on the $10m USD loan over 20 years, which is an average of $500,000 USD pa. That sum includes significant expenditure on (a) horses and (b) renovations on a house bought in England in 2021. After IJ Ltd was incorporated in 2017, the drawdowns against the loan were funnelled via the company and then recorded in the company accounts as a debt owing to H, which currently stands at about £2.7m. ii) In addition, the Group paid for as many expenses as possible which could be classified as business related. This included rental of the various properties referred to above, and travel abroad. H told me that the majority of the expenditure of himself and W was met in this way. Assuming for the moment that a similar amount was met from this latter source as from the loan, the parties’ lifestyle may have cost up to $1m USD pa (just over £700,000 pa).

29. The personal payments which were met or authorised by the business were not, so far as I could tell, the subject of any checks or queries. H charged most things to his credit cards (one a business card and one a personal card) which were paid by the Group without question. When substantial monies were needed for specific purposes outside usual credit card expenditure, H would contact his friend Mr KM who wears three hats as (i) Protector of the A Trust, (ii) Managing Director of the corporate trustees of the A Trust and (iii) co-director with H of HL. H has known Mr KMs since 2017. Mr KM would arrange for the payments when requested. I am quite satisfied that he essentially did as H asked, and the Group was used by H as in effect his personal bank account.

30. Because (i) the $10m USD loan was extinguished over time, and (ii) on H’s case, he had no remuneration for twenty years, it follows that the structures he put in place had the effect of causing him a very substantial personal financial loss, with no compensatory earnings, despite his exceptionally hard work and success in growing the business. He acknowledged in evidence that that this was extremely unusual.

31. In August 2017, a cottage was bought in England for either £200,000 or £300,000. The monies came from H but were funnelled through IJ Ltd which then owned the property. It was sold in 2021, and the monies remained in the company’s accounts.

32. In December 2017, the A Trust was set up. H’s brother F seems to have handled the formalities. H says the trust was intended to continue to build a legacy for the grandchildren, following on from the 1997 trust which had been shut down because of an issue with bankers. The HL shares were “rolled over” into the A Trust. There is no evidence as to what happened to the first trust and in particular what happened to any trust assets, which may have included H’s father’s company shares.

33. In September 2018, H’s father died. His mother died in 2022.

34. In March 2021, a property in England was bought for £815,000 in W’s name, with monies sourced from the Group. Monies were also paid for renovations, which amounted to (according to a schedule produced by H) £400,000 GBP and $558,000 CAD, so about £700,000 in all). These monies were offset against H’s $10m USD. The house was, it seems, the only property to be bought in the personal names of either H or W during the marriage.

35. From 2017, when IJ was incorporated, the company accounts record that £2.72m was advanced by H to pay for renovations and also for the parties’ general expenses. This is recorded as a debt to him in the accounts. H has produced a schedule suggesting the figure should be £2.84m. The difference is immaterial and perhaps explained by exchange rates. The whole of the sum was netted off against H’s loan to HL.

36. W says that these various structures and ways of meeting personal expenses were designed by H largely to minimise tax, which seems likely to be the case. H described himself to W as “the smartest guy in the world when it comes to tax”. H has been successful in his attempts to avoid tax; he has not paid any tax during the marriage, nor been required to file tax returns in any country, nor attracted scrutiny from any tax authorities.

37. W says, and I accept, that H kept his finances largely secret from her. She always believed him to be a very wealthy man. She did not ask too many questions. She knew in broad terms of his involvement with the Group, and he would occasionally tell her about exciting projects, but she knew none of the detail. She thought he was making money out of successful deals. She was not aware of the $10m USD loan. She had some knowledge of the existence of a trust, but no details. She had little visibility about the finances. She did not know that H was not receiving any remuneration, and that they were living off company expenses and the $10m USD loan. There was no joint account and she did not have access to a credit card with, or paid for by, H. H would on occasions transfer sums of money to W for incidental expenses.

38. H’s personal bank statements evidence the ways in which he funnelled monies to IJ Ltd, which were then offset against his $10m USD loan. They (and other pieces of evidence) also demonstrate H deploying funds in his accounts for business purposes as well as personal purposes, all of which, he says, was reconciled within the business. There is a blurring between business and personal finances, and a tangible sense that H largely treated it all as one pot into which he dipped, leaving it to the accountants/bookkeepers to draw up a post facto reconciliation. Thus: i) $816,353 CAN enters his personal account on 17 May 2021 and the next day goes out as “payment owing to a company being acquired by the Group”. ii) A series of payments at $20,000 CAN pm are described as “loans to a Canadian company”. iii) A payment to the Group on 1 September 2023 in the sum of $100,000 CAN. iv) A payment of $500,000 USD for investment in S in 2023 which H says was channelled through his personal account on behalf of the Group. v) A share register suggests that H directly made an investment in PT S in March 2013 which was then sold in 2016, although H said that this was on behalf of the Group. vi) $219,940 USD on 27 May 2024 from H to fund an investment in SY. vii) H received $2m CAN from the Group in October 2020 to fund an investment in a company called R S Ltd. Those funds in turn, H says, were sourced from the proceeds of sale by the Group of an investment in C T S I, and were used on behalf of the Group.

39. In October 2023, W saw a whiteboard with words on it about H, the business and the trust, but thought nothing of it at a time when the parties were still together.

40. In May 2024, when clearing out the annexe four months after separation, W again saw the whiteboard, and the words written on it. She took two photographs. Those photographs show a stick figure drawing of W, H and their dog which everyone agrees was done by H. Underneath is an abbreviated organogram of the Group. Below the organogram: i) There are arrows from H, to the trust, to HL and on to an intermediate holding company. Above H is written “UBO” which, as counsel agreed, stands for “Ultimate Beneficial Owner”. ii) Separately there are two arrows from H’s name; one to “S” and one to the Group (Caribbean). From H’s name there is an arrow to the corporate trustees and above that are written the words “UBO: H”.

41. W is adamant that the words were written by H. H denies having written them. He says they might have been written by his niece, U, who was employed by the Group, and another employee, V, as part of a blue sky thinking session when they were staying at the cottage. I do not consider I can make a finding about the handwriting, as to which there is no expert evidence. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the probable explanation is that H wrote the words, or that they were written by one or more persons at his direction. I did not believe H’s account. It seems implausible to me that junior employees would refer to H as the UBO of a trust without him so saying. There was a suggestion by H that this might have been in respect of a KYC issue for a bank but there was no material evidence to support this hypothesis which seemed unlikely and failed to explain why he would be referred to as the UBO if he was not. It seems inherently improbable that two junior employees would write “UBO” when throwing out ideas. It is surprising that H did not call either U or V to give evidence on this obviously important piece of evidence. I am satisfied that the whiteboard was written by or at the direction of H and accurately reflects the true position that H is the UBO of the trust.

42. Since separation, W has lived at the property and H at the house in the Caribbean with his new partner who is expecting their baby in the spring. H told me that there is a residency issue which prevents him from living there now, but that he expects to obtain a new permit so that he can continue to live in the Caribbean.

43. H says that from 2024 onwards, the Group has run into financial difficulties which gathered pace in 2025. He says that the business is now on the point of imploding. In early 2025, he resigned as CEO of HL and received a $730,000 CAN severance payment, plus $230,000 CAN being the balance of the loan, so $1m CAD in total. The Group stopped paying the rent on the property where he lives. He told me that all the companies are in administration and insolvency practitioners are involved.

44. H produced a purported valuation of the business by his brother which asserts that the Group has no value and is underwater. I attach no weight to the valuation itself, which is not expert evidence, and has not been scrutinised. However, his brother refers to some potentially relevant figures which I reproduce here. He says that the forecast EBIDTA of $40m USD turned out to be $21.7m USD, that revenue was down, debt was at over $250m USD and cashflow was at -$27m USD.

45. H told me that the group overstretched itself with debt, had no buffer when it did not grow and was faced with immediate credit constraints. It has no tangible assets. Creditors were usually given preference shares in partial lieu for monies advanced, and where those shares have declined in value, they want their debt returned. Credit lines have reduced, making growth more difficult. The Group is reliant on a handful of creditors (and in particular Z which has reached the limit on its credit line) without whose support they cannot trade. H said, “it’s all over”. The workforce has been laid off. The companies are interlocking with cross guarantees and the edifice is collapsing. He does not believe the group will survive. W’s leading counsel correctly points out that there are almost no recent accounts for the group, and the picture painted of insolvency is patchy, lacking comprehensive documentary support. W is suspicious of these events occurring during the litigation. Nevertheless, there is material to support H’s case, and I do not think he has deliberately engineered the downfall of the companies. I cannot say for sure that the entire business is worthless, or that parts of it will not recover, but I take the view overall that any value is likely to be limited, illiquid and speculative. I should add that H, and others, had judgment for $5m CAN entered against them, but have been able to set that aside, although proceedings are ongoing. Procedural background

46. W’s divorce application is dated 9 February 2024. It progressed to a Conditional Order dated 5 November 2025. Her Form A is dated 17 June 2024. A First Appointment took place before HHJ Wright in October 2024. The application was allocated to High Court Judge level.

47. On 10 April 2025, a case management hearing took place before me. My order recorded that the parties would use their best endeavours to agree a value of the Group for the Private FDR, but that absence of agreement would not prevent the Private FDR going ahead.

48. At the post Private FDR directions hearing before me on 2 October 2025, I approved the settling of letters of request seeking information about the trust. It seemed to me that the responses received from the trustees to requests for information had not been enlightening. There has been no response to the letters of request.

49. At the same hearing, I determined in principle that an SJE report on the value of the trust’s share of the Group was “necessary” in the event that I were to conclude, contrary to H’s primary case, that the A Trust is a resource available to him within the meaning of s25. However, as no formal Part 25 application had been made, I put over issues as to the identity of the expert or the letter of instruction. I had some reservations about the appointment of a SJE, as it seemed to me that on any view the timetable was tight, with little more than 3 months for the SJE to report and it seemed to me that W’s application had been made late in the day. In the event, although the identity of the expert was agreed, the letter of instruction was not. I determined the letter of instruction on the papers on 29 October 2025. Thereafter, the parties were unable to agree as to which documents should be sent to the SJE. Further, the SJE queried her ability to assist if the business was entering insolvency. It became obvious that the SJE would not be able to report in time for this hearing. On 11 December 2025, W applied for an adjournment of the trial, so as to allow time for the SJE to report, which I refused on paper. I was concerned about delay and cost. I said this in a short written determination: “… the primary issue between the parties is whether H he is the ultimate beneficial owner of the Group. It seems to me that at the very least I can continue to deal with that issue at the forthcoming hearing without the valuation report. Depending on my conclusions, it may (or may not) thereafter be necessary for the valuation exercise to be undertaken, but it seems to me that at the very least the issue of non-disclosure can properly be addressed.” The A Trust

50. H’s case is that, like the trust established in 1997, the A Trust was set up to benefit succeeding generations. The beneficiaries are his father’s six grandchildren (none of them H’s, although his forthcoming baby would fall within the asserted class of beneficiaries).

51. For H to say that A Trust is a continuation of the previous trust is not of itself helpful, since there is no corroborative evidence about the previous trust; there are no trust documents, no letters of wishes, nothing to confirm the intentions behind the trust, no accounts, no evidence of trust assets, and no evidence about distributions. Nor is there anything to indicate what happened to the trust assets and when it was wound up, if indeed it was. There is no context, let alone detail, as to how this fitted into the overall family arrangements.

52. In respect of the A Trust, there is before me a trust deed, but that is the extent of relevant disclosure. From that document the following can be seen: i) It was settled on 28 December 2017. ii) It is subject to the law of Country X. iii) The amount settled into the trust was $10 USD. H says that the shareholding in HL was rolled into the trust, although there is no evidence thereof. iv) The settlor was Mr KM. v) The Protector is Mr KM. The Protector has the power by clause 26.6 to appoint a successor Protector. vi) The professional trustee was and remains C TC Ltd. Mr KM is the managing director thereof. vii) The original beneficiary was Mr Y, a colleague of Mr KM. On 3 January 2019, by a Deed of Nomination, the corporate trustee appointed Mr W as the beneficiary, and excluded Mr Y. Mr W is a Caribbean based lawyer and trust professional; so too, it seems, Mr Y. According to H, Mr Y and Mr W have been “professional individuals who know the ultimate beneficiaries are [the six grandchildren]”, whose ages now range from 19 to 28, although there is no evidence from Mr Y and Mr W to this effect. viii) The trust deed contains at clause 5.1 powers to “transfer, appropriate or apply the whole or any part of the capital or income of the Trust Fund to or for the maintenance, advancement, education or other benefit of all or such one or more exclusively of the other or others of the beneficiaries in such shares or manner as the Trustees shall in their discretion and without being liable to account for the same think fit”. ix) By clause 9 the trustees may, with the written consent of the Protector, include or exclude a named beneficiary. x) By clauses 24.3 and 24.4 the Protector may require a trustee to resign and has the power to appoint an additional or new trustee.

53. The trustees have had ample opportunity to give a full explanation of the trust. Mr KM, by letter dated 1 April 2024 and in his capacity as director of the corporate trustee, said: “I hereby confirm that [H] is not a settlor, a trustee, a beneficiary or a member of a beneficial class of any trust of which [the trustee company] has any involvement.” That was followed by less than forthcoming replies dated 9 September 2024 from Mr KM to questions by H’s lawyers:

1. "Who is the settlor of the trust or trusts of which our client has any connection and what is the connection;" Your client has no connection with any of our trusts and has not settled any trust of which we are the trustee; therefore, we are unable to disclose information about our trust clients.

2. "What are the terms of the trust or trusts ( ie blind trust/discretionary trust etc);" Save for his position as CEO of the Group, your client has no connection with any of our trusts; therefore, we are unable to disclose information about our trust clients.

3. "If our client is a beneficiary, in what capacity is he a beneficiary. If he is one beneficiary within a class of beneficiaries, how many other beneficiaries are in the beneficial class;" Your client has no connection with any of our trusts and is not a beneficiary of any of our trusts; therefore, we are unable to disclose information about our trust clients.

4. "What distributions, if any, has our client received from the trust/s in the past;" Your client has no connection with any of our trusts and has not received distributions from any of our trusts; therefore, we are unable to disclose information about our trust clients.

5. "What are the assets of the Trust;" Your client has no connection with any of our trusts; therefore we are unable to disclose information about our trust clients and their assets.

6. "Are there trust accounts for the trust/s and can they be provided together with the trust deed and any deeds of variation;" Your client has no connection with any of our trusts; therefore, we are unable to disclose information about our trust clients.

7. "Are there any letters of wishes or other accompanying documents that would "sit" with the main trust deed;" Your client has no connection with any of our trusts. We are unable to disclose information about our trust clients and their trust documentation.

8. "What benefits, if any, does our client derive either directly or indirectly from or through the trust, with documentary proof of same." Save for his position as CEO of the Group, your client has no connection with any of our trusts and has not received any benefit whatsoever from any of our trusts. We are unable to disclose information about our trust clients.

54. This response strikes me as unhelpful. H accepted in evidence (in answer to a question from me) that the trustees would do whatever they are asked by him, particularly if his brother F supported it. I am confident that F would want to assist H (he has not provided any evidence to the contrary). Yet the trustees have declined to give even the most basic information about a trust which on any view is intended to benefit one or more of the members of the family, and for which the disclosed documents tell the reader very little.

55. The lack of even the most basic information means that there is no real way of establishing what assets are held in the trust, beyond the acknowledged holding in the Group via HL. There are no consolidated accounts. Most of the accounts which have been produced for individual companies are for the calendar years 2022 and 2023, but not for 2024 or 2025 other than for a 6 month period for HL up to 30 June 2024. I was told that commissions and fees would sometimes be fed up to HL. There are only two sets of accounts for HL which have been placed before me: i) To December 2019 which shows bank accounts and marketable securities of $13.7m USD, and the only significant debt being $5m USD owed to H via his loan. Profit was $719,000 USD. ii) The 6 months to 30 June 2024 which shows assets of $7.9m USD, which includes $4.9m USD of marketable securities and “Note receivable” of $2.7m USD, against debts comprising an intercompany loan of $7.7m USD and “Note payable” of $3m USD.

56. In addition to the above, HL held, via intermediaries, the various subsidiary Group companies.

57. H says that: i) There is no letter of wishes. The trustees do not confirm that. ii) There are no trust accounts. The trustees do not confirm that, and I note that under the local law trustees are required to produce annual accounts. iii) The trust has never made any distributions to himself or any other person. In answer to a question from me, he said that he had never made a request for a distribution, and as far as he was aware, nor had anybody else in his family. iv) The only ever asset held by the trust is its holding in the Group. The trustees do not confirm that and the limited accounts provided suggest otherwise. v) Until recently, the trust held 50% of the Group via HL and the other 50% was held by CD. In Replies to Questionnaire dated 31 October 2025, H said that the Trust now holds 40%, Mr CD 40% and the other 20% is held by management and employees. There is no documentary evidence of this reduction. Other trust(s)

58. H was asked questions about another trust, B Trust. I am satisfied that this is separate from the A Trust and it has not been adequately disclosed. The evidence is as follows: i) On 2 June 2022, an email was sent to H, copying in Mr KM, from HK at R S Ltd about a fundraising round for a total of $1.25m USD between five investors. Ms HK attached a draft subscription agreement “for execution by B Trust”. ii) Mr KM replied on 6 June 2022 as follows: “Could you please amend the documentation to reflect that our ownership will be in the name of “[the trustee company] in its capacity as trustee of B Trust as opposed to “B Trust Ltd.”” I assume that the document attached by Ms HK referred to B Trust Ltd. iii) Ms HK replied that she would and, for KYC purposes, she requested a copy of the Trust Deed and details of the beneficiaries of the trust. iv) Mr KM replied “Please see the attached trust deed. As you can see, the only beneficiary of the trust is KM.” Mr KM referred to the source of funding as being from the sale of shares in CT S Corp, a Canadian company. The attached document to which he referred has not been produced.

59. H could not explain this reference to B Trust but agreed that it could not be the A Trust. Mr KM was not the beneficiary of the A Trust, the two trusts have clearly distinct names, and the B Trust was funded in or about 2022 by the proceeds from C, unlike the A Trust which (purportedly) had only been funded with the Group shares.

60. In my judgment, this is a separate trust which has a connection with the Group and thereby to H. It is not possible to say what assets are, or have been, held by the trust. The undisputed assets

61. The undisputed assets are: i) The property, which is mortgage free and has an agreed value of £837,500 so that the net equity after costs of sale is £812,375. ii) H’s bank accounts (I adopt his figure): £126,827. iii) W’s bank accounts: £40,566. iv) H anticipates receiving an inheritance from his late mother in the sum of £154,423. v) H’s liabilities are -£5,000. vi) W’s liabilities, mainly referable to legal fees are -£524,043. Principally, she owes over £450,000 under a litigation loan on which interest is charged at 26.8%. That sum is repayable at the end of these proceedings.

62. I propose to attribute nil value to IJ. At 31 March 2025, according to draft accounts, it had net assets of £391,451. It owed about £2.7m to H, but on the assumption that those sums will not be repayable, such debt can be ignored. Theoretically, therefore, it holds a positive valuation. However, it makes significant losses (-£429,568 in 2024 and -£239,856 in 2025). We are now a year on and, assuming a similar loss, there will be minimal, value in the business. Income

63. As for income, W derives no net income from her equestrian business. She has served notice on an equestrian facility near where she lives, and now has reduced her stabling requirements to 5 horses. She has signed a lease on a smaller facility to accommodate these horses at a cost of £17,238pa, which will reduce the equestrian overheads, but not such, in my view, as to enable her to generate a significant income. Regrettably, she did not tell the judge at a Maintenance Pending Suit hearing that she had given notice on her previous lease. However, she has paid the previous lease right up until this hearing. She receives £18,000pa rental from the annexe at her home which I shall assume is about £15,000pa net of tax.

64. As things stand, in my judgment W is unlikely to be able to generate meaningful earnings through IJ. W accepted as much in her oral evidence. In reality, the company was not set up in order to be a profitable business; it enabled W to compete as an eventer, both H and W to enjoy the eventing community, and H to channel monies through the company for personal purposes. I do not consider I should assess her earning capacity on the basis of running an unprofitable business. Other jobs could include being a riding instructor or some more administrative role in the equestrian world. Going back to journalism would be difficult after so many years away from that work. W told me that if she did an independent job (rather than carrying on her business), she would expect to earn “in the low twenty thousands”. I propose to take her earning capacity at £25,000pa net.

65. H says that after standing down as CEO of the Group, he entered into an independent contractor arrangement with (one of the Group’s companies) for $10,000 CAN pm, plus possible bonuses which he says he has not in fact received. He is exploring a different contract, also at $10,000 CAN pm, with his late father’s consulting business, Consulting Ltd, which is owned by two of his siblings; quite how that business found its way to them is unclear. The evidence of the parties

66. W gave evidence first. I thought she was honest and doing her best to help me. She is not financially astute. She was given no responsibility for financial matters which H controlled. In answer to a number of question she said “I don’t know” which was not really surprising as she has had to try and piece together how their financial affairs in the marriage were structured, in circumstances where H had largely kept such matters from her and she had not actively queried them. She found it difficult to answer questions about how she will manage financially in the future which, again, I thought was unsurprising given that (i) her case about non-disclosure has not been determined and (ii) she does not know what she will have. I did not think she was grasping; she recognised that she would have to live off whatever she has.

67. H, like W, was composed in his evidence. I was not convinced by his answers about the whiteboard, the trust and why he apparently has nothing to show for over twenty years of commitment as founder and CEO of a successful IT group of companies. Law on non-disclosure

68. In Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, Moylan LJ stated as follows: [86] My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. They are broad because, as I have sought to emphasise, non-disclosure can take a variety of forms and arise in a variety of circumstances from the very general to the very specific. My remarks are focused on the former, namely a broad failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in respect of a party’s financial resources, rather than the latter. [87] (i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by s 25 of the 1973 Act, the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non- disclosing party. [88] (ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party’s failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption said, should the court ‘engage in pure speculation’. As Otton LJ said in Baker v Baker, inferences must be ‘properly drawn and reasonable’. This was reiterated by Lady Hale in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415, [2013] 2 FLR 732, at para [85]: ‘… the court is entitled to draw such inferences as can properly be drawn from all the available material, including what has been disclosed, judicial experience of what is likely to be being concealed and the inherent probabilities, in deciding what the facts are.’ [89] (iii) This does not mean, contrary to Mr Molyneux’s submission, that the court is required to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket. There will be cases where this exercise will not be possible because, the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations, means that the court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources’, to repeat what Wilson LJ said in Behzadi v Behzadi. [90] (iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party’s non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called ‘the inherent probabilities’ the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome. This is, effectively, what Munby J did in both Al- Khatib v Masry and Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and, in my view, it is a legitimate approach. In that respect I would not endorse what Mostyn J said in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211, at para [16](vii). [91] This approach is both necessary and justified to limit the scope for, what Butler- Sloss LJ accepted could otherwise be, a ‘cheat’s charter’. As Thorpe J said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, although not the court’s intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party. This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para [7], that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para [16](viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the non- discloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations.

69. In Ditchfield v Ditchfield [2023] EWHC 2303 (Fam), I said this at para 15: “The potential consequences of failure to disclose have been clearly set out in a series of cases summarised in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, [2020] Fam 160, [2020] 1 FLR

225. The law is clear. The court is entitled, in the absence of full and frank disclosure, to draw adverse conclusions where appropriate and to the degree of specificity or generality deemed fit. A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party. As Thorpe J (as he then was) said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, at 367: ‘… if in consequence the obscurity of my final vision results in an order that is unfair to [the husband] it is better that than that I should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the wife.’ Law on trusts

70. In HO v TL [2023] EWFC 215 I attempted to summarise the relevant law in respect of trusts as follows: “

51. I approach the legal principles as follows: i) The test as set out in Charman v Charman [2005] EWCA Civ 1606 at para 13 is: “…whether the trustee would be likely to advance the capital immediately or in the foreseeable future”. ii) The court brings “a judicious mixture of worldly realism and of respect for the legal effects of trusts, the legal duties of trustees and, in the case of off-shore trusts, the jurisdictions of off-shore courts" (per Sir Mark Potter P in Charman v Charman (No.4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246, CA at para 57). iii) “The question is not one of control of resources; it is one of access to them”; per Lewison LJ in Whaley v Whaley [2011] EWCA Civ 617 at para

113. iv) The court must look at the facts realistically; Whaley (supra) at para

114. v) “The court will not put undue pressure on trustees to exercise their discretion in a particular way, but may frame an order which affords “judicious encouragement” to provide one spouse with the means to comply with the court’s view of the justice of the case: Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668”; Whaley (supra) at para 114 ibid. vi) Continuing at para 114, Lewison LJ, referring to what was said in Thomas, stated that what would not be undue pressure would be if: a) The interests of the other beneficiaries would not be appreciably damaged; and b) The court decides that it would be reasonable for the husband to seek to persuade trustees to release more capital to enable him to make proper financial provision for his former wife. vii) In the same paragraph, Lewison LJ added that “…if the court makes such an order the trustees are not bound to comply with the husband’s request; but it is plainly proper for the trustees to take it into account…and commonly it will be decisive”, citing Lewin on Trusts 18th ed. viii) The court is not bound to accept the say so of trustees; SR v CR [2009] 2 FLR 1083 per Singer J at para

60. ix) Although overseas trustees may reasonably wish not to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, “it is hard to see why participation by the trustees in a helpful or meaningful way in the court’s inquiry qua witness could be construed as a submission to the jurisdiction”; BJ v MJ (Financial Remedy: Overseas Trusts) [2011 EWHC 2708 (Fam) per Mostyn J at para

21. x) The ordinary rule of evidence is that the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence and/or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue on the action; Wisnieswki (a Minor) v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] EWCA Civ 596, as applied by Moor J in R v B [2017] EWFC

33. In Manzi v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1882 Sir Ernest Ryder SPT made plain that there is no obligation to draw an adverse inference; instead, the court has the discretion to do so. Whether it should will depend on the facts of the case; at the very least, the judge might be less inclined to attach full weight to what the trustees say if they decline to attend qua witness when they could offer considerable assistance on a particular issue. xi) Relevant factors when determining whether the Charman test is met include: a) The nature and purpose of the trusts. Trust documents, including settlement deeds and letters of wishes, will be informative, but so too may be evidence within the family as to the working of the trust, and their expectations therefrom. b) Whether the husband or wife is a main or principal beneficiary, or merely one among many minor beneficiaries of similar standing. c) Whether distributions to a party would appreciably damage other beneficiaries. d) The history of distributions or loans to a party, including how often they have been made, for what purpose, and whether requests for funds have been turned down. Where loans have been made, the terms of repayment and security may require scrutiny. e) The value of the overall trust funds, and the quantum of monies sought to be provided from that source. f) Whether the trust funds are fully liquid (e.g. in investment portfolios) or tied up in private businesses and potentially difficult to realise. g) Whether the beneficiary has a close relationship with the trustees (or, protector, should there be one). h) The extent of explanation, information and documentation provided by the trustees, and whether they declined to attend court in a witness capacity. Analysis

71. I have read two large bundles, received oral evidence from the parties and received helpful written and oral submissions.

72. I am satisfied, having considered all the evidence and submissions in the round, that H has not been fully truthful and honest in his presentation. In my judgment, he has the ability to access resources which have not been disclosed. Such assets may be held within trusts, or in some other structure, or by persons on his behalf. I say this for the reasons set out in the succeeding paragraphs. Necessarily, judgments are linear in that they follow a sequence, but I have considered each piece of evidence within the context of the whole picture.

73. I have concluded above that the words on the whiteboard accurately reflect the true position, namely that H is the ultimate beneficial owner of the A Trust. I do not accept H’s explanation for the whiteboard. Either he wrote it, or it was written by someone at his direction. Since H flatly disputes any involvement in the trust, it follows that, in my judgment, his presentation about the trust is false. I consider the whiteboard to be critical evidence. It establishes the true position. And H’s denial of that position infects his evidence on disclosure generally.

74. It is relevant, in this context, that an email from H to Mr KM dated 10 July 2021 says that Mr KM is the administrator of “my family trust” [emphasis added]. Given that H abjures any involvement in the trust, the use of the word “my” is telling. He could have said “the family trust” or “my family’s trust” but he did not. I accept that this by itself might be of limited significance, but when viewed in conjunction with other evidence about the trust, it seems to me to have greater import.

75. Although H points out that no assets have been bought in either his or W’s sole name other than the cottage in England, I agree with W’s case that H throughout marriage deliberately sought to distance himself from personal wealth so as to minimise tax and scrutiny. His modus operandi is to run his financial affairs through complex multi-national structures which shield him from the scrutiny of tax and other authorities. That is not of itself nefarious; where done in accordance with the laws of the relevant jurisdiction(s), it is a legitimate means of asset protection. It does, however, make the process of establishing his true wealth more difficult without complete and transparent disclosure by H.

76. The structure of the trust is in one sense beguilingly simple. There are full discretionary powers as to distribution of capital and income. There are powers to add and exclude beneficiaries. There are powers to change trustees. There are powers for the Protector to be replaced. The current beneficiary, Mr W (like the beneficiary before him) is a professional, and not, in reality someone who would receive any benefits. It is a boilerplate trust deed with named professionals, but no family members (including H) are named, nor is there any linked class of beneficiaries. It could hardly be more flexible, and its simplicity enables H to assert that he has no connection with it.

77. Mr KM is the named Settlor and Protector. He is a professional trustee. He also a director of one of the Group companies. He is a direct link between the trust and the Group. On the evidence before me, he simply does H’s bidding. As referred to above, he deals with requests by H for transfers of money from the Group for personal and business purposes. There is no suggestion that his approval is required, or that he queries or refuses what H asks of him. I am confident that he simply acts on H’s instructions; he is a cipher for H. In respect of the trust, H accepted that Mr KM would do what H asks of him, although he suggested that Mr KM would want F involved as well. If H can require the trustee to act in a particular way, this rather gives the lie to the constant refrain that the trust is nothing to do with him.

78. I do not accept that the trust is for the benefit of the six grandchildren as the only, or primary beneficiaries. If that is the case, there is not a document anywhere to say so. H told me that Mr KM and Mr W are well aware who the beneficiaries are. If so, it seems to me that they should have been called to give evidence. Mr KM would likely have been of assistance on the trust more generally had he been called to give oral evidence about who the beneficiaries are, the wider nature and purpose of the trust, what assets it holds, how it was funded and so on. Further, H might have sought to adduce oral evidence from his siblings and/or the grandchildren, but has not done so. Finally, I note that none of these grandchildren appear to have received any benefit from the trust, including during their education.

79. I have set out above how the trustees have responded to requests for information. I regard such responses as having been unhelpful. I am satisfied that H could have required them to provide full answers. There is no evidence that he made such a request to them. In my judgment, he has hidden behind the screen erected by the trustees which has been designed to prevent the court from having any access to information about the trust beyond the boilerplate trust deed. Given that W has from the very beginning made the trust a major plank of her non-disclosure case, the failure of H and the trustees to provide a proper exposition of the trust is telling and in my judgment permits the court to draw the inference that H has something to hide.

80. Nor has any evidence been provided about the first trust. I appreciate it was set up a long time ago, in 1997, but it seems to have been in existence until 2017 and there is nothing to inform the court as to how it operated, and in particular, what assets it held and how those assets were disposed of. There is nothing to assist me as to how the family operated this structure, and how it linked to the A Trust.

81. The terms of the trust deed enable H to benefit. He is not irrevocably excluded from benefiting. There is nothing to stop H being appointed as beneficiary under the terms of the trust; Mr KM would act as H wishes. Once that step is taken, there is nothing to stop distributions being made to H and again Mr KM would act as H wishes. Even if there are other beneficiaries (and under the trust deed as it stands, there are not), distributions to H can be made without consideration of their interests (clause 5.1). These are almost identical to the steps referred to by Lewison LJ at paragraph 115 of Whaley (supra). H has not taken these steps because he has not needed to, and because it suits him not to be named.

82. In my judgment, the A Trust should be viewed in context. Its principal (but not necessarily only) asset is 50% (perhaps now 40%) of the Group. H was the co-founder with Mr CD, and has been the CEO and driving force. It would be surprising if H’s prima facie 50% entitlement was permanently alienated from him after it was founded in 1998, benefitting others in the family but not himself, even though he was married for twenty years and had financial responsibilities. I regard it as possible that H intended the grandchildren to benefit from his efforts upon his death, as he had no children himself, but the suggestion that he irrevocably excluded himself from being able to access any wealth in the trust seems improbable to me, and not made out on the evidence. It is all the more improbable when coupled with the evidence that H received not a penny of remuneration, instead drawing down on the loan such that his wealth ostensibly decreased during the marriage to nil, rather than increasing as one might expect of someone in his position, managing a business with turnover getting on for $1bn USD pa. He did not even leave himself (and by extension, W) with a rainy day fund other than, arguably, the house in England. To have relied upon an interest free, unsecured loan from a technology group with no assets was surprisingly cavalier unless, as in my judgment is the case, he had access to other resources.

83. It also seems improbable to me that the group companies did not generate, or were not intended to generate, monies to be extracted from the Group and sit in the trust for retention and, as may be necessary, distribution. That, one would have thought, would be sensible asset protection. Why leave it all in risky technology companies? For an income generative business, which, as H says, does not have tangible assets, it is surprising, if true, that no steps have been taken in good times to extract monies for the benefit of beneficiaries. If the aim of the trust is (as H claims) to protect the wealth of future generations, why has this not taken place, particularly when they were minors? It seems more likely to me that monies have been extracted in the past 20 years or so and passed up to H via the A Trust, or to its predecessor, or to some other family structure, or to be held for him by a family member.

84. In respect of the Group, I have set out above the blurring between personal and business finances, and the use of private monies to fund investments. There are likely to have been many other such examples over the years. H says that these were on behalf of the Group, but it seems to me to be likely that in some instances, like Mr CD or his brother G who took personal stakes and netted millions, he has had benefit therefrom. I note that in the case of S, acquired in 2023 for $500,000 USD, the wording on the whiteboard includes an arrow from H to S which is suggestive that he owned the investment.

85. I heard some evidence about the wealth of H’s siblings and his co-founder, Mr CD. Of course, everyone’s personal circumstances are different. But it is apparent that all of them are significantly wealthier than H, even though H was instrumental in helping them create at least part of their wealth. F is now divorced, but H thought he has up to $5m CAN in retirement accounts (there is no information about his wealth pre-divorce). E is also divorced and has a property in Canada; beyond that, there is no information. G has a property in Barbados worth, H thought, $4m USD and a house in the UK worth, H thought, £2m. Mr CD is said to be very wealthy.

86. W said in written evidence that when she asked H what provision would be made for her in the event of H predeceasing her, either by will or by insurance, he replied that “ [his brother and co-founder] will take care of you”. I asked H a specific question about what provision he intended for W in the event of his death and he replied that he expected his family to look after her. That seemed to me to be consistent with his wider family being able to access funds earmarked for H, from trust or other sources.

87. I have set out above my finding that, contrary to H’s case, there is at least one other trust in existence, the B Trust. I cannot say what it contains, but it had the resources to fund a particular investment. Again, this significant evidence is to be seen in the context of all the other evidence, as part of an emerging picture.

88. My overall conclusion is that H has concealed the true financial picture and that he has access to undisclosed assets in the A Trust and/or the B Trust and/or in some other structure and/or held by individuals on his behalf. To attempt to find exactly how, when and where this came about would be too speculative. In general terms it is likely to have come about through monies derived from the Group, and funnelled out to H, perhaps over a long time, but there may have been other resources (for example from the monies placed in the first trust by his father). I further conclude, in relation to trust provision, that the trustees would act upon his direction and there is no meaningful fetter on his ability to access whatever funds may be available.

89. Having carefully considered the way forward, I have concluded that to adjourn the proceedings for a SJE report on the Group would not be the right course of action. At one level, it is tempting to invite a SJE to burrow down into the Group. However, that will take time and cost money. W in her evidence gave me the clear impression that she would like to bring matters to a close. Both parties need an end to this debilitating litigation. If, as appears to be the case, the business is in a rapid decline and in whole or in part is in the hands of insolvency practitioners, it is hard to see what a SJE would add.

90. Despite my findings about H’s non-disclosure, there is some reliable, albeit incomplete, evidence that the Group is in significant difficulties. It has a mountain of debt. Growth has slowed. Insolvency practitioners are involved., There is nothing to indicate how much can be salvaged, or whether it will recover.

91. Doing the best I can, and balancing the problems facing the Group with my findings about H’s undisclosed wealth, I have reached the conclusion that H’s wealth measures a few million pounds rather than running into the tens of millions.

92. It seems to me that application of the so called sharing principle is not straightforward here. The scale of wealth is not securely founded by clear documentary evidence, and it may be that the Group has little value. Further, although the parties were married for a long time, it appears to me that there was a significant degree of pre-marital wealth in the form of (i) the USD $10m loan and (ii) the Group which was already established.

93. In my judgment the better approach is to approach this case by reference to W’s needs. In reality, that is how both parties have approached it, and it is the most practical way to resolve their finances.

94. I consider it reasonable for W to retain the cottage in England. It is not grand, but comfortable and she wishes to remain there. Reasonable alternatives in the bundle before me are in the same ballpark figure. H’s alternatives seemed to me to be thoroughly mean.

95. H must undertake not to enforce the £2.7m owed by W/her company to him, and in any event to indemnify her. It costs him nothing to do so, and ensures that there will be no civil proceedings.

96. H must pay £525,000 to clear W’s debts. That is a need; if it is not paid, the creditors will likely enforce sale. And the incurring of costs is in large part due to W’s attempts to establish the true financial picture. Had H accepted the trust was accessible, and had a full picture of the trust been given at an early stage of proceedings, this case would have taken a rather different course over the last year or so.

97. That leaves income needs. I disregard the sum of £128,000pa for the horses. That is her passion, but I do not think H should be responsible for it. It is far from clear to what extent W will actually compete, and to attempt to run an equestrian business to cover that level of horse expenditure is optimistic. It is a matter for W how she exercises her earning capacity, but to expect H to fund the annual horse costs is not reasonable.

98. That leaves the personal budget of £150,000pa, which includes the cost of running the main part of the cottage and the annexe. That can be trimmed a little, but broadly seems reasonable to me. Against that I will apply an earning capacity of about £25,000pa net, and £15,000pa net from rent, leaving a need of about £110,000 which I round down to £100,000pa on the basis that some expenditure can reasonably be pared down.

99. A clean break is clearly desirable. I do not consider that it should be calculated on a whole life basis; the marriage was for 20 years, W is still relatively young and has time to rebuild, and the parties do not have children. In my judgment it is right to capitalise on a 20 year term, broadly equal to the length of the marriage; the sum of £100,000pa per At A Glance is £1,590,000; taking account of £40,000 in her bank accounts reduces the figure to £1,550,000. In 20 years, W will be 67 and H

77. W can, of course, stretch her budget for longer by spending less. She should have the benefit of the state pension (which is no longer included in the Duxbury Tables within the capitalised figure). And she can trade down her house at that point if necessary.

100. H’s needs, in my judgment, are met. He has access to undisclosed wealth. If the outcome is unfavourable to him, he only has himself to blame. He has a track record as a successful businessman and entrepreneur and I anticipate that he will be able to revive his business activities.

101. I will therefore make the following order: i) W to retain the house. ii) H to indemnify re the monies advanced by him from the loan to fund W’s business. iii) H to pay two lump sums to W: a) £525,000 to clear W’s debts, plus any accrued interest on the litigation loan(s) from 30 January 2026 onwards. b) The capitalised sum of £1,550,000. iv) I will not reduce this by any sums paid to W by H since separation as it seems to me that I have dealt with the case on the basis of her present needs. I will hear submissions on time for payment, but the £525,000 needs to be prioritised because of the involvement of a litigation lender in funding W’s costs. v) Until payment of the second lump sum of £1,550,000 H shall pay interim maintenance of £100,000pa (reduced pro rata by any part payment). vi) My provisional view is that there should be no order as to costs. vii) Chattels to be divided by agreement.

102. In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the totality of the evidence before me, and to the criteria set out at s25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.