R v Clive Moore & Anor

__________________ Wednesday 11 February 2026 THE LADY CHIEF JUSTICE: Introduction

1. The appellants, Clive Moore and Edwin White, appeal against their convictions with leave of the single judge. Clive Moore was convicted of doing an act intending to pervert the course of public justice. Edwin White was convicted of two counts of fraud and one count of doing an act intending to pervert the course of public justice. White had also pleaded guilty to a further count of using a false instrument before the trial began. The trial was held in the Crown Court at Gloucester and concluded on 28 August 2024.

2. Before the trial, both appellants applied for the indictment to be stayed. They submitted that to try the case would amount to an abuse of the process of the court because the police unit which had investigated the allegations (the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department ("IFED" of the City of London Police ("COLP")) was funded by a sponsored services agreement ("SSA") between the police authority for COLP and the Association of British Insurers ("ABI"). It was not suggested, nor has it been suggested before us on appeal, that a fair trial was not possible. Rather, it was said, and is submitted again on appeal before us, that trying the offences investigated in this way was so inimical to the interests of justice that it would be improper to do so. That application was refused by the trial judge. It is that refusal which forms the basis for this appeal. The Facts

3. The case arose out of a reported road traffic collision between two vehicles: an Aston Martin belonging to and being driven by White, and a Peugeot belonging to and being driven by a third person, a co-accused at trial, Nicholas Ralph. Ralph was convicted of one count of fraud and also one count of doing an act intending to pervert the course of public justice. He has not sought to appeal against his convictions.

4. On 4 May 2018, White and Ralph called their respective insurers claiming that their vehicles had been involved that day in an accidental collision. The version of events presented to the insurers was that the Peugeot being driven by Ralph had hit a pothole and had veered across the road into the path of White's oncoming Aston Martin. Each vehicle was said to be written off. Each appellant told their insurance company that Ralph was responsible for the collision. They each claimed under their respective insurance policy for what they asserted to be the value of their written-off vehicles. Moore was eventually named by White as a witness to events and made a statement in support of White's insurance claim.

5. The prosecution case at trial, as accepted by the jury, was that these were fraudulent claims. They were able to establish that the value of the Aston Martin was inflated by White in his claim; that the damage to the vehicles was not consistent with the account of the collision presented by the appellants and Ralph; that the electronic systems of the Aston Martin established that the driver's airbag in that vehicle had not been activated in a collision, as claimed by White; and that the driver's seatbelt could not have been worn by White at the time of a collision, as he had claimed.

6. No further rehearsal of the facts or the evidence is required as, as we have indicated, the sole ground of appeal does not relate to the rulings or directions of the judge at trial or the sufficiency or quality of the evidence. The Application before the Trial Judge and his Ruling

7. The basis of the application for a stay was that these allegations were investigated by the IFED. That unit, which investigates insurance fraud countrywide, is entirely funded by money provided by the ABI, a representative body for British insurance companies. The appellants asserted: first, that this funding arrangement was unlawful; and secondly that, lawful or not, it risked an improper shift of resources away from other police investigations, compromised police independence, and created an appearance of bias and of compromised police integrity. This was said to make any prosecution of an offence investigated by IFED an abuse of the process of the court.

8. The judge, in rejecting the application, identified the two limbs on which a court can hold that a trial on an indictment amounts to an abuse of process. Limb 1 is a case in which a defendant cannot receive a fair trial. That, he said, did not apply here. A fair trial of these appellants was perfectly possible. Limb 2, relied upon by the appellants, is where a stay is necessary to protect the integrity of the courts and the criminal justice system. The judge concluded that this case did not justify a stay under limb 2 whether the SSA was lawful or made ultra vires. Having reached that conclusion, he decided that he did not need to determine whether or not the SSA was lawful, for any conclusion on that would not affect his ruling. He rejected the argument that the SSA led to the improper prioritisation of work of this nature over other police work. The SSA did not have the effect of diverting resources away from other work. Rather, it provided resources for an area of policing which otherwise might not be funded or might be inadequately funded. There was, in any event, he found, a strong public interest in the police investigating insurance fraud, as a failure to investigate such crime would likely lead to an increase in fraudulent claims and a resultant rise in insurance premiums. This rise in premiums would affect most people in this country. He concluded that the public would be encouraged and not concerned at the thought of the insurance companies making a financial contribution to police investigations of this sort, thereby ensuring that more fraud of this nature was investigated properly. The judge accepted that this could not happen at the expense of fairness, but noted that there was no direct connection between the SSA and the investigation in question. Fairness was not compromised, he stated. There was no conduct, in his judgment, so egregious as to merit a stay. The Appellant’s Submissions before this Court

9. As to lawfulness, the appellants accept that the term "gift" in section 93 of the Police Act 1996 is wider than the meaning of an unconditional gift, but distinguishes between lawful commercial sponsorship and contracts for services. Mr Vaitilingam KC, for the appellants, emphasises the difference, in his submission, between a contract of sponsorship, which is legitimate and acceptable, versus, on the other hand, a contract for services. His submission is that the SSA "goes way beyond a contract of sponsorship". He points to ACPO guidance in force in 2011 (at the time of the SSA), and particularly to section 5, which deals with sponsorship. He took us to paragraph 5.5.3, where there was a statement that sponsorship should not be there to fund "core police functions". He also took us to a revised Financial Management Code of Practice 2018, and in particular to Annex A where under the heading "Income" it is stated: "However, it is not acceptable to receive a gift that is linked to a police investigation; for example, a force should not accept a share of compensation that resulted (either directly or indirectly) from an investigation undertaken by the force."

10. Mr Vaitilingham also emphasised aspects of the witness statement of DCI Hill of COLP, where DCI Hill recognised, amongst other things, that IFED existed because insurance fraud was not otherwise a priority. His evidence was to the effect that almost all cases coming to COLP came from the ABI at a rate of around 200 cases a year. The statement also identified the making of decisions as to what to investigate by reference to an intelligence document produced by the Insurance Fraud Bureau ("IFB"). The submission was that COLP's decision as to whether or not to investigate or to prosecute here was informed by risk assessments and documents produced by the IFB. In short, the submission for the appellants is that the arrangement between the ABI and COLP under the SSA was to provide funding to allow IFED to operate under an arrangement that was unlawful.

11. As for abuse, the appellants' case is that the funding arrangement in the SSA, whether unlawful or not, carried with it risks. Such risks included the shifting of resources away from mainstream policing towards the niche needs of a third party funder; potential compromise of the police's operational independence; the suggestion that there would be at least the appearance of bias in that the type of cases being covered by the funding might be regarded as being given unwarranted priority over other work; and that there might be the appearance to the public of compromised police integrity.

12. Reliance is placed by the appellants, at least in their written submissions, on the authority of R v Hounsham [2005] EWCA Crim 1366. In that case risks of this nature emanating from a private funding arrangement were identified. Reference is also made to R v Zinga [2014] EWCA Crim 52; [2014] 3 All ER

90. There the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas, urged that consideration be given urgently as to how the police should react to an offer of assistance by a commercial enterprise in the field of confiscation and compensation claims. The appellants accept that they cannot quantify any change in operational policing decisions which might have resulted from the SSA, but invite us to conclude that it is inevitable that some of these risks as identified must have materialised. The contention is that the funding arrangement in the SSA is so far removed from normal funding arrangements in place for policing that it creates a perception that the right to have cases investigated has been purchased by those who can afford it at the expense of the rights of those who cannot. This should be viewed as undermining the integrity of the criminal justice system to such an extent that the indictment should have been stayed. There is, as we have identified, nothing particular about the facts of this investigation or prosecution to which the appellants can point or upon which they can rely. Their submission is that all cases investigated by this policing unit are equally undermined.

13. In his oral submissions, Mr Vaitilingham put the abuse point very succinctly. His position was that the police had approached the ABI, notwithstanding the warnings in Hounsham. His submission is that there was a clear breach of the guidance so given and that the relationship created by virtue of the SSA created an obvious danger by means of the accepting of resources from victims. The Respondent's Submissions

14. Mr Badenoch KC, for the respondent, resists the appeal. He submits that the SSA was properly entered into by the relevant police authority using the power to do so in section 93 of the Police Act 1996. He points to the broad drafting in section 93 and he submits that, whilst the ACPO guidance and the revised financial management guidance might be targeting commercial sponsorship in a more traditional sense, nothing in either of those documents, which were in any event guidance only, in terms prohibited the provision of cash for investigative purposes, as envisaged under section

93.

15. Beyond the question of lawfulness, the submission for the respondent, in short, is that the concerns expressed by the appellants are not justified on the facts of this case and that in all the circumstances the judge was right to refuse the application for a stay. Mr Badenoch emphasised that the facts of the cases in Hounsham and Zinga are very far removed from the facts of the present case. Amongst other things, Hounsham was a case about the soliciting of funds by alleged victims – an issue which does not arise here.

16. Finally, in terms of submissions, we record that the court allowed the City of London Corporation to intervene in this appeal to the extent of providing written submissions. The City of London Corporation, through its Common Council, is the police authority and local policing body responsible for COLP. Its written submissions effectively support the position of the respondent and argue that we should uphold the decision of the trial judge. They helpfully summarise the features of the funding arrangement in the SSA, and its consequences, that are said to justify the conclusion that there was no abuse of process here. The Law on Abuse of Process

17. The law on abuse of process was recently considered by this court in R v Ng and O’Reilly [2024] EWCA Crim

493. When considering whether a judge had been right to refuse to adjourn a trial when there was no prosecutor available to prosecute it, the court said: "21. In summary, the power to stay criminal proceedings as an abuse of process is an important though exceptional remedy to be exercised with care and restraint. A stay of proceedings is the exception, not the rule; it is a measure of last resort.

22. There are two species (or limbs) of abuse justifying a stay, each of which is separate and distinct. The first is when a fair trial is not possible. The second is where it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety, or public confidence in the criminal justice system would be undermined, for the defendant to be tried in the particular circumstances of the case. The abuse must amount to an affront to the public conscience.

23. Within the second category fall cases where the police or prosecuting authorities have engaged in misconduct. Category 2 abuse is by its nature very rarely found – such cases will be 'very exceptional'". As it was put in R v BKR at [34], the second limb does not arise 'unless the defendant, charged with a criminal offence, will receive a fair trial …. It seems clear that something out of the ordinary must have occurred before a criminal court may refuse to try a defendant charged with a criminal offence when that trial will be fair'".

24. There is a two-stage approach when considering limb 2 abuse. First, it must be determined whether and in what respect the prosecutorial authorities have been guilty of misconduct, such as very serious examples of malpractice and unlawfulness (as opposed to state incompetence or negligence). Secondly, it must be determined whether such misconduct justifies a stay on the ground of abuse of process. This requires an evaluation on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, weighing in the balance the public interest in ensuring that those charged with crimes should be tried against the competing public interest in maintaining confidence in the criminal justice system.

25. Unfairness to the defendant is not required; rather the focus should be on whether the court's sense of justice and propriety is offended or public confidence in the criminal justice system would be undermined. Equally, a stay should not be imposed for the purpose of punishing or disciplining prosecutorial misconduct. The focus must be on whether a stay is appropriate in order to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system."

18. Thus, the ultimate question for us is whether the court's sense of justice and propriety is offended or whether public confidence in the criminal justice system would be undermined by allowing a prosecution to proceed in these circumstances such that a stay is necessary in order to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system. The Funding Arrangement in the SSA

19. The funding agreement in this case purports to be made pursuant to section 93 of the Police Act 1996, which provides: "93 Acceptance of gifts and loans.

1. A local policing body may, in connection with the discharge of any of its functions, accept gifts of money, and gifts or loans of other property, on such terms as appear to the body to be appropriate.

2. The terms on which gifts or loans are accepted under subsection one may include terms providing for the commercial sponsorship of any activity of the local policing body or of the police force maintained by it."

20. The SSA was entered into by the Mayor and Commonality and Citizens of the City of London on 19 October 2018. It followed on from previous similar agreements made between the same parties in 2011, 2013 and 2015. The SSA addresses the issue of independence. Paragraph H of the recital records that: "The authority has agreed that the Commissioner may take such actions as he deems in his absolute discretion necessary to provide the service in accordance with this agreement". The issue of independence is further addressed at paragraph 2.6 of the SSA itself: "Nothing in this agreement shall in any way fetter, or otherwise restrict, the operational independence of the Commissioner." Further, at paragraph 20: "Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as to deem the Commissioner nor any key personnel or other police officer or the authority or any subcontractors or employees to be an employee, servant, partner or joint venturer of the ABI."

21. The second schedule to the agreement also provides for a mechanism to determine the amount of money to be provided by the ABI in any particular year: "The budget for the first year of the term … shall be capped at GBP £3,871,500 for year one of the service. Thereafter the budget and budget cap may be increased in line with the retail price index for each of the remaining two years of the term." Analysis

22. Like the judge, we do not consider it necessary to determine outright the question of the lawfulness of the SSA under section 93 of the Police Act 1996. However, we do consider that it is far from clear that the SSA was made ultra vires the police authority's powers. Although the term "gift" is often used to mean the provision of money or property without any condition or expectation attached to it, that is evidently not the meaning given to it by section 93: see section 93(2) in particular.

23. Against that background, and without making any final determination on the question, there is, in our judgment, considerable force in the submission that the natural meaning to be attached to the word "gift" in section 93 is wide enough to cover situations such as this. The ACPO guidance and the revised Financial Management Guidance upon which the appellants rely focus on a different type of commercial sponsorship, and neither guidance in terms prohibits the provision of cash for investigative purposes as such. DCI Hill's statement, whilst helpful on the question of abuse, provides little assistance on the question of statutory interpretation.

24. Against that background we turn to the question of abuse of process. We have considered the terms of the SSA with care. We find nothing about the SSA which offends the court's sense of justice and propriety such that public confidence in the criminal justice system would be undermined by allowing a prosecution to proceed in these circumstances such that a stay is necessary in order to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system.

25. In particular, we note the following features: i) The money is being provided by the ABI to COLP and not directly to IFED. It is an arm's length agreement entered into by the police authority with a duty to consider overall policing needs and not just the requirements of this particular policing unit. ii) This is not the only agreement of its type. DCI Hill's witness statement details funding provided by the Intellectual Property Office for the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit, and UK Finance for the Dedicated Card and Payment Crime Unit. Agreements such as this are being used as an attempt to enhance the amount of money available to investigate categories of crime for which otherwise the amount of funding which could be made available might be limited. There is, as the judge noted, a strong public interest in the police investigating insurance frauds of this type. Further, the money being provided is to advance an extant interest of the police and the public in investigating fraud. It is not a question of inducing police activity in an area in which there would not otherwise be police interest. iii) There is transparency about the SSA. It is made in writing; it is open to inspection. The police authority which entered into it is answerable to Parliament, thus ensuring accountability. iv) The money is being provided to the policing unit by a trade body and not by individual insurance companies. The body has no financial interest in the outcome of any particular investigation. No individual insurer who might have an interest in any particular investigation being advanced has provided funding directly. v) None of the money payable under the SSA has been advanced to further a particular investigation. There is no risk that a particular investigation will be advanced by COLP over another investigation due to any financial incentive from the funding process. vi) The funding was a fresh revenue stream. It could not have had the effect of diverting funding from other police investigations, thereby creating the appearance or reality of unfair prioritisation of investigations on the basis that the funder of this unit was receiving preferential treatment. vii) The police have clear independence of action guaranteed by the SSA itself. This is addressed by paragraph H of the recital to the agreement and paragraphs 2.6 and 20 of the SSA itself. The involvement of another body – here the IFB – in the strategic monitoring and oversight of the unit does not materially undermine this independence. viii) There is no element of day-to-day management of the manner in which frauds of this nature are conducted by the funder. Responsibility for policing rests firmly with the Commissioner and the officers under his or her command. ix) There is no duty placed on the police to investigate only those crimes where the alleged victim is a member of the ABI. The vast majority of investigations undertaken will inevitably emanate from ABI. That is a reflection of the breadth and depth of its membership from the British insurance industry. There is no risk that the funder has bought some form of exclusivity by virtue of providing money, and IFED has in fact pursued matters in which no ABI member firm has any interest. x) The amount of money due under the SSA is fixed in advance for the entirety of the contract. There is a formula for determining what it will be year on year by reference to the retail price index. There can be no reasonable suspicion that there is any incentive element to the money due and paid.

26. In reaching our conclusion we are of course alive to the risks of private funding identified by this court in Hounsham. There Gage LJ stated as follows: "31. … In our judgement, soliciting by the police of funds from potential victims of fraud, or any other crime, quite apart from being ultra virus police powers, is a practise which is fraught with danger. It may compromise the essential independence and objectivity of the police when carrying out a criminal investigation. It might lead to police officers being selective as to which crimes to investigate and which not to investigate. It might lead to victims persuading a police investigating team to act partially. It might also lead to investigating officers carrying out more thorough preparation of the evidence in a case of a 'paying' victim; or a less careful preparation of the evidence in the case of a non contributing victim. In short, it is a practise which, in our judgement, would soon lead to a loss of confidence in a police forces ability to investigate crime objectively and impartially."

27. However, we note that the facts of that case were markedly different from the facts of the case before us, as were the facts in Zinga. In Hounsham, the funding was actively sought by junior police officers for the very purposes of furthering a particular investigation. The money was to allow for the investigation to proceed to the stage of interviewing the suspects for which activity the police did not have adequate funding at the time. Against that background, the concerns of Gage LJ are obvious and entirely understandable. There was a very close connection in that case between the provision of the funds and a particular investigation. An individual approach such as occurred there carried with it a number of risks, including the appearance of bias, and the possibility that the police would for financial reasons favour that investigation over another. The features of the SSA which we have already identified are enough to allay the concerns expressed in Hounsham. It is of note that even in Hounsham, despite these concerns, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to stay the indictment. The court said at [33]: "… we are not persuaded that this conduct was such that the judge was wrong to refuse a stay."

28. The arguments advanced in this case are significantly less strong than those advanced in Hounsham for the reasons that we have given.

29. We have thus reached the conclusion that the judge was entitled to find that this was not a case of abuse of process, without deciding outright whether the funding agreement was lawful or made ultra vires the powers of the police authority. We are satisfied that the judge was right to refuse the application, whether or not the SSA was lawfully made. The unlawfulness of an agreement does not mean that any prosecution in which the funding for the investigation has been provided pursuant to it amounts to an abuse of process. As we have already concluded, it is far from clear that the SSA was unlawful in any event. Conclusion

30. For these reasons, there is nothing about the SSA or the manner in which it was operated which renders the prosecution of these two appellants an affront to justice such that the judge should have stayed the indictment as an abuse of process.

31. Both appeals against conviction are accordingly dismissed. ________________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: [email protected] ______________________________