R v Daniel Mihaai Popescu

LADY JUSTICE MACUR:

1. On 4 April 2024, Daniel Mihai Popescu (“the appellant”) pleaded guilty to attempted murder and stalking, contrary to section 2A(1) and (4) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. On 28 May 2024, he was sentenced for the attempted murder, to an extended determinate sentence of 20 years 4 months, pursuant to section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising a custodial term of 17 years 4 months and an extended licence period of 3 years. No separate penalty was imposed in regard to the stalking offence.

2. He appeals against sentence by leave of the Single Judge. He is represented by Mr Aubrey KC who appeared also in the court below. We are grateful to Mr Aubrey for his concise and focused submissions both in writing and amplified orally before us today. The Facts

3. The appellant and Andreea Pintili commenced a relationship in September 2020 and separated in August 2023. Andreea was pregnant with the appellant’s child. However, the appellant became fixated with Andreea and began stalking her. He would constantly telephone repeatedly from a withheld number. On 27 October 2023 he saw Andreea at her local train station where he pleaded with her to reconcile. The following day he followed her onto the train. He took a picture of her son and placed it on TikTok. On 31 October he put two bags of his clothing outside her address and left a voicemail message saying: “Don’t touch my clothes, I’m not going from the street until you get back together with me”, he then continually knocked on her window. He was arrested and released on bail with a condition not to contact Andreea.

4. Andreea moved to an address in Aberfan in an attempt to escape him. He obviously discovered her whereabouts and on 30 November waited for her as she took a train to work and again pleaded with her to reconcile. Andreea saw the appellant later that afternoon visiting her new address.

5. The appellant told the friend he was staying with at the time that he was going to stab Andreea’s new partner. That friend gave evidence that he was aware of the appellant leaving the house every day between 4.00 am and 5.00 am to travel to Aberfan to look for Andreea’s new partner.

6. On 1 December the appellant sent messages to his sister in Romania saying: “What can I say? Andreea got back with her ex. I haven’t been in work for a week. I’ve been following them every day, and today I found out where it is.” Another message read: “Yes, whores must die. Why should they put my son under his name? Not once in a lifetime will that ever happen.” He also said that he would either “Go to jail or kill myself if I can.”

7. In the morning of 5 December the appellant, armed with a knife travelled to the road in Aberfan where Andreea was living. He hid behind a parked car. Andreea, returning home after escorting her children to school, was approached from behind and grabbed by her arm. She was 37 weeks’ pregnant at the time and instinctively held her arms over her stomach. The appellant told Andreea he had a knife and would kill her if she did not follow his instructions which were to go into her house. Andreea fell to the floor as she tried to break free, at which point the appellant started to stab her and did so several times. A Ms Kira Terrett was out walking her dog nearby and saw what was happening. She screamed and ran towards them to try to help, at which point the appellant fled.

8. Andreea was taken to hospital. She had three superficial defensive wounds to her thumb, a penetrating wound to the right side of her back, measuring 3 to 5 centimetres in length and 1 centimetre in depth and another penetrating wound to the left side of her back with the same measurements. There was a further wound to superficial tissues of her back. At hospital she received morphine, and the wounds were closed with deep sutures. Fortunately, a scan confirmed that her unborn child was unharmed and she was discharged from hospital the following day.

9. In her victim impact statement Andreea said she felt “lucky to be alive after this harrowing experience”. When she felt him stabbing her in the back she thought “that was it” and she was going to die. She is convinced that if Ms Terrett had not witnessed the attack and screamed at the appellant he would have continued until her death. She remained very anxious about what the appellant had done and had sleepless nights and nightmares just thinking about it. She continued to feel anxious whenever she left the house and relived the day repeatedly. She had been physically unwell due to the injuries sustained to her back, but the scars that remained were a constant reminder of what the appellant had done. The attack had affected her social life and undermined her confidence completely. She felt she would never be safe from the appellant and felt scared and anxious at the thought that she is the mother of his child and, once released, his sole intention will be to locate and kill her and the child.

10. The appellant was of previous good character. The judge had regard to a pre-sentence report and the psychiatric report which was prepared on the appellant’s fitness to plead.

11. Sentencing the appellant the judge realistically identified the lead offence of the attempt murder and said that she proposed to sentence in respect of that offence to reflect the overall offending as indicated by the stalking that had taken place, and the charge under section 2A of the Act. She had regard to the Overarching Sentencing Guideline on Domestic Abuse. She determined that the attempt murder fell within category B2. Category B (high culpability) because the appellant took a knife to the scene intending to use it and having used it to commit the offence and furthermore the fact the offence was planned or premeditated.

12. In relation to harm, although she found Andreea’s physical injuries were not of the most serious type, that was entirely fortuitous. The harm intended was already reflected in the nature of the offence itself, that is attempted murder indicating an intention to kill. It was foreseeable that the repeated stab injuries might have caused serious physical or psychological harm. The contents of Andreea’s victim personal statement demonstrated that she had suffered serious physical or psychological harm , albeit not amounting to category 1 harm.

13. The judge found the offence was aggravated by the fact that the offence was committed while the appellant was on bail with a condition not to contact Andreea and it had been committed in a domestic context. Andreea was more vulnerable because she was 37 weeks’ pregnant and because of the risk to her unborn child. Although the appellant had desisted in his attack, the judge was satisfied to the appropriate standard that it was only because of the intervention of the passerby. Further, she found there was no true remorse.

14. In mitigation the judge took into account the psychiatric report and the appellant’s lack of previous convictions. The judge was satisfied that there was a significant risk that the appellant would commit further specified offences likely to cause serious physical or psychological harm to another and in particular a very high risk of serious harm towards Andreea and to any of her future partners.

15. If imposing a determinate sentence after trial, she concluded that the least period of imprisonment she would have imposed to reflect the overall offending, would have been one of 26 years. Allowing full one-third credit for his guilty plea the sentence would therefore be one of 17 years and 4 months. However, since that sentence did not fully address the risk that the appellant currently represented, it was necessary to impose an extended sentence in order to protect the public in the future with an extended licence period of 3 years which was imposed. The appeal

16. Realistically, Mr Aubrey concedes that there can be no appeal against the finding of dangerousnessor the imposition of an extended sentence. He acknowledges that this was an appalling and terrifying attack and does not seek to undermine that fact. His single and focused point on appeal is that the judge was wrong to categorise the lead offence as falling within B2 rather than within category B3 of the guidelines. Therefore, even taking into account the aggravating features of the case, the sentence was manifestly excessive.

17. The judge had determined that Andreea’s physical injuries were not of the most serious type. Mr Aubrey submits that Andreea’s victim personal statement did not establish that she had suffered serious psychological harm, beyond that incorporated in the expectation that anyone who had been the victim of an attempted murder would necessarily suffer some psychological harm to know that they had been the victim of such an attack. He argues out section 63(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020, to which the judge referred, and which requires the court to consider not only the harm caused but also that intended or foreseeably to be caused, distracted the judge. This was, after all, an offence of attempted murder where the intent to kill had been proved. The starting point for a category B3 case was one of 20 years with a range of 15 to

25. Discussion

18. We are satisfied that the correct categorisation of the physical harm occasioned to Andreea should be 3 rather than 2, as the judge found in her sentencing remarks. However, we disagree with Mr Aubrey’s submission regarding the judge’s categorisation of the psychological impact of the offence, which is not so easily traduced. In any event, the aggravating features of the offending as identified by the judge would, if this offence had been categorised as a B3 offence, undoubtedly uplift the starting point of 20 years towards the top of the range of 25 years.

19. In any event, we notice specifically that the sentencing guideline provides that: “For offences involving an extreme nature of one or more very high or high culpability factors a sentence higher than the offence range or an extended or life sentence may be appropriate.”

20. We have seen CCTV footage recording the appellant lying in wait behind a parked car and the commencement and continuation of his attack upon Andreea during which he repeatedly and determinately stabbed her. The judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant only desisted in his attack because of the passerby’s screams and obvious intent in running towards the scene to intervene. We agree, both with the judge and Mr Aubrey, that it was fortuitous that the injuries caused were not more severe.

21. This case featured, as Mr Aubrey recognised, both of the category B high culpability factors, namely that the offender took a knife to the scene explicitly intending to kill Andreea’s partner, but also implicitly Andreea and therefore necessarily the unborn child according to the appellant’s text message to his sister. There was premeditation and considerable planning involved.

22. We regard the CCTV footage to amply demonstrate and justify this as an offence involving “the extreme nature” of the culpability factors to call for a higher sentence than the offence range and an extended sentence. Consequently, whether the starting point of 26 years was arrived at by the judge by categorising the offence as falling within category B2 or B3, with appropriate uplift for the aggravating circumstances, this sentence is not manifestly excessive. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: [email protected]