R v Demi Leigh Greening
MR JUSTICE BENNATHAN: 1 On 7 May 2025 in the Crown Court at Kingston-Upon-Hull, the appellant pleaded guilty to offences of burglary and fraud. On 27 August 2025 before HHJ Thackray KC at the same court, the appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of escape and was sentenced for all three matters as follows: for burglary, 45 months' imprisonment; for...
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MR JUSTICE BENNATHAN: 1 On 7 May 2025 in the Crown Court at Kingston-Upon-Hull, the appellant pleaded guilty to offences of burglary and fraud. On 27 August 2025 before HHJ Thackray KC at the same court, the appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of escape and was sentenced for all three matters as follows: for burglary, 45 months' imprisonment; for fraud, 6 months' imprisonment, concurrent; for escape, 2 months' imprisonment, consecutive. That gave a total effective sentence of 47 months. The judge also made a restraining order. 2 The appellant was known to the complainant Maureen Algar, as she (the appellant) is a former partner of the complainant's housemate Wayne Lightfoot. When Mr Lightfoot first moved in with the complainant, the appellant stayed at the property for a few nights in February 2024. The complainant later asked her to leave. On 25 October 2024 the appellant attended the complainant's address with two men and asked to be let inside. She was refused entry. The complainant then heard a smash to the window and turned to see her housemate Mr Lightfoot clearing up glass. The complainant went into the back room to get the ventilator for her inhaler as she felt she could not breath. She left Mr Lightfoot attempting to stop the appellant and the two men from entering. The complainant sat on her bed to use her inhaler and the appellant walked into her room. The appellant took the complainant's purse from the coffee table and ran out of the house. The complainant tried to chase her, but moved slowly due to her age and her ill-health. 3 Mr Lightfoot closed the front door and the complainant called the police. She also contacted her bank, to inform them her purse had been stolen with her debit cards. She was told the bank card had been used twice, along with a further failed attempt. The total amount taken was £44.50. The unsuccessful transaction was for £35. Damage to the window was valued by the complainant at £98. 4 The appellant was arrested and gave a "no comment" interview. 5 While at court for a hearing of the burglary and fraud offences, the appellant jumped out of the dock and landed in the main court area, where she was detained by staff. This was the conduct that led to the escape charge. 6 The appellant was 26 years old at the time of sentence. She had 18 previous convictions for 34 offences spanning from March 2010 to November 2024. These included 12 theft and other similar offences. She had two previous convictions for burglary, both when she was before the youth court, and thus, she qualified for the mandatory minimum of three years under the "three strikes" provisions of section 314 of the Sentencing Act 2020. 7 The Judge did not have the benefit of a Pre-sentence Report. We have been supplied with a Pre-appeal Report ordered by the Single Judge. It tells of the appellant's very difficult start in life, the child of parents with drug and alcohol addictions, and her ending up in care. She too went on to become addicted to drugs. She expressed a degree of remorse for the burglary, though claimed the victims owed her money. She has worked fairly well in various jobs during her time of custody and has the possibility of a stable home with her paternal grandmother on release from custody. 8 The probation officer in a very full and careful report, for which we are very grateful, suggests that release from a custodial sentence under post-release licence would provide better supervision (with a possibility of recall if needs be) than a community sentence. The probation officer noted that the appellant's last Pre-sentence Report had been in September 2020, so some five years before she was sentenced for these matters. 9 Ms Algar, the complainant, made a victim impact statement. She struggles with her health and mostly spends her time in bed with breathing difficulties. The burglary broke a window she could not afford to have repaired. She felt that the appellant took advantage of her, knowing her ill-health, to steal from her. 10 In passing sentence, the Judge decided the burglary was category A culpability, due to the targeting of a vulnerable victim, and harm 1 because of the upset described by Ms Algar in her statement and the fact she was on the premises when the burglary took place. That categorisation leads to a starting point under the Sentencing Council guidelines of three years' imprisonment with a range of two to six years. The Judge noted the aggravating factors of the appellant attending the group, the later use of the bank card and her many previous convictions. The Judge noted the two earlier burglary convictions and the consequent three-strike provisions, but said he would give them little weight because the earlier offences were both when the appellant was under 18. He allowed some mitigation for the fact the appellant had "had some difficulties in life". The Judge decided the least sentence he could impose after trial was five years, that is 60 months, and he then deducted 25 per cent for the guilty pleas at the pre-trial preparation hearing, leading to a sentence of 45 months, with a concurrent term for the fraud, as we have already described. There are no Sentencing Council guidelines for the offence of escape. The judge passed a sentence of two months on the basis that the sentence would have been three months after trial, a figure already reduced to address totality. 11 The grounds of appeal argue that the Judge failed to have regard, or at least sufficient regard, to the fact the previous burglary convictions were some years before, when the appellant was a youth. The grounds submit further or in the alternative that the sentence passed was manifestly excessive. The criticism that the Judge paid too much heed to the youth court convictions can be dealt with shortly. As Judge Thackray said in terms, he did not take those offences very much into account. 12 Looking at the sentence overall, however, we have reached the conclusion that the starting point of five years for the burglary was too high. This was a young defendant who had had a desperately hard start in life and struggled with addiction and all the associated problems that brings. The full and grim details of her history are set out in detail in the report ordered by the Single Judge. In addition, although the Sentencing Council guidelines are an invaluable starting point, there are aspects of the burglary that are somewhat removed from the normal intrusion into a stranger's home. The account given by the appellant was of her believing, rightly or wrongly, that she was owed money by one or both of the occupants of the house, and her snatching the purse was by way of an unlawful reaction. 13 We do not lay down any matter of principle, nor do we belittle the suffering of the complainant in this case, a woman unable to defend herself or give chase, but it does seem to us that this aspect should have found some place in the Judge's reasoning. While we have every sympathy for judges in our busy crown courts wanting to get through their many cases, it may be that this case points towards the wisdom of ordering a pre-sentence report, even when custody is inevitable. 14 For all these reasons, we conclude that while the Judge was entitled to go above the three years' starting point, that balancing exercise should not have taken the sentence he would have imposed after trial as high as five years. 15 We, therefore, quash the sentence of 45 months for the offence of burglary on the basis the sentence after trial could have been four years. We reduce that by the agreed reduction for guilty plea to three years. The other sentences remain as they were, leading to a total sentence of three years, two months' imprisonment. To that extent and that extent alone, this appeal is allowed __________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. 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