R v JFH

(APPROVED) MRS JUSTICE JEFFORD:

1. The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this case. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. Further and for that reason, we anonymise the name of the appellant. If identified, his identity could lead to the identification of the victim. We will in the course of this judgment refer to him simply as 'the appellant'.

2. The appellant was born on 6 January 2008. On 25 September 2025, in the Crown Court at Bradford, the appellant (then aged 17) changed his plea to guilty on count 1, which charged him with causing grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

3. On 2nd October 2025, in the Crown Court at Bradford, the appellant was convicted following a trial on counts 3, 4 and

5. Those counts comprised three counts of sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. He was acquitted on count 2, a count of attempted rape.

4. On 21 November 2025, before the same court, the appellant was sentenced as follows: • On count 1 — an extended sentence of 10 years, comprised of a custodial term of 7 years and 8 months' detention and an extended licence period of 2 years and 4 months • On count 3 — 2 months' detention concurrent • On counts 4 and 5 — 2 years' detention concurrent

5. He now appeals against his sentence on count 1 with leave of the single judge. The Facts

6. The facts of these offences are truly horrific. The appellant and the complainant had known each other from school and had previously been in a relationship for around 6 months when they were both 15 years old. It was a relationship of boyfriend and girlfriend, but it involved no sexual element. The relationship had come to an end in October 2023 as the appellant's sexualised behaviour had been making the complainant feel uncomfortable.

7. In late January or early February 2025, the appellant and the complainant became friends again after the appellant had apologised for his earlier behaviour. There was no suggestion from either the appellant or the complainant that this relationship would be anything more than just simple friendship. The Crown's case at trial however was that the appellant did want to be more than just a friend to the complainant.

8. On 18 March 2025 the appellant and the complainant had been to a secluded wooded area in the Low Moor are of Bradford to walk the appellant's dog. The appellant subsequently lured the complainant back to the same location that night on the pretext of taking photographs of the sunset. The appellant set out with a bag which contained his camera, some cable ties and a claw hammer.

9. At the location the appellant was messing around, grabbing the complainant, and trying to scare her. This caused her to drop her mobile phone. When she bent down to pick up her mobile phone, the appellant threw her to the floor and began kneeing her, kicking her and beating her with the claw hammer. The complainant was screaming and telling the appellant to stop during the attack but he told the complainant to be quiet or he would get caught. The complainant managed to crawl away but the appellant grabbed her foot and dragged her along, telling her to stop fighting. During the struggle all of the complainant's upper clothing had come off.

10. The appellant thereafter kissed the complainant aggressively, causing her pain. He then touched her naked breasts and put his hands down her leggings and underwear, touching her vagina. The complainant fought back and moved to try to prevent the appellant from doing what he was doing.

11. The complainant was cold and she asked the appellant to get her coat for her. Eventually he did so and, as he walked away, the complainant took the chance to escape.

12. We note that the complainant was by this time alone, injured and half naked, in the dark, and without her phone. In the dark she had no idea where to go so she just ran. She fell into a body of water. Now soaking wet and cold, she hid in the water from the appellant until she could no longer hear footsteps or see a torch from the mobile phone.

13. When the complainant thought it was safe, she ran again, wet, cold, naked from the waist up, until she reached the main road. She went to the nearest house she could see. It was by then around 8 pm. The door to the house was opened by a man who described finding a half-naked young girl wearing a pair of trousers that looked soaked through and covered in blood. The complainant said that she had been attacked and asked for help. The householder took the complainant into his home and dialled

999. Police officers subsequently attended the address and the complainant named the appellant as her attacker.

14. The complainant was taken to hospital and her injuries were noted to consist of a fractured skull, facial fractures including a fracture to a cheekbone, a fracture to the lower part of her eye socket and the side of the eye socket, a fracture to her right forearm, fractures to the index and middle fingers of her hand, and a suspected fracture to another finger, and various cuts which required suturing or gluing, along with bruises and abrasions.

15. A forensic pathologist concluded that the complainant had been subjected to a very serious assault involving multiple blunt force impacts with a weapon such as a hammer including blunt force impacts to her head.

16. Following the attack, the appellant had been contacting various members of his family, apologising for what he had done and stating that he had just "flipped". A family member subsequently encouraged him to hand himself into the police. The appellant was arrested at 3.26 am on 19 March 2025, having telephoned the police and given them his location, stating that he was cold and had hurt his friend. The appellant was interviewed by police officers in relation to the offences and made no comment. The injuries

17. The complainant's facial fractures required surgery under general anaesthetic to repair a right orbito-zygomatic complex fracture. A metal plate was placed in her face. It still causes her pain, particularly in cold weather. To carry out the surgery, incisions were made in the eyelids, which will leave permanent scarring. The medical evidence was that the blunt force trauma caused a right traumatic mydriasis, causing uneven pupil size. Whilst it is not suggested that this is physically serious, it is likely to be a long-term condition. The fractures to her right hand and fingers have healed but she is unable to bend her index finger and it is occasionally painful. Despite physiotherapy, she is unlikely to regain the full range of movement.

18. There was no psychological evidence in relation to the complainant but it is inevitable that such a brutal attack on someone so young will have a profound and lasting impact. In her victim personal statement the complainant says that she is scared all the time. She is scared to leave the house, and, when she does, someone has to be with her or at least on the phone with her. She has nightmares and flashbacks. She describes an incident in which a teacher, wholly innocently, touched her arm and she "freaked out" and had to go home. She has scars on her head, face and body which serve as a constant reminder of what happened to her. She says: "I will never forget what he did to me and will have to live with this for the rest of my life." Particularly distressingly, she still asks herself what she did wrong to cause this attack on her, and we cannot stress enough that she did nothing wrong and was in no possible way responsible for what happened to her. Sentencing

19. The Crown submitted that count 1 was a high culpability category A offence. There was a significant degree of planning involved: the arrangement to meet at a secluded location and taking a weapon and the cable ties, which can only have been for the purpose of threatening and subduing the complainant. The assault itself was prolonged and persistent. When the complainant started to get away, she was caught and dragged back. The judge sentenced on the basis that this was a category A offence, and that is not challenged on appeal.

20. The Crown and the Defence agreed that the harm fell into category

2. On that issue the judge disagreed. In his sentencing remarks, as we have done, he referred to the permanent scars that served as a reminder of the attack. He took the view that the psychological damage was more serious and likely to be long lasting if not permanent. It was affecting the complainant's normal life and had entirely changed her life. He concluded that the harm was in the highest category

1.

21. In addressing harm, the Guideline provides as follows: "All cases will involve ‘really serious harm’, which can be physical or psychological, or wounding. The court should assess the level of harm caused with reference to the impact on the victim. Where there are factors present from more than one category of harm, the court should weigh those factors in order to decide which category most resembles the offender’s case." In relation to category 1 harm, that includes: "Offence results in a permanent, irreversible injury or psychological condition which has a substantial and long-term effect on the victim’s ability to carry out their normal day-to-day activities or on their ability to work." It is whether harm falls within that category that the Guideline requires the judge to assess.

22. For category 1 harm the starting point for an adult would have been 12 years' imprisonment and the range 10-16 years. Had the harm been classed as category 2, as the appellant submits it should have been, the starting point would have been 7 years and the range 6-10 years.

23. The judge rightly said that he would have to make a substantial downward adjustment from the starting point to reflect personal mitigation and the appellant's age. He also gave credit of 20% for the plea on count

1.

24. In terms of personal mitigation, the judge took into account the fact that the appellant had had a difficult start in life and spent most of his life in foster care. He took into account the reports of Dr Nimmagadda and the intermediary, Ms Pattinson-Watt, and a Youth Justice Report prepared on the appellant.

25. He explained that he would pass a sentence on count 1 that took into account the other offences. That was an entirely proper approach. The determinate sentence that the judge would have passed was one of 7 years and 8 months' imprisonment. He found the appellant to be dangerous and there is no challenge to that finding, or the imposition of an extended sentence with a further period of licence.

26. To reach the sentence of 7 years and 8 months with 20% credit for guilty plea, the sentence that the judge would have passed before that credit would have been one of 9 years and 7 months. We note that the judge did not indicate how he had reduced the sentence to take account of the appellant's age and immaturity and we bear in mind the importance of individualistic sentencing for children and the indication given in paragraph 6.46 of the Guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People as to the approach the court should take to the adult guideline for a particular offence. If we assume that the judge intended to pass a sentence of two-thirds of the adult sentence, the sentence he would have had in mind would have been one of over 14 years' imprisonment. The appeal

27. The sole ground of appeal is that the judge was wrong to place the harm in category

1. In short, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the judge did not have the evidential basis to place the offence in that category. We reject that submission.

28. This was a difficult sentencing exercise given the horrific circumstances of the offence. In relation to whether harm fell within category 1, the appellant's submissions have focused very largely on the physical injuries caused to the complainant. In our view the judge did not focus solely on those injuries or to the extent that he regarded them in isolation as placing the offence in category

1. As we have already indicated, he took into account the psychological harm to the complainant. In his sentencing remarks he said this: "Physically, your victim has been left with permanent physical scars and irreversible damage to her hand. She has lasting visible reminders of what you did to her, but the psychological [harm] is even more serious. Before this attack, she was an outgoing and fun-loving and bubbly young woman who used to love the outdoors. She’s not the same young woman now. She’s frightened to leave the house and is having flashbacks. She’s been left nervous, and worried, and cautious. She has said that she no longer loves life. I believe that the psychological damage caused by this attack will be long lasting, if not permanent. All this is affecting her normal day-to-day activities. I think her life has been entirely changed by this attack. I believe that this is a case involving harm in the highest category."

29. We consider that the judge had sufficient evidence to conclude there was such psychological harm that had a substantial effect on the complainant's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. Given her age and the nature of this attack, there was every reason to conclude that these impacts would be long-term ones: she is scared all the time and scared to leave the house alone; she is constantly reminded of what happened to her and always will be; she is not the person that she was.

30. We do not consider that, as has been submitted on behalf of the appellant, the judge fell into error in finding that that harm did not fall within category

1. That was an assessment he was entitled to make on all the evidence and it was an assessment the Guideline required him to undertake.

31. We have also stood back and considered whether this sentence was in all the circumstances just and proportionate. Taking all the matters to which we have referred into account, the sentence that the judge would have passed on an adult would not have been manifestly excessive. We consider that the judge has made an appropriate evaluative judgment of the overall nature of this offence and the harm and impact on the complainant. No complaint is then made about the manner in which he has taken account of the appellant's youth. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: [email protected]