Richard Wood & Anor v Sophie Fleming

JUDGE TINDAL: Introduction 1. This judgment is a sequel to the judgment that I gave in more detail on 13th August 2024 (‘the Main Judgment’). There I set out – in detail, I hope – the history of this case. In short, it arises from the death of Brendan Fleming, a well-known and well-respected solicitor in the city of Birmingham for 40 years. It relates to the reaction of his partner, the Defendant, Sophie Fleming, to his death and what must be described as her campaign against Mr Fleming’s Executors, namely his independent financial advisor Mr Wood, and Mr Fleming’s successor as head of his law firm, Ms Ward. 2. In the Main Judgment, I explained the litigation resulting from Ms Fleming falling out with Mr Wood and Ms Ward (as I shall refer to them) has given rise both to probate proceedings issued by Ms Fleming challenging Mr Fleming’s will and Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s claim (technically in separate proceedings I dealt with together then) for harassment and application for an injunction against her. The latter I granted in favour of Mr Wood and Ms Ward to restrain Ms Fleming from harassing them; in particular, by her online conduct (in particular social media posts) accusing them of fraud, crime and similar allegations. 3. At the hearing where I gave the Main Judgment, I had several issues to deal with. None were suggested by any of the parties to require oral evidence at that point – a point I made in the Main Judgment itself. But I set out, at paragraphs 16 through 45 of that judgment, a detailed history of the case, which has not been criticised factually, save in a couple of respects which I will deal with as I go in this judgment. 4. In the Main Judgment, I dealt with issues of jurisdiction for both the probate and the injunction claims and I also reconsidered my determination that there should be an injunction against Ms Fleming, giving detailed reasons why I rejected her submissions that such an injunction would interfere with her rights under Art.10 European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) or indeed would otherwise be inappropriate. 5. However, in a passage of the judgment (at paragraphs 85 through 100) I also dealt with Ms Fleming’s application for summary judgment dismissing the harassment claim. In that judgment, I set out the detailed principles of claims for harassment under section 1 of the Protection of Harassment Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’), in cases such as Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB), which I need not repeat in this judgment. 6. In particular, at paragraph 88, I said: “I am satisfied that Mr Wood and Ms Ward have a 'real not fanciful' prospect of establishing that Ms Fleming's 'course of conduct' against them on the internet between March and June 2024 alone amounted to 'harassment' under s.1(1) PHA. It was plainly 'targeted at' them and amounted to a 'deliberate and persistent course of conduct', causing them 'alarm and distress' (as they say in their statements). Whether it went beyond the 'unattractive' into the 'oppressive' is plainly a matter for trial. This is especially so since I have found that Ms Flemings' allegations were unfounded. I accept Ms Fleming may still also have a defence under s.1(3) PHA even if her conduct did amount to 'harassment'. She would doubtless say her purpose was to 'prevent crime' i.e. 'fraud' by the Executors, which even though her perspective was wrong might still have been 'rational': Hayes v Willoughby [2013] 1 WLR 935 (SC), which is clearly a matter for trial. However… here Ms Fleming has also involved Mr Wood and Ms Ward's professional regulators and dragged in innocent third parties like employees of [the law firm Brendan Fleming Limited], destabilised by her emails. All these issues are for trial. I dismiss her summary judgment application.” This shows that Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s allegations of harassment against Ms Fleming are inextricably linked to her allegations of fraud etc against them. 7. The present hearing is the trial of the Claimants’ (Mr Wood and Ms Ward) allegations against Ms Fleming of harassment and unlike the Main Judgment, it is based upon oral evidence given by Mr Wood and Ms Ward themselves, which Ms Fleming has had the opportunity to challenge through cross-examination by Mr Angelides. Having determined those allegations, if necessary, I shall proceed to deal with their allegations of contempt of court, which raise related but analytically-distinct issues. 8. Ms Fleming has chosen not to attend this hearing. In August 2024 at the hearing where I gave the Main Judgment, she and her children were living where they had spent the last year of Mr Fleming’s life – in Northern Ireland. But about a month or so after my Main Judgment, Ms Fleming moved with her children to Turkey. I accept that she had long planned to do so before Mr Fleming died, but as her own Counsel Mr Angelides accepted, one ancillary reason for her to move to Turkey was because of the pending proceedings for contempt. Whilst Ms Fleming previously requested an adjournment of the injunction and committal proceedings in an email, her grounds essentially repeated her contention the Court lacked jurisdiction which I rejected in the Main Judgment; and the fact that she has also appealed that is not a good reason to adjourn either. By moving to Turkey, Ms Fleming has chosen to make it more difficult for herself physically to attend Court as I directed she would have to do for this hearing given it concerned alleged contempt. Indeed, I find she has deliberately chosen not to attend, but has still been able to instruct Mr Angelides directly to look after her interests. Notably, he was not instructed by her to renew the application for an adjournment of the hearing today. I do not hold Ms Fleming’s absence against her, indeed if I deal with the allegations of contempt, I will remind myself she has the right not to give evidence and simply to test the evidence of Mr Wood and Ms Ward. However, of course, I do not have the benefit of hearing Ms Fleming’s evidence explaining why she has acted as she has. 9. Nevertheless, Ms Fleming has made her perspective very clear in her various posts on social media which form the subject of the harassment and contempt allegations and which at previous hearings she has attended remotely she accepted she had made. Indeed, one reason why Ms Fleming has not renewed her request for an adjournment is that she wishes her own allegations of fraud etc against Mr Wood and Ms Ward to be tested by their giving evidence and being cross-examined about those allegations. She wants findings made about her own allegations on the merits, which as Mr Angelides pointed out, was not something I was asked to do in August in the Main Judgment. Therefore, I am asked by both sides today to resolve definitively not only Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s allegations of harassment and contempt against Ms Fleming, but her allegations of fraud etc against them which she says justifies her conduct towards them. 10. It was primarily for that reason that I refused the Claimants’ application today for Default Judgment on their harassment claim in the absence of a Defence by Ms Fleming. Whilst I accept the conditions for entering a Default Judgment under CPR 12.3 are met, I consider I have a discretion whether to do so under CPR 12.21 which applies because Ms Fleming was served out of the jurisdiction in Northern Ireland. Under CPR 12.12(1), in such an application, the Court, ‘shall give such judgment as the claimant is entitled to on [their] statement of case’. Even an uncontested claim for harassment must still be proved on evidence, particularly as I explained in the Main Judgment in the context of Art.10 ECHR freedom of expression. It is not like an undisputed claim for a debt. Since that is the case, I considered it appropriate to hear evidence from Mr Wood and Ms Ward tested in cross-examination – and to make determinations on that evidence of their allegations of harassment, rather than entering a Default Judgment on that claim. There seem to me three good reasons to take that course in the interests of all parties and indeed, of the Court. 11. Firstly, it is in the interests of Ms Fleming herself that Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s allegations of harassment against her and her own allegations of fraud etc against them which she says justifies her conduct are adjudicated on evidence tested in cross-examination, as Ms Fleming has instructed Mr Angelidies to do, even though she herself has chosen not to give evidence. She has complained her own allegations of fraud have never been determined on evidence, which is true. The fact that I decided in the Main Judgement that Ms Fleming’s allegations were based on her misunderstandings rather than evidence has not prevented her from maintaining them and they should be definitively adjudicated on evidence and I approach that with an open mind on the basis that the evidence may cause me to look at those allegations differently. 12. Secondly, it is in the interests of Mr Wood and Ms Ward that they give evidence and address Ms Fleming’s allegations head-on. As they have now done so, if I accept their evidence, and I say immediately for reasons which I will now explain that I do – that means they have exonerated themselves of Ms Fleming’s allegations. That not only enables me once and for all to adjudicate Ms Fleming’s allegations – albeit to reject them wholly – it also now means she no longer has – if she ever did have – any legitimate basis whatsoever to continue to make them. 13. I reach that conclusion because Mr Wood and Ms Ward were cross-examined so skilfully and expertly by Mr Angelides, on Ms Fleming’s behalf. He has done everything he could do, on behalf of his client. Yet Mr Wood and Ms Ward have in evidence fully answered Ms Fleming’s allegations in a compelling way and I entirely accept their evidence. Whilst of course Ms Fleming was not here to give evidence, in truth as I summarised in the Main Judgment at paragraphs 13 – 15, her allegations were always based in part on her own misunderstanding of various events: “Firstly, as executors of Mr Fleming’s 2020 will, it is Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s responsibility to administer it unless there is clear evidence that it was invalid. Ms Fleming suggests it was invalid on two grounds: that Mr Fleming lacked testamentary capacity and ‘knowledge and approval’ of his will. Ms Fleming suggests the evidence is clear…but I will find it is not clear. So, unless and until the 2020 will is declared invalid, it is not wrong for the Executors to ‘rely on’ it, it would be wrong not to do so. Secondly, as I will explain, the Executors have not ‘changed’ Mr Fleming’s domicile from Turkey to Northern Ireland, which Ms Fleming fears will expose his c.£8 million estate to 40% in UK inheritance tax. Rather, his decision to move from Turkey to Northern Ireland a few months before his death legitimately raises a potential change in his domicile which Mr Wood and Ms Ward are duty-bound as his executors to consider referring to HM Revenue and Customs. However, as they say, they could apply for this Court to decide whether or not the possibility of change in domicile is sufficiently strong that they are required to approach HMRC. I am not deciding that today. It can be subject of application at that stage by Executors and submissions by Ms Fleming (or I would strongly suggest, her legal representatives). Thirdly, the Executors did not ‘mislead’ HHJ Rawlings on 8th January 2024 into making an order allowing them to ‘misappropriate’ BFL. She alleges… the Executors deliberately redacted the will to disguise from HHJ Rawlings that it was a Turkish will; and thirdly that the will wrongly called BFL ‘Brendan Fleming Solicitors Limited’ which did not exist as a company. The latter is correct, but that does not invalidate an order in proceedings relating to the actual company BFL replacing as its sole shareholder Mr Fleming with his executors after his death. The redaction of the will in order to focus exclusively on BFL, removing references to Turkey, was understandable since BFL is an English company plainly within the jurisdiction of the English Companies Court and the Turkish elements were irrelevant.” 14. The third reason why I have adjudicated the allegations on their merits is really in the interests of finality. Rather than entering Default Judgment and enabling Ms Fleming to make an application to set that aside under CPR 13 if there is a reasonable prospect of success at trial without hearing any evidence, the only recourse Ms Fleming will now have – once I have given my reasons for rejecting her allegations and finding that she has indeed committed harassment against Mr Wood and Ms Ward and has no defence to it – is that she will either have to appeal me, or she will have to make an application, under CPR 39.3, explaining what her good reason was for not attending the trial. 15. Of course, I will deal with any such latter application on its merits if it is made, but I should add that Ms Fleming certainly knew about this hearing. Not only did she instruct Mr Angelides to attend on her behalf (but did not instruct him to renew her emailed request for an adjournment which I had refused), I reminded Ms Fleming of the need to attend this hearing earlier this week. She attended by telephone at a directions appointment on the probate proceedings (although again wisely instructed lawyers to represent her). I concluded the hearing by reminding her that the injunction and committal hearing had been listed for today and that if she did not attend without good reason, I would proceed to deal with it in her absence, as I have now done. Any complaint that there may have been in the past that Ms Fleming could not have afforded to travel to Birmingham due to her lack of income – for the reasons explained in my Main Judgment – is now addressed by her receipt for the last few weeks (as confirmed at that directions appointment) of a significant amount of money from the pension fund of Mr Brendan Fleming (a joint decision by Mr Wood in his capacity as trustee of it, which speaks volumes about his fairness). Ms Fleming has no apparently good reason not to be here and none has been advanced on her behalf by Mr Angelides. Findings of Fact 16. In those circumstances, I will turn to make my findings of fact on the harassment claim (not the committal application which I will address later), which I make on the balance of probabilities with the burden of proof squarely on Mr Wood and Ms Ward. I need not set out all the history of the litigation, because I have dealt with it in my Main Judgment, at paragraphs 16 through 46 which is not contested save in a couple of respects I clarify in the present judgment. I will therefore focus my findings on the issues in dispute on the harassment claim. 17. Mr Fleming owned and was the sole shareholder of his law firm, ‘Brendan Fleming’, a well-respected law firm in Birmingham for many years principally specialising in family cases. He personally run the firm through the company which owned it Brendan Fleming Ltd (‘BFL’) of which he was the sole shareholder and director. The difficulty was that when Mr Fleming sadly passed away at the end of 2023, that left Ms Ward, his successor in running the firm, with a major problem: there was no director and so the firm was at risk of having to cease to practise under Solicitors Regulatory Authority rules. In my Main Judgment, I said that was the only reason why Ms Ward and Mr Wood as executors applied to HHJ Rawlings in January 2024, to replace Mr Fleming as the director and shareholder of BFL with themselves as his Executors. 18. However, Ms Fleming says that in reaching that view in my Main Judgment, I did not deal with three points, which Mr Angelides has explored in detail with both Mr Wood and Ms Ward today in evidence. Those three points feed into an overarching allegation by Ms Fleming that Mr Wood has conspired with others in his financial advice firm Barnett Ravenscroft and latterly also Ms Ward, Mr Fleming’s nominated successor at BFL, to take control of it and to oust Ms Fleming herself and her children from any role in BFL. In short, Ms Fleming has repeatedly suggested Mr Wood and Ms Ward have ‘stolen’ BFL from her. 19. The first point is Ms Fleming’s complaint that BFL’s company articles, drafted by Barnett Ravenscroft some years ago, deliberately did not contain the standard clause 17(2) in the statutory Model Articles for private companies limited by shares (what was once called ‘Table A’) that: ‘In any case where, as a result of death, the company has no shareholders and no directors, the personal representatives of the last shareholder to have died have the right, by notice in writing, to appoint a person to be a director’. However, as Mr Wood explained, whilst BFL was set up by a company in the Barnett Ravenscroft group, it was an entirely separate company or the financial advice company for which he works. Moreover, Mr Wood’s understanding was that the reason for the deliberate omission of clause 17(2) was typical of many thousands of companies across the country because ‘personal representatives’ requires a Grant of Probate which can take a considerable time to get. So, it is preferable for companies simply to apply to Court rather than have to wait for a Grant of Probate to replace a deceased director/shareholder. I accept that explanation which strikes me as straightforward common sense. 20. In those circumstances, there is simply nothing suspicious, sinister, or concerning about the removal of the standard clause 17(2) from BFL’s articles, whether by Barnett Ravenscroft or anyone else. Indeed, it would have been positively unwise to have left it in for a company where there was one director-shareholder. Moreover, that omission was made many years ago, long before any of these issues arose and would have had nothing to do with Mr Wood, other than the fact that it happened to have been done someone working in the same group as him, to which he probably introduced Mr Fleming, because he was his Independent Financial Adviser. Indeed, if anything, removing the standard article required a Court application to appoint a replacement director, which gives greater independent oversight in this situation, hardly consistent with a long-standing plan to ‘steal’ BFL. So, the first building block in Ms Fleming’s conspiracy allegation turns out to be completely misconceived. The same is true of the other two building-blocks, as I shall now explain. 21. The second building block is that in the course of the setting up of the various companies that Mr Fleming had (as I explained in the Main Judgment, not just BFL, but property holding companies and so on) that formal statements were filed at Companies House, called CSO1s, which declared Mr Fleming as being British when in fact he was Irish. However, as Ms Ward pointed out, whilst there were a couple of such CSO1s wrongly describing Mr Fleming as British, he actually signed them himself, suggesting he either overlooked it or did not consider it significant (given he had lived and worked in Britain for decades). Again, this is no basis whatsoever for any ‘conspiracy to steal BFL’. 22. The third building block relates to the application, to which I have already referred, to HHJ Rawlings in the Companies Court in January 2024 to replace Mr Fleming as the shareholder with the Executors. Ms Fleming places great emphasis on the redaction of Mr Fleming’s will and the removal of any references to his living in Turkey and having many properties there, which she says misled HHJ Rawlings by ‘hiding’ the fact this was a ‘Turkish will’, made in 2020 when he was still living in Turkey, left his sole share in BFL 50% to Ms Ward (if still employed) and 50% to his children as residuary beneficiaries. This is now the third time I have considered Ms Fleming’s allegations in this respect. The first time was in refusing her application on 7th June 2024 to set aside HHJ Rawlings’ order. I explained to Ms Fleming then the reason HHJ Rawlings granted the application was to enable BFL to continue operating and even if the redaction of the will of references to Turkey presented a partial picture, it was irrelevant to an application to an English Court over an English company. Ms Fleming was not convinced by this and maintained her allegations, both in the litigation and as I shall explain in her online conduct. I rejected them once again in my Main Judgment at para.29 when refusing her renewed application to set aside HHJ Rawlings’ order: “The trigger for [Ms Fleming’s] grievance was the Executors’ urgent application to HHJ Rawlings in Birmingham Companies Court on 8th January 2024 for permission to make an ordinary resolution appointing a new director of BFL. Whilst those proceedings are now for probate, as their ‘CR’ case number shows, they were initially Companies proceedings relating to BFL, an English-registered company for which an English Companies Court indisputably has jurisdiction. The only role the 2020 will – redacted or not – played was to prove not that Mr Wood and Ms Ward were entitled to inherit BFL (only Ms Ward was and only then 50% and if still employed by it) but that they were Mr Fleming’s executors. So, the Turkish aspects of the will – including his address – were simply irrelevant. Indeed, it may have breached confidentiality of Ms Fleming and her children had those redactions not been made. It is true the will wrongly referred to ‘Brendan Fleming Solicitors Limited’, but that did not prevent it being valid or being used to prove that Mr Wood and Ms Ward were the executors under that will of Mr Fleming, so entitled under s.125 Companies Act 2006 to have BFL’s public register amended to name them as shareholders in place of him after his death. So, the set-aside application is misconceived.” Having heard Ms Ward’s evidence under cross-examination, I remain of that view. Indeed, she explained in evidence that the reason why the Turkish properties and other references were redacted was because the SRA themselves said that she was at liberty to excise or redact anything from the copy of the will that was irrelevant to Brendan Fleming Limited, so that is what she did. Far from Ms Fleming’s allegation of a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court by airbrushing out references to Turkey, the redactions were made to remove irrelevant material making no difference whatsoever to the English Court’s undoubted jurisdiction over an English company. 23. For the third and hopefully final time, I confirm without equivocation that Ms Fleming’s allegation that HHJ Rawlings was ‘misled’ into making the order on 8th January 2024 is entirely misconceived (quite aside from now being issue-estopped). Mr Wood and Ms Ward did not mislead HHJ Rawlings into making an Order. They made the application to save the company; partly, of course, for Ms Ward and her colleagues – but also for the residual beneficiaries under the will, who would have a half share in BFL, Ms Fleming’s children. If it had not been made, the residuary estate inuring to those children would have been worth much less than it otherwise would have been. I am entirely satisfied that both Mr Wood and Ms Ward have been anxious as Executors to respect the interests of Ms Fleming’s children as residuary beneficiaries entitled to 50% of BFL. By contrast, Ms Fleming herself has no such entitlement but sadly has jeopardised her children’s inheritance by destabilising BFL by her misguided conduct. 24. I also tried to explain – in my Main Judgment in August – that Ms Fleming’s ‘conspiracy theory’ against Mr Wood and Ms Ward may also have been fuelled by a misunderstanding over the question of Mr Fleming’s domicile. She has plainly convinced herself that Mr Wood and Ms Ward are conspiring not only to ‘steal’ BFL from her (to which I repeat she has no personal entitlement under the will), but also to effectively determine that Mr Fleming was domiciled in Northern Ireland rather than Turkey when he died, which would expose his estate to a huge UK inheritance tax liability. However, as I explained in my Main Judgment, the Executors have not ‘changed’ Mr Fleming’s domicile from Turkey to Northern Ireland as Ms Fleming alleges. Rather, his decision to move from Turkey to Northern Ireland – which she told me was due to her own personal circumstances and not his – legitimately raises a potential change in his domicile, which Mr Wood and Ms Ward are duty-bound, as Executors, to consider referring to HM Revenue and Customs. But they could apply for this Court to decide whether the possibility of a change of domicile is sufficiently strong that they are required to do so, and indeed that possibility was discussed at the directions appointment on the probate claim on Monday of this week. 25. In short, unfortunately, Ms Fleming has convinced herself that Mr Wood and Ms Ward are conspiring to ‘steal her children’s inheritance’ from the innocuous combination of standard and reasonable alteration of company articles, an errant mistake in one or two forms filed at Companies House, the understandable redaction of a will in a Court application about a company and Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s understandable concern about domicile as Executors. I say for once and for all that nothing could be further from the truth. On the balance of probabilities I reject and dismiss any allegation or even suggestion of fraud, criminal behaviour, or misconduct, of any kind, by Mr Wood or Ms Ward. That is simply wrong and in my judgement, should never have been an allegation made by Ms Fleming as she never had a scintilla of evidence to support it. 26. I therefore turn from Ms Fleming’s misguided allegations of fraud against Mr Wood and Ms Ward, to their allegations of harassment by her in making those misguided allegations. I can deal with that relatively briefly because my findings of fact are really set out in my Main Judgment, as they were based effectively entirely on objective evidence, which has never been challenged – about Ms Fleming’s own social media posts. 27. In short, it suffices to summarise it in this way. Regrettably, the way that Ms Fleming reacted to the application to HHJ Rawlings in January 2024 was – as I put it in my Main Judgment at paragraph 30 ‘to take up arms against the Executors online, as a quintessential 21st Century keyboard warrior’. She began by emailing Mr Wood and Ms Ward, making accusations of professional conduct against them: misleading the Court; seeking to steal the inheritance, etc. On 2nd March 2024, Ms Fleming repeated her unfounded allegations to the Financial Conduct Authority about Mr Wood. In early March 2024, she also reported them to the Police who understandably said that contesting a will was a civil matter. 28. On 14 March 2024, Ms Fleming posted on Facebook, not naming Mr Wood or Ms Ward, but making serious accusations about them, specifically, saying ‘solicitors can get very greedy and immoral when there is a chance to manipulate the will, to inherit from someone with a vulnerable condition’. Indeed, by the end of April 2024, Ms Fleming was emailing staff at the law firm and accusing Ms Ward of misconduct. It suffices to repeat paragraphs 32 and 33 of my Main Judgment: “Moreover, by the end of April 2024, Ms Fleming was emailing staff at BFL: “The dispute is very nearly at the end and the inevitable result will be that Rebecca Ward would no longer be any part of Brendan Fleming Limited and due to professional negligence Brendan died intestate. He made it very clear to me and everyone that he intended the solicitors’ business to continue after his death if at all possible. I believe with a little restructuring that’s entirely possible. I’ve copied in the SRA who’ve been investigating Rebecca’s misconduct and the other solicitors who were involved in the misappropriation of Brendan Fleming Limited.” One of the striking things to me is that when I asked Ms Fleming about this, to try and understand why she, as the children’s mother, would want to internally destabilise BFL which aside from her former partner’s public legacy was a significant asset in their residuary estate, she said that BFL would never make any money for her and the children. That perhaps illustrates that Ms Fleming did not see that she had anything particularly to lose from attacking her former partner’s law firm, though she plainly was not thinking about the effect her actions were having on its completely innocent employees. I am afraid that is reflective of how Ms Fleming has not really thought about the implications of many of the things she has done over the last seven months.” 29. In June 2024, Ms Fleming then launched probate proceedings, which were listed initially before myself, on 7th June. As I have mentioned, at that hearing I dismissed Ms Fleming’s application to set aside HHJ Rawlings order of 8th January 2024 and dismissed her application to bring contempt proceedings against the Executors. As I said to her at the time, it was clear that they had not interfered with the administration, just simply sought to save BFL from closure under SRA rules. As I said in my Main Judgment in August, I had hoped that that would clear up Ms Fleming’s misunderstandings about this issue. However, her conduct got worse after I had tried to explain her misunderstanding, rather than better. 30. As I said in my Main Judgment, Ms Fleming’s main concern in June-July was understandably, to release funds for the maintenance of her children. On 7th June, I encouraged a request to the investment company, which fell outside the estate and therefore did not have to await the will dispute. I accept Mr Wood’s evidence that he was amenable to such a request, which fits the correspondence between the solicitors he and Ms Ward as Executors instructed and Ms Fleming about that. But as I said in my Main Judgment, it was Ms Fleming who sabotaged that possibility of getting maintenance for her and her children. She was the one who wrote to the investment company and accused Mr Wood of fraud, and as a result, understandably, that company refused to release any money. Yet again Ms Fleming’s misconceived accusations were totally against her own interests and those of her children. 31. Unfortunately, the dispute got worse when someone made an anonymous and malicious referral to Northern Ireland Social Services in relation to Ms Fleming’s children. That is not an accusation renewed or put to Mr Wood or Ms Ward today. But they have both denied it in their evidence, and I find on the balance of probabilities that it was not them. It was more likely to have been someone Ms Fleming had upset in Northern Ireland but the identity of the complainant is still unclear. 32. However, Ms Fleming’s yet again mistaken belief that Ms Ward or Mr Wood made that referral provoked her into an even more ferocious campaign online. On 11th June 2024, Ms Fleming on Facebook made effective reference to Mr Wood and Ms Ward (albeit unnamed) as the Executors of Mr Fleming being fraudsters, robbing her children of the inheritance and making them suffer poverty. She set up a Go Fund Me page, seeking funding for herself, as a victim of a fraudster masquerading as a wealth management financial adviser – clearly, Mr Wood – setting up to defraud Brendan’s children. 33. On 17th June 2024, Ms Fleming specifically named both Mr Wood and Ms Ward on her Facebook post as ‘criminals’ and said they had misappropriated an SRA-registered regulated solicitors practice, by misleading the Court with a redacted will, to hide the fact the will is an invalid will and they exhibited false, fabricated evidence to mislead the judge that he had jurisdiction to make the Order. I repeat: Ms Fleming did this even after I had explained to her on 7th June that had not happened. It is one thing not accepting and indeed appealing a judge’s decision. It is quite another publicly posting allegations which flatly contradict that decision, albeit is not an allegation of contempt. 34. In June 2024, Ms Fleming also started posting on Facebook pages of other online campaign groups relating to children’s rights, e.g. on 26th June, that ‘Brendan Fleming Solicitors is now owned by a fraudster and a solicitor, who lied to the Court and misappropriated the company, the two of them relying on an invalid will to embezzle the inheritance of Brendan’s children and leave them suffering severe hardship. The new director has no morals to be able to make her late boss’ family suffer’. Ms Ward explained, this prompted clients to email in, saying, ‘I have heard you are fraudsters’. It was a deliberate attempt by Ms Fleming to attack the law firm by undermining its clients’ confidence in it (and also as I have explained, her own children's inheritance). 35. I pause there because that is the point at which the Executors applied for a without notice Injunction, which I granted on 2nd July as explained in my Main Judgment. I am wary about proceeding further with my findings if fact as I must not in the context of a judgment on an injunction make findings which predetermine a committal application. Nevertheless, it suffices to say that Ms Fleming, herself, accepted before me at the hearing on 13th August that she had continued to post similar posts, and there is plenty of evidence in the bundle that she has done so. However, I do not rely at this stage on any of the posts after my first injunction on 2nd July 2024, other than to say that the conduct has continued, albeit with a pause of a few weeks between the hearing of 13th August and the promulgation of my Main Judgment at the end of September 2024 once I had approved the transcript (which regrettably took a few weeks to arrive, as the present transcript has done, despite my expedition of it). Indeed, it is unnecessary to rely on Ms Fleming’s social media posts since 2nd July 2024 as there were 70 posts before then of which those I have mentioned in this judgment are merely the clearest and most serious examples. Conclusions on the Injunction 36. For ease, I repeat the legal principles for ‘harassment’ in my Main Judgment: “The key principles were summarised by Nicklin J in Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB) (and have been applied since by Chamberlain J in McNally v Saunders [2022] EMLR 3 and most recently by Mr Eardley KC in Sully v Mazur [2024] EWHC 1999 (KB)). However, I start with the relevant statutory provisions. s.1 and 7 PHA provide, so far as material: “1(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. (1A) A person must not pursue a course of conduct (a) which involves harassment of two or more persons, and (b) which he knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons, and (c) by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not one of those mentioned above)— (i) not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or (ii) to do something that he is not under any obligation to do. (2)…[T]he person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to… harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other. (3) Subsection (1)  or (1A) do..not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows— (a) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime… or (c) in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable…. 7(2) References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress. (3)A “course of conduct” must involve— (a) in the case of conduct in relation to a single person (see section 1(1)), conduct on at least two occasions in relation to that person, or (b) in the case of conduct in relation to two or more persons, conduct on at least one occasion in relation to each of those persons” ss.3-3A provide a course of conduct amounting to harassment under s.1(1) or indeed s.1(1A) give rise to a civil remedy and may be restrained by injunction. In Hayden [44], Nicklin J summarised the general principles of the law on ‘harassment’ under s.1(1) PHA in previous authorities (citations omitted): “i) Harassment is an ordinary English word with a well understood meaning: a persistent and deliberate course of unacceptable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person…calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress: ‘a persistent deliberate course of targeted oppression’. ii) The behaviour said to amount to harassment must reach a level of seriousness passing beyond irritations, annoyances, even a measure of upset, that arise occasionally in everybody’s day-to-day dealings with other people. The conduct must cross the boundary between [conduct] that is unattractive even unreasonable and conduct that is oppressive and unacceptable. To cross the border from the regrettable to the objectionable, the gravity of the misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability under s.2. A course of conduct must be grave before the offence or tort of harassment is proved. iii) The provision, in s.7(2), that ‘references to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress’ is not a definition of the tort and it is not exhaustive. It is merely guidance as to one element of it. It does not follow that any course of conduct which causes alarm or distress therefore amounts to harassment; that would be illogical and produce perverse results. iv) s.1(2) provides that the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it involves harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct involved harassment. The test is wholly objective. The Court’s assessment of the harmful tendency of the statements complained of must always be objective, and not swayed by the subjective feelings of the claimant. v) Those who are ‘targeted’ by the alleged harassment can include others ‘who are foreseeably, and directly, harmed by the course of targeted conduct of which complaint is made, to the extent that they can properly be described as victims.” It is also relevant that Ms Fleming’s ‘course of conduct’ took place in the context of litigation. Mr Eardley KC added to Hayden in Sully at [16]: “It is the course of conduct itself that must have the requisite harassing quality, not each individual piece of conduct. Harassment can, and often does, arise through the persistent, unwanted repetition of acts which, viewed in isolation, may be innocuous: see Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ 123 at [45] [Iqbal] …also illustrates that harassment can arise through the sending of inter partes correspondence in connection with legal disputes. Rix LJ said, at [41] ‘The judge was perhaps concerned, and rightly so, not to set up every complaint between lawyers as to the conduct of litigation as arguably a matter of harassment within the Act. It must be rare indeed that such complaints, even if in the heat of battle they go too far, could arguably fall foul of the Act’. He added, at [54], ‘Whatever the hardships involved in litigation, it is not the occasion for irrelevant and abusive dirt to be thrown as part of a malicious campaign. Just as even freedom of the press may be abused in a rare case …so even litigation, whose natural contentiousness also requires its own freedom of speech, can exceptionally be abused…” Indeed, Mr Eardley KC found Sully was such an ‘exceptional’ case of true ‘harassment’ in conduct of land litigation, including frequent, repetitive, lengthy demanding communications; personal abuse of opposing litigants including to their employers; and objection taken to their choice of lawyers.” 37. In my Main Judgment, I also dealt with the relevance of Ms Fleming’s right to freedom of expression under Art.10 ECHR. Whilst this is now a trial and I am no longer concerned with the strictures of making an interim injunction interfering with that right, for ease I repeat Nicklin J’s guidance in Hayden more generally: “…vi) Where the complaint is of harassment by publication, the claim will usually engage Art. 10 [ECHR] and, as a result, the Court’s duties under ss.2, 3, 6 and 12 [HRA]. The [PHA] must be interpreted and applied compatibly with the right to freedom of expression. It would be a serious interference with this right if those wishing to express their own views could be silenced by, or threatened with, proceedings for harassment based on subjective claims by individuals that they felt offended or insulted. vii) In most cases of alleged harassment by speech there is a fundamental tension. s.7(2) provides that harassment includes ‘alarming the person or causing the person distress’. However, Art 10 expressly protects speech that offends, shocks and disturbs… ‘Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having’. viii) Consequently, where Art.10 is engaged, the Court’s assessment of whether the conduct crosses the boundary from the unattractive, even unreasonable, to oppressive and unacceptable must pay due regard to the importance of freedom of expression and the need for any restrictions upon the right to be necessary, proportionate and established convincingly. Cases of alleged harassment may also engage the complainant’s Art.8 rights. If so, the Court will have to assess the interference with…rights and the justification for it and proportionality. The resolution of any conflict between rights under Art.8 and Art.10 is achieved through the ‘ultimate balancing test’. ix) The context and manner in which the information is published are all-important. The harassing element of oppression is likely to come more from the manner the words are published than…content. x) The fact that the information is in the public domain does not mean that a person loses the right not to be harassed by [its] use…. There is no principle of law that publishing publicly available information about somebody is incapable of amount to harassment. xi) Neither is it determinative that the published information is, or is alleged to be, true. ‘No individual is entitled to impose on any other person an unlimited punishment by public humiliation…’. That is not to say that truth or falsity of the information is irrelevant. The truth of the words complained of is likely to be a significant factor in the overall assessment (including any defence advanced under s.1(3)), particularly when considering any application for an interim injunction. On the other hand, where the allegations are shown to be false, the public interest in preventing publication or imposing remedies after the event will be stronger. The fundamental question is whether the conduct has additional elements of oppression, persistence or unpleasantness which are distinct from the content of the statements; if so, the truth of the statements is not necessarily an answer to a claim in harassment.” 38. In my Main Judgment, given at an interlocutory stage, I focussed on the importance of Ms Fleming’s Art.10 ECHR right to Freedom of Expression. However, as Nicklin J said in Hayden, that must be balanced against any Art.8 ECHR rights to Private Life (and reputation) of the targets of the online conduct, especially where I have now found that Ms Fleming’s online allegations against Mr Wood and Ms Ward were ill-founded. I am entirely satisfied that Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s Art.8 ECHR rights to Private Life and reputation are engaged and have been interfered with by Ms Fleming’s unfounded public allegations about them in a way clearly amounting to ‘harassment’. 39. It was especially evident in Ms Ward’s evidence where she became quite emotional describing the impact of Ms Fleming’s incessant personal attacks. Ms Fleming has attacked not just Ms Ward personally but BFL itself, including posts on social media targeted at groups for parents going through care proceedings – which is, of course, a significant part of the work of BFL. I accept Ms Ward’s evidence that has created not only tension and conflict within BFL and destabilised members of staff, but also between BFL and its clients, which I am bound to say must have been deliberate and for what purpose only Ms Fleming will ever be able to understand. It is particularly bizarre because Ms Ward’s firm is the asset in Mr Fleming’s estate inuring to her children, and yet if she had set out this year to cause her own children's inheritance the maximum damage, it is difficult to see how she could have tried harder. Ms Fleming’s campaign against Ms Ward and BFL has been as vitriolic and abusive as it has been self-defeating. The stress of dealing with this has plainly taken its strain on Ms Ward. 40. Mr Wood is an Independent Financial Adviser, trusted by people with their money and property and as they would see it, their own children’s inheritance. Yet he has found his professional integrity and reputation undermined by Ms Flemings’ repeated public complaints to his regulator but also on social media. This has really affected Mr Wood personally, as is clear from his evidence, and indeed has become at times personal, with references to his family which is particularly hurtful as he explained he too had suffered bereavement of a partner leaving him with children, just like Ms Fleming. Yet despite that shared experience, Ms Fleming in her grief has lashed out at him relentlessly. 41. The first legal question is whether there has been a course of conduct by Ms Fleming on more than one occasion, which amounts to harassment of Mr Wood and Ms Ward. There has certainly been a course of conduct over months, repeated relentlessly, despite the intervention of a Court seeking to disabuse Ms Fleming of her misapprehensions, despite injunctions being made, whether without notice and then on notice, although as I have explained I do not take that into account at this stage as it relates to Contempt. The point is that it has never really stopped for more than a short period of time. 42. I am satisfied Ms Fleming’s course of conduct has amounted to harassment of Mr Wood and Ms Ward, because it has caused them substantial personal alarm, distress, and taken a huge personal toll on them and their Art.8 private lives which outweighs Ms Fleming’s Art.10 rights to freedom of expression, especially since her allegations are unfounded. I am satisfied Ms Fleming’s conduct has been of a kind to cross the threshold from what is regrettable to objectionable, oppressive and unacceptable. I am satisfied it has reached that threshold because of: (i) its volume – it is relentless; (ii) its duration – months and months; and (iii) its scattergun approach to regulators, to online campaign groups and clients. Ms Ward even told me that her firm’s suppliers had been targeted – and that is the right word – by Ms Fleming. In those circumstances, it undoubtedly crosses the threshold into true harassment. This is precisely the sort of conduct the Act intended to address. 43. There is, of course, a statutory defence, as I flagged up in my Main Judgment in August under s.1(3) of the Act as explained in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] 1 WLR 935 (SC). That section provides three limbs of a defence: “(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows— (a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, (b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or (c)that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable."” (b) certainly cannot apply. There was no relevant enactment or rule of law. (c) cannot apply either – Ms Fleming’s conduct has never been reasonable. In fact, it has been downright unreasonable, for all the reasons that I have given in this judgement. However, in my Main Judgment in August I highlighted the potential defence under s.1(3)(a) of the Act, that Ms Fleming might argue that the conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. As explained in Hayes, ‘purpose’ is a subjective word. It does not have to be reasonable conduct. As the majority of the Supreme Court held in Hayes, if there was a purely subjective belief in the mind of the harasser that she was preventing or detecting crime, that would be a defence, unless that belief was irrational, that it was capricious or so outrageous in its defiance of logic so as to be perverse. 44. In the present case, if Ms Fleming had conducted a targeted campaign, specific to the particular allegations of misconduct pursued only with the appropriate bodies – the SRA in Ms Ward’s case, the FCA in Mr Wood’s case, and with the Police – or raised it purely through Court proceedings, then she could perhaps say, however wrongheaded her allegations, that she focused on the prevention or detection of crime, by targeting her allegations to people who were in a position properly to investigate those allegations. That might have just about fallen within the scope of the s.1(3)(a) defence as explained in Hayes. 45. However, that is not what Ms Fleming has done. She has never investigated the allegations. She has never been troubled to worry about whether there is any evidence for them. She has scattered the allegations far and wide, to all and sundry – anyone who has anything to do with Ms Ward or Mr Wood, or indeed the organisations for which they work. This is totally irrational. In the case of the targeting of BFL as a firm, it attacks her own children's inheritance. It is completely perverse – indeed even from her own children’s perspective. 46. Therefore, I uphold the claim and find that Ms Fleming has committed the tort of harassment against Mr Wood and Ms Ward. I have no confidence whatsoever that anything I say will ever persuade Ms Fleming to stop. But by giving a judgment in public, as I am now doing, I can exonerate Mr Wood and Ms Ward, who have done nothing wrong, and I can make clear that the only person who has any responsibility for this whole situation is Ms Fleming herself, by pursuing completely misconceived allegations in an unreasonable, oppressive and totally irrational way. 47. The reality of the situation is bereavement affects different people in different ways. It clearly brought out the best in Mr Wood and Ms Ward. I am afraid, it has brought out the worst in Ms Fleming. I understand she is dealing with her own sorrow and the loss of Mr Fleming, not least as he left her without property in his will (except Turkish property if she occupied it). I am afraid Ms Fleming has ‘taken out her grief’ on the Executors and made allegations against them which have no relationship to reality whatsoever. 48. I am likely to carry on the injunction against Ms Fleming in some form, but I would prefer to hear submissions on that after I have dealt with the contempt application, since the scope of the injunction has changed somewhat since I originally granted it. 49. I will rise for a few minutes. I am anticipating being in a position to hear evidence relatively briefly on the contempt application given the allegations of contempt are all admitted communications and social media posts by Ms Fleming. The only question is whether I am satisfied to the criminal standard any of them breach my injunction. Of course, if Mr Angelides can if he wishes cross-examine Mr Wood or Ms Ward again. (Hearing continued) Contempt 50. Mr Angelides did not see any need for further cross-examination of Mr Wood or Ms Ward, but I have heard detailed submissions from him and Mr Day on the alleged contempt. 51. I am entirely satisfied that the conduct of Ms Fleming amounted to harassment and continues to do so amount because the conduct has effectively continued. But on the question of contempt, there is a different question to be decided, which is whether the conduct in the Contempt Notice since the date of my first injunction on 2nd July 2024 was in breach of my Order, and whether, in particular – as Mr Angelides rightly reminds me, following Harris v Harris [2001] 2 FLR 93 – the terms of the injunction were clear, the Defendant was aware of those terms, and her conduct unambiguously breached them. 52. Whilst Ms Fleming has not pursued her application to strike-out the committal, the guidance of Burton J in Supermax v Malhotra [2019] EWHC 2711 (Comm) remains apt in relation to whether a breach has been proved to the criminal standard of proof. “First, the court order and the particulars of breach of it must be clear and comprehensible, and the particulars must make plain the thrust of the claimant's case (see e.g. per Woolf LJ in AG for Tuvalu v Philatelic Distribution Corporation Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 926 at 42). Secondly, the particulars of breach must be supported by prima facie evidence contained in the affidavits or witness statements, and any exhibits, accompanying the application, so as to show a real prospect of success. Thirdly, an application must not be brought for an illegitimate purpose. Fourthly, an application must be proportionate (see Sectorguard plc v Dienne [2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch)) to the need of enforcing court orders and preventing interference with justice. Fifthly, both the order and the particulars of breach must be seen and read in context and given their natural and ordinary meaning, in the light of the knowledge of the relevant participants (see Pan Petroleumv Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Co Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1525 per Flaux LJ at 41(3)). Sixthly, in construing an order there is need to pay regard to the mischief sought to be prevented by that order. Seventhly, an order is not vitiated by cross-referring to documents, including contractual documents, but indeed the reference to such documents may assist in making it clear; and such injunctions are frequent, and rightly so (as for example in Pan Petroleum). The principle still remains whether the order was clear as to what a recipient should do (see Woolf LJ in Harmsworth v Harmsworth [1987] 1 WLR 1676 at 1686D)…. Eighthly…at the end of a committal hearing, after all the evidence has been considered, if there can be seen to be more than one reasonable inference to be drawn, and at least one of them is inconsistent with a finding of contempt, or if an innocent explanation of the contempt is a real possibility (see Daltel Europe Ltd v Makki [2005] EWHC 749 Ch at 30 per David Richards J… the claimant fails.” 53. I also remind myself of the procedural requirements for contempt at CPR 81.4: “(1) Unless and to the extent the court directs otherwise, every contempt application must be supported by written evidence by affidavit or affirmation. (2) A contempt application must include statements of all the following, unless (in the case of (b) to (g)) wholly inapplicable— (a) the nature of the alleged contempt (for example, breach of an order or undertaking or contempt in the face of the court); (b) the date and terms of any order allegedly breached or disobeyed; (c) confirmation that any such order was personally served, and the date it was served, unless the court or the parties dispensed with personal service; (d) if the court dispensed with personal service, the terms and date of the court's order dispensing with personal service; (e) confirm any order allegedly breached or disobeyed included a penal notice… (f) the date and terms of any undertaking allegedly breached. (g) confirmation of the claimant's belief the person who gave any undertaking understood its terms and the consequences of failure to comply with it; (h) a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order; (i) defendant has the right to be legally represented in contempt proceedings; (j) the defendant is entitled to reasonable opportunity to obtain representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test…. (l) the defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing; (m) Defendant is entitled not obliged to give written/oral evidence in defence (n) the defendant has the right to remain silent and to decline to answer any question the answer to which may incriminate the defendant; (o) the court may proceed in the defendant's absence if they do not attend but (whether or not they attend) will only find the defendant in contempt if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts constitute [a] contempt…..; (p) if the court is satisfied that the defendant has committed a contempt, [it] may punish the defendant by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets….. (q) that if the defendant admits the contempt and wishes to apologise to the court, that is likely to reduce the seriousness of any punishment by the court….” 54. As stressed in Inplayer v Thorogood [2014] EWCA Civ 1511, a Defendant is entitled to: (i) Know the allegations in advance, as Jackson LJ said at p.39: “A judge hearing a committal application should confine himself… to the contempts …alleged..[or] invite amendment…. and provide any necessary adjournment…” (ii) Not provide a witness statement or give evidence and to be told he has those rights: Moutreuil v Andreewitch [2020] 4 WLR 54 (CA), although he should also be warned adverse inferences can be drawn from his failures to do so. (I should add, there was no objection by Ms Fleming’s Counsel on the committal at the August hearing or Mr Angelides today to the contempt being listed immediately to follow trial). (iii) Be informed of his right to (means-tested) Legal Aid and the right to instruct lawyers of his choice: Haringey LBC v Brown [2015] EWCA Civ 483). I have borne those cardinal principles of fairness fully in mind when considering the contempt allegations against Ms Fleming. 55. The alleged breaches by Ms Fleming of my injunction sought to be proved by Mr Wood and Ms Ward date from 4 July 2024 through to 11 July 2024. Therefore, they are all alleged breaches of the without notice injunction that I made, rather than alleged breaches after I renewed that on-notice on 19th July 2024, or indeed again on 13th August 2024. Mr Wood and Ms Ward allege that Ms Fleming has breached paragraph 5 of the injunction which I granted without notice on 2nd July 2024, which stated: “Until further order of the Court, the Defendant shall not: a. telephone, text, email or otherwise contact or attempt to contact Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward (including via any social networking website or other forms of electronic messaging) except as is necessary for the conduct of ongoing proceedings or for the purposes of serving documentation in relation to other court proceedings; b. telephone, text, email or otherwise contact or attempt to contact the friends and family of Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward (including via social networking websites or other forms of electronic messaging); c. outside the litigation process publish, or otherwise communicate any information that criticises Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward; d. publish, or repeat, or in any way or encourage the publication or repetition of any critical statements of or concerning Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward by any means and on any form of social media; e. publish, or otherwise communicate, any private and/or confidential information relating to Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward; f. otherwise cause Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward to suffer alarm and/or distress; and/or g. instruct, encourage or in any way suggest that any other person should do any of the matters listed above and/or otherwise harass Richard Wood and/or Rebecca Ward or cause them to suffer alarm or distress.” 56. Therefore, reminding myself of the cardinal importance of procedural fairness in committal cases, it is particularly important I should be satisfied that Ms Fleming was properly served with the injunction and understood its terms. On Ms Fleming’s behalf, Mr Angelides has renewed her complaints about service of the injunction I considered in the Main Judgment, but given she now faces committal, I reconsider them afresh. 57. However, I can deal with this shortly, because it is perfectly obvious that Ms Fleming was aware of the existence and terms of my injunction of 2nd July from her own social media post of 4th July which is an alleged contempt in the Committal Notice. She said: “Good news for criminals of England and Wales, you can easily get your victim imprisoned, seize their home, etc, by making an ex parte application to a judge if all the evidence you present to the judge proves your crime.” 58. This fits the evidence of the Claimants’ process server Mr McConkey that he personally served (consistent with CPR 81) Ms Fleming at her then-home in Omagh, Northern Ireland with the injunction at 8.30pm on 3rd July 2024. That obviously prompted Ms Fleming’s social media post the following day. I dealt with the issue of jurisdiction for the injunction in the Main Judgment at paragraph 79, which I repeat for ease: “On 19th July, I determined that the English Courts had interim jurisdiction to make an injunction against Ms Fleming despite her residence in Northern Ireland due to s.24(1) CJJA. I was also satisfied of English jurisdiction as she could be validly served there, as service is how a defendant is subjected to the Court’s jurisdiction: Barton v Wright Hassall [2018] 1 WLR 1119 (SC) at [8]. As confirmed in Re Liddell’s Settlement Trusts [1936] Ch 365, as an injunction operates in personam (i.e. personally) the English High Court may make one over a defendant living abroad, providing they can be validly served with English proceedings. Whilst this generally requires the Court’s permission (CPR 6.36)…under CPR 6.32 and 6.40(2), the Court’s permission is not required for service of a defendant in Northern Ireland of English proceedings (given there are no pending proceedings elsewhere in the UK) provided they can be personally served, which was done here on 3rd July…” 59. I am therefore satisfied so that I am sure that not only was Ms Fleming validly served with my injunction of 2nd July 2024 on 3rd July, I am also sure this prompted her to make the social media post on 4th July. She clearly understood the seriousness of breach of the order, because she made a sarcastic comment about the risk of imprisonment. 60. However, the second question is whether the terms of the injunction were clear. I am satisfied that they were and it has not been suggested by Mr Angelides they were not. Nevertheless, I am also conscious that the terms of the injunction have changed. As I explained in the Main Judgment at paragraphs 101 to 107, I actually adjusted the terms on 13th August to broaden the injunction in two ways (by making a mandatory injunction requiring Ms Fleming to take down social media posts; and extending protection to the Claimants’ lawyers) but to narrow it in other ways, as I explained: “101…I am satisfied that [the injunction] requires some degree of adjustment in the light of three factors. Firstly, I have now taken into account Art.10 ECHR freedom of expression. Second, the position has changed on the ground, because of my appointment of the interim administrators. Thirdly, in the light of Ms Fleming’s conduct since he original injunction on 2nd July…it seems to me appropriate to adjust some of the language in the original injunction. That in part narrows that language, but actually in part widens it. 102 I will maintain the prohibition on Ms Fleming telephoning, texting, emailing or otherwise contacting or attempting to contact Mr Wood or Ms Ward in the ways prohibited by paragraph 5(a) of the existing injunction, likewise contacting their friends and family in the terms prohibited by paragraph (b). However, paragraph 5(c) needs to be narrowed. A prohibition on Ms Fleming criticising Mr Wood and Ms Ward ‘outside the litigation’ – to put it neutrally, whether or not there has been a Contempt, has not worked. Moreover, as the [Executors] are now taking a back seat in terms of the administration of the estate pending suit, that wording can in my judgement fairly be tightened, which would also enhance the scope of Ms Fleming’s Art.10 ECHR right to freedom of expression. 103 There is a difference, as both Ms Fleming and Mr Day accept, between her criticism of Mr Wood and Ms Ward which might fall within the scope of freedom of expression even if unpleasant on one hand; and her allegations of professional misconduct and criminal misconduct on the other which are completely unjustified and are ‘likely’ to fall outside the protection of Art.10 ECHR even with the additional latitude for freedom of expression in Hayden. I remind myself that my assessment of whether the conduct crosses the boundary from ‘the unattractive, even unreasonable, to the oppressive and unacceptable’ must ‘pay due regard to the importance of freedom of expression and the need for any restrictions upon the right to be necessary, proportionate and established convincingly’. With that fully in mind, I am nevertheless satisfied that a prohibition on publishing or communicating only allegations of criminal or professional misconduct against Mr Wood and Ms Ward would suffice. Paragraph 5(d) as it will be including instructing, encouraging or in any way suggesting any other person should do likewise. 104 Clause 5(e) of the existing injunction should remain to prohibit publication or otherwise communicating any confidential information relating to Mr Wood or Ms Ward. This is narrower and less restrictive than ‘any personal information’ criticised in other cases. Likewise, I will delete paras. 5(f) and 5(g) of the existing injunction as now unnecessary.” 61. It seems to me that in fairness to Ms Fleming, I should limit the scope of my findings to conduct which would not only breach the original terms of the injunction on 2nd July, but would have done so had it contained the narrower wording of the injunction of 13th August. For example, I will not make any findings based upon clause 5(f) of the injunction of 2nd July, that prohibited Ms Fleming causing Mr Wood and Ms Ward to suffer alarm and distress, for the reasons I gave in my judgment of 13th August. That term, I am satisfied, was (on reflection) too wide, having regard to questions of issues of Ms Fleming’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. That is not to say that I was wrong to make the original injunction in those terms, but simply that once Ms Fleming had had the opportunity to make representations about her freedom of expression, I accepted there was some force in her contentions and I, therefore, deleted that paragraph. Therefore, in fairness to her, I do not make any findings of its breach. 62. I should also say that paragraph 5(c) of the injunction of 2nd July which prohibited Ms Fleming ‘outside the litigation process publishing or otherwise communicating any information that criticises Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward’, I also adjusted on 13th August so that it read ‘publish or otherwise communicate any information that criticises Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward for either criminal or professional misconduct’. That tightened the scope of the prohibition to allegations of criminal or professional misconduct (albeit strictly whether or not within the litigation process). Therefore, despite the fact that there was no requirement of criminal or professional misconduct in paragraph 5(c) of the injunction of 2nd July, I will limit my findings to allegations or findings, where I am sure to the criminal standard of proof that she has communicated information that criticises Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward in the sense of accusing them of criminal or professional misconduct. 63. Likewise, paragraph 5(d) in the injunction of 2nd July has also narrowed. Ms Fleming was originally ‘prohibited from publishing or repeating, or in any way encouraging the publication or repetition of, critical statements of or concerning Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward, by any means, and any form of social media’. However, on 13th August I narrowed that to a prohibition on Ms Fleming ‘publishing or repeating, or in any way encouraging the publication or repetition of any allegations of criminal or professional misconduct against Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward, by any means and on any form of social media’. Therefore, as with paragraph 5(c), I will limit my finding on paragraph 5(d) to findings of allegations of criminal or professional misconduct. 64. However, there has been no change to paragraph 5(a) of the injunction of 2nd July, that Ms Fleming is ‘prohibited from telephoning, texting, emailing or otherwise contacting, or attempting to contact, Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward, including via social media, except for the purposes as necessary for the conduct of ongoing proceedings, or the purposes of serving documentation in relation to other court proceedings’. The same is true of paragraph 5(b), that Ms Fleming is ‘prohibited from telephoning, texting, emailing or otherwise contacting, or attempting to contact, the friends and family of Richard Wood and / or Rebecca Ward, including via social networking websites, or other forms of electronic messaging’. 65. By adopting that approach, I can satisfy myself in fairness to Ms Fleming that any findings that I make that she was in contempt, are findings that she was in breach of the terms of the injunction not only at the time but as subsequently narrowed. On that basis, I can turn then finally to whether I am sure that her conduct unambiguously breached those terms even on that narrower basis. For reasons I now explain, I am sure of that, indeed, it was not seriously contended that Ms Fleming did not breach those terms. 66. As explained, I leave aside allegations of breach of paragraph 5(f) of the injunction of 2nd July and limit findings of alleged breach of paragraphs 5(c) and (d) to Ms Fleming’s allegations of criminal and professional misconduct by Mr Wood and Ms Ward. However, it is important when considering paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b) to understand the way that social media works. Explicit references by Ms Fleming on her own Facebook account to Ms Ward and Mr Wood effectively can be seen as contacting them if reference to an individual by name on social media links to that individual’s account (which is how Ms Ward and Mr Wood have discovered many of Ms Fleming’s posts). 67. On 4th July, Ms Fleming posted the following (my numerals): (i) ‘My Facebook posts are not for friends/family of Rebecca Ward & Richard Wood – please block me to avoid threats of my imprisonment’…(ii) ‘Good news for Criminals of England & Wales. You can easily get your victim imprisoned, seize their home etc by making an ex parte application to a Judge, even if all the evidence you present to the Judge proves YOUR crime.’; (iii) I have only been warming up in relation to exposing the hideous assault on my family. However, I have no intention of ‘harassing’ anyone with truth so if the truth upsets you please stop reading it. Please block me. Don’t watch the documentary or read the news articles’…(iv) Is there any barrister at 3 Paper Buildings that does not lie to Judges? [Image of Dorian Day with the title – “Dorian Day attacker of the defenseless”]; (v) “Finally! No risk now of a fraudulent application for Grant of Probate using addresses where Brendan has never lived. [Image of letter from Probate Registry]. 68. I am satisfied so that I am sure that all these form part of the same string of posts by Ms Fleming on 4th July 2024 which all breached paragraphs 5(a) and (b) in that Ms Fleming sought to communicate with Mr Wood, Ms Ward and their friends and family, albeit to suggest they block her posts (rather than restraining her own conduct in those posts). Further, I am satisfied that (iv), in implying Mr Day had been instructed by Mr Wood and Ms Ward to lie to judges, also breached paragraphs (d) of the injunction (since the latter would be professional misconduct); likewise, (v) breached paragraph 5(d) of the injunction in implying there had been a previous fraudulent application for probate, implicitly by Mr Wood and Ms Ward as executors. I appreciate that requires interpretation of the posts in context, but that is legitimate: see Pan Petroleum. 69. The breaches by Ms Fleming on 6th July 2024 were even clearer. I need not set them all out in detail. Her post that ‘Since Brendan died Rebecca Ward & Richard Wood have embezzled his children’s inheritance’speaks for itself and I am sure constitutes a breach of paragraph 5(d) (as an allegation of crime) and paragraphs 5(a) and (b) as a communication directed at Ms Ward and Mr Wood. Indeed, on another post the same day, Ms Fleming specifically directed an allegation of ‘embezzlement’ at them, again breaching the same paragraphs. Similar posts the same day breached the same paragraphs in referring to Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s ‘effort to destroy Brendan’s family’ and in another post implicitly to them as ‘wicked evil criminal snakes’ destroying his family. However, with apologies to Mr Wood, I must single out for particular emphasis Ms Fleming’s post on the same day that: ‘Richard. Why is your alcoholic suicidal wife relevant to your efforts to leave Brendan’s children without any parent or any inheritance.’ This not only clearly breached paragraphs 5(1) (b) and (d) of my injunction it was a thoroughly inhumane comment about an entirely innocent third party. 70. On 7th July, Ms Fleming posted on a social media account for parents whose children were facing care proceedings (or ‘stolen by social services’ as it put it) that: ‘You will be at a huge risk is you choose a Solicitors based on their previous excellent reputation and then they get suddenly closed down when a fraud is exposed. Please share.’ Therefore, from context this was clearly a reference to BFL and sought to drive a wedge between it and potential or actual clients (as Ms Ward explained in her evidence). I am sure that it breached paragraph 5(d) of the injunction. I am also sure that it breached paragraphs 5(a) and (b) as well, as communications directed at Mr Wood, Ms Ward and those known to them because the post was ‘re-posted’ in numerous locations on You Tube and Tik Tok in circumstances where it was clearly intended to reach them. 71. On 8th July, there was perhaps the clearest breach of paragraph 5(d) of the injunction of 2nd July with Ms Fleming’s Facebook post saying: “Eight days after Brendan died, Richard Wood, a financial adviser, who has been setting Brendan up to embezzle his estate, since 2013, and Rebecca Ward, an employed solicitor, presented a redacted will, false evidence to the Court, to have the company shares transferred to them. They gave undertakings to get grant of probate ASAP. But six months later, all they are doing is starving Brendan’s dependent family of funds, to coerce us into consenting to their invalid will. They refuse to propound it because they know it is invalid. Those criminals took advantage of Brendan, while Brendan was suffering a breakdown, to get a will in their favour. Now they are embezzling the inheritance that rightly belongs to Brendan's six dependent children, leaving the children dependent on charitable donations. They claim to have a valid will but refuse to propound it, use aggressive litigation ex parte injunctions, to try and prevent me challenging. They are sick and evil, and now they have Brendan’s solicitors’ business, with so many vulnerable clients. But the SRA cannot do anything about it, because they got it by misleading a judge.” Again I am also satisfied of a breach of paras 5(a) and (b) because the specific naming of Ms Ward and Mr Wood targeted them and their friends and family on social media. 72. On 9th July, Ms Fleming posted on Facebook that Barnett Ravenscroft, Mr Wood’s firm ‘will help you protect your wealth while you are alive and then they embezzle it from your loved ones when you die’. To drive home the point, Ms Fleming then posted a link to a video relating to Mr Wood saying: ‘This is Richard Wood, the fraudster. He will get you wealthy and then embezzle your estate for himself when you die’. I am sure that both posts, read together, breached paragraphs 5(a), 5(b) and (d) of the injunction. The same is true of Ms Fleming’s post of the same date referring not only to Mr Wood and Ms Ward specifically, but also to their barrister in the probate proceedings, Mr Feltham as ‘providing an opinion to justify Richard Wood & Rebecca Ward continuing to seize Brendan Fleming’s assets’, as with her earlier post about Mr Day. 73. On 10th July, Ms Fleming posted on Facebook ‘Has Richard Wood and Rebecca Wood taken away Brendan’s family’s human rights, as well as their inheritance? Let us see if they can take away my liberty without a fair trial and for exercising my freedom of expression to disclose the inhumane way they have treated us since Brendan died’. On the same date, 10th July, Ms Fleming posted on Facebook, ‘When Brendan Fleming Solicitors falls into the direction of crooked Rebecca Ward, Richard Wood and Rebecca Ward stole the children’s inheritance by an act of fraud. The criminals made him write it when he was sick during Covid. They needed to hide Brendan’s Turkish domicile and fake an English domicile, to make it look the will was valid. They attempted to imprison the children's mother, to silence her from exposing their crimes. Richard Wood and Rebecca Ward are criminals. Rebecca Ward stole the children's inheritance by fraud. They had to fake Brendan was British, living in England, while knowing he was Irish. Rebecca Ward lied to the SRA, claiming Brendan assets could not maintain his children’. Along with similar posts that day, these were further breaches of paragraphs 5(a)(b) and (d) of the injunction for similar reasons as already discussed. Finally, on 11th July, Ms Fleming posted a video in various locations on social media, including the comment ‘Brendan, in his prime before he was oppressed by Rebecca Ward’, again I am sure this breached paragraphs 5(a),(b) and (d) of the injunction. 74. Therefore, to that extent, I find at least partial breach in respect of every entry on the Committal Notice. I am satisfied, so that I am sure to the criminal standard of proof, that Ms Fleming’s conduct unambiguously breached the injunction in those respects. Indeed, as Mr Day reminded me, when Ms Fleming was representing herself, on 13th August, she not only accepted that she had made those posts, but that she had done so in conscious and deliberate violation of the injunction. I refrained from making a finding to that effect in my judgment on 13th August, because it was not fair for Ms Fleming to find her guilty of contempt before I was dealing with the contempt. But she seemed bizarrely proud of the fact that she had breached the injunction and indeed said that she would be prepared to continue doing so. It appears, I am bound to say – although I make no finding about it because it is not on the Committal Notice and I want to be fair to Ms Fleming – that that is exactly what she has continued to do, judging by Ms Ward’s most recent statement. However, whilst it is unnecessary to rely on Ms Fleming’s effective admission of breach at the hearing on 13th August, it fortifies my conclusion that I am satisfied so that I am sure, that the alleged contempts are proved. 75. However, without having heard submissions, my provisional view (at 4.40pm) is that I am not inclined to proceed to sentence now. What I am inclined to do is to defer consideration of sentence for the conduct for the course of the probate proceedings – because I hold out the hope it might be a Sword of Damocles over Ms Fleming’s head which may finally begin to curb her conduct and offer some protection to Ms Ward and Mr Wood through the course of those proceedings. (Hearing continued) 76. JUDGE TINDAL: Having heard the further submissions of Mr Day and Mr Angelides, I can simply say the injunction will be in the same terms as those which I granted on 13th August. I entirely accept Mr Angelides’ point, put forward with the same skill and consideration as all of his submissions have been today, that the injunction should go no further than is necessary in effecting Ms Fleming’s freedom of expression. I agree, which is the reason why I adjusted my judgment on 13th August, to calibrate it precisely against that standard. I am satisfied that the Injunction Order in those terms does respect and does not disproportionately interfere with Ms Fleming’s Art.10 ECHR rights, or indeed freedom of expression of common law. 77. So far as the duration of the injunction is concerned, it is simplest to say simply “until further order’. But the reason is that if I were to say ‘during the whole currency of the proceedings’, there is a risk the injunction might last too long. Whereas if I say, ‘until further order’, then that leaves it simply to the Court to determine when the injunction has served its purpose and is no longer needed, and that will depend principally on Ms Fleming and whether she finally ceases her hitherto incessant posts. 78. Mr Day also asked for Hadkinson relief – in effect preventing Ms Fleming from making further applications whilst she remains in breach of the injunction. However, as he accepted, that is a last resort order. By contrast, I am deferring consideration of penalty and as Mr Angelides says that points against Hadkinson relief in any event. 79. As requested, I will assess damages for harassment at the nominal rate of one pound to each Claimant. The only thing left is to deal with costs. 80. I am satisfied that, obviously, the Claimants are the winners of the proceedings, both in relation to the injunction and in relation to the committal. I am also satisfied that the conduct of Ms Fleming has gone well outside the norm justifying indemnity costs, because as I have explained in my Main Judgment, on 13th August, Ms Fleming’s conduct of the whole proceedings – injunction, committal and probate – has gone well outside the norm. It has been characterised by not only the same unfounded accusations of criminal misconduct against the Claimants, but also by her manner and her presentation to me on 13th August, her insistent applications to the Court, which all lacked merit – although in fairness to her, I have only certified one totally without merit. 81. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that Ms Fleming should pay the Mr Wood and Ms Ward’s costs of the injunction and committal proceeding so far, to be assessed on the indemnity basis, and to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. 82. Finally, Mr Angelides made an application for permission to appeal. I refuse the application for permission to appeal in the injunction proceedings, on the basis that the grounds are not arguable, for the reasons I have given. As Mr Day reminded us, Ms Fleming does not need permission to appeal my finding of committal. – – – – – – – – – – Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP. Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.martenwalshcherer.com