Mannings Organisation Limited & Anor v Joseph Henry Manning

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1160 (KB) Case No: KB-2025-004435 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING’S BENCH DIVISION Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 14 May 2026 Before: ANDREW KINNIER K.C. Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court Between: (1) MANNINGS ORGANISATION LIMITED (2) MANNINGS AMUSEMENTS LIMITED Claimants – and – JOSEPH HENRY MANNING Defendant Richard Power K.C. (instructed by Greenwoods Legal Services Limited) for the Claimants Thomas Grant K.C. and Hugh Jeffery (instructed by Boodle Hatfield) for the Defendant Hearing: 10 February 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Approved Judgment This judgment was handed down remotely on 14 May 2026 at 2pm by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and released to the National Archives. ANDREW KINNIER K.C. sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court: Introduction

1. There are two applications before the court. The first is the return date of the Claimants’ application (dated 27 November 2025 but issued on 1 December 2025) for an injunction (originally granted by Foster J on 2 December 2025 (“the injunction”)) restraining Mr Joseph Manning Senior, the Defendant, inter alia from (a) operating any business at any event for which the Claimants have an exclusive right to operate except with their written agreement and (b) threatening, intimidating, inflicting physical violence on or interfering with the Claimants’ directors, employees, customers or sub-contractors, or interfering with or destroying the Claimants’ property (“the injunction application”). The second is Joseph Senior’s application (dated 15 January 2026) to discharge the injunction (“the discharge application”).

2. No discourtesy is intended but in this judgment, for the sake of clarity, I have described Mr Joseph Manning Senior, Mrs Sindy Manning, Mr Joseph Manning Junior and Mr Clayton Manning as “Joseph Senior”, “Sindy”, “Joseph Junior” and “Clayton” respectively. PART 1 – background The parties

3. The Claimants operate temporary funfair events in various cities in the United Kingdom. They provide attractions and catering services for the Winter Wonderland event in Hyde Park (“Winter Wonderland”) and the Winterland event in the Bluewater shopping centre in Dartford (“Winterland”).

4. Mannings Organisation Limited (“Mannings Organisation”), the First Claimant, was incorporated in December 1989. Mannings Amusements Limited (“Mannings Amusements”), the Second Claimant, was incorporated in May 2001. Until 2020, Joseph Senior was the majority shareholder of both companies. In that year, Joseph Senior made gratuitous transfers to his two sons, Joseph Junior and Clayton, the result of which is that he retains a 34% shareholding in both companies and the balance is held by Joseph Junior and Clayton in equal proportions of 33%.

5. Until 2024, Joseph Senior was the sole director of both Claimants. By ordinary resolutions, passed on 10 July 2024, Joseph Junior and Clayton were appointed directors of both Claimants. By further ordinary resolutions, passed on 6 September 2024, Joseph Senior was removed as a director of the two companies since when Joseph Junior and Clayton have been the only directors. The family dispute

6. The Manning family’s involvement in the amusement industry is longstanding and has its roots in the 19th century. Since the 1980s, Joseph Senior has set up and successfully developed several businesses in the industry. Unfortunately, since 2019 Joseph Senior and his sons have disagreed about the ownership of those businesses and their associated assets. In essence, Joseph Junior and Clayton maintain that their father has failed to honour his promises to recognise their interests in those businesses and assets. Joseph Senior denies that any such promises were made. The result has been a complete breakdown in the relationship between father and sons. As the substance of the many statements served by the parties demonstrates, their disagreement has also divided the wider family, friends, colleagues and employees.

7. The family’s quarrel will now be fought out in three sets of High Court proceedings. In addition to the present litigation, a claim was issued on 7 October 2025 by Joseph Junior and Clayton in the Business and Property Court. They seek interests, by way of proprietary estoppel, in the business assets of Joseph Senior (including his 34% shareholding in the Claimants) and Sindy, their mother (“the proprietary estoppel claim”). More recently, Joseph Senior and Sindy filed an unfair prejudice petition under the Companies Act 2006 which, in summary, seeks an order that Joseph Junior and Clayton buy their father’s shareholding in the Claimants (“the unfair prejudice claim”).

8. Although much in this claim is contentious, it is clear that the relationship between Joseph Senior, Joseph Junior and Clayton deteriorated markedly from October 2023 onwards. The Claimants rely on a series of alleged incidents between October 2023 and October 2025 in which Joseph Senior is said to have harassed his sons by various means in order to secure the transfer of exclusive rights in the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events from the Claimants to him. It is alleged that Joseph Senior: (a) Threatened to set fire to the Claimants’ equipment in October 2023; (b) On 1 February 2024, told the Business Development Manager at Landsec, which runs Bluewater that he should deal solely with him as Joseph Junior no longer represented the Claimants; (c) On 8 July 2024, assaulted Clayton and Joseph Junior. It is said that the former was head-butted by his father causing him to suffer a broken nose and the latter’s brow and one ear were cut; (d) On 5 August 2024, made threats of violence against Joseph Junior at the latter’s home; (e) In October 2024, shouted threats at Clayton; (f) On 29 December 2024, attended Winterland and used threatening behaviour towards an employee of Mannings Amusements; (g) In December 2024, contacted the Executive Vice President of IMG (the company which runs Winter Wonderland for the Royal Parks) to persuade him not to deal with the Claimants and alleged that his sons had “stolen” the companies from him; (h) In February 2025, made a telephone call to an employee of Mannings Amusements in which he threatened to evict three of the Claimants’ employees who lived in caravans at the depot; (i) On 13 October 2025, instructed a letter to be sent from his solicitors to a director of Luminarie Street Limited (“Luminarie”) in which he sought to “warn off” the company from dealing with the Claimants; and (j) On 16 October 2025, forced entry to Winterland and sought to pitch his food stalls without the Claimants’ consent.

9. Until 2024, Joseph Senior remained engaged in the management of the Claimants but since then the parties’ dealings have been conducted through their solicitors. The immediate context to the present proceedings

10. In October 2025, the imminent opening of the Winterland event brought the family’s dispute to a head.

11. On 6 October 2025, Mr Thomas Christie, the Claimants’ solicitor, wrote to Ms Nicola Bushby, Joseph Senior’s solicitor, to set out the terms on which they were willing to allow him to attend Winterland and pitch his food stands. The next day Ms Bushby replied stating that Joseph Senior and Sindy would attend in exercise of established rights with The Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain (“the Guild”) and they did not require the Claimants’ consent or agreement to do so. In a letter dated 10 October 2025, Mr Christie told Ms Bushby that neither Joseph Senior nor Sindy would be allowed to attend the event to pitch their food stalls. The letter also said that The Showmen’s Guild Rules (“the Guild Rules”) were irrelevant to the question whether Joseph Senior and Sindy were allowed to attend to sell food.

12. As indicated above, on 13 October 2025, Ms Bushby, on behalf of Joseph Senior, wrote to Mr William Thurston Senior, a director of Luminarie, one of the Claimants’ sub-contractors. Joseph Junior is also a director of Luminarie and Mr Thurston is his father-in-law. The letter said that Joseph Senior had concerns about Luminarie’s dealings with the Claimants and particularly in relation to Winter Wonderland. It also said that Joseph Junior and Clayton, in breach of their fiduciary duties as directors of the Claimants, had diverted various lines of business properly belonging to those businesses. The letter sought an undertaking from Luminarie that it would not take any commercial opportunities at Winter Wonderland that had historically been held by the Claimants. It also asked for disclosure of the full extent of Luminarie’s activities at Winter Wonderland to Joseph Senior.

13. On 16 October 2025, as he said he would, Joseph Senior attended Winterland. He created an opening in the event’s perimeter fence and set up his food stalls. Winterland’s head of security asked him to leave but Joseph Senior refused to do so. The police later attended and on 17 October 2025, the food stalls were removed by Charles Manning, Clayton’s brother-in-law, on behalf of Joseph Senior.

14. Three events in November 2025 prompted the Claimants to issue the present claim. First, on 11 November 2025, the Claimants became aware that the Royal Parks had received an anonymous letter urging them not to award the Winter Wonderland contract to Manning Amusements. The letter has not been disclosed but Joseph Junior and Clayton believe Joseph Senior to be the letter’s author. Secondly, at about the same time, Joseph Junior learned that IMG had held an executive level meeting to decide what to do should Joseph Senior attempt to gain entry to Winter Wonderland and set up his stalls. Finally, in the latter part of November 2025, members of the Manning family were contacted by a journalist from the Daily Telegraph. Joseph Junior’s understanding is that the journalist was researching an article about Mannings Amusements’ involvement in Winter Wonderland. He suspected the article would portray the Claimants in a bad light and he believes that his father is in some way involved in the article’s genesis and preparation. The injunction application

15. Prompted by the Claimants’ concerns about Joseph Senior’s alleged actions, this claim was begun by the injunction application. It sought urgent relief under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“the Act”) “to restrain [Joseph Senior] from entering or operating a business at two attractions, or at any event for which [the Claimants] have an exclusive right to operate and from harassing [the Claimants], its directors, employees, customers or sub-contractors.” It is the Claimants’ case that unless restrained, in light of the incident at Winterland on 16 October 2025, the anonymous letter sent to the Royal Parks and the Daily Telegraph’s interest in Mannings Amusements and Winter Wonderland, Joseph Senior will continue to disrupt their commercial operations and cause “significant commercial and physical harm” to the businesses and their staff. The Claimants also relied upon the series of incidents summarised above to demonstrate a course of conduct which was intended to cause alarm and distress.

16. On 2 December 2025, having heard submissions from counsel then instructed by the Claimants (Mr Robert Machell) and subject to the usual cross-undertakings, Foster J made the following order: “IT IS ORDERED THAT up to and including 10 December 2025 (“the Return Date”): (1) The Intended Defendant, MR JOSEPH HENRY MANNING, must not enter “Winterland”, Bluewater Shopping Centre, Bluewater Pkwy, Dartford, Greenhithe DA9 9ST or “Hyde Park Winter Wonderland”, Hyde Park, London, W2 2UH at Hyde Park, other than as a visitor having paid the appropriate entry ticket price. (2) The Intended Defendant, MR JOSEPH HENRY MANNING, must not operate any business at “Winterland” Bluewater Shopping Centre, Bluewater Pkwy, Dartford, Greenhithe DA9 9ST OR “Hyde Park Winter Wonderland”, London, W2 2UH at Hyde Park. (3) The Intended Defendant, MR JOSEPH HENRY MANNING, must not operate any business at any event for which the Applicants (or either of them) have, and have given the Intended Defendant written notice that they have, an exclusive right to operate, save pursuant to an agreement in writing with the Applicants. (4) The Intended Defendant, MR JOSEPH HENRY MANNING, must not threaten, intimidate, inflict physical violence on, or interfere with the rights of, the Applicants’ directors, employees, customers or sub-contractors, or interfere with or destroy the Applicants’ property. (5) The Intended Defendant, MR JOSEPH HENRY MANNING, must not interfere with the delivery of post or any other deliveries addressed to, or obviously intended for delivery to, Mannings Organisation Limited, Mannings Amusements Limited, Joseph Arthur Manning, Alexandra Manning and/or Clayton Joseph Manning. (6) The Intended Defendant may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this Order … (7) The case to be listed on 10 December 2025 before a High Court Judge of the King’s Bench Division with a time estimate of 2 hours …” Procedural steps after 2 December 2025

17. On 3 December 2025, the Claimants issued a Part 8 claim. The claim form was endorsed with brief details of the claim. In summary, the Claimants relied on 10 specific incidents between October 2023 and 16 October 2025 which were alleged to amount to harassment; the conduct involved harassment of two or more people and by that conduct, Joseph Senior intended: “a. to persuade the Claimants to give up to the Defendant, or to companies controlled by him, valuable exclusive contracts including those for the Winterland event at Bluewater and the Winter Wonderland event at Hyde Park; and/or b. to persuade the Claimants to allow companies controlled by the Defendant to operate as sub-contractors for the Claimant without paying.” It was also said that Joseph Senior’s actions were unwanted, oppressive and unreasonable and alarming and caused distress to those affected.

18. On 8 December 2025, Cavanagh J approved a consent order which gave directions for the service of evidence by the parties and adjourned the return date to the first available date after 19 January 2026 with a time estimate of 1½ days.

19. The injunction and discharge applications were listed before me on 10 February 2026. In addition to the original affidavits of Mr Thomas Christie (the Claimants’ solicitor with day-to-day conduct of the case), Joseph Junior and Clayton, the parties served a total of 11 witness statements for the injunction application. I have also considered the statements of Ms Bushby, and Mr Owen Wallis, the supervising partner at the Claimants’ solicitors, which dealt with the discharge application. The bundle and supplemental bundle together comprised approximately 1,000 pages. The evidence was supplemented by a skeleton argument lodged by Mr Richard Power KC, counsel for the Claimants, and a 57-page skeleton argument prepared by Mr Thomas Grant KC and Mr Hugh Jeffery, counsel for Joseph Senior. The parties also served authorities bundles. PART 2 – the injunction application The parties’ positions

20. As Winterland and Winter Wonderland ended in December 2025/January 2026, the Claimants no longer seek the orders at paras. 1 and 2 of the injunction. They have made alternative postal delivery arrangements so para. 5 is also not pursued. The result is that the Claimants now seek the continuation of paras. 3 and 4 only.

21. On 16 January 2026, the day after the discharge application was issued, the Claimants’ solicitors proposed two undertakings to resolve matters: “Mr Joseph Henry Manning (i) will not operate a business at or seek to enter as a business, any event for which [the Claimants] (or either of them) have, and have given the Defendant written notice that they have, an exclusive right to operate, save pursuant to an agreement in writing with [the Claimants]; and (ii) will not disparage the Claimants to any of their business partners including LandSec, IMG, PWR Events and/or those set out in paragraph 19 of the witness statement of Joseph Arthur Manning dated 16 January 2026.”

22. Joseph Senior’s position is that the claim and the injunction application are unmeritorious. For that reason, he rejected the proposed undertakings and declined to offer any alternative ones. However, he has said in correspondence, in evidence and by Leading Counsel in open court that he has no intention of having any contact of any sort with Joseph Junior and Clayton other than through solicitors. Joseph Senior has also said in his evidence that he will not attend Winterland or Winter Wonderland pending the Guild’s determination of the dispute he referred to them about his right to pitch a food stall at Winterland. At para. 161(4) of the skeleton argument served on his behalf, it is stated that Joseph Senior has no intention of doing that which is sought to be injuncted. Injunctive relief – the relevant principles

23. Subject to a legal question about any threshold for relief which is discussed at paras. 36-39 below, the parties agree that the three-stage American Cyanamid test applies: the Claimants must satisfy the court that there is a serious issue to be tried; damages are an inadequate remedy and the balance of convenience favours the grant of relief.

24. I also remind myself that in dealing with an application for an interim injunction, the court should not attempt to resolve “critical disputed questions of fact or difficult points of law” in which the claim of either party may ultimately depend, particularly where the point of law “turns on fine questions of fact which are in dispute or are presently obscure”: Derby & Co. Limited v. Weldon (No. 1) [1990] Ch 48 at 58F-G (per Parker LJ) and 63G-H (per Nicholls LJ); Sukhoruchkin v. Van Bekestein [2014] EWCA Civ 399, para. 32 (per Sir Terence Etherton C).

25. To that end, at a contested hearing on the return date, the court should not conduct a mini-trial or decide disputed points of fact. It cannot assess the veracity of evidence absent cross-examination of the witnesses. As Lord Diplock said in American Cyanamid [1975] AC 396 at 407: “The use of such expressions as ‘a probability’, ‘a prima facie case’, or ‘a strong prima facie case’ in the context of an exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, in other words, there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try and resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. One of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as to damages upon the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that it aided the court in doing that which was its great object, viz. abstaining from expressing any opinion upon the merits of the case until the hearing … So unless the material available to the court at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the plaintiff has any real prospect of succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, the court should go on to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief that is sought.” The Act – the relevant provisions and case-law

26. Three provisions of the Act are relevant: ss. 1, 1(1A) and 3A. Section 1 materially provides that: “(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct – (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.” (2) For the purposes of this section … the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to or involves harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to or involved harassment of the other.”

27. References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress: s. 7(2). A “course of conduct” must involve in the case of conduct in relation to two or more persons, conduct on at least one occasion in relation to each of those persons: s. 7(3)(b). That said, references to a person, in the context of the harassment of a person, are references to a person who is an individual: s. 7(5).

28. Section 1(1A) provides that: “A person must not pursue a course of conduct – (a) which involves harassment of two or more persons, and (b) which he knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons, and (c) by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not of those mentioned above) – (i) not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or (ii) to do something that he is not under any obligation to do.”

29. Section 3A is concerned with injunctions to protect persons from harassment within s. 1(1A): “(1) This section applies where there is an actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1A) by any person (“the relevant person”). (2) In such a case – (a) any person who is or may be a victim of the course of conduct in question, or (b) any person who is or may be a person falling within section 1(1A)(c), may apply to the High Court or the county court for an injunction restraining the relevant person from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment in relation to any person or persons mentioned or described in the injunction.”

30. As to the case-law, in Majrowski v. Guys and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 6 and a series of other cases held that the threshold of seriousness applied in cases of harassment. The nature of that threshold was concisely summarised by Sir David Eady in Shakil Ur-Rahman v. ARY Network Limited [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB) where, at para. 16, he found that what matters is that there is a minimum threshold of seriousness before the statutory tort can be established. The question will be whether the course of conduct goes beyond the sort of annoyance and irritation that one has to tolerate, as part of living alongside other people in a modern society, and has become “oppressive and unacceptable” or “fairly severe”.

31. In Hayes v. Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 [2013] 1 WLR 935, Lord Sumption defined, at para. 1, harassment as an ordinary English word with a well understood meaning. It is a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress.

32. A course of conduct requires a unifying “nexus”: R v. Patel [2004] EWCA Crim 3284, para.

40. To that end, where an allegation of harassment relies on a series of incidents which are few in number and widely spaced in time, the question is whether those incidents can “properly be said to be so connected in type and in context as to justify the conclusion that they can amount to a course of conduct”: Pratt v. DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 483, para.

10.

33. Finally, in Clyde & Co. LLP v. Kennedy [2025] EWHC 1186 (KB), the court found, at para. 15, that in a claim brought by a corporate body under s. 1(1A) of the Act, such a claimant must prove, in addition to the other requirements of the statutory tort, that the conduct relied upon was intended by the defendant to persuade the legal person making the claim not to do something that it is entitled or required to do, or to do something that it is not under any obligation to do. The Claimants’ submissions

34. Mr Power KC submits that each limb of the American Cyanamid test has been satisfied. In summary: (a) There is plainly a serious issue to be tried as to whether the Claimants have a claim for a final injunction against Joseph Senior under the Act. The combined effect of ss. 1(1A) and 3A(1) is that where there is an actual or apprehended breach of s. 1(1A), any person caught by s. 1(1A)(c) (which includes the Claimants) may apply to the High Court for an injunction restraining the relevant person from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment in relation to any person or persons mentioned in the injunction. (b) In any event, Joseph Senior robustly disputes the allegations of violence and business interference which can only be resolved at trial. Similarly, lengthy recitation of factual disputes and disagreement about the Guild Rules are also matters for trial. (c) Damages are an inadequate remedy because they cannot compensate the Claimants for the violence, alarm and distress caused by the threats of violence. The Claimants’ sole source of income is running fairs and events. It appears that Mannings Amusements has lost the 2026 summer event at Bluewater and the Winterland Event for 2026 and 2027 has yet to be confirmed. The likely loss of revenue from these sources is said to be substantial but difficult to quantify. (d) Finally, the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours the grant of relief. The essential point made by Mr Power is that irreparable harm may be caused to the Claimants were Joseph Senior not to be restrained. By contrast, he would suffer little, if any, prejudice as the Claimants have offered him the opportunity to run his business at events subject to the agreement of terms. Joseph Senior’s submissions

35. Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery mounted a robust attack on the merits of both the claim and the injunction application. Their extensive arguments can, I hope fairly, be summarised thus: (a) The application is made quia timet. The threshold for such relief is high: the applicant must demonstrate that there is a “sufficiently real and imminent risk” that absent the injunction they will be subject to a tortious wrong: Joseph Boyd v. Ineos Upstream Limited [2019] EWCA Civ 515, para.

34. Such relief should not ordinarily be granted unless the applicant can show “a strong probability” that, unless restrained, the defendant will do something which will cause the applicant “irreparable harm”, namely, harm which if it occurs cannot be reversed or restrained by an immediate interlocutory injunction and compensated by damages: Lloyd v. Symonds [1998] EWCA Civ

511. In short, the Claimants’ evidence, even taken at its height, does not satisfy that test. (b) As a matter of statutory construction of the Act (in particular, ss. 1(1A) and s. 3), corporate entities such as the Claimants may seek an injunction on the basis that they are persons under s. 1(1A)(c) whom the Defendant allegedly intends to persuade through the course of conduct amounting to harassment of two or more individuals. But, importantly, the incidents relied upon by the Claimants must have a sufficient connection to constitute a course of conduct and be united by the Defendant’s intent to persuade the Claimants to do or not to do some specific thing: Clyde & Co. LLP v. Kennedy [2025] EWHC 1186 (KB), para.

15. (c) The ten incidents said to have occurred between October 2023 and October 2025 and pleaded in the claim form do not amount to a properly arguable case of harassment under the Act. Therefore, the claim has no real prospects of success. Indeed, the case is said to be “poorly constructed and will fail.” (d) As to relief, three principal points are made: first, relief is strictly limited to that which would prevent a defendant from pursuing the course of conduct which amounts to harassment of a natural person. In other words, the terms of the injunction must correspond to the threatened tort: Joseph Boyd, para. 34(4). The proposed terms do not do so. Secondly, continuation of the injunction (or, for that matter, the undertakings proposed on 16 January 2026) would grant the Claimants relief to which they are not entitled under the Act. The Claimants do not genuinely fear acts of harassment against natural persons. On the contrary, their professed fears are commercial. Finally, the relief sought is imprecise and so objectionable. (e) In any event, Joseph Senior “has no intention of doing that which is sought to be injuncted and there is no evidence to show the contrary.” (f) The balance of convenience weighs heavily against the grant of relief not least because of the reputational damage caused to Joseph Senior by the existence of the injunction which his sons are making widely known in the industry. Discussion Quia timet?

36. As to Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery’s argument that the Claimants in fact seek quia timet relief, two points arise: first, I am not satisfied that the application is one for precautionary relief. The application sought to restrain Joseph Senior from continuing an existing course of conduct which was alleged to constitute harassment under s. 1(1A) of the Act. That much is clear from para. 32 of Mr Christie’s affidavit in which he explained that the application’s urgency was prompted by concerns that Joseph Senior’s previous conduct would continue. That view is echoed in the evidence of Joseph Junior and Clayton. Therefore, the Claimants’ case is that a cause of action existed when proceedings were issued. In my judgment, that is not precautionary relief properly called: Lloyd v. Symonds [1998] EWCA Civ

511.

37. Secondly, as summarised above, it is said by the defence that the test for precautionary relief requires an applicant to show a strong probability that he will suffer irreparable harm without relief. In support, Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery relied on Lloyd’s case in which the Court of Appeal considered whether the first instance judge had applied the correct test when granting a permanent injunction to restrain nuisance caused by dogs barking. In finding that the judge had not done so, Chadwick LJ said that: “in the present case, therefore, I am persuaded that the judge approached the question whether or not to grant a permanent injunction on the wrong basis. He should have asked himself whether there was a strong probability that, unless restrained by injunction, the defendants would act in breach of the Abatement Notice served on 22nd April 1996.” [my emphasis]

38. The Lloyd case does not support the proposition that a threshold test of strong probability of irreparable harm applies to the grant of interim relief. Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery also cited para. 34 of the Joseph Boyd case in which the factors relevant to the grant of precautionary relief were summarised by the Court of Appeal. In short, no test of strong probability of irreparable harm was identified as relevant to the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

39. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the threshold test for which Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery contend applies. Therefore, I now turn to the first limb of the American Cyanamid test. A serious triable issue

40. During the course of submissions, Mr Power KC observed that Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery had approached the return date as if it were the trial (as illustrated by their 57-page skeleton argument.) Mr Power’s point was that the many arguments advanced by Joseph Senior’s lawyers were matters for the trial. At this stage, the first question is whether the Claimants had shown a serious triable issue. To that end, it is obvious from the lengthy and numerous witness statements served by Joseph Senior and paras. 86-130 (pp. 25-36) of the skeleton argument lodged on his behalf that the facts about the Claimants’ allegations of violence and business interference are materially disputed. It was equally obvious that those factual disputes, the relevance and effect of the Guild Rules and the many other questions of law raised by the defence were properly matters for trial. In short, I agree.

41. I accept, of course, that in some cases the court may seek to resolve points of law at the return date hearing if they are reasonably straight-forward or they do not turn on detailed submissions of law or fact and, importantly, it is in the interests of justice to do so. Having considered the lengthy skeleton argument lodged by Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery and the numerous witness statements served on behalf of Joseph Senior, for the principal reasons summarised below, I am not persuaded that the legal arguments advanced by the defence and the factual disputes arising in this case can be comfortably described as straight-forward.

42. The parties accept that a corporate entity may apply for injunctive relief under s. 3A of the Act. The central question at trial will be whether the Claimants have established a course of conduct against individuals with the aim of persuading the Claimants to do something, namely, to transfer the Claimants’ exclusive rights to the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events to Joseph Senior. Among other matters, the answer will require the court to consider each of the alleged incidents; to determine the seriousness of those incidents and, in particular, whether a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct has been proved against person(s) with the deliberate object of causing alarm and distress. The answer will also require the court to decide whether the alleged conduct had the aim of persuading the Claimants to transfer their rights in the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events to Joseph Senior. The answers to these central points can only be fairly and fully reached after evidence has been adduced and tested. In other words, the principal legal questions at trial are contingent upon the court’s assessment of the parties’ evidence following cross-examination.

43. In relation to the incident on 16 October 2025, the parties’ evidence gives rise to legal questions whether the Guild Rules allowed Joseph Senior to pitch his food stands at the event irrespective of whether Mannings Amusement consented; whether Mannings Amusements’ rights under its agreement with the event owner allow it to insist on sub-contractors such as Joseph Senior obtaining its consent to pitch a stand and the nature and effect of any determination of a referred dispute by the Guild. Joseph Senior’s assertion is that the combined effect of rr. 23(a)(1)(a), 8(I)(5) and 18 of the Guild Rules entitled him to pitch his food stands at Winterland (and, presumably, at other events at which he says he has acquired a right to pitch.) In reply, the Claimants maintain that there is nothing in the Guild Rules that allows Joseph Senior to commit an act of criminal trespass. Self-evidently, these are not simple matters on which a court can take a summary yet fair view at this stage because detailed legal submissions will be needed at trial to allow the court to reach an informed decision. A return date hearing is not the appropriate time at which these questions can be satisfactorily resolved.

44. Following the hearing, a point arose in relation to the scope of the Claimants’ alleged exclusive rights in relation to Winter Wonderland. The opening paragraph of Mr Power KC’s skeleton argument put the point thus: “The Claimants … have the exclusive right to provide attractions and catering services for the Winter Wonderland event in Hyde Park and the Winterland event in the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent.” The contention was founded in the Claimants’ evidence (for example, in para. 8.2 of Mr Christie’s affidavit and para. 15 of Clayton’s affidavit) and asserted in the Claimants’ skeleton argument relied upon before Foster J.

45. After the hearing and prompted by service of the Points of Defence by Joseph Junior and Clayton in the unfair prejudice claim, there was an exchange of correspondence about the scope of the Claimants’ alleged rights at Winter Wonderland. Joseph Senior’s solicitors noted the first paragraph of Mr Power KC’s skeleton argument and the affidavits of Mr Christie and Clayton. Those materials were contrasted with the substance of paras. 78 and 107 of the Points of Defence which state that neither Mannings Amusements nor Mannings Organisation have, or have ever had, exclusive rights in respect of Winter Wonderland. In response, the Claimants’ solicitors say that there is no contradiction between their clients’ position in these proceedings and the unfair prejudice claim. They maintain that the Claimants’ evidence before this court states that they enjoy exclusivity solely in relation to the provision of rides and attractions at Winter Wonderland. It has never been said that the Claimants enjoy exclusivity over all contracts that apply to Winter Wonderland.

46. Reviewing matters in the round, there now appears to be an inconsistency between the extent of the exclusivity contended for by Mr Christie and Clayton in their affidavits and the admissions made in the Points of Defence in relation to the provision of catering services at Winter Wonderland. In that respect, it seems that the Claimants do not have exclusive rights. Two points arise from the exchange of correspondence: first, although the scope of the Claimants’ exclusivity rights at Winter Wonderland may be confined to providing rides and other attractions, there is no apparent dispute about the exclusive nature of Mannings Amusements’ rights at the ten events listed in para. 19 of Joseph Junior’s witness statement of 16 January 2026. Secondly, the inconsistency in the Claimants’ evidence is something which Joseph Senior’s solicitors quite properly brought to the court’s attention. It is also a point on which Joseph Junior and Clayton may well be cross-examined at trial. That said, without hearing their evidence tested on the point, I cannot fairly decide whether, as Joseph Senior’s solicitors suggest, they have knowingly made false statements in their evidence to this court.

47. In both written and oral submissions, Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery contended that the relief sought by the Claimants is unavailable to them under the Act. I shall take each principal point relied upon by them in turn. First, the parties are seemingly agreed (or at least not in serious disagreement) that in order for corporate bodies such as the Claimants to bring a claim under the Act for injunctive relief, they must be caught by s. 1(1A). There is also little apparent dispute that the corporate claimant must prove that the alleged conduct was intended by the defendant to persuade the claimant not to do something that it is required or entitled to do, or to do something that it is under no obligation to do: Clyde & Co. LLP v. Kennedy [2025] EWHC 1186 (KB), para.

15. Although Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffrey’s skeleton argument sought to demonstrate that the Claimants had failed to establish the required course of conduct and intended aim, those central matters turn on the court’s assessment of parties’ evidence to be tested at trial. They cannot be safely determined at this stage.

48. Secondly, Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery argued that the scope of s. 3A of the Act is effectively confined to what they called the “paradigm” case in which a corporate entity seeks to restrain protestors from taking a particular course of conduct. It is said that Mr Jeffery’s research had identified no case, comparable to the present, in which the Act has been used in the context of a family dispute over proprietary interests in business assets. For present purposes, the essential point is that there is no authority before the court which supports the contention that relief under s. 3A of the Act is confined in this way. As Mr Power KC submitted, the contention sits uneasily with the substance of s. 3A which is explicitly concerned with “any conduct”: see s. 3A(2). This point of construction is an arguable matter for trial.

49. Thirdly, it is said that the injunction sought for by the Claimants is in fact disguised commercial relief which ought not to be granted under the Act. It is submitted that operating a business cannot constitute harassment of a natural person for the purposes of s. 3A of the Act and the claim has been “shoe-horned” into the Act to avoid the need to plead economic torts and seeking relief in relation to those causes of action. Notwithstanding the forceful way in which the point was advanced, for present purposes, I am not satisfied that it addresses the fact that, as indicated above, s. 3A is engaged in relation to “any conduct” which amounts to harassment. That phrase is, on its face, intentionally broad and, absent any contrary indication in the Act or in the authorities, it is seemingly sufficient to embrace the conduct of which the Claimants complain. In other words, the question is one for trial.

50. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried: namely, whether the conduct alleged by the Claimants amounts to harassment under the Act which they are entitled to restrain by an injunction. Adequacy of damages as a remedy

51. As to the second stage of the American Cyanamid test, I am satisfied that damages are not an adequate remedy in this case. I accept Mr Power KC’s submission that damages cannot compensate for violence and the alarm and distress caused by the threats of violence. I also accept that were Joseph Senior to seek to force entry to any of the events at which the Claimants say they have exclusive rights (such as those identified in Joseph Junior’s statement of 16 January 2026), it may lead to irreparable damage both to their reputation and the loss of any such rights (as illustrated by the Claimants’ evidence on the apparent loss of the summer event at Bluewater). It is difficult to see how such an outcome could be reversed or restrained by an immediate interim injunction. Balance of convenience

52. As to the balance of convenience, the following factors weigh against the continuation of relief: (a) There is no evidence of any incident involving the alleged use of violence by Joseph Senior since 8 July 2024 which appears to have been an isolated event. (b) There has been no other alleged incident involving contact between Joseph Senior and his sons or the Claimants’ employees since October 2025. (c) The injunction addressed any immediate concerns insofar as they related to last year’s Winterland and Winter Wonderland events. There is no suggestion that Joseph Senior has breached the injunction in any way. Indeed, in relation to communications with his two sons, these appear to be exclusively conducted through their solicitors. (d) I accept that the existence of the injunction and awareness of it may have caused Joseph Senior some reputational harm in the industry. (e) Although he has declined to offer undertakings or to agree those proposed in January 2026, Joseph Senior has given a conditional assurance that he will not attend the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events or contact Joseph Junior and Clayton pending the Guild’s determination of the parties’ dispute. Thus far, he has been as good as his word. In that regard, I also note Joseph Senior’s medical diagnosis and advice that he should avoid sources of stress and anxiety.

53. There are, however, substantial points that count in favour of continuing the injunction: (a) As set out above, the injunction was granted against the background of a bitter family dispute that shows no sign of being resolved. Although the incident on 8 July 2024 was an isolated use of violence, the fact that the dispute resulted in Joseph Senior allegedly assaulting his two sons evidences the intensity of Joseph Senior’s reaction to what he perceives to be their nefarious behaviour. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the intensity of his feelings towards his sons has diminished in any way. (b) As the Claimants submitted, the incident on 16 October 2025 demonstrated Joseph Senior’s determination to vindicate what he sees as his rights. Set against that background, I accept the submission that irreparable harm may be caused to them were Joseph Senior not to be restrained from taking action which he believes that he is entitled to take in relation to other events at which the Claimants have exclusive rights (including the summer events discussed in Joseph Junior’s statement). (c) On the available evidence, were the injunction not to be continued, the likely prejudice which the Claimants would suffer is greater than that borne by Joseph Senior if the order were to continue. He has been offered the opportunity to run his businesses at events subject to accepting the relevant terms and conditions required from sub-contractors. As Mr Power KC argued, the only conceivable loss which Joseph Senior will suffer is paying commercial terms to the Claimants for attending events over which they have rights. Any loss can be compensated in damages should Joseph Senior be successful at trial. (d) As set out below, the trial can be listed in July 2026. The injunction will continue until judgment which is likely to be little more than three months. Any prejudice to Joseph Senior will therefore be short-lived while ensuring that the status quo is preserved in the meantime. (e) Although Joseph Senior offered conditional assurances about his future conduct, given the history and continuing intensity of the family dispute, I have not been persuaded that, absent an injunction or an undertaking, those assurances will prevent or limit the risk of irreparable harm to the Claimants. It is notable that the assurances offered by Joseph Senior were confined to the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events. They do not cover the spring and summer events over which the Claimants have rights. The general statement in his skeleton argument that Joseph Senior will not do those things which are sought to be injuncted does not wholly reflect the comparatively more limited assurances he gave in his witness statement. Ultimately, given the nature and history of the dispute, I am not satisfied that assurances alone will “hold the ring” pending trial.

54. Given the nature and weight of the factors in favour of relief continuing, I am satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the continuation of para. 3 of the injunction and, subject to some revision, para. 4 until judgment or further order. In relation to the latter, there is some force in the submission that the phrase “or interfere with the rights of” is vague and the Claimants have not addressed the criticism of this aspect of the order. Para. 4 should therefore provide that Joseph Senior “must not threaten, intimidate or inflict physical violence on the Claimants’ directors, employees, customers or sub-contractors, or interfere with or destroy the Claimants’ property.” PART 3 – the discharge application Introduction

55. Joseph Senior asks the court to discharge the order on two grounds: first, his lawyers were “deliberately excluded” from the without notice hearing before Foster J on 2 December 2025; secondly, the Claimants failed to discharge their obligations to provide the court with full and frank disclosure and to give the court a fair presentation of the parties’ positions. I shall take each ground in turn. The first ground – the parties’ submissions

56. The essential point made by Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery is that there was a duty upon the Claimants’ representatives to draw to the court’s attention “the extremely unusual proposal that the hearing should proceed ex parte notwithstanding that notice in the general sense of a proposed application had been given to Joseph Senior’s legal representatives” but that duty was not discharged. It was said that the Claimants’ lawyers failed to explain to court, both in evidence and submission, why the application was said to be urgent. In particular, they did not identify the reasons why Joseph Senior would say that a without notice application was procedurally improper. These omissions were aggravated by the Claimants’ further failure to correct the judge’s impression that Joseph Senior had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing.

57. Mr Power KC’s response was succinct: first, the Claimants’ lawyers’ obligations were satisfied by placing before the court the lengthy 16-page letter sent by Joseph Senior’s solicitor on 1 December 2025 (“the 1 December letter”) and the further letter of 2 December 2025 (“the 2 December letter”). That correspondence made clear Joseph Senior’s position that the putative urgency was “entirely illusory” and he would need to lodge detailed evidence in reply to the application. Secondly, Joseph Senior’s solicitors were aware that the Claimants were seeking an urgent hearing on 1 or 2 December 2025. Instead of seeking to resolve matters by giving undertakings, Joseph Senior insisted on the application being re-listed as a non-urgent matter at a time convenient to his counsel. In the circumstances, Joseph Senior cannot complain that the Claimants did what they said they would do. Discussion

58. This element of the discharge application has been pitched highly by Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery. It is said that the Claimants’ solicitors “deliberately excluded” the Defendant’s lawyers from the hearing on 2 December 2025. That contention has not, in my judgment, been made good.

59. It is common ground that the Claimants provided Joseph Senior’s solicitors with the unsealed application notice and the supporting affidavits on 27 November 2025. It is agreed that there was no meaningful difference between the unsealed and sealed versions. It is also agreed that Joseph Senior’s solicitor provided a detailed response to the application in the 1 December letter. Indeed, the letter anticipated much of Mr Grant KC’s argument at the hearing before me and, in particular, it vigorously disputed the application’s putative urgency. The 1 December letter had been drafted with significant contributions from counsel and so it can be reasonably taken to have made the points that would have been put before the court at an inter partes hearing.

60. In his letter of 1 December 2025, the Claimant’s solicitor told the other side that an urgent listing had been requested and an update would be provided when it was received. The same day, the Claimants’ solicitor filed the application and asked for it to be heard on 2 December 2025. Much was made in correspondence, in evidence and in submission about the Claimants’ solicitor’s failure to provide a screenshot of the filing comments box in which a hearing had been sought on 2 December 2025. Absent any good reason not to do so, it would have been prudent for the Claimants’ solicitor to have notified his counterpart about the specific date for which a hearing had been sought (not least to avoid the disagreement that has subsequently arisen). That said, I have been shown nothing (whether in the Civil Procedure Rules, the King’s Bench Guide or the case-law) to suggest that there is an obligation to provide a screenshot of the filing comments box because it is a communication with the court.

61. The evidence is that on 2 December 2025, at 10.38 a.m., the Claimants’ solicitor received an e-mail from the court to confirm that the application and the supporting affidavits had been accepted that day at 10.37 a.m. The hearing of the application was listed before Foster J to be heard at 12.15 p.m. on 2 December 2025. The Claimants’ solicitor was notified about the listing at 11.57 a.m., that is to say, 18 minutes beforehand.

62. The sealed application was served on Joseph Senior’s solicitor at 12.14 p.m., nearly 1½ hours after it had been sent by the court. As there was no meaningful difference between the sealed and unsealed applications, nothing turns on the time taken by the Claimants’ solicitor to send it to the other side. However, the Claimants’ solicitor did not inform his counterpart that the hearing had been listed for 12.15 p.m. That omission was addressed by an update, sent by e-mail, at 12.33 p.m., during the hearing.

63. For the sake of completeness, I note that by an e-mail sent at 12.44 p.m. Ms Bushby asked for confirmation that the parties’ correspondence of 27 and 28 November and the 1 and 2 December letters had been handed to the judge. Six minutes later, Mr Wallis confirmed that they had been handed to the judge.

64. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Claimants’ solicitor sought deliberately to exclude Joseph Senior and his representatives from the hearing. The root cause of the issue was the fact that the former had been given 18 minutes’ notice of the listing. As a result, he was under some significant time pressure to notify counsel and to get to court for the start of the hearing. Although it is unfortunate that the Defendant’s solicitor was not informed of the hearing until it had started, there is no suggestion that, even if they had been notified of the 12.15 p.m. listing swiftly after the court confirmed it at 11.57 a.m., either counsel or solicitor could have attended on his behalf. The second ground – the parties’ submissions

65. Joseph Senior’s case was set out in detail in paras. 180-197 of Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery’s skeleton argument and paras. 50-53 of Ms Bushby’s statement. In summary: (a) In relation to the Guild, the Guild Rules and Joseph Senior’s future intentions, counsel for the Claimants failed to give the court a correct analysis of the nature and legal effect of the Guild Rules or the role and function of James Manning and Swaley Elliott as Guild representatives. In particular, counsel failed to explain the relevance of live arbitral proceedings before the Guild and Joseph Senior’s wish to resolve the dispute by that route. (b) Counsel had failed to explain adequately the broader context of the proprietary estoppel claim; or say that Joseph Senior had not attended Winter Wonderland at all during the 2024/5 season or the 2025 season; or confirm that, even on the Claimants’ case, there had only been one physically violent encounter between father and sons; or inform the court that Joseph Senior had consensually withdrawn his stalls from Winterland on 17 October 2025 and had not attended the site since 16 October 2025. (c) Counsel failed to set out the arguments that were reasonably available to Joseph Senior under the Act. In particular, no reference was made to the points that legal persons cannot be harassed for the purposes of the Act and the sole basis for injunctive relief in favour of legal persons was ss. 1(1A)(c) and 3A. Consequently, the court had no assistance on whether the injunctive relief sought was outside the Act’s scope. (d) No potential arguments were outlined to the effect that there was no real risk of the acts sought to be injuncted happening. On the contrary, counsel submitted that, absent relief, there was a real risk of violence at the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events. (e) Counsel also failed to provide any help to the court on the “terms, breadth, vagueness and lack of particularity in the injunctive relief sought.”

66. The Claimants’ essential response is that the parties’ correspondence, but particularly the 1 December letter, were before the court. Notably, the judge confirmed that she had read the latter. All the matters that the Defendant’s solicitor said should have been drawn to the judge’s attention were before the court whether in evidence (for example, Clayton’s affidavit) or in correspondence (especially the 1 December letter). The relevant legal principles

67. The parties were seemingly agreed that the relevant principles are those summarised by Carr J (as she then was) in Tugushev v. Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm) at para. 7: “The law is non-contentious. The following general principles can be distilled from the relevant authorities by way of summary as follows: i) The duty of an applicant for a without notice injunction is to make full and accurate disclosure of all material facts and to draw the court’s attention to significant factual, legal and procedural aspects of the case; ii) It is a high duty and of the first importance to ensure the integrity of the court's process. It is the necessary corollary of the court being prepared to depart from the principle that it will hear both sides before reaching a decision, a basic principle of fairness. Derogation from that principle is an exceptional course adopted in cases of extreme urgency or the need for secrecy. The court must be able to rely on the party who appears alone to present the argument in a way which is not merely designed to promote its own interests but in a fair and even-handed manner, drawing attention to evidence and arguments which it can reasonably anticipate the absent party would wish to make; iii) Full disclosure must be linked with fair presentation. The judge must be able to have complete confidence in the thoroughness and objectivity of those presenting the case for the applicant. Thus, for example, it is not sufficient merely to exhibit numerous documents; iv) An applicant must make proper enquiries before making the application. He must investigate the cause of action asserted and the facts relied on before identifying and addressing any likely defences. The duty to disclose extends to matters of which the applicant would have been aware had reasonable enquiries been made. The urgency of a particular case may make it necessary for evidence to be in a less tidy or complete form than is desirable. But no amount of urgency or practical difficulty can justify a failure to identify the relevant cause of action and principal facts to be relied on; v) Material facts are those which it is material for the judge to know in dealing with the application as made. The duty requires an applicant to make the court aware of the issues likely to arise and the possible difficulties in the claim, but need not extend to a detailed analysis of every possible point which may arise. It extends to matters of intention and for example to disclosure of related proceedings in another jurisdiction; vi) Where facts are material in the broad sense, there will be degrees of relevance and a due sense of proportion must be kept. Sensible limits have to be drawn, particularly in more complex and heavy commercial cases where the opportunity to raise arguments about non-disclosure will be all the greater. The question is not whether the evidence in support could have been improved (or one to be approached with the benefit of hindsight). The primary question is whether in all the circumstances its effect was such as to mislead the court in any material respect; vii) A defendant must identify clearly the alleged failures, rather than adopt a scatter gun approach. A dispute about full and frank disclosure should not be allowed to turn into a mini-trial of the merits; viii) In general terms it is inappropriate to seek to set aside a freezing order for non-disclosure where proof of non-disclosure depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action, unless the facts are truly so plain that they can be readily and summarily established, otherwise the application to set aside the freezing order is liable to become a form of preliminary trial in which the judge is asked to make findings (albeit provisionally) on issues which should be more properly reserved for the trial itself; ix) If material non-disclosure is established, the court will be astute to ensure that a claimant who obtains injunctive relief without full disclosure is deprived of any advantage he may thereby have derived; x) Whether or not the non-disclosure was innocent is an important consideration, but not necessarily decisive. Immediate discharge (without renewal) is likely to be the court's starting point, at least when the failure is substantial or deliberate. It has been said on more than one occasion that it will only be in exceptional circumstances in cases of deliberate non-disclosure or misrepresentation that an order would not be discharged; xi) The court will discharge the order even if the order would still have been made had the relevant matter(s) been brought to its attention at the without notice hearing. This is a penal approach and intentionally so, by way of deterrent to ensure that applicants in future abide by their duties; xii) The court nevertheless has a discretion to continue the injunction (or impose a fresh injunction) despite a failure to disclose. Although the discretion should be exercised sparingly, the overriding consideration will always be the interests of justice. Such consideration will include examination of i) the importance of the facts not disclosed to the issues before the judge ii) the need to encourage proper compliance with the duty of full and frank disclosure and to deter non-compliance iii) whether or not and to what extent the failure was culpable iv) the injustice to a claimant which may occur if an order is discharged leaving a defendant free to dissipate assets, although a strong case on the merits will never be a good excuse for a failure to disclose material facts. xiii) The interests of justice may sometimes require that a freezing order be continued and that a failure of disclosure can be marked in some other way, for example by a suitable costs order. The court thus has at its disposal a range of options in the event of non-disclosure.” Discussion

68. There are two fundamental difficulties facing this ground: first, the principal points on which Joseph Senior relies in answer to the injunction application were comprehensively set out in the 1 December letter; secondly, the judge read and understood that letter. In particular, there is no indication (or, indeed, any submission) that Foster J did not appreciate the nature or substance of Joseph Senior’s case on the question of urgency or the application’s merits.

69. In considering the merits of the discharge application, the letter of 1 December is important because it was a detailed and reasoned response to the injunction application. There was no suggestion from the defence that the letter omitted any material point that would have been put before the judge had they attended the hearing. The letter was clearly drafted and notwithstanding its length, Joseph Senior’s arguments were readily identifiable. Given the matters now advanced by Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery, it is necessary and useful to set out the points addressed in the letter. In summary: (a) The introduction (paras. 1-5) was a robust articulation of Joseph Senior’s case. In forthright terms, it was said that the application rested on inaccurate evidence and was a calculated smear of Joseph Senior’s character and reputation. The application was said to seek a quia timet injunction, the threshold for which had not been met. There had been no contact between father and sons since 16 October 2025 and Joseph Senior had no desire to interfere with the Claimants’ business in any way. The letter stated that the “protestations of urgency are bizarre. It is transparent that Joseph Jr and Clayton are lashing out in response to an anonymous letter and an article in the Telegraph, neither of which were instigated by Joseph Sr.” (b) The letter set out what it described as “the true factual history” which might more neutrally be described as Joseph Senior’s account of the dispute since 2024. Paras. 6-28 summarised the various phases of the dispute since 2024 including the Winterland incident on 16 October 2025. It included a section, at paras. 15-28, which set out Joseph Senior’s view that the Guild Rules vested a right of tenure for stallholders at events such as Winterland and that the Claimants’ new arrangements were inconsistent with those rules (especially r. 23(a)(1)(a)). That section also made clear that Joseph Senior had voluntarily removed his stalls at Winterland “to avoid a confrontation and is progressing matters through formal dispute resolution”: paras. 23 and

26. The latter was a reference to the complaint Joseph Senior had lodged under the Guild Rules. (c) The letter made clear that Joseph Senior had not attended Winter Wonderland during the 2024/5 or the 2025 season: para.

29. (d) Paras. 33-69 contained Joseph Senior’s answer to each of the incidents relied upon by the Claimants to demonstrate a course of conduct alleged to amount to harassment. (e) Para. 70 responded to the Luminarie Street Limited correspondence and asserted that the letter was perfectly proper and could not, on any view, amount to evidence of harassment. It also confirmed that no letter had been sent to any other contractor at Winter Wonderland. (f) Paras. 71-76 dealt with the Claimants’ allegation that Joseph Senior interfered with their post. (g) Joseph Senior’s response to the Claimants’ case on urgency was set out, at length, in paras. 77-96. It was in two parts: the first dealt with the (undisclosed) anonymous letter that Joseph Senior denied sending (paras. 77-86); the second addressed the Daily Telegraph article(paras. 87-96). It was said that the two matters relied upon “to found supposed urgency are entirely illusory”: para.

96. (h) Under the heading “The Draft Injunction”, paras. 97-124 made four principal points: first, paras. 2 and 3 of the draft order were injunctions in restraint of trade (not harassment) while the terms of para. 4, an injunction in restraint of harassment, were “intolerably broad”. Secondly, the application did not seek to restrain continuing or present wrongdoing. On the contrary, it sought to restrain apprehended future wrongs. Having recited the authorities which were said to establish the threshold for a quia timet injunction, it was said, at para. 107, that the evidence fell far short. Thirdly, various criticisms were made of the breadth of the proposed restraints on Joseph Senior. His solicitor did not seek to re-draft the proposed order because “it is not our role to particularise your draft injunction for you”: para.

120. Fourthly, it was argued that the evidence did not constitute “anything which could be described as a course of conduct amounting to harassment of Joseph Jr and Clayton”: para.

121. (i) Although no undertakings were offered, the letter provided the following assurances about Joseph Senior’s future conduct: “125. Our client has no intention of attending Winterland or Winterland Wonderland [sic]. Without making any concessions he has instructed us to convey to your clients, pending the outcome of the Showmen’s Guild proceedings, his assurance that he will not attend in any form those events.

126. Our client has no intention of having any contact of any sort with Joseph Jr and Clayton, other than through solicitors. Again, he has instructed us to convey his assurance that he will have no contact in the future. We hope that you will provide a similar assurance on behalf of his sons.”

70. The 2 December letter made three points: no good reason existed for not drafting a claim form to accompany the application; the application was not urgent and, in any event, it should be listed “in the usual way” and with regard to counsel’s availability. This letter was also considered by the judge.

71. In her witness statement, Ms Bushby set out various matters which she thought should have been put before the court by Mr Machell. These points are largely repeated in the skeleton argument. In short, the existence and broad substance of the family dispute and the proprietary estoppel claim were set out in paras. 9-11 of Clayton’s affidavit. The role and function of the Guild were also addressed at paras. 24-27 of the 1 December letter and in the context of Joseph Senior’s case that his actions on 16 October 2025 were consistent with the Guild Rules. That role and function were, in my judgment, fairly summarised by Mr Machell in his exchanges with the judge. The facts that Joseph Senior had (a) not attended Winter Wonderland in 2024/5 or 2025 and (b) removed his stalls from Winterland on 17 October 2025 were set out in paras. 29 and 59 of the 1 December letter respectively. The latter point was also made in para. 30 of Clayton’s affidavit. Joseph Senior’s account of the incident on 8 July 2024 (that is to say, the only incident in which physical violence is alleged) was summarised in paras. 38-44 of the 1 December letter. Joseph Senior’s position in answer to the allegations regarding his involvement in the Daily Telegraph article was also addressed in the 1 December letter.

72. Both Ms Bushby’s statement and counsel’s submissions made much of how the Guild’s role and function was explained to the judge. The short point is that the Claimants did not suggest that the Guild Rules were irrelevant or inconsequential. Their argument was (and remains) that the Guild Rules do not justify trespass. On my reading of the evidence (including the transcript), the position was fairly presented and explained to the judge.

73. Finally, the relevant principles of law were fairly presented and summarised in Mr Machell’s skeleton argument including the elements of s. 1(1A) of the Act. As Carr J found in Tugushev, the obligations of full and frank disclosure and fair presentation do not require a detailed exposition of every point that may arise. Here, the 1 December letter set out Joseph Senior’s case in relation to liability under the Act and Mr Machell’s skeleton argument assisted the court on the relevant provisions of the law including, pertinently, s. 1(1A) of the Act. He did so fairly and sufficiently.

74. In my judgment, the material facts and law were placed before the judge by the Claimants. The 1 and 2 December letters set out all the matters that Joseph Senior’s lawyers had to say in response to the application and there is nothing to suggest that the judge did not properly consider the correspondence. I should also say that the clarity of the 1 December letter is likely to have assisted Foster J’s analysis of the case. The discharge application is, therefore, dismissed. PART 4 – case management directions

75. At the hearing, the parties submitted (and I agree) that the matter should proceed to trial as soon as possible. To that end, there should be an expedited trial of the claim for a final injunction, to be listed on the first available date after 20 July 2026 with a time estimate of four days. Regrettably, that is the only direction on which the parties agree. The outstanding points will be resolved on the papers after the parties have lodged written submissions. Conclusion

76. For the reasons set out above: (a) Para. 3 and, subject to a minor revision, para. 4 of the injunction shall continue until judgment or further order; and (b) The discharge application is dismissed.

77. I should be grateful if counsel could prepare a draft order which reflects my conclusion. Finally, I should thank Mr Power KC, Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery for their assistance.