Dr Beaulah Banfield v Stanmore College

Neutral Citation Number:  [2026] EWHC 617 (KB) Case No: KB-2025-004312 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 13 March 2026 Before : James Healy-Pratt sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : Dr BEAULAH BANFIELD Claimant – and – STANMORE COLLEGE Defendant – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – The Claimant appeared in person Mr Ezra Macdonald (instructed by Stone King LLP) for the Defendant Hearing dates: 13th February 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Approved Judgment

1. Introduction 1.1 This Part 8 claim is brought by Dr Banfield against her employer Stanmore College. This is primarily an employment dispute between employee and employer relating to redundancy. After internal grievance proceedings between the parties had been completed, Dr Banfield resorted to litigation against Stanmore College. Evidently Dr Banfield was not satisfied with the outcome of her grievance proceedings and chose to escalate the dispute to the High Court. The Claimant’s case seemingly relates to a breach of employment contract by the Defendant, without the Claimant referring to any wrongful dismissal in her statement of case. Applications have been made by both parties to the Court for interim remedies. No attempts at alternative dispute resolution have been sought by either party to date.

2. Dr Banfield is representing herself in these proceedings, to whom I shall refer to as the Claimant. Mr Macdonald of Counsel is representing Stanmore College, the latter to whom I shall refer to as the Defendant. Contents Introduction [Paragraphs 1-2] The applications [3] The hearing [4] Decision overview [5] Factual Background [6] Procedural history [7] The effect of the injunction [8] Defendant’s submissions [9] Claimant’s submissions [10] Law & procedure [11-18] Analysis [19] Defendant’s application to set aside injunction [19.1-19.6] Defendant’s application for summary judgment [19.7-19.13] Defendant’s application for strike out [19.14] Claimant’s application for summary judgment/strike-out [19.15] Probation not a bar to termination [19.16] Claimant’s application for permission for contempt application [19.17] Conclusion [20] Costs [21]

3. The applications 3.1 The hearing listed before the Court was to determine one application by the Defendant, and one application by the Claimant. Each application had two parts. The Defendant’s application dated 4 December 20025 was made under CPR r 23.10 to set aside the injunction dated 28 November 2025 by Sweeting Jand for summary judgment / strike-out pursuant to CPR r 23.3 / 3.4: 3.2 The Claimant’s application dated 29th December 2025 was for an order pursuant to CPR 24 & 81(5)(a)(b) for summary judgment including strike-out, together with an application for contempt in relation to some of the employees of the Defendant as well as Mr. Pidgeon, solicitor for the Defendant. Towards the end of the Claimant’s oral submissions, her application for contempt was recharacterized to an application for leave to apply rather than a contempt application per se.

4. The hearing 4.1 Mindful that the Claimant was representing herself, I ensured that the hearing was meticulously conducted with scrupulous fairness. I granted an application that the Claimant be permitted to have a Mackenzie Friend. I granted a short adjournment during the morning part of the hearing to enable the Claimant to consider submissions made by Mr. Macdonald, Counsel for the Defendant. I ensured that the Claimant was able to follow all references made to the documentary evidence and legal authorities. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Claimant confirmed to the Court that the hearing had been conducted fairly. Mr. Macdonald was always courteous to the Claimant and contributed significantly to the fairness of the hearing.

5. Decision overview and disposal 5.1 I grant in part the application made by the Defendant relating to the issues of the injunction and contempt. The injunction should be discharged. I also direct that the matter is transferred to the Part 7 procedure, which is plainly more appropriate. The Claimant’s application for summary judgment/strike-out is refused, as is her application for permission to apply for contempt. The application relating to contempt made by the Claimant was wholly misconceived. I direct that the remaining matters are transferred forthwith to the Part 7 procedure, a Particulars of Claim is filed within 28 days, with a hearing listed thereafter with the Master for further Directions. A consequential hearing will be listed at the same time as hand-down of this judgment to finalise the appropriate Order. The Defendant’s costs of and caused/occasioned by the incorrect use by the Claimant of the Part 8 procedure are granted.

6. Factual background 6.1 The Claimant has been employed by the Defendant since 29 March 2010. Her role at that time was as a Science Technician. The Claimant went through various roles at the College, culminating in the Claimant’s successful application for the role of Head of Faculty – STEM. STEM is an acronym for Science, Technology, Engineering & Maths. The Claimant’s prior role was Interim Head of School – Science, Engineering, Access & Sports which she had held since 1 August 2023. In February 2024, the Claimant was provided with a Head of Faculty contract. As such, the position offered pursuant to that contract was “Head of Faculty – STEM”. The Claimant requested her contact be amended to state the specific areas within the STEM umbrella that she was responsible for, namely Science, Engineering, Access and Sports (“SEAS”). The parties entered in a Contract with the SEAS designation on 21 May 2024 with a commencement date of 1 February 2024. 6.2 A restructuring process was implemented by the Defendant on 21 May 2025, and finished on 6 June 2025. Ultimately the Claimant was selected for redundancy. Notice of redundancy was given on 11 July 2025. The Claimant was placed on garden leave from 11 July 2025, expiring on 30 November 2025. The Claimant indicated an intention to issue proceedings in August 2025, in response to which the Defendant’s solicitors stated by email on 11 August 2025 that Part 8 would not be the appropriate procedure. Some 19 days prior to expiration of the Claimant’s notice period, the Part 8 claim was issued on 11 November 2025.

7. Procedural history 7.1 Part 8 proceedings were issued by the Claimant against the Defendant on 11 November 2025, and transferred from the Chancery Division to the Kings Bench Division by Master Clark on 24 November 2025. At that time, there was a proposed but unissued application by the Claimant seeking urgent injunctive relief. 7.2 The Part 8 Claim Form sought court declarations by the Claimant on 7 issues. In brief those seven issues are as follows:

1. The Defendant’s restructuring consultation document of 15th May 2025 is a sham, in part to make the Claimant redundant. That the Claimant’s SEAS employment contract did not form part of the restructuring.

2. The Claimant’s signed legally binding contract of employment dated 21 May 2024 was not terminated on 1 August 2025. Therefore, the Claimant could not be made redundant on 30 November 2025. That the Claimant’s SEAS employment contract did not form part of the restructuring due, in part, to the Principal at the Defendant not being aware of the SEAS contract.

3. The Defendant’s Grievance Outcome Letter of 25 June 2025, and the Appeal to the Grievance dated 16 July 2025 is a sham, including allegations of gross misconduct by the governors of the Defendant. The Claimant asserts that the SEAS contract was not acknowledged by the governors to be in force, or to be part of the restructuring schedule in May 2025.

4. That an employee of the Defendant (Executive Director of Corporate Services) had full knowledge of the Claimant’s SEAS employment contract but failed to inform their Senior Leadership Team of that contract. The Claimant asserts allegations of gross misconduct against that employee relating to that failure and other issues related to the restructuring schedule in 2025 and her employment contract in 2024.

5. That the Defendant’s Principal utilized an unsigned contract of employment for discriminatory and deceptive purposes against the Claimant, including allegations of gross misconduct against that Principal. In particular, the Claimant makes allegations around the knowing misdescription of a post that the Claimant applied for in 2024 relating to the Faculty of STEM, then approving the restructuring schedule in May 2025 without due regard to the role the Claimant was actually undertaking.

6. That the Notice of Dismissal by Reason of Redundancy of 11 July 2025 is a sham, including allegations of gross misconduct against the employee who issued the Notice. In particular that the employee was aware the Claimant’s SEAS contract was not a STEM contract, and not deleted as part of the restructuring schedule, and not having due regard for the Employment Rights Act 1996 where the SEAS contract was not part of that schedule.

7. That the Defendant breached the Claimant’s data protection rights by handing over her Informal Grievance Complaint (relating to a prior member of staff) to a third party without permission, including allegations of gross misconduct against the Defendant by allowing their solicitors, Stone King LLP to handle the Claimant’s data without her knowledge or consent. In particular that the Principal and an employee of the Defendant were informed by the Claimant that her informal grievance complaint should not be reviewed by an external third party. 7.3 Accompanying the Claim Form was a 59-page witness statement from the Claimant, together with 296 pages of exhibits. One logical conclusion of the declarations sought numbered 1-6 is a claim for wrongful dismissal but this has not been articulated by the Claimant. Other potential remedies may lie in other potential jurisdictions, but this issue was not addressed by either party. 7.4 On 21 November 2025, the Claimant emailed the Solicitor representing the Defendant, Mr Pidgeon at Stone King LLP. Attached were an application for an injunction dated 20 November 2025, a skeleton argument, a witness statement, and exhibit bundle, a Certification of Urgent Business and a submission confirming that the application had been uploaded to CE file that day. The injunction was not made on a without notice basis, and Mr Pidgeon assumed that he would receive a sealed copy in due course with a hearing date for that injunction application. By way of an Order dated 24 November 2025 the claim was transferred to the Kings Bench Division. 7.5 The Defendant, through its solicitors, provided an acknowledgment of service to the Part 8 claim on 25 November 2025 on Form N210. The Acknowledgment of Service objected to the use of Part 8 procedure. Section B was ticked that they intend to contest the claim. Nothing was put into the text box at Section B. Section D was ticked where the Defendant objected to the Claimant issuing under this procedure. Reasons given for the objection in the text box at Section D were “See attached witness statement of Antony Pidgeon dated 25 November 2025”. Mr. Pidgeon completed the statement of truth on behalf of the Defendant. 7.6 Mr Pidgeon set out in his first witness statement dated 25 November 2025 the background to the claim, the objection to Part 8 procedure, a claim for costs, and transfer to Part

7. The reasons given by the Defendant for the objection to the use of the Part 8 procedure are illuminating: (1) That there is a complex factual background to the matter. (2) That there is a clear and substantial dispute of fact relating to (i) the allegations of a sham restructuring, (ii) the Claimant’s role as part of that process, (iii) that the Grievance outcome and Appeal were shams, (iv) the Defendant’s use of an unsigned contract for discriminatory and deceptive purposes, and (vi) that the Notice of Dismissal by Reason of Redundancy of 11 July 2025 was a sham. 7.7 The Defendant denied the allegations contained within the substance of the declarations sought by the Claimant. Clearly the Defendant also considered that the claim should proceed under CPR Part

7. They took the view, rightly, that “In order to fully litigate this dispute, a properly pleaded particulars of Claim should be filed to which the Defendant can respond to by way of a formal Defence. Thereafter a full disclosure exercise will need to be undertaken and it will be necessary for the parties to rely upon (an ultimately cross examine) multiple witnesses (to include the board of governors who dealt with the Claimant’s grievance) in order to resolve the various factual issues.” 7.8 Objectively, I agree with the Defendant that the declarations sought by the Claimant relied upon serious allegations made against the Defendant. Those declarations clearly required evidential determination on multiple issues of fact. Hence the Part 7 procedure was plainly more appropriate than the Part 8 procedure chosen by the Claimant. The Claimant sought to persuade me that there were no issues of factual dispute, that the facts were clear, and it was the interpretation of the facts that mattered. I disagree with the Claimant on that issue. The very nature of the declarations sought, including claims of processes being a sham, staff gross misconduct and discrimination require proper evidence, not currently before the Court. It is misconceived to assert that a binary assessment of the known facts is sufficient for disposal of the claim. 7.9 On 25 November 2025, the Claimant applied by way of N16A for an urgent injunction. The claimant alleged that the Defendant had failed to comply with a data subject access request made on 4 October 2025. That was relevant in the context of information required for her case for breach of contract currently pending at that time in the Chancery Division. The Defendant had notified the Claimant that they would comply with the access request by 5 January 2025. This caused concern to the Claimant, as her redundancy date was 30 November 2025.That urgent hearing took place on 28 November 2025. The Claimant seemingly did not serve that application on the Defendant or their solicitors prior to the hearing on 28 November 2025. 7.10 Between 25 and 28 November 2025, there was some material communication from the Court. On 26 November 2025, the parties received a letter from the court. The letter noted that Master Thornett had considered the Acknowledgment of Service and that he directed as follows:- “The Master has noted the submissions from the Defendant in its response to service of the Part 8 Claim Form, in particular challenging the propriety of the Claimant's use of Part

8. I suggest the Claimant immediately reviews her procedural position and, if so advised / she decides that Part 7 is the better procedure, then she serves a Particulars of Claim on the Defendant along with a request (by email to my clerk) that the court seals an Order treating the procedure as transferred to CPR 7 and as provides consequential interim directions (i.e. payment of any adjusting fee and formalising a date for service of the Particulars of Claim). Conversely, if the Claimant maintains that Part 8 remains the appropriate procedure, please advise my clerk (again by email) and I will list a short hearing at which the appropriate procedure will be considered and directed. In the meantime, nothing will happen in the claim until there has been clarification to/from the court about the appropriate procedure.” 7.11 I reasonably infer from that communication that Master Thornett had pause for thought in relation to the more appropriate litigation path for this matter, and that the proper determination of this issue was contingent to the claim proceeding any further. In my view, that was entirely reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances. 7.12 Later that day, the Claimant sent by email to the Defendant, copying the court, an 18-page document entitled “Dr Banfield’s response witness statement”. I infer that the Claimant intended that her statement satisfy the directions of Master Thornett, and maintained that Part 8 was the correct procedure for the matter. 7.13 On 28 November 2025, at around 16:49 the Claimant emailed Mr Pidgeon and the Defendant a copy of the Injunction Order, without supporting documentation, and without any detail as to what had happened at the injunction hearing. Mr Pidgeon was not given informal notice of that hearing. At 22:50 that day, the Claimant emailed Mr Pidgeon and the Defendant an amended (slip rule) Injunction Order, skeleton argument, witness statement in support and an exhibit bundle. Again, no detailed information was provided by the Claimant as to what happened at the hearing. 7.14 On 28 November 2025 Sweeting J issued an order, without a penal notice, following a hearing involving the claimant only, that:

1. The implementation of the “Notice of Dismissal by Reason of Redundancy” dated 11 July 2025 is stayed until further order.

2. The Appellant is to notify the Respondent of the terms of this Order forthwith.

3. The Appellant is to the serve the Respondent with a sealed copy of this Order and all accompanying documentation within 7 days of receipt of the order.

4. The Respondent has a right to apply to set aside, vary or stay this Order, on notice to the Appellant within 7 days of service of the same, pursuant to CPR 23.10

5. Costs reserved. REASONS On the face of it there is a serious issue to be tried because there is underlying litigation in which the defendant had objected to the form of proceedings, namely whether part 7 should be used rather than part 8, which is to be determined by an application in front of the Master. However there has been no application to strike out the claim and at present it appears that it will proceed subject to arguments about the procedural route. Although the claimant might have a claim for reinstatement if she were to be successful in the litigation I accept for present purposed that she would suffer prejudice if her employment were brought to an end as a result of the implementation of the redundancy notice which she contends was served upon her in breach a (sic) contract. Damages may not be an adequate remedy. The Claimant commenced proceedings in the Chancery Division which were then transferred. There appear to have been a number of short administrative delays which have resulted in this application having been made as a matter of urgency. It is evident that the claimant intended originally to ask for a between the parties hearing. In the circumstances I take the view that the balance of convenience and the interests of justice militate in favour of granting interim relief. On reflection and rather than imposing an obligation on the parties to return to court in relation to the stay I leave it to the defendant to consider whether it wishes to apply to set aside or vary.

8. The effect of the injunction 8.1 The Defendant was not at the hearing, was not provided with a note of the hearing, and had to rely on the wording of the Injunction. The Defendant understood the effect of that injunction to maintain the status quo. What that means is that the injunction operated to stay the effect of the redundancy, so that the notice period remained ongoing, and the dismissal had not occurred. Since the Claimant remains under notice, the Claimant remains on garden leave, pending further order of the Court. I agree with the Defendant’s position on this issue. 8.2 An ordinary and natural reading of both the terms of the injunction and the reasons given by Sweeting J would in my judgment be entirely consistent with the stance of the Defendant. The wording of the order is clear that the implementation of the notice of redundancy is stayed – not dismissed or treated as never having been of effect. The Claimant was on garden leave until her notice expired. The injunction preserved the status quo removing the redundancy notice, but expressly did not provide reinstatement. Its effect was to continue the notice period pending further order of the court. 8.3 The Claimant took a different and, in my judgment, a misconceived view of the effect of that injunction and notified the Defendant and their solicitor by email at 21:55 on Sunday 30 November 2025 that she intended to return to work to resume their role as Head of Faculty. On 1 December 2025, the Principal at the Defendant emailed the Claimant at 07:18 and stated that the Claimant should not return to the College, that their lawyers would be in touch with the Claimant, and that they would be seeking guidance from the Courts and clarification regarding the interim injunction. 8.4 That same day, the Claimant attended the premises of the Defendant and sought entry, which was refused. As a result, the Claimant has made further allegations relating to the Defendant that they are in breach of the injunction. In my view, those further allegations have no basis. This is because they were premised on the Claimant’s misunderstanding of the effect of the injunction that she had sought against the Defendant. 8.5 Collaterally, it is worth noting alongside this timeline of events that the Defendant had put in train the termination of employment by Defendant, including the issuance of a P45 Notice and the payment of all sums due to the Claimant under the notice and redundancy provisions of her contract. I am satisfied that this was done by the Defendant, in its ordinary course of business with the expectation that the notice period for the Claimant would expire on 30 November 2025. 8.6 In my view, the Defendant has abided by the terms of the injunction. They have continued to treat the Claimant as being on garden leave. Mr Macdonald for the Defendant did make some general submissions about the wording of the injunction and its reasons, but he did not question the statement by Sweeting J that the Claimant might have a claim for reinstatement were she to be successful in the litigation. 8.7 There remains a subsidiary dispute between the Claimant and the Defendant in relation to monies owed. On 2 December 2025, Mr Pidgeon, for the Defendant, wrote to the Claimant “My client is entitled to decide that you should remain on garden leave, and that is what they have done. It follows therefore that you should now return the redundancy payment my client made to you last week. If you do that, my client can make salary payments to you as before, until further Order of the Court.” 8.8 Given that I have granted the application by the Defendant to set aside the injunction as at the date of hand down of this judgment, some form of accounting task may need to be undertaken by the Defendant relating to sums potentially due by one party to the other.

9. The Defendant’s submissions 9.1 The Defendant’s position is that the injunction should be discharged. They assert there is no prima facie case that the Claimant’s dismissal was in breach of contract and hence no serious issue to be tried. Even if there were, they say that damages would be an adequate remedy. Further they assert that there has been a breakdown of the implied trust and confidence between employer and employee that goes to the balance of convenience. 9.2 If the Defendant is right that there is no prima facie case for breach of contract, they assert that the declarations sought by the Claimant (numbered 1 – 6) are academic. Additionally, the Defendant contends that there is no prima facie case for Declaration 7, as the Defendant asserts it has a lawful basis for data processing. Hence, they seek the claims for declaratory relief should be struck out or dismissed summarily. Finally, the Defendant contends that the contempt application is misconceived and seriously defective as it is non-compliant with CPR 81.4 and 81.5; and should be struck out or dismissed. 9.3 The Defendant asserts that there is no basis put forward by the Claimant on which her dismissal was in breach of contract. The Defendant contends that the role of the Claimant was properly taken into consideration as part of the restructuring, and that proper notice of redundancy was provided under the terms of the Claimant’s SEAS contract. Posing a counterfactual they assert: Even if the restructuring was a sham, even if the Claimant’s role did not form part of the restructure, even if the handling of her grievance and appeal were a sham, even if her employment contract details were not known to the Leadership team, even if the Principal sought to use an unsigned contract for discriminatory and deceptive purposes, even if the Notice of Dismissal were a sham, the Defendant says that they would still be entitled to terminate the contract in accordance with its provisions – by giving notice. The elegance of this argument lies in its simplicity. 9.4 However, on closer analysis, it does not stand up fully to scrutiny. This is because the Claimant may have some form of legal remedy should the evidence demonstrate, at a later stage, that the employment contract was not terminated lawfully. Sweeting J made the same point in his reasons for permitting the injunction of 28 November 2025 by stating that “the claimant might have a claim for reinstatement if she were to be successful in the litigation”. In my judgment, this remains a valid point. Reinstatement may become a potential remedy at some stage, even if ostensibly remote. That is however wholly contingent on how the evidence emerges. Counsel for the Defendant made some broad submissions about the wording of the injunction, but did not take issue with the potential claim for reinstatement raised by Sweeting J.

10. The Claimant’s submissions 10.1 The Claimant’s position is that her redundancy was bogus and illegitimate; and that her redundancy was not permitted under her contract of employment, and that she was a victim of discrimination. Her opening statement in her skeleton argument asserts that “The claim is about corruption at the highest level to remove the Access curriculum from the management of the Claimant in breach of her contract.” The Claimant asserts breach of contract but does not refer to wrongful dismissal. The Claimant states that her claim is not for money, but for seven declarations relating to her employment situation and the handling of her confidential personal data. At one stage in the correspondence (15 January 2026 to the Defendant solicitors), the Claimant raises the issue of the Defendant settling the dispute, but does not articulate what the form or substance of any putative settlement might be. 10.2 The Claimant seeks summary judgment as well as strike-out against the Defendant for failure to properly Acknowledge Service of her initial Part 8 proceedings. Additionally, the Claimant seeks an application for contempt against certain of the Defendant’s staff members, as well as the Solicitor representing the Defendant, Mr Pidgeon. During the hearing, the Claimant recharacterized her contempt application as one for leave to apply to the Court to bring the contempt application. 10.3 The Claimant’s primary argument on her application for summary judgment and strike out is that of procedural irregularity: The Defendant’s failure to complete Box B of the Acknowledgment of Service was fatal to their ability to defend the claim. Without stating a remedy in Box B, they were prevented from seeking further relief. The Claimant sought to cascade this alleged failure to prevent the Defendant from seeking to lift the injunction, as well as preventing their application for summary judgment and/or strike out of her claim. I reject that Claimant’s procedural irregularity argument, since I consider it wrong in law, to which I shall return later.

11. Law and Procedure 11.1 There was no significant dispute between the parties on the applicable law relating to the issues raised in the applications. I highlight below the operative legal authorities and relevant civil procedure that I have been mindful of in reaching this judgment. 11.2 In relation to litigants in person, I remind myself of Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC, where at paragraph 18, Lord Sumption stated: “lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court. The overriding objective requires the courts so far as practicable to enforce compliance with the rules: CPR rule 1.1(1)(f). The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties… Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.” 11.3 In relation to setting aside the injunction, summary judgment and strike out:

1. CPR r 23.10 provides 23.10 (1) A person who was not served with a copy of the application notice before an order was made under rule 23.9, may apply to have the order set aside or varied. (2) An application under this rule must, unless the court directs otherwise, be made within 7 days after the date on which the order was served on the person making the application.

2. CPR r 24.3 provides 24.3 The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on an issue if— (a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.

3. CPR r 3.4 provides insofar as is material 3.4 (1) In this rule and rule 3.5, reference to a statement of case includes reference to part of a statement of case. (2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; [. . .] (3) When the court strikes out a statement of case it may make any consequential order it considers appropriate. [. . .] (6) If the court strikes out a claimant’s statement of case and it considers that the claim is totally without merit – (a) the court’s order must record that fact; and (b) the court must at the same time consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order. (7) If a defendant applies to strike out all or part of the claim form or particulars of claim, that defendant need not file a defence before the hearing. 11.4 In relation to contempt: CPR Part 81 addresses applications for contempt. CPR r 81.4 sets out stringent requirements for a contempt application; and r 81.5, for service. 11.5 In relation to the injunction: Where damages would be an adequate remedy, injunctive relief should not normally be granted: American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC

396. Damages are an adequate remedy for wrongful dismissal (i.e. dismissal in breach of contract): Marsh v National Autistic Society [1993] ICR453. The measure of damages will be the period of notice which the employer ought to have given. An injunction should only be granted in circumstances where trust and confidence has not broken down: Alexander and ors v Standard Telephones and Cables plc[1990] ICR 291, ChD; Ali v Southwark LBC [1988] ICR

567. The Courts will be reluctant to injunct an employer to retain an employee in whom he no longer feels the trust and confidence which are an essential part of the choice of employee: Anderson v Pringle of Scotland Ltd (1998) SLT

754. 11.6 Wrongful repudiation of the contract of employment either terminates the contract or puts an end to the status of the dismissed employee as an employee: in both cases the employee is confined to his remedy in damages: Alexander 11.7 In the absence of express agreement, the parties are not to be taken as having intended that a failure to comply with contractually binding disciplinary procedures would give rise to a common law claim for damages: Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust[2011] UKSC 58.Parliament had not intended that an employee could choose to pursue his complaint of unfair dismissal in the ordinary courts: ibid. 11.8 Unambiguous words of dismissal may be taken at face value without the need for any analysis of the surrounding circumstances: Sothern v Franks Charlesly and Co[1981] IRLR 278, CA. 11.9 As to data protection: Processing of a data subject’s personal data for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings is necessary for the performance of the employment contract, and to exercise rights conferred by law (i.e. under the contract): Hopkins v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2020] EWHC 2355 (QB). That case was referable to Regulation 2016/669 but arguably applies mutatis mutandis to the condition in Schedule 9 Para 2 Data Protection Act 2018, i.e. that “the processing is necessary a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party . . .” Paragraph 6 Schedule 9 Data Protection Act 2018 permits processing where it is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by either the controller or the third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed. 12 As to procedural issues relating to Part 8 proceedings: CPR 8.1 (2) A claimant may, unless any enactment, rule or practice direction states otherwise, use the Part 8 procedure where they seek the court’s decision on a question which is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact. As the White Book states at 8.0.1: In essence, the Pt 8 procedure is designed for the determination of relevant claims without elaborate pleadings. If the procedure is misused, the defendant can object and equally the court on its own initiative, and as part of its function to manage claims, will order the claim to proceed under Pt 7 and give appropriate directions. 13 As to the use of Part 8 proceedings: In Merit Holdings Limited v Michael J Lonsdale Limited [2017] EWHC 2450 TCC, [21,22, 31, 32] Jefford J cautioned against the over liberal use of Part 8: “It is therefore, an express requirement of the use of the Part 8 procedure that the question for the Court is one that is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact and it is, it seems to me, to be implied in the rules that the question should be framed with some degree of precision and/or be capable of a precise answer. The experience of this court shows that there is a real risk of the Part 8 procedure being used too liberally and inappropriately with the risks both of prejudice to one or other of the parties in the presentation of their case and of the court being asked to reach ill formulated and ill-informed decisions. Had a Part 7 procedure been adopted, then on the face of the pleadings, the parties’ positions would have been fully set out and, if not, further information could have been sought. If there were no need for factual evidence, there would have been mechanisms available (in the discretion if the court) to resolve the issue of the contractual relationship between the parties promptly – for example, by the hearing of a preliminary issue or an expedited hearing – and on a sure footing than is offered by the Part 8 procedure in circumstances such as this. All these issues seem to me to illustrate why care should be taken by the parties and the Court in the deployment of the Part 8 procedure.” I further note that Berkeley Homes (South East London) Limited v John Sisk and Son Limited [2023] EWHC 2152 (TCC) and Cathay Pacific Airlines v Lufthansa Technik [2019] EWHC 484 Ch set out the correct approach to Part 8 procedure were there were disputed issues of fact that meant the claim could be started under CPR Part

7. 14 Responding to a claim under Part 8 CPR 8.3Acknowledgment of service (1) The defendant must – (a) file an acknowledgment of service in the relevant practice form not more than 14 days after service of the claim form; and (b) serve the acknowledgment of service on the claimant and any other party. (2) The acknowledgment of service must state – (a) whether the defendant contests the claim; and (b) if the defendant seeks a different remedy from that set out in the claim form, what that remedy is. (3) The following rules of Part 10 (acknowledgment of service) apply – (a) rule 10.3(2) (exceptions to the period for filing an acknowledgment of service); and (b) rule 10.5 (contents of acknowledgment of service). The White Book 2025 Notes p413 states: 8.4.1 Responding to claim Default judgment is not available in Pt 8 claims: r 8.1(5). The combined effect of r.8.3 and para 7.3 of the Practice Direction is that if a defendant wishes to respond to a Pt.8 claim they must acknowledge service within 14 days of service of the claim form using Form N210 and this involves filing and serving an acknowledgment of service. It is at this stage that, in practice, a defendant must either respond to the claim, for example if a different remedy to the remedy claimed is sought they should set this out with particulars, or seek to dispute the court’s jurisdiction (a directions hearing will then be listed) or object to the use of the Pt.8 procedure, for example, on the ground that a substantial dispute of fact needs to be considered by the court in the particular claim (again a directions hearing will be listed).

15. Procedure where defendant objects to use of the Part 8 procedure CPR 8.8 (1) Where the defendant contends that the Part 8 procedure should not be used because – (a) there is a substantial dispute of fact; and (b) the use of the Part 8 procedure is not required or permitted by a rule or practice direction, he must state his reasons when he files his acknowledgment of service. (Rule 8.5 requires a defendant who wishes to rely on written evidence to file it when he files his acknowledgment of service) (2) When the court receives the acknowledgment of service and any written evidence it will give directions as to the future management of the case. (Rule 8.1(3) allows the court to make an order that the claim continue as if the claimant had not used the Part 8 procedure) The White Book 2025 Notes p 415, states: 8.8.1 Procedure where the defendant objects to the use of the Part 8 procedure. This provision is set out in r8.8. An objection will be considered by the court…In practice, the judge will consider the appropriateness of otherwise of the use of the alternative procedure when the claim comes before them either initially or at the directions hearing. A person who uses the Pt.8 procedure inappropriately, e.g. knowing that there are significant issues of fact, and causes a defendant to incur costs that are wasted will be likely to be the subject to an order to pay those costs. By comparison, if it becomes apparent after the filing of the defendant’s acknowledgment of service that the claim is not suitable for Pt.8, the parties should act co-operatively and submit an appropriate consent order to the Master or District judge pursuant to r.8.1(3) together with suggested Pt 7 trial directions…. Rule 8.8(2) does not abrogate the court’s power under r.3.3 to strike out the claim of its own initiative: Banfield v Mann [2021] EWHC 2436 (QB). 16 The proper approach to summary judgment and strike out applications. 16.1 There is a degree of overlap between the rules relating to summary judgment and those for strike out. Both parties have made applications for summary judgment whilst concurrently seeking an alternative request that the Court should strike out the other party’s statements of case. Broadly, an application for summary judgment is focussed on the evidential question as to whether the respondent can prove their case. An application for strike out is focussed on whether the respondent’s statement of case has no real prospect of succeeding at trial. The court may grant summary judgment of either the whole of a claim or a particular issue if it considers that the respondent has no real prospect of succeeding on or successfully defending the claim or issue, and that there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial. 16.2 On a summary judgment application, the court should not conduct a mini trial to resolve disputed questions of fact. Instead, the court will assume that all the facts pleaded by the respondent in his statements of case, along with any facts relied on by the respondent for the purposes of the application itself, will be established at trial. 16.3 Under CPR 24.3, the Court may give summary judgment against a respondent on the whole of a claim, if it considers that the respondent has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, and there is no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at trial. Further, under CPR 3.4(2), the Court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim, or (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the Court’s process.

17. Summary Judgment In Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB), Nicklin J said, at paragraph 142: 'The, now familiar, principles governing summary judgment were summarised in Easyair Ltd -v- Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) [15] per Lewison J (and approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Sons Ltd -v- Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098). Drawing upon other relevant authorities the following can be stated: (1) The court must consider whether the claimant has a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success: Swain -v- Hillman [2001] 1 All ER

91. The criterion is not one of probability; it is absence of reality: Three Rivers DC -v- Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 [158] per Lord Hobhouse. (2) A "realistic" claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products -v- Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 [8] (3) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a "mini-trial": Swain -v- Hillman. This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products -v- Patel [10]; Optaglio -v- Tethal [2015] EWCA Civ 1002 [31] per Floyd LJ. (4) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust -v- Hammond (No.5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd -v- Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR

63. (5) Nevertheless, to satisfy the requirement that further evidence "can reasonably be expected" to be available at trial, there needs to be some reason for expecting that evidence in support of the relevant case will, or at least reasonably might, be available at trial. It is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may "turn up". A party resisting an application for summary judgment must put forward sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that s/he has a real prospect of succeeding at trial (especially if that evidence is, or can be expected to be, already within his/her possession). If the party wishes to rely on the likelihood that further evidence will be available at that stage, s/he must substantiate that assertion by describing, at least in general terms, the nature of the evidence, its source and its relevance to the issues before the court. The court may then be able to see that there is some substance in the point and that the party in question is not simply playing for time in the hope that something will turn up: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd -v- TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725 [14] per Moore-Bick LJ; Korea National Insurance Corporation -v- Allianz Global Corporate & Speciality AG [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 413 [14] per Moore-Bick LJ; and Ashraf -v- Lester Dominic Solicitors & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 4 [40] per Nugee LJ. Fundamentally, the question is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that disclosure may materially add to or alter the evidence relevant to whether the claim has a real prospect of success: Okpabi -v- Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2021] 1 WLR 1294 [128] per Lord Hamblen. (6) Lord Briggs explained the nature of the dilemma in Lungowe -v- Vedanta Resources plc [2020] AC 1045 [45]: "… On the one hand, the claimant cannot simply say, like Mr Micawber, that some gaping hole in its case may be remedied by something which may turn up on disclosure. The claimant must demonstrate that it has a case which is unsuitable to be determined adversely to it without a trial. On the other, the court cannot ignore reasonable grounds which may be disclosed at the summary judgment stage for believing that a fuller investigation of the facts may add to or alter the evidence relevant to the issue…"

18. An evidential distinction between summary judgment and strike out: King -v- Stiefel [2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm) [21] per Cockerill J

25. There is one potential distinction between the position in relation to an application for summary judgment under CPR r. 24.2 and an application to strike out under CPR r. 3.4(2)(a). As just noted, under CPR 24 evidence is admissible to show that the pleaded allegations are fanciful – albeit that the court will be very cautious about rejecting a claimant’s factual case at the summary judgment stage.

26. When considering an application to strike out however the facts pleaded must be assumed to be true and evidence regarding the claims advanced in the statement of case is inadmissible. This is noted in Terry Allsop v Banner Jones Limited [2021] EWCA Civ 7 by Marcus Smith J (giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal) at [7], citing the judgment of Arnold LJ in Libyan Investment Authority v King [2020] EWCA Civ 1690, at [96]: “In contrast with the applications under CPR 3.4(2)(b), the applications under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 24.2 are concerned with the merits of the claim, specifically whether the claim meets the (low) threshold of what I shall call “reasonable arguability”. Although it can be said that there is no material difference between the test applied by these two provisions, there is an important distinction between CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 24.2, in that an application under CPR 24.2 can be supported by evidence, whereas an application under CPR 3.4(2)(a) should not involve evidence regarding the claims advanced in the statement of case.”

19. Analysis Defendant’s application to set aside the injunction. 19.1 I grant the Defendant’s application to set aside the injunction, based on the balance of convenience and special factors. Following the well-known American Cynamid case, the Defendant says there is no prima facie case, hence no serious issue to be tried, damages are an adequate remedy and that the balance of convenience, including special factors relating to the breakdown of the implied term of trust and confidence favours discharge of the injunction. 19.2 Those assertions are made in the face of the reasons given by Sweeting J, where the evidence of underlying litigation between the parties was considered to constitute a serious issue to be tried, damages were not regarded as an adequate remedy since re-instatement was a possible remedy, and that the balance of convenience militated against the operation of the notice by way of redundancy. 19.3 The Claimant’s primary objection to the injunction being set aside is premised on the Defendant not having abided by that injunction. Given my findings above in relation to the ordinary and natural meaning and effect of the injunction, I reject this objection by the Claimant. The Defendant has observed the terms of the injunction to date. 19.4 Clearly there is a stark dispute on the facts between the parties as to the adequacy or otherwise of the redundancy process that resulted in the Claimant being issued notice by way of redundancy. Following the reasoning of Sweeting J on the grant of the November 2025 injunction, there remains a possible and identifiable remedy for the Claimant. That is wholly contingent on how the evidence plays out once this matter has been transferred to the Part 7 procedure, full pleadings have been entered and witness statement evidence provided. For the reasons given below in relation to summary judgment and/or strike-out by the Defendant, I consider that there is a serious issue to be tried. 19.5 Similarly, in relation to damages, my view is that damages may not be adequate, again the possible, and arguably remote, remedy of reinstatement highlighted by Sweeting J in the November 2025 injunction still stands. 19.6 Turning to the balance of convenience and “special factors”: Plainly the implied duty of trust and confidence between the Claimant and the Defendant has broken down. That is objectively obvious from the contents of the pleadings, applications and witness statements from each party. I remind myself that an injunction should only be granted in circumstances where trust and confidence has not broken down, as per : Alexander and ors v Standard Telephones and Cables plc & Ali v Southwark LBC & Anderson v Pringle of Scotland Ltd . On this basis, I grant the application by the Defendant for the injunction of 28 November 2025 to be set aside as from the date of this judgment. Defendant’s application for summary judgment/ strike out 19.7 The Defendant has consistently regarded the Part 8 process as the wrong procedure for this matter. This was first raised in correspondence by the solicitors for the Defendant with the Claimant on 11 August 2025: “It is clear that a significant dispute exists between the parties, and that Part 8 is not the appropriate procedure. In issuing the Applications, our client will necessarily incur significant legal costs. It is important to note that the civil court has the power to make costs awards against parties and that the general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the legal costs of the successful party.” The Defendant has consistently regarded Part 7 to be more appropriate, requiring full pleadings and witness evidence. That was made very clear in Mr Pidgeon’s first witness statement of 25 November 2025, referred to above. In Mr Pidgeon’s third witness statement dated 29 January 2026, it is stated: “In the event that the Court is not minded to strike out the claim or grant summary judgment in the College’s favour, the College seeks directions that the matter proceed as a Part 7 Claim and that the Claimant must file a Particulars of Claim within 28 days thereafter; and that the Claimant pays the College’s costs thrown away as a result of the incorrect use of the Part 8 procedure; in the alternative, the College’s costs of and occasioned by the incorrect use of the Part 8 procedure; in the further alternative, the College’s costs of the applications.” Bearing that in mind, the Defendant asserts that the Claimant’s statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and/or the Claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim; in the alternative that Paragraphs 1-6 of the Statement of Case disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and/or the Claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, and that there is no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at Trial. For the reasons given below, I decline to strike out the Claimant’s claim or grant summary judgment in favour of the Defendant. However, it is clear that the Part 8 procedure is not appropriate for this matter, that the Defendant made their position explicitly known on that issue both in correspondence and in evidence submitted as part of the Acknowledgment of Service. Accordingly, as part of this judgment, I will be issuing directions that the matter be transferred to Part 7, the Claimant file a Particulars of Claim within 28 days, and that the matter be returned to the Master for further directions as appropriate. In relation to costs, it is entirely appropriate that Costs be awarded in favour of the Defendant in relation to their costs of and occasioned by the Claimant’s incorrect use of the Part 8 procedure [see paragraph 21 below]. 19.8 – The Part 8 framework is not ideally suited to the summary disposal, by way of interim remedy applications, of what is essentially a Part 7 claim. Round Part 7 pegs do not sit happily in square Part 8 holes. Reminding myself of Merit Holdings Limited (supra), there is here a real risk of the Part 8 procedure being used too liberally and inappropriately with the risks both of prejudice to both parties in the presentation of their cases and of the court being asked to reach ill formulated and ill-informed decisions. 19.9. In relation to summary judgment, the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. A hallmark of Part 8 proceedings is the absence of substantial disputes of fact. For the reasons given above, it is abundantly clear that there are substantial disputes of fact between the parties. Unsurprisingly, within the framework of Part 8 proceedings, there is a deliberate and conscious absence of full pleadings and voluminous witness statements. However, in this matter, the absence of full pleadings and full witness statements creates an issue when looked at through the prism of a summary judgment application. Given the nature of the allegations made by the Claimant in relation to the declarations sought, it is clear that full witness statements by various employees of the Defendant will be required. Indeed, they could be reasonably expected to be deployed as central to the evidence available at trial. It may well transpire that such witness evidence will be fully or partially dispositive on the salient issues. 19.10. This Court cannot ignore reasonable grounds which may be disclosed at the summary judgment stage for believing that a fuller investigation of the facts may add or alter the evidence relevant to the issues. Put another way, the question is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that disclosure may materially add to or alter the evidence relevant to whether the claim has a real prospect of success. I am also mindful that the court will be very cautious about rejecting a claimant’s factual case at the summary judgment stage. In my judgment, a fuller investigation of the facts under the Part 7 procedure is necessary, including full witness statements from the Principal and named employees of the Defendant. 19.11. The Defendant asserts that the Claimant does not have a realistic claim, it is not one that carries some degree of conviction, there is no real prospect of success, and that there is no other compelling reason why the case should not be disposed of at trial. Evidentially, this Court broadly assumes all the facts pleaded by the Claimant in their statement of case, along with the facts relied upon by the Claimant for the purposes of the application itself, will be established at trial – tempered by the fact that this Court does not necessarily take at face value everything that a claimant says in their statements before the court. The issue is whether there is real substance in the factual assertions made, and whether those assertions are contradicted by contemporaneous documents. 19.12. The Claimant’s core claim is that the Principal at the Defendant was not aware of the amendments to the Claimant’s employment contract in February-May 2024, (which is admitted by the Defendant) and that this was symptomatic of various unlawful actions, including, but not limited to, the Claimant being wrongfully selected for redundancy. Subsidiary to that is the claim of alleged breach of her data protection rights, primarily by the Principal relating to a grievance complaint against a former member of staff of the Defendant. The Defendant maintains that the processing of any data was lawful. 19.13. In my judgment, it is not reasonable, proportionate or just to grant summary judgment in favour of the Defendant at this time, based upon the Claimant’s statement of case and the incomplete evidential picture. Further, I am not satisfied that the Claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim at this time. The Claimant makes serious allegations relating to gross misconduct and discrimination. These do not sit easily with there being no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at a trial. I have already given reasons for why further evidence is required, and in my view the claim warrants further examination through the disclosure process under Part

7. 19.14 The Defendant’s application for strike out. When considering an application to strike out, the facts pleaded must be assumed to be true and evidence regarding the claims advanced in the statement of case is inadmissible. Does the Claimant’s statement of case disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim? Returning to the counterfactual raised by the Defendant above and extending it to all 7 declarations sought by the Claimant in the Part 8 Claim Form; even if the restructuring was a sham, even if the Claimant’s role did not form part of the restructure, even if the handling of her grievance and appeal were a sham, even if her employment contract details were not known to the Leadership team, even if the Principal sought to use an unsigned contract for discriminatory and deceptive purposes, even if the Notice of Dismissal were a sham, and even if the Claimant’s personal and protected data rights had been breached, the Defendant says that they would still be entitled to terminate the contract in accordance with its provisions by giving notice. However, assuming the facts pleaded in the Claimant’s statement of case are true, the Claimant may have some form of legal remedy arising from her employment contract being terminated wrongfully and/or her personal and protected data rights being breached. Accordingly, in my view the Court should not exercise its powers under CPR 3.4 to strike out the Claimant’s claim. 19.15 The Claimant’s application for Summary Judgment/Strike out. The Claimant sought summary judgment and/or strike out against the Defendant. Her primary submission was based on the Civil Procedure Rules, specifically that the Acknowledgment of Service had not been sufficiently completed, in Box B, by the Defendant under the Part 8 rules. The Claimant asserted that failure to enter details of an alternative remedy in the text box at Box B was a fundamental error. As a result of that, the Defendant was in a fatally flawed procedural position on a number of issues, including their ability to make the applications that they had. The Claimant was not able to point to any legal authority supporting her submission. The Defendant highlighted the notes contained within The White Book 2025, which constitute good guidance. I reject the Claimant’s submission in its entirety on this issue, which is wholly misconceived. At 8.4.1 and 8.8.1 (supra): The White Book 2025 at 8.4.1 states: It is at this stage that, in practice, a defendant must either respond to the claim, for example if a different remedy to the remedy claimed is sought they should set this out with particulars, or seek to dispute the court’s jurisdiction (a directions hearing will then be listed) or objects to the use of the Pt.8 procedure, for example, on the ground that a substantial dispute of fact needs to be considered by the court in the particular claim (again a directions hearing will be listed). The Defendant indicated in Box B that it opposed the claim, and at Box D indicated that it objected to the use of Part 8 procedure and offered a witness statement from Mr Pidgeon explaining the reasons. This falls squarely within the guidance contained within the White Book. In my view, the Defendant complied entirely with the Part 8 procedure in relation to the Acknowledgment of Service in a timely fashion. Corroboration of that can be found in the letter from Master Thornett dated 26 November 2025 that notes the Defendant has objected to the Part 8 procedure, and that “nothing will happen in the claim until there has been clarification to/from the court about the appropriate procedure.” Accordingly, in relation to this ground, the application by the Claimant for summary judgment and/or strike out is not granted. 19.16 Probation not a potential bar to termination by the Defendant A secondary submission made by the Claimant was in relation to the construction of her contract of employment. The Claimant submitted that the probation clause at Clause 3 of the SEAS Contract is a condition precedent to the Defendant being able to operate the notice provision at Clause

25. This is because there has to be a probationary period first for the Claimant, in order for the notice provisions to apply. The Claimant asserts that her continuous employment with the Defendant since 2010 is not relevant and that she was entitled to a probationary period in her new role and contract from 2024. I reject the Claimant’s submission, on the basis of an ordinary and natural reading of the applicable terms of that contract. For ease of reference, I have set out below the wording of the two clauses in question:- “Probation The first 6 months of your employment will be a probationary period, during which your suitability for the position to which you have been appointed will be assessed. The College reserves the right to extend your probationary period if, in its opinion, circumstances so require. During your probationary period, or at the end of it, your employment may be terminated either by you or by the College on giving one month’s written notice. You will not be deemed to have passed your probationary period unless and until that is confirmed to you in writing. This clause will not be applicable to the established staff. … 25.2 After the completion of any probationary period, the College may terminate your employment by giving you in writing whichever is the greater of: (a) one month’s notice; or (b)one week’s notice for each year of service, up to a maximum of twelve weeks’ notice. 25.3 You may terminate your employment at any time by giving the College three months’ notice in writing. 25.4 The College may terminate your employment without notice or without compensation in lieu of notice If you are guilty of gross o serious misconduct, gross negligence or gross incompetence. 25.5 During any period of notice of termination (whether given by you or the College), the College shall be under no obligation to assign any duties to you and shall be entitled to exclude you from its premises, although this will not affect your right to receive your normal salary and other contractual benefits. If you are required to stay at home during the notice period, clause 19 shall continue to apply. 25.6 You will be entitled to four months’ written notice if your employment is terminated by reasons of redundancy. The Claimant’s submission does not make sense on a plain, ordinary and literal reading of the above clauses. Clearly the Probation clause does not apply to the established staff. It cannot be stated in a more explicit or obvious manner. The Claimant had been a member of the established staff since 2010. In my judgment, the wording of clause 25.2 is merely meant to make it clear that if there is a probationary period, then that period should not be taken into account when calculating applicable notice periods. I note that the Claimant asserts that she sought an amendment to clause 3, however no evidence has been provided to support that assertion. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court denies the application by the Claimant for summary judgment/strike out against the Defendant. 19.17 The Claimant’s application for contempt/permission for contemptapplication The Claimant made an application on 29 December 2025 that included “the Defendants (including Mr Anthony Pidgeon) are in contempt of Mr Justice Sweeting’s amended sealed order dated 28 November 2025”. The Claimant’s submissions took issue with how the Defendant had allegedly not abided by that injunction together with their Solicitor’s conduct of the case. The Claimant’s witness statement dated 29.12.2025 in support, and skeleton argument dated 12 February 2026 contain serious allegations of Mr Pigeon misleading the Court and making false statements. In correspondence, the Claimant has made serious allegations that Mr Pidgeon made up evidence and threatened Mr Pigeon with a referral to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Oral submissions were made by Mr Macdonald for the Defendant. He highlighted a litany of procedural errors by the Claimant in relation to the allegations of contempt, culminating in that application being submitted by the Defendant to be ill founded, not properly made and abusive in the circumstances. Further, no permission for making the contempt application had been made under CPR 81.3 (5). In response, the Claimant made further oral submissions changing her position. The Claimant sought to retrench to a position of making an application for permission to the Court, for an application for contempt. Unsurprisingly, the Defendant re-iterated its objections and submitted that the recharacterized application for permission should be refused. I repeat my findings above relating to my views in relation to that injunction and why I considered the Defendant and its solicitors had abided by the terms of that injunction. I further consider that the allegations made by the Claimant in relation to Mr Pidgeon and his conduct of the matter on behalf of the Defendant are wholly unfounded. Mr Pidgeon has been measured and professional at all times in his correspondence with the Claimant, as well as in relation to the contents of his three witness statements. Mr Pidgeon has objectively in my view acted wholly professionally at all times in his representation of the Defendant. The Claimant’s allegations in this regard come perilously close to her application being considered an abuse of process. In contrast, the Claimant has not been measured in tone in her correspondence with Mr Pidgeon, or indeed her unfounded allegations against him. Simply because Mr Pidgeon is representing the Defendant’s case in opposition to that of the Claimant, it is unhelpful at the very least for the Claimant to resort to intemperate correspondence. In Mr Pidgeon’s second witness statement of 4 December 2025, relevant email correspondence is set out that passed between him and the Claimant, following service of the Injunction Order. The evidence fails to disclose any reasonable basis as to why the Claimant wrote to Mr Pidgeon on 3 December 2025 to; “put him on notice that I am preparing a report to the Solicitor Regulation Authority (sic) about your conduct with regards to this case. Any future breaches will be added to the complaint.” In many ways, the application(s) by the Claimant relating to contempt simply underline the evidential disagreements between the parties, that have been manifestly obvious from the commencement of this claim. In general, the proper time for determining the truth or falsity of statements is at trial, when all the relevant issues of fact are before the court and the statements can be considered against the totality of the evidence (Daltel Europe Ltd v Makki [2005] EWHC 749 (Ch). Moreover, it is crystal clear from the contents of the Claimant’s witness statement dated 29 December 2025 that trust and confidence has irrevocably broken down between the parties. Regardless of that reality, the Claimant should be most careful to ensure they conduct themselves appropriately in all correspondence and the future handling of the claim with the Defendant and their solicitors henceforth. Reminding myself that the applicable test under CPR r.81.3(2)(5)(b) for permission is not whether a contempt of court has in fact been committed but whether proceedings should be brought to establish whether it has or not. In my judgment there is no prima facie case, let alone a strong prima facie case of any of the allegations of contempt by the Defendant or their solicitors. On that basis, I need not proceed onto questions relating to public interest or proportionality. Accordingly, leave for permission for application for committal is refused.

20. Conclusion This claim is not suitable for Part 8 procedural determination. As part of transfer to the Part 7 procedure, the Claimant should file a Particulars of Claim, giving full and careful consideration to her actual causes of action, and giving full and careful consideration to the available remedies sought. The Defendant’s application to set aside the injunction is granted. Neither the Claimant’s nor the Defendant’s application for summary judgment/strike out are granted. The Claimant’s application for permission for an application for contempt is not granted. Directions are given for the claim to be transferred forthwith to Part 7, with Particulars of Claim to be filed within 28 days, and a hearing before the Master thereafter for further directions.

21. Costs Under CPR 44.2 this Court has discretion as to costs. That discretion includes whether costs are payable by one party to another, the amount of those costs and when they are to be paid. If the Court decides to make an order about costs, which I have, then the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. I am mindful of the specific provisions of CPR 44.2 (4) (5) & (6) in the context of my findings above relating to this claim being inappropriate for determination under the Part 8 procedure. Accordingly, the Defendant’s costs of and caused/occasioned by the incorrect use by the Claimant of the Part 8 procedure are granted, to be paid by the Claimant. Costs reserved in relation to remaining matters. I would be grateful for Counsel for the Defendant to draw up the appropriate Order, in conjunction with the Claimant. A Consequential hearing has been listed after the hand-down of this judgment to facilitate finalising the appropriate Order and Costs.