Galina Ivanovna Zhuravleva v Ioulia Fedikhanovna Kamalova

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1041 (Ch) Case No: PT-2025-001071 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL Date: 11 May 2026 Before : MASTER MCQUAIL – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : GALINA IVANOVNA ZHURAVLEVA Claimant – and – IOULIA FEDIKHANOVNA KAMALOVA Defendant – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Daniel Dovar (instructed by Collyer Bristow) for the Claimant The Defendant in person Remote Hearing date:17 April 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – JUDGMENT This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00 am on 11 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ……………………….. MASTER MCQUAIL

1. By Part 7 claim form issued on 15 October 2025 with accompanying particulars of claim the claimant seeks from the Court a direction that the Chief Land Registrar register two central London leasehold flats (the Flats) presently registered in the name of the defendant in the name of the claimant or an order vesting them in the name of the claimant together with an account of rent received by the defendant and other consequential relief. The claim follows on from proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) (FTT) in which it was determined that the claimant is the sole beneficial owner of the Flats.

2. The defendant is resident in Spain, but has engaged in both the FTT proceedings and related County Court proceedings

3. On 17 October 2025 I dealt with the claimant’s application for permission to serve the defendant in Spain and made an order on the papers, including the first witness statement of Samara Dutton of the claimant’s solicitors, Collyer Bristow, in the usual way that the claimant have permission to serve the claim form and particulars of claim and any other documents in the claim on the defendant out of the jurisdiction at her address in Spain, (the 17 October Order). The defendant’s address was recorded in that order as “C Badia 54-41, Albir, L’Alfasapeli, Alicante 03581, Spain.”

4. Collyer Bristow, instructed the Spanish law firm of Rivero & Gustafson to arrange for service on the defendant as is explained by Samara Dutton in her second witness statement dated 17 December 2025. In that witness statement Ms Dutton explains that the address in the 17 October Order was the address at which the defendant was served in the related County Court claim. She went on to explain that when investigating service it became apparent that “L’Alfaspelpi” was a misspelling of “L’Alfas del Pi” and so the address “C Badia 54-41, Albir, L’Alfas del Pi, Alicante 03581, Spain.” has been used as the service address. In addition documents have been served at “C Badia 41, Albir, L’Alfas del Pi, Alicante 03581, Spain” which is how the defendant had written her address in an application in the FTT proceedings dated 5 November 2025.

5. Mr Sebastian Galan a partner with Rivero & Gustafson signed a certificate of service in Spanish form (written in English) dated 13 November 2025 in which he explained that he had been instructed by Collyer Bristow to have certain documents served on the defendant. He went on to explain that two attempts were made to serve the documents on 4 and 5 November at C Badia 54-41 Albir L’Alfas del Pi, Alicante, 03581 Spain and two attempts were made to served on 11 and 12 November 2025 at C Badia 41, Albir, L’Alfas del Pi, Alicante 03581 Spain . His certificate further explained that none of the service attempts were successful as the door was not opened at either address on either occasion but that notices were left informing the addressee that she might collect the service documents from the nearest post office to her residence. He certified that service had been validly and lawfully carried out in accordance with Spanish Law and, in particular Law 29/2015 of 30 July on international legal cooperation in civil matters and the 1965 Hague Convention. The documents scheduled to this certificate included within the hearing bundles show that the documents which Mr Galan caused to be served included the claim form and particulars of claim, the application and supporting evidence for permission to serve out and the 17 October Order as well as the bundle of supporting documents including Orders of and the Judgment of the FTT.

6. On 20 November 2025 Abbie Coleman of Collyer Bristow emailed the defendant at her gmail address attaching copies of the claim form, particulars of claim, the 17 October Order and the application for that order and the evidence in support, and bundle of supporting documents. The email explained that valid service had taken place pursuant to CPR 6.37 and 6.40, and the 17 October Order and the laws of Spain. The email stated that the date of deemed service was 4 November 2025 and explained when an acknowledgment of service and defence would be due.

7. On the following day Abbie Coleman emailed the defendant’s gmail address and as well as her protonmail email address explaining that valid service had taken place on the defendant in Spain by post and that she would have one month to collect the relevant papers from the local post office. The email went on to explain that the documents had all been emailed to the gmail address the previous day and were now also being emailed to the protonmail address.

8. The defendant did not acknowledge service or otherwise respond to the proceedings or the emails of 20 and 21 November. It is notable, however, that the defendant sent 6 emails from her gmail address to addresses including those of individuals at Collyer Bristow in the period from 25 November to 10 December concerning the FTT proceedings and a hearing at the County Court at Central London which took place on 3 December 2025.

9. On 17 December 2025 the claimant issued an application in these proceedings seeking a disposal hearing because of the defendant’s failure to acknowledge service or file or serve a defence and in the circumstances of the claim not being suitable for default judgment without a hearing.

10. Mr Galan signed a similar certificate dated 9 January 2026 to the one signed in November 2025 recording two attempts to serve on 23 December and 26 December at the 54-41 address and on 26 December and 29 November (presumably a slip for December) at the 41 address with similar lack of success in anybody answering the door. Again notices to collect the service documents from the post office were left at each address. The schedules to the certificate show that the documents of which Mr Galan was certifying service were the 17 December application and associated documents.

11. The disposal hearing was in due course listed to take place remotely on 17 April 2026.

12. Mr Galan signed a further similar certificate of service dated 28 January recording two further service attempts on 16 January and 19 January at each of the 54-41 and 41 addresses. The certificates record a similar outcome, save that on 19 January at the 41 address a person answered the door and refused to accept delivery. Again notices to collect the service documents were left at each address. The relevant schedules show that what was being served was the Notice of Hearing for 17 April.

13. On 14 April the defendant issued an application by which she sought orders: (i) declaring that the court has no jurisdiction over the defendant and setting aside service of the Claim Form pursuant to CPR Part 11; and (ii) an order dismissing the claimant’s application for a disposal hearing.

14. That application was supported by a 167 paragraph witness statement of the defendant written in fluent English. It explained that she had only become aware of the present proceedings on 10 Aril 2026 when she found in her spam folder an email from Collyer Bristow dated 7 April 2026 attaching a copy of the hearing bundle for the disposal hearing. It further set out the defendant’s evidence in support of her application in some detail. It explained also detailed contentions as to the merits of the claimant’s claim and why it should proceed to a full trial and not be disposed of at a disposal hearing so that the hearing listed on 17 April should be adjourned. It went on to deal with why the defendant says that the claim should be struck out and why an Extended CivilRestraint Order (ECRO) should be made by reference to the lengthy history of litigation between the claimant and the defendant. It also set out reasons why, if the defendant were to be found to be in default on any deadline she should be granted relief from sanction. The witness statement concluded by requesting that correspondence or documents be sent to her address at “Calle Badia 54-41, Alfaz del Pi, Alicane , Spain, 03581”, explaining that she does not accept service by email but made a request for documents to be sent by email in order to facilitate timely communication and to avoid issues as to further receipt of documents that copies of emails should be sent to her protonmail email address. The defendant’s second witness statement and skeleton argument essentially amplified the content of the first witness statement and the arguments made by the defendant.

15. On 15 April 2026 the claimant issued an application notice seeking an extension of time to serve the claim form and for permission to serve by procurador and waive any requirement to provide the defendant with translations. That application notice was support by the third witness statement of Samara Dutton.

16. I directed that the two April applications be listed to be heard alongside the disposal hearing already listed for 17 April. Late on 16 April the defendant filed and served a second witness statement which is 38 paragraphs long and early on 17 April the defendant filed an 8 page skeleton argument.

17. Late in the day, for understandable reasons, Collyer Bristow requested that Mr Galan prepare a legal opinion for the Court dealing with Spanish Law and the service of proceedings in this matter. Mr Galan produced such a document dated 16 April 2026. The document is not an expert report complying with CPR Part 35 and the defendant objected to it being adduced late. Permission would be needed to rely upon it and in the circumstances of its lateness, lack of compliance with the rules and the defendant’s objection it seems to me it would not be appropriate to give the claimant permission to rely upon so far as it contains expert opinion evidence.

18. However, I will allow the claimant to rely on it so far as it contains further factual evidence about the steps Mr Galan took to have the proceedings served. It is verified by a statement of truth and provides helpful detail about the steps that were taken. In particular the explanation is given that service was by use the Burofax service provided by Correos, Spain’s national postal service and thus by an authorised public officer. It also includes references to materials evidencing relevant legal matters. While it has only been filed and served at a late stage, the defendant has had and taken the opportunity to put in her own very full factual evidence to say what she wishes about the service process and her engagement or otherwise with that process.

19. The remote hearing proceeded as listed on 17 April, albeit that there was some initial technical difficulty with hearing the defendant. That was fortunately resolved and Mr Dovar, counsel for the claimant, and the defendant were each able to make their submissions. The Issues

20. In light of the defendant’s attendance and engagement with the proceedings the issues that fall to be determined are whether the defendant has been validly served alternatively whether the court should grant retrospective confirmation that the steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention o the defendant were good service under CPR 6.15(2). Only if the claimant were to be unsuccessful on those points would the court need to determine whether an extension of time for service should be granted. The claimant’s position, if service were effective, was that the defendant should have a reasonable time in which to file and serve a defence; there was no question that the claim be considered for disposal at the hearing.

21. CPR 11.1 provides that a defendant who wishes to challenge the court’s jurisdiction to try a claim or argue that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction may apply for a declaration to one of those effects. CPR r.11 (2) provides that a defendant who wishes to raise such a challenge must first file an acknowledgement of service.

22. The defendant has filed no acknowledgment of service and is therefore not strictly in a position to challenge jurisdiction. However I consider that in light of her application to challenge the validity of service I should determine that question and, if it arises, the question of service under 6.15(2).

23. The defendant raises five grounds of challenge: (i) a failure to provide translations of the service documents; (ii) that the method of service is not permitted by Spanish Law; (iii) that misstatements were made by Collyer Bristow about the dates for responding to the proceedings; (iv) that service was not in accordance with the terms of the 17 October Order; and (v) that insofar as there was service by email that was not good service.

24. In addition the defendant raised issues about limitation, abuse of process and the making of an ECRO against the claimant. Validity of Service

25. The claimant’s application for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction was made under CPR 6.37. CPR 6.40(3) provides that: Where a party wishes to serve a claim form or other document on a party out of the United Kingdom, it may be served— (a) by any method provided for by— (i) [Omitted] (ii) rule 6.42 (service through foreign governments, judicial authorities and British Consular authorities); or (iii) rule 6.44 (service of claim form or other document on a State); (b) by any method permitted by a Civil Procedure Convention or Treaty; or (c) by any other method permitted by the law of the country in which it is to be served. (4) Nothing in paragraph (3) or in any court order authorises or requires any person to do anything which is contrary to the law of the country where the claim form or other document is to be served.

26. Spain has ratified the Hague Service Convention (HSC). Art 10 provides: “Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with – a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination, c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.

27. Material published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law online shows Spain has not objected to service by any of the three methods set out in art.10. Objection (i) no translations

28. The defendant submitted that she was entitled, if served in Spain, to be served with translations of the English service documents in Spanish. She placed reliance upon CPR 6.45 and argued more generally that a failure to provide a Spanish translation deprived her of the protection of understanding what was served on her.

29. The claimant submitted that CPR 6.45 requires that translations of claim forms or other documents are required when service is under 6.43 (service thorough foreign governments, judicial authorities etc.) or under 6.44 (service on a State). Where, as here, service was effected by post in Spain there is no requirement in the CPR for a translation. Accordingly the challenge made by reference to CPR 6.45 is baseless, unless it would be contrary to Spanish Law to serve without translations. Alternatively if there is anything in this ground of challenge and there were some requirement in Spanish law for there to be translations of the service documents, the claimant asks for any defect to be waived, given the defendant’s level of engagement with the current and with previous proceedings in excellent written and spoken English. Objection (ii) method not permitted by Spanish Law

30. The defendant’s submission was that service by post of foreign proceedings was not in accordance with Spanish law and that in the absence of proof of receipt by the addressee there was no valid service. She relied upon the fact that the attempts to serve at both addresses were unsuccessful. She also questioned Mr Galan’s independence, given that he acts for the claimant in Spanish proceedings.

31. The claimant submitted that Art. 10(a) provides freedom for parties to send documents by post directly. As Mr Galan’s certificates and the factual evidence in his legal opinion explain the method of service relied on by the claimant, was to use the Burofax service provided the national postal service and the leaving of notices to collect at both addresses, when the primary service attempt was unsuccessful. Objection (iii) misstatements by Collyer Bristow

32. The defendant’s challenge under this heading seems to be based on a contention that the dates suggested by Collyer Bristow for responding to the claim in the emails of 20 and 21 November 2025 were incorrect.

33. The claimant submitted that the defendant was unable to explain, even if there were any misstatement why it would invalidate any service that took place. Objection (iv) service not in accordance with the 17 October Order

34. The defendant’s challenge in this regard appears to be that Collyer Bristow served not at “C Badia 54-41, Albir, L’Alfaaspelpi, Alicante 03581, Spain” (as stated n the Order) but at “C Baldia 41, Albir, L’Alfas del Pi, 03581, Spain” which she says did not amount to compliance with the terms of the 17 October Order.

35. Ms Dutton explains in her second witness statement how the misspelling of Alfas del Pi occurred and why two versions of the numbering of the defendant’s address came to be in circulation and thus why service was attempted at both versions of the numbering. The defendant has now confirmed her address as Calle Badia 54-41, Alfaz del Pi, Alicante, Spain, 03581.

36. The claimant asks that this immaterial defect is waived. The address in the 17 October Order is the same as that given in previous proceedings in which the defendant engaged and the alteration is minor ‘L’Alfaspelpi’ to ‘L’Alfas del Pi’. The postcode and main aspects of the address remain the same. Objection (v) Purported Service by Email

37. The defendant contended that service to her gmail address on 20 and 21 November is not good service absent her consent or the prior permission of the court to serve by email.

38. The claimant explained that is not relying on service by email, but did point out that despite the defendant’s refusal to accept service of any documents by email, she would like them emailed to her nonetheless. Limitation

39. The defendant has also raised a limitation issue. She asserts that by reason of section 21 of the Limitation Act 1980 the claimant’s claims became time barred 6 years after the death of her son who was previously the registered joint owner of the Flats with the defendant.

40. The claimant said that such an argument is misconceived and arose from a misunderstanding of the claim and the 1980 Act. Abuse of Process and Application for a Civil Restraint Order

41. The claimant’s further arguments that the claim should be struck out as abusive or that a civil restraint order should be made were described by Mr Dovar as outlandish. Service by Another Method or Place CPR r.6.15(2)

42. The claimant’s alternative contention, if any of the defendant’s challenges are good, is that the court should make an order for retrospective authorisation of the steps already taken are good service. CPR 6.15 provides: (1) Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place. (2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service. (3) An application for an order under this rule— (a) must be supported by evidence; and (b) may be made without notice. (4) An order under this rule must specify— (a) the method or place of service; (b) the date on which the claim form is deemed served; and (c) the period for— (i) filing an acknowledgment of service; (ii) filing an admission; or (iii) filing a defence.

43. The decision of the Supreme Court in Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44 confirms that 6.15(2) could apply to service out claims. In Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2014] EWCA Civ 593, [26] the Court of Appeal expressed the view that it would be surprising if it did not include cases where the HSC applies and also observed that the Abela case discourages taking a legalistic or technical approach to serve where proceedings have been brought to the attention of the defendant.

44. The claimant placed reliance on the “good reason” test set out by Carr LJ (as she then was) in R. (on the application of the Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care) [2022] EWCA Civ 355 at [54]-[55], where the Judge said: “What constitutes "good reason" is essentially a matter of factual evaluation; over-analysis and copious citation of authority will not assist (see Barton at [9]).

55. The following summary suffices for present purposes: “(i) The test is whether in all the circumstances, there is good reason to order that steps taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant are good service; (ii) Service has a number of purposes, but the most important is to ensure that the contents of the document are brought to the attention of the person to be served. This is a critical factor. But the mere fact that the defendant knew of the existence and content of the claim form cannot, without more, constitute a good reason to make an order under CPR r 6.15(2); (iii) The manner in which service is effected is also important. A "bright line" is necessary to determine the precise point at which time runs for subsequent procedural steps. Service of the claim form within its period of validity may have significant implications for the operation of any relevant limitation period. It is important that there should be a finite limit on the extension of the limitation period; (iv) In the generality of cases, the main relevant factors are likely to be: (a) Whether the claimant has taken reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules; (b) Whether the defendant or his solicitor was aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when it expired; (c) What, if any, prejudice the defendant would suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form. None of these factors are decisive in themselves, and the weight to be attached to them will vary with all the circumstances. (See Barton at [9], [10] and [16].)”

45. The claimant submitted that: (i) the claimant has taken reasonable steps to serve in accordance with the rules as identified in Mr Galan’s legal opinion and his certificates of service. It is also notable that: the defendant does not deny receiving the notices to collect the papers; she has not sought to collect the papers and on at least one occasion a person answered the door, but refused to accept papers at the address she has given. The defendant is evading service. There is therefore good reason for alternative service and for retrospective service by way of email; (ii) the defendant has now had the claim form and particulars of claim and so is aware of the proceedings and their content; (iii) the claimant is content for the effective service date to be taken from 10 April 2026, when on the defendant’s version of events, she first came across the claim; and (iv) If the date is for service taken as 10 April 2026 no prejudice can be suffered by D in responding to claim. Conclusions

46. I do not agree with the defendant that not providing a translation of the documents affects the validity of service effected by Burofax in Spain. Provision of translations is not a requirement for service under CPR r. 6.40(3) and the defendant has not identified any authority that serving without a translation would be contrary to Spanish Law. Articles 20 and 23 of Spanish Law on International Legal Cooperation (Ley/2015) to which I was referred by the Defendant do not contain any Spanish Law provision that means the absence of translations be illegal.

47. The method of service employed was in accordance with Art 10(a) of the HSC. The evidence of Ms Dutton and Mr Galan is that attempts were made to serve at both the addresses 54-41 and 41 and when service was unsuccessful notices were left at each address that the service documents might be collected from the nearest post office. Mr Galan has certified that that is good service in accordance with Spanish law. I am therefore satisfied that the proceedings were served on the defendant on 4 November 2025. I reject the defendant’s suggestion that Mr Galan was in any way disqualified from being the agent to arrange service because he has previously acted for the claimant.

48. The alleged misstatements by Collyer Bristow are irrelevant to the question of the validity of service. If the proceedings were not validly served any dates for responding suggested by Collyer Bristow would necessarily be premature. If the proceedings were validly served no later misstatement of dates could undo the validity of service.

49. The 17 October Service Order was to the effect that the defendant might be served in Spain at an identified address. The fact that there was a difference between the exact configuration of “L’Alfaspelpi” in the Order and “L’Alfas del Pi” in the address as served is not a material deviation from the terms of the order. It is not suggested in the defendant’s evidence that the deviation would have made any difference to the identity of the door or doors at which the Spanish postal service would have attempted to make delivery. There has been service at both 54-41 and 41 and it is plain from the defendant’s evidence that her correct address is Calle Badia 54-41, L’Alfaz del Pi, Alicante, Spain, 03581. If there is any irregularity I would waive it.

50. The email service point is irrelevant.

51. The limitation argument raised is a bad one, section 21 of the 1980 Act makes plain that there is no period of limitation for an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property in the possession of a trustee alternatively the demand for the return of the trust property was only made in 2025 after the FTT’s decision.

52. The defendant’s suggestion that either the claim be struck out or a civil restraint order be made (presumably to have effect to prevent the claimant pursuing this claim) were not supported by any coherent legal reasoning. The claim is in effect one to enforce a decision of the FTT; it seems difficult to argue that it is one that is strikable and, in the absence of any claim or application made by the claimant which has been certified as totally without merit, it is difficult to see that the jurisdiction to make any sort of restraining order is engaged.

53. I am satisfied that service was validly effected on 4 November 2025 at the 54-41 address.

54. I am in any event satisfied that in all the circumstances there is good reason to order that the steps taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant constitute good service.

55. It is apparent from her detailed engagement in writing and at the 17 April hearing (without prejudice to her jurisdictional challenge) that the existence and content of the claim form were brought to the attention of the defendant no later than 10 April 2026 when she found the email with the hearing bundle in her spam folder. It is plain that the defendant understood the content of the claim form notwithstanding it was written in English. 10 April was within the period of validity of the claim form and, as I have explained, there is no question of any limitation period having expired.

56. The claimant’s solicitors instructed solicitors in Spain to have the documents served by Burofax and they were entitled to understand from Mr Galan’s certificates of service that the claim form (and later the 17 December application and the notice of hearing) had been served in accordance with Spanish law, so that reasonable steps to serve had been taken. There is no denial by the defendant in her written evidence that she received the notices to collect left at the 54-41 address or explanation in that evidence of what she did, if and when she did receive the notices. I infer that the defendant is making it as difficult as possible for the claimant to effect certain service.

57. There will be no prejudice to the defendant by authorising service by means of the email sent enclosing the hearing bundle on 7 April 2026. The defendant will not be deprived of an opportunity to defend the claim.

58. The defendant herself has requested that future communications be sent by email, it is plain that she agrees that is an efficient way of conducting these proceedings going forward.

59. In light of my conclusions I propose to adjourn the application for an extension of time for service.

60. If the parties are unable to agree an order and any other consequential matters arising from this judgment there will need to be a short remote consequentials hearing.