Supreme Court of Mauritius, 15 avril 2026, 2026 BMB 26 – Police v Kevin PURDASEE

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Police v Kevin PURDASEE

2026 BMB 26

BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT OF BLACK RIVER In the matter of: Cause number: p295/26 Police V Kevin PURDASEE BAIL RULING 1. The applicant was brought to court on the 16 th March 2026 on the present provisional information for the offences of bribery by public official [count 1] under the Financial Crime Commission Act and aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime (drug dealing with aggravating circumstances: organising the importation of cannabis with an averment of trafficking) [count 2] under the Dangerous Drugs Act coupled with the Criminal Code.

2. The applicant has, through his legal representative, moved to be admitted to bail.

3. The respondent’s case was conducted by state law officer and during this bail application, the enquiry officer PS Ramessur posted at the ADSU was called upon to expatiate on the grounds of objection, namely: the risk of absconding, risk of reoffending, the risk of interfering with witnesses and tampering with evidence.

4. I do bear in mind the facts and circumstances which led to the arrest of the applicant. In that regard, the enquiry officer [EO] stated that in connection with an offence of conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, to wit: importation of cannabis with the averment of trafficking, three persons were arrested on the 31 st January 2026, namely: Mr Jean Berty David Kardaree, Mr Mohamad Said Bin Yusuf Jeetun, and Mr Jean Rohan Noe Quinzine Perle.

5. As the enquiry progressed, it was revealed that in the month of January 2026, the co- accused met the applicant in the parking of Super U Tamarin where they remitted to the latter a sum of Rs15,000. The sum was remitted to the applicant in his capacity as police officer posted at the Black River National Coast Guard [NCG] for the purpose of the repossession of a Tremlett boat which was under police enquiry at the Black River NCG. The boat was subsequently released to be used in the commission of the offence of organising the importation of cannabis.

6. In the face of the allegations raised by co-accused Perle against the applicant, the police examined the mobile phone of co-accused Perle at the Police IT Unit and the retrieval and analysis of evidence from the said mobile phone corroborated the version of Mr Perle involving applicant.

7. The applicant was placed under arrest on the 12 th March 2026 and was positively identified by Mr Perle.

8. The police have also secured a video recording of a conversation between the applicant and other co-accused where the applicant was giving to the co-accused useful information about the Tremlett boat, hence facilitating the co-accused to organise the importation of dangerous drugs.

9. The EO mentioned that four defence statements have been recorded from the applicant so far wherein the latter denied the charge against him. The applicant has a clean record and is not on bail.

10. In relation to the risk of absconding, the EO stated that in view of the seriousness and gravity of the offence allegedly committed, police will contemplate lodging the case before the Supreme Court and that such offence carries a long custodial sentence. Furthermore, should the applicant be found guilty of the offences, he may be liable to a severe penalty. The prospect of a lengthy term of imprisonment constitutes a strong incentive for the applicant to evade the course of justice. The EO also stated that Mauritius is a small island surrounded by sea and that the applicant is a police officer who has been posted at the NCG for the past 15 years where he had acquired maritime knowledge including sea routes. Moreover, the applicant was conducting enquiries into sea-related offences so that he may have contact with skippers and other boat owners. On these grounds, police have reasonable ground to believe that the applicant may abscond and fail to surrender to court as and when required.

11. Insofar as the risk of reoffending is concerned, the EO based himself on the nature of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of this case to suggest that the applicant has engaged himself in a drug trafficking business by facilitating drug traffickers in the importation of dangerous drugs in the country by sea routes. Police also are in possession of the conversation between the applicant and co-accused which makes police believe that the applicant will likely reoffend by engaging in similar activities.

12. As regards the risk of interfering with witnesses and tampering with evidence is concerned, the EO stated that the investigation has reached a crucial stage whereby new elements have emerged which require the police to record further statements from the applicant. Furthermore, police have arrested one more suspect who has incriminated the applicant and new evidence has been disclosed to the police. These new pieces of evidence have not been confronted yet to the applicant. The EO stated that the enquiry tends to establish a drug business of a much larger scale with international ramifications. The complexity of the enquiry increases the vulnerability of the witnesses and the risk that evidence may be compromised.

13. In cross-examination, the following pieces of evidence were elicited from the EO: a. That the applicant was an enquiry officer at the NCG; b. That the police have yet to verify the applicant’s version to the effect that it was for the boat owner to remove sunken boats; c. That more statements have to be recorded to grasp the applicant’s influence in the administrative procedure in the release of a sunken boat at the NCG; d. That the offence was one of organising the importation of cannabis but that no cannabis was secured; e. That neither the video nor the audio from the recording which is in the possession of the police has been forensically analysed yet, although a transcription of the conversation has already been carried out by the police; f. That applicant has a fixed employment, fixed place of abode and strong family ties; g. That there are other witnesses whose versions have not been put to the applicant yet.

14. In re-examination, the EO clarified that the co-accused were arrested before they could carry out their plan to import cannabis and as per the version of co-accused Perle, they

intended to import cannabis in bulk which exceeds the value of Rs1,000,000, which explains the averment of trafficking.

15. At the close of the respondent’s case, the applicant made a statement from the dock and stated that he will cooperate with the police and will abide by all conditions.

16. The court has considered the evidence placed on record as well as the submissions offered by counsel appearing on both sides.

17. The Court is alive to the principles governing bail as authoritatively laid down inter alia in the cases of Maloupe v The District Magistrate of Grand Port 2000 SCJ 233, Deelchand v The DPP 2005 SCJ 215 and Hurnam v State 2005 UKPC 49 and the court is aware that in carrying out the balancing exercise between the alleged risks posed to society and the administration of justice in granting the applicant bail and the applicant’s rights to his fundamental rights to liberty and presumption of innocence, the court still has to consider the grounds of objection in conjunction with the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the evidence based on its strength and/or weakness, the seriousness of the offence and the record and/or character of the applicant.

18. The nature of the evidence is relevant in the court’s assessment of the risks put forward by the police and the court has to determine the nature of the evidence which the police have so far on account of its strength and/or weakness. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Deelchand (supra), the strength or weakness of the evidence is a relevant factor in assessing the risks put forward by the police and consideration has to be given to the type of evidence and factors affecting its quality but without going into the details of those evidence [vide Maloupe (supra)].

19. It is not the role of this court to delve into the veracity or the truthfulness of different versions nor to make findings as to the credibility of witnesses. A bail hearing should not be a dress rehearsal for the trial itself. The Supreme Court aptly pointed out in Maloupe (supra) that “It is not appropriate, in our view, for a magistrate, whilst considering an application for bail, to examine the precise evidence available to the police and to conclude as to whether it amounts to a prima facie case”.

20. Having these principles in mind, this court has considered the nature of the evidence that the police have so far. On the one hand the police have evidence of the meeting

place where the accused allegedly met with the applicant and where a sum of money was remitted to the latter for the latter to facilitate in the organising of the importation of dangerous drugs by using his capacity as police officer of the NCG to release a boat. The police are also in presence of a recording in the form of a conversation between the applicant and co-accused whereby the applicant is providing information about the Tremlett boat which he released. Moreover, a co-accused has positively identified the applicant and his mobile phone has been examined by the police and the contents of the phone reveal corroborative elements. The EO also stated that a new suspect was arrested and the latter also implicated the applicant and that his version should be confronted with the applicant. On the other hand, the applicant has denied the charges and the defence has raised questions about the veracity of the recording. The defence has also tried to downplay the magnitude of the drug-related offence. However, the EO clarified his answers in re-examination and clearly stated that the drug trafficking offence was in relation to the importation of cannabis in bulk. Based on the testimony of the EO and his answers in cross-examination, this court forms the view that the nature of evidence in the present matter is patently strong as there are several elements which link the applicant with the commission of the alleged offences.

Risk assessment 21. It is established that, in assessing the risk of absconding, factors such as the character of the person, his family and other occupational and professional ties have to be considered when deciding whether a person may or may not abscond [vide Deelchand (supra) citing Neumeister v Austria 1968 1 ECHR 91]. The relevant extract from Deelchand (supra) is as follows: “Considerations relevant to the risk of absconding will include the strength, weakness or absence of family, community, professional or occupational ties and financial commitments as such ties, if strong, might be strong incentives not to abscond and, if weak might increase the risk of absconding. The strength of the evidence may also be relevant because if it is likely that the charge will not be proved, the defendant may be less likely to abscond. The court must ask itself: what would be likely to motivate the applicant to abscond and what would be likely to make him refrain from absconding? Is the risk too great to be taken or is the level of risk acceptable, such that it can be taken having regard to the presumption of innocence? Can the risk at least be reduced to an acceptable level by the imposition of conditions?”

22. In Hurnam v State 2004 PRV 53, the Supreme Court held as follows: “It is obvious that a person charged with a serious offence, facing severe penalty if convicted, may

well have a powerful incentive to abscond or interfere with witnesses likely to give evidence against him…”

23. It is undisputed that the offences of bribery by public official and aiding and abetting in the commission of drug importation with the averment of trafficking are serious offences which may very likely attract severe penalties, including custodial sentence. The court verily believes that, as a police officer himself, the applicant must have realised the seriousness of the alleged offences and the seriousness of the nature of evidence against him.

24. On the one hand, it has been elicited in favour of the applicant that he has a fixed address and strong family ties. Furthermore, the applicant enjoys the full benefit of the presumption of innocence.

25. On the other hand, the testimony of the EO in relation to the knowhow of the applicant of maritime routes and probable contact with skippers and other boat owners has gone unrebutted. The fact that the applicant is himself a police officer can also be seen as a circumstance which aggravates the applicant’s situation as the applicant may not expect leniency from a court of law, especially in light of the strong nature of the evidence against him.

26. The court agrees with the EO that, when all surrounding circumstances are viewed in conjunction, there are strong incentives for the applicant to abscond in the present matter. The fact that he has a clean record is not a passport to bail. Reliance is placed on the authority of DPP v Poonye 2018 SCJ 182 where the Supreme Court highlighted that: “the fact that one has a clean record does not necessarily mean that that person could not have previously been involved in illegal activities. Everything will depend on the facts of that particular case.”

27. In relation to the risk of reoffending, the risk that a person may reoffend whilst on bail must be a real one and there must be adequate reasons to explain its existence [vide Clooth v Belgium 1991 ECHR 71, cited in Deelchand (supra)]. Furthermore, court notes that the risk of reoffending might be greater in drug-related cases by reason of the financial gain attached to these kinds of offences and thus drug offences may be more easily repeated. It is a peculiarity of drug cases whereby a person can be easily tempted to make as much money as possible whilst on bail [vide also Korimbaccus v The District Magistrate of Port-Louis 1988 SCJ 476].

28. Moreover, the court should also take into account the seriousness of the consequences of the danger of having drug-related offences being repeated [vide Matznetter v Austria, cited in Deelchand (supra)]. In that regard, reference is made to the case of Hossen v District Magistrate of Port-Louis 1993 MR 9 at page 12 as follows: “It seems to us, in addition, that insufficient attention is sometimes paid to the point made in the section concerning the protection of the public (section 8(d)(ii) of the Bail Act 1989) and that, in this connection, the prevailing situation in the country, or in any particular area, assumes all its importance. Everyone knows that the consumption of certain drugs, like any other vice one may think of, is never likely to disappear completely from the face of the planet and that, at times, it may not be reasonable to insist on the detention of suspects of a certain type. But when, on the contrary, we are faced with a proliferation of drug consumption, or a resurgence of this scourge which can only result in the corruption and degradation of the country’s youth in particular, then the courts have a duty and the responsibility to protect the public against every person who is involved in any activity that is likely to facilitate or encourage the drug trade.”

29. In the present matter, the police have evidence that the applicant accepted money to provide the co-accused with a boat to facilitate in the organising of importation of dangerous drugs. The applicant’s involvement cannot be downplayed. As a police officer posted at the NCG and in charge of enquiries related to boats, there is evidence that he took money in exchange of the release of a boat under his enquiry to be used for a drug-related activity. From the deposition of the EO, the evidence available to the police so far tends to suggest that the applicant was an important actor in the commission of the alleged offences. The risk that the applicant may be tempted to indulge anew whilst on bail is real and the consequences on society and administration of justice should such risk materialise far outweigh the prejudicial effect to the applicant.

30. In relation to the risk of interfering with witnesses, it is established that it has to be based on satisfactory grounds, and I find it apt to quote from Deelchand (supra): “It would be preposterous to hold the view that in each and every application for bail, it would suffice that an enquiring officer should express his fear that the applicant would interfere with one or more witnesses for the accused to be denied bail on that ground. To satisfy the court that there is a serious risk of interference with a witness, satisfactory reasons, and appropriate evidence in connection thereof where

appropriate, should be given to establish the probability of interference with that witness by the applicant. In his book “Bail in Criminal Proceedings” (1990), Neil Corre, writing from sound practical experience, points out that the risk that the applicant may “interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice” is “an important exception to the right to bail because any system of justice must depend upon witnesses being free of fear of intimidation or bribery and upon evidence being properly obtained”. He then goes on to point out: “The exception’s most common manifestations are in cases where: (a) the defendant has allegedly threatened witnesses; (b) the defendant has allegedly made admissions that he intends to do so; (c) the witnesses have a close relationship with the defendant, for example in cases of domestic violence or incest[…]”

31. It is obvious that, during the deposition of the EO, he mentioned vaguely potential witnesses whose versions have not been confronted to the applicant yet, without giving any detail as to the connection and/or relationship shared between the applicant and those so-called potential witnesses. In the light of such shortcomings, it is not enough for the court to be satisfied of the plausibility of the risk of interfering with witnesses. The same thing can be said regarding the risk of tampering with evidence. The EO has not expatiated on the evidence yet to be gathered and how the applicant may tamper with those evidence. Although deciding bail is about assessing risks, the risks put forward must be based on facts. In the absence of concrete facts, the court cannot and should not surmise in favour of denying bail. The risk of tampering with evidence is thus found to be unsubstantiated.

Imposition of conditions 32. Having considered the risks of reoffending and absconding substantiated, this does not entail that bail should automatically be refused to the applicant. There is an inherent duty upon this court to assess whether conditions can be imposed to adequately curb the risks, and if so, how the imposition of conditions would render them negligible [vide DPP v Aubert 2020 SCJ 214].

33. The most common conditions that courts of law usually impose in granting bail are the furnishing of one or more sureties, the entering into a recognizance in applicant’s

name, reporting conditions, curfew orders and the duty to inform the police of daily movements.

34. Although a person can be explained that his surety may be forfeited or his recognizance estreated, on the other hand once a person has been bailed out and walks out of the court room, that person is free to do whatever he wants and in between reporting conditions and curfew orders, there is no effective control over the activities of that person, where he goes or with whom he associates himself. [vide Islam v Senior District Magistrate, Grand Port District Court 2006 SCJ 282].

35. Court has also considered the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the inefficiency of the means of monitoring by way of electronic bracelets or GPS or mobile phone tracking systems, as highlighted in Aubert v State 2022 SCJ 405 and Celerine v Her Honour, Senior District Magistrate, District Court of Black River 2023 SCJ 495 and I form the view that these monitoring systems may not be effective at all times.

36. Conditions, if any, should be capable of curbing the risk and it is a futile exercise to consider fancy conditions if those conditions are not capable of being enforced.

37. Based on the seriousness of the offences at hand, the nature of the present charges, the nature of the evidence against the applicant, and based on all surrounding facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the inability of the police in monitoring the applicant constantly and the inefficiency of modern tracking systems, this court is of the view that no bail conditions can render the risks negligible.

38. The risk posed to society at large and the administration of justice if the risks of reoffending and absconding materialise whilst the applicant is on bail would have more dire consequences and tilts the balance towards denying bail.

39. The motion for bail is thus set aside.

M I F NATHIRE Ag Senior District Magistrate This 15th April 2026