Supreme Court of Mauritius, 6 mai 2026, 2026 IND 16 – Chamilall S.G. v WS Insight Limited

1 Chamilall S.G. v WS Insight Limited

2026 IND 16

Cause Number 243/23

IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF MAURITIUS (Civil Side)

In the matter of: –

Sharma Ghanshyam Chamilall

Plaintiff

v.

WS Insight Limited

Defendant

Ruling

The averments of this plaint are essentially that as per a contract of employment with Defendant dated 23.1.2019, Plaintiff was confirmed in the post of Head of Group Finance with effect from 22.10.2018 drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 634,350, paid in USD. His employment was terminated in circumstances entitling him to severance allowance for the following reasons: 1. Following an unfortunate turn of events in 2019, Defendant’s biggest contract in South Sudan was split between a few competitors resulting in a significant decrease in the group operating profit. 2. From July 2022, following the loss of other important contracts in DRC Congo and Kenya, Defendant started experiencing serious financial difficulties and

2 its CEO started to force people out in order to reduce overheads and operating losses to ensure the financing of its operations in Mauritius. 3. In November 2022, Defendant’s CEO informed Plaintiff that the employment of the Bid Manager and Compliance Manager, both holding group position similar to the Plaintiff would be terminated and which thereafter materialized. 4. Tension grew between him and the CEO when he started challenging his strategy and started expressing his disapproval with his unethical methods to avoid paying the dues of those targeted by him. Another source of tension was the CEO’s expectation that he should blindly authorize payments initiated under the CEO’s instructions even if they were not made in the normal course of business. 5. The financial situation was so dire that he did not receive his salary for 5 consecutive months from July to November 2022. He was paid 2 months’ arrears in December 2022 and by January 2023, 3 months’ salary was still outstanding. On 20.1.23, he requested his outstanding salary be paid forthwith and which he received on the same day meaning all money due to him. 6. But Defendant retaliated by issuing a formal notice of his suspension with immediate effect pending investigation. 7. He fulfilled all his obligations during his suspension period and even worked on weekends whereby he had to relate only to the CEO and the Group Head of HR. 8. In February 2023, he received several calls from former employees informing him that Defendant was trying to manipulate employees into giving statements against him for bullying. 9. On 27.2.2023, he had a first meeting with the CEO (at the CEO’s request) at Bagatelle whereby he would be asked shortly to hand over his banking credentials as the disciplinary process was moving to a “contentious” stage. Although the investigation had started in January 2023 by the Group Human Resource, there has never been any formal request from the Investigator to meet with her for the purposes of her internal investigation.

3 10. On 15.3.2023 he had a second meeting with the CEO (at the CEO’s request) at Bagatelle where he was advised to resign instead of having to answer charges of sexual misconduct at the workplace, as there was no longer any working relationship between them. 11. He was pressurized by the CEO into negotiating the terms of his resignation claiming that Defendant had to comply with statutory delays. Having claimed to have done nothing wrong to the CEO, he said to him that any amicable settlement to be reached could only be done on the basis of unjustified dismissal and which had to be discussed between Counsel of both parties. 12. Subsequently, he received a letter of charges dated 18.3.23 convening him to attend 2 hearings on 3 rd and 7 th April 2023 respectively. 13. Defendant having taken no further step towards an agreement as to the compensation payable to him upon termination of his employment, he made a formal request under Section 64(5) of the Workers’ Rights Act (which reads: where the employer decides to hold a disciplinary hearing, he shall, at the request of the worker, provide him with such information or documents as may be relevant to the charge). 14. He was provided with documents relevant to the charges whereby he came to realise that the CEO had prior to 22.2.2023, reviewed the complaint, the witness statements and the draft investigation report, and then the charges of misconduct were levelled on the basis of an interim report setting out the findings of an investigation completed on 10.3.2023. 15. He made a further request under Section 64(5) of the Workers’ Rights Act, which would have assisted him on fundamental questions of law to be raised by him and to the true nature of the hearing proposed to be held by the employer. 16. Defendant made it clear that it had no intention of complying with further requests under Section 64(5) of the Workers’ Rights Act and declined a postponement on the basis that there was also another day scheduled for the hearing which was on the 7 th . 17. By way of a letter dated 7.4.2023, he was informed that the hearing was heard in his absence and although the charges 1,2.1, 2.2,2.3,2.4,3,4,5,6,7,8,9

4 and 10 were proved, after having taken into consideration of his position and tenure of employment, Defendant had decided to give him a final and severe warning. He was instructed to resume work on Monday 10.4.2023. 18. The CEO had announced to his colleagues that a series of changes would be applicable upon Plaintiff’s return including restrictions on interaction with the Plaintiff. 19. Defendant allocated his office and parking space to another colleague, the very person whose complaint had allegedly triggered his suspension and the internal investigation that ensued. 20. Thus, Defendant was bent on tarnishing Plaintiff’s reputation and to provoke him into resigning as Defendant’s laches had been exposed in that the Defendant’s CEO having failed to scare the Plaintiff into resigning and knowing that he could not terminate Plaintiff’s employment for reasons related to his alleged misconduct. 21. Thus, Defendant’s mala fide is blatant, because an employer that was genuinely convinced that Plaintiff was guilty of the charges referred to in the notice of termination dated 7 th April 2023, could not have taken in good faith any other course than to dispense with his services. 22. Plaintiff is entitled to consider that Defendant has put an end to his employment by reason of the cumulative effects of the following acts and/or omissions: (a) Failing to pay the Plaintiff his salaries and as when due; (b) Issuing a purported notice of suspension in retaliation for the Plaintiff insisting on his dues; (c) Failing to investigate promptly alleged complaints made against Plaintiff; (d) Attempting to pressurize the Plaintiff into resigning; (e) Levelling charges with culpable levity and in total disregard to its statutory obligations;

5 (f) Sanctioning Plaintiff for reasons relating to his alleged misconduct without affording him with an effective opportunity to give his explanations as to the charges levelled; and (g) Embarking on a course of conduct meant to isolate Plaintiff from his colleagues and to belittle him at his place of work to cause him stress and provoke him into resigning; The termination of his employment, is for all the above reasons, unlawful and unjustified and he is entitled under the law to severance allowance. The sum of Rs. 6,089,760 or USD 131,706.30 represents severance allowance due to him by Defendant and for which he has prayed the court ordering Defendant to pay such amount to him. The matter was fixed for arguments on particulars being insisted upon for proper answers. Learned Counsel for the Defendant relied on the case of Gujadhur and Ors v Gujadhur & Sons Ltd [1962 MR 49] as regards the objects of particulars namely to prevent surprise at trial by informing the opposite party what the case is which he has to meet, to explain and limit pleadings which are vague and require limitations and generally to define and narrow down the issue to be tried and to save unnecessary expenses. Upon demand of particulars and demand of further and better particulars the following reply was given: 3. Upon Defendant having insisted on the communication for full and detailed particulars of the Defendant’s biggest contract as well as the competitors referred therein, Plaintiff answered that the facts, matters and things set out were given merely as a matter of context. The particulars sought cannot assist Defendant in meeting the case that Plaintiff is entitled to consider that it had put an end to his employment. As per paragraph 4 of the plaint, Plaintiff has averred that following an unfortunate turn of events in 2019 the Defendant’s biggest contract in South Sudan was split between a few competitors, which resulted in a significant decrease in the group’s operating profit. These are material averments as they are the reason why there has been a decrease in the group’s operating profit. He

6 has respectfully submitted that the Defendant is entitled to know particulars of that biggest contract and secondly of the few competitors amongst which that biggest contract has been split. It is not during trial that the Defendant will come to know what was that contract and who the competitors were. 5. When the Defendant has insisted on the communication for full and detailed particulars as to how, when and in what manner the CEO allegedly forced people out and for communication of the names of the said persons, Plaintiff answered that it was a matter of evidence. At paragraph 5 of the plaint, Plaintiff has averred that from July 2022 following the loss of other important contracts in DRC Congo and Kenya, the Defendant started experiencing serious financial difficulties and its CEO started to force people out to reduce overheads and operating losses. The Defendant is entitled to know in what manner allegedly the CEO forced people out and who those people were. Vaguely referring to people without having the names does not give details who those people were. He relied on the case of Ringadoo R.D.N. v. Jugnauth A.K. [2006 MRC 8] wherein the Master held that “In my view since the petitioner has himself averred that 300 persons attended the meeting, it is their duty to give particulars of those persons and petitioner cannot just declare that should they be known then they will be communicated. Petitioner should therefore give a better answer to that question.” So, within the context of an election over there in a meeting they said there were 300 persons, they were ordered to give the names of the 300 persons. 7. When the Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars of the alleged unethical methods mentioned therein, the answer was that it is a matter of evidence and same shall be adduced at the time of trial. At paragraph 7 of the plaint, Plaintiff has averred that tension grew between him and the CEO when he started challenging the CEO’s strategy and started expressing his disapproval with the latter’s unethical methods to avoid paying dues as targeted by him. Plaintiff is alleging that the CEO of Defendant company has resorted to unethical methods. Defendant must be told what those unethical methods are. Defendant is told that it is a matter of evidence. He has respectfully submitted that it is not a matter of evidence as unethical methods is too vague and Defendant does not know what that entails. Defendant cannot be

7 taken by surprise at trial as to what those unethical methods are and Defendant must be told ab initio during pleading stage as to what is meant by the Plaintiff as regards the unethical methods. 8. When Defendant has insisted on communication of full and detailed particulars as to when, how and in what manner did the CEO expect the Plaintiff to allegedly blindly authorize payments, the Plaintiff answered that it is a matter of evidence and same shall be adduced at the time of trial. At paragraph 7 of the plaint (…) another source of tension was the CEO’s expectation that the Plaintiff should blindly authorize via internet banking payments. Defendant must have particulars as to that effect. 10. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars of “all obligations of the Plaintiff” mentioned therein. Plaintiff answered that it is a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial. Paragraph 13 reads that Plaintiff has averred that he fulfilled all his obligations and was even requested to work during weekends. The Plaintiff says he has fulfilled all his obligations. Defendant needs to know what those obligations were. Again, someone is saying that I have fulfilled all my obligations is too vague. It requires delimitation. Defendant needs to know what is meant by that. Defendant cannot know what those obligations are during trial when he comes to depose, that I have fulfilled my obligations, namely I have done A, B, C, D, E, he could say so. 13. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars of the names and addresses of the employees whom Defendant was allegedly manipulating, Plaintiff answered that it is a matter of evidence and same shall be adduced at the time of trial. At paragraph 14 of the plaint, Plaintiff has averred that in February 2023, he received several calls from former employees informing him that Defendant was trying to manipulate employees into giving statements against him for bullying. So, that has to do directly with the Plaintiff. Defendant must be told but who those former employees are. Again, he has relied on the case of Ringadoo R.D.N. v. Jugnauth A.K. [2006 MRC 8] for that purpose.

8 16. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how, when and in what manner the Plaintiff became aware that an investigation had started in January 2023 and the Plaintiff answered that it is irrelevant to the present matter. Paragraph 16 of Plaint, Plaintiff has averred that notwithstanding the fact that the investigation had started in January 2023 by the Group Human Resource, there has never been any formal request from the investigator to meet with her for the purpose of her internal investigation. So, what Defendant is asking under question 16 is full and detailed particulars as to how and in what manner the Plaintiff became aware of that investigation. Plaintiff says there was an investigation, Defendant needs to be provided with details as to what that investigation was, how did he come to know about that and when did he come to know about that. 17. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how, when and in what manner did the Defendant make it clear that it had no intention of complying with further request and for communication of the document witnessing same, Plaintiff answered that it is a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial. Under paragraph 25 of the plaint, Plaintiff has averred that the Defendant not only neglected to provide the information requested by Senior Counsel, but made it clear that it had no intention of complying with further request under section 64(v) of the Act. So, what Defendant is asking under question 17 is how and in what manner did the Defendant make it clear that it had no intention of complying with the verbal request and for communication of the document witnessing same, if there is any. Defendant is told that it is a matter of evidence. But Defendant must be told with particulars as to how the Defendant made it clear that it would not be complying with further request. 18. When Defendant has moved for communication of the names of the “other colleagues” who allegedly verbally confirmed the email dated 9 April 2023, the answer was that this is a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial.

9 Question 18 under paragraph 28 of the plaint, Defendant moves for communication of the names of other colleagues who allegedly verbally confirmed the email dated 9 April 2023, that is, under para. 28. Plaintiff has averred that he also came to know that the CEO had announced to his colleagues that all of the charges of misconduct levelled against him had been established, the CEO had decided to give Plaintiff a severe warning and further announced the series of changes applicable upon the Plaintiff’s return. So, the names of the colleagues under reference here is important and he has relied on the case of Ringadoo R.D.N. v. Jugnauth A.K. [2006 MRC 8] for that purpose again. 19. When the Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and when was the alleged complaint made and for communication of any document witnessing same and the answer was it is a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial. Under paragraph 29 of the plaint, Plaintiff further avers that Defendant allocated his office and parking space to another colleague, the very person whose complaint had allegedly triggered his suspension, an internal investigation that ensued. So, Defendant needs to know what that complaint is all about that triggered the suspension of the Plaintiff and the internal investigation, saying vaguely that there was a complaint made by the very person who is another colleague is not enough, Defendant must be able to know what that complaint was all about, because Plaintiff is expected to give details of that during trial. 20. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to the basis on which Plaintiff considered that Defendant had put an end to his employment, Plaintiff answered that it is a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial. Under paragraph 31 of the plaint, Plaintiff avers that that he wrote to the CEO of Defendant on 10 April 2023 to communicate his stand to the effect that he considered that Defendant had put an end to his employment. Defendant is asking in the context of the claim of severance allowance, what is the basis that Plaintiff considered that Defendant had put an end to his employment.

10 21. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and in what manner did the Defendant fail to investigate promptly the alleged complaints made against the Plaintiff. The answer given was that it was a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial. The Defendant insists on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and in what manner did the Defendant fail to investigate promptly the alleged complaints made against the Plaintiff. Under paragraph 33 (c) of the plaint, failing to investigate promptly alleged complaints made against the Plaintiff. Defendant must be given details as to how and in what manner did the Plaintiff fail to investigate promptly the alleged complaints. Defendant must be told how, what were the complaints about and how did Defendant not investigate those complaints promptly, promptly may mean a lot of things. 22. When Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and in what manner was the Plaintiff allegedly belittled at his place of work and for communication of any document in support thereof, Plaintiff answered that it is a matter of evidence which shall be adduced at the time of trial. Under paragraph 33(g) of the plaint, Plaintiff avers that embarking on a course of conduct meant to isolate the Plaintiff from his colleagues and to belittle him at his place of work to cause him stress and to provoke him into resigning. So, Defendant is asking for particulars as to how and in what manner was Plaintiff allegedly belittled at work. Learned Counsel for Defendant has finally submitted that it is not the classical case where there is a disciplinary hearing, somebody is terminated after charges are proved and severance allowance is asked. This case comes with a slightly different twist of facts. It is that the Plaintiff considers for several things he says in his plaint that he considered that the Defendant terminated his employment and is asking for severance allowance in this case. So, the particulars asked for, is a bit of a case of constructive dismissal where those particulars are of paramount importance to enable Defendant to prepare its plea and to prepare for the trial. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted as follows:

11 He stressed that the present case is not like a case of constructive dismissal but is a case of constructive dismissal. He has invited the Court to look at the plaint as a whole. The case is one of constructive dismissal and there have been specific averments as to why the Plaintiff is entitled to construe himself as constructively dismissed. At paragraph 33 of the plaint, there are subparagraphs and which is the case the Defendant has to meet. Did the Defendant fail to pay the Plaintiff his salaries as due? Did Defendant issue a purported notice of suspension in retaliation for the Plaintiff insisting on his dues? Did the Defendant fail to investigate promptly the alleged complaint? The question is asked how. The averment is that you did not do something. The question is how I did not do something. Now how does someone say how you don’t do something? It is either you did something and then you ask what did I do? But if my averment is that you did not do it, you can ask me how did I not do it? That is what we are looking at. That is the type of question we are having to answer. Then it is, was there an attempt to pressurize the Plaintiff to resign? Was there levelling of charges with culpable levity and total disregard to statutory obligations? Was the Plaintiff sanctioned for alleged misconduct without affording him a hearing? Did they embark on a course of conduct meant to isolate the Plaintiff? This is the case. These are the material facts which the Plaintiff will have to prove in order to be entitled to the prayer. Now, because this is a case of constructive dismissal, it is important to set the background and that is what the first 13 paragraphs are about. The Plaintiff is explaining what is the context. He was in effect someone who was not agreeable with a pattern of conduct which was, when the allegation is, when finance went in the red, the pattern was to get rid of people who had a big pay cheque. That is the averment and that is the background. Now, is this a material averment in a case of constructive dismissal? Of course not. But it is a matter of background. He relied on two recent rulings of the Master’s Court namely Mauritius Union Assurance Cy Ltd v Lamco International Insurance Ltd & Ors. [2025 MRC 2] and The Bramer Banking Corporation Ltd v Nandimex Co. Ltd [2013 MRC 29]. There is no dispute that the aim of particulars is that no one is taken by surprise. But there is also now established that particulars should not be used as a tactic to gain time. In that context, this background is precisely that this is a Defendant who gets rid of people to reduce costs and they do it by forcing them to leave, by putting charges and then trying to negotiate with them. This is the background that this

12 Plaintiff is saying. Will the Plaintiff be able to prove his case, that is something else. Will the Court believe him that is something else. But can Defendant say it does not know what the case is. If it is a fishing expedition, the Plaintiff will not give particulars and if it is a matter of evidence, Plaintiff will not give evidence. His friend wants Plaintiff to tell the Defendant right now everything Plaintiff is going to state when he comes in the box. Is that what particulars are meant for in which case why do we have a trial? Defendant wants to know the names of people. The persons are the Bid Manager and the Compliance Manager. Does the Plaintiff need to tell the Defendant the names of their Bid Manager and Compliance Manager. How is it important for this Court to know what contracts were lost and who are the competitors. What is important is whether there is a context and will the Plaintiff be believed at the end of the day. Can Defendant say I cannot defend a case unless I know what contract I lost or I cannot defend the case unless you tell me the name of the Bid Manager, unless you tell me the name of the Compliance Manager. I cannot be taken by surprise. This case is about did Defendant fail to pay him his dues? This case is about when he insisted that he be paid his dues, Defendant suspended him a few days later. The crux of the case starts at paragraph 20 where Plaintiff had a letter of charges, his Counsel made a request in compliance with the law for documents, Defendant refused to give those documents. His Counsel wanted to talk to Defendant’s Counsel or to the Chairman, Defendant refused to communicate the name and refused to postpone the case. Following that Defendant say that it had a disciplinary hearing in his absence, it found the charges proved and then what does it do”. Does it dismiss the Plaintiff? No. Defendant says that it has found it proved that he harassed other employees. But what does Defendant do when it was found proved. Plaintiff comes back to work. We found you guilty, but come back and work. This is the story of this case, trying to get rid of someone, realizing that you can’t and then call him back to work and then tell all his colleagues you know he’s been guilty of gross misconduct, but he is coming back to work. We are going to put him in his office and no one can talk to him or discuss with him. It is for the Court to decide whether it is this is a tactic or whether it is a genuine attempt to have particulars to which defendant is entitled. In his submission, when we read as a whole and given the answers already provided, this Defendant cannot be said that he does not know what the case is. Plaintiff has averred that he wrote to the CEO of the Defendant on 10 April 2023 to communicate his stand to the effect that he considered that the Defendant had put an

13 end to his employment. There is a letter and Defendant tells you how is it that you are constructively dismissed. There is a letter. This case is all about this. Will the Court decide this is constructive dismissal and the Defendant’s question is- tell me how Defendant has constructively dismissed. By Plaintiff insisting that he does not have to answer is to ask for judgment and Plaintiff does not want to drag things on. It is to the disadvantage of the Plaintiff because that is a tactic which he is asking the Court not to condone. Learned Counsel for the Defendant has submitted in reply that paras, 1 to 13 is the context and the crux of the case starts as from paragraph 20. A plaint should contain material facts. His submissions are that all averments in the plaint are material averments under which Defendant is entitled to particulars. The purpose is to pin the Plaintiff to the story and that is the purpose of asking for particulars. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff had nothing else to clarify in reply. I have given due consideration to the arguments of both learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff and learned Counsel for the Defendant. First of all, it has cropped up for the first time in the course of the arguments that the plaint is not only like a case of Constructive dismissal contended by learned Counsel for the Defendant but is a case of constructive dismissal as confirmed by learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff. However, the plaint has not averred that the claim of severance allowance is being pressed under Constructive dismissal so that it would be respectfully highly desirable that the plaint be amended accordingly. Now, as regards the occurrence of Constructive Dismissal, the Privy Council in Saint Aubin v Francois Doger de Speville [2011] UKPC 42 has succinctly held that: “constructive dismissal occurs if an employer imposes on an employee unilaterally, that is without the employee’s consent, a substantial modification of the original conditions: Adamas Limited v Cheung [2011 UKPC 32]. The employee is entitled, though not bound, to treat such a change so imposed as a constructive dismissal.” (emphasis added). Equally relevant is the case of Joseph v Rey & Lenferna Ltd [2008 SCJ 342] where the Supreme Court stressed the following:

14 “(…) constructive dismissal by an employer occurs where an employee is entitled to put an end to his contract of employment by reason of his employer’s conduct. Although the employee terminates his employment, it is the employer’s conduct which constitutes the breach of contract. It is therefore imperative that the employee clearly indicates, by word or conduct, that he is treating the contract as having been terminated by his employer and if he fails to do so, he will not be entitled to claim he has been constructively dismissed.” Now it is useful to note that in Katavi (Mauritius) Limited v The Ministry of Arts and Culture [2025 SCJ 474], the Supreme Court relied on the case of Bedacee A.D. v Hookoomsing Y. [2002 SCJ 271] to enunciate the following: “The words “cause of action” comprise every fact (though not every piece of evidence) which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, to support his right to the judgment of the Court (see Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 per Lord Esher M.R. p. 131). … The words have been defined as meaning “simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles a person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person…”” (emphasis added) Moreover, in Partners in Performance Global Solutions v Endeavour Mining Corporation [2020 SCJ 93], the Supreme Court stressed that given the similarity between rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000 (dealing with contents of pleadings) and Order 18, rule 7(1) in England, it was useful to consider an extract from Odgers’ Principles of Pleading and Practice in Civil Actions in the High Court of Justice (22 nd Edition) at page 88 endorsed in Lus Ad Vitam Association v The State of Mauritius [2014 SCJ 142] and later approved in Mrs Ww. Abdool Rahim Modaykhan & Ors v SBM Bank (Mauritius) Ltd [2017 SCJ 350] as follows: “The function of pleadings then is to ascertain with precision the matters on which the parties which differ and the points on which they agree; and thus to arrive at certain clear issues on which both parties desire a judicial decision. (…) By this method they must speedily arrive at an issue. Neither party need disclose in his pleading the evidence by which he proposes to establish his case at the trial. But each must give his opponent a sufficient outline of his case.” (emphasis added) Indeed, in Odgers’ on Pleading and Practice 20 th Edition, Particulars, at pages 156 and 160 on the purpose of particulars (cited in Gujadhur and Ors v

15 Gujadhur & Sons Ltd [1962 MR 49]) and at page 162 as to when particulars will be ordered, the learned Author had the following to say: “The object of particulars is to enable the party asking for them to know what case he has to meet at the trial, and so to save unnecessary expense and avoid allowing parties to be taken by surprise. (…) Particulars thus “prevent surprise at the trial” and limit inquiry at the trial to matters set out in particulars. They tend to narrow down issues, and ought to be encouraged. (…). Particulars will be ordered whenever the master is satisfied that without them the applicant cannot tell what is going to be proved against him at the trial. But how his opponent will prove it is a matter of evidence of which particulars will not be ordered. (emphasis added) (…) It is no objection to an application for particulars that the applicant must know the true facts of the case better than his opponent. He is entitled to know the outline of the case that his adversary will try to make against him, which may be something very different from the true facts of the case. His opponent may know more than he does; in any event it is well to pin him down to a definite story (…).” (emphasis added) Indeed in E.S. Jhuboo v A. Ganoo & Ors [2021 SCJ 49], the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement: “It is sometimes argued as an objection to an application for particulars that the applicant must know the true facts of the case better than his opponent. However, this objection is misconceived: each party is entitled to know the outline of the case that his opponent is going to make against him and to bind him to a definite story.” (emphasis added) Furthermore, as illustrated in The Bramer Banking Corporation Ltd v Nandimex Co. Ltd [2013 MRC 29] where it was highlighted that the object of particulars is to define the issues and they will be ordered “whenever the Master is satisfied that without them the applicant cannot tell what is going to be proved against him at the trial. But how his opponent will prove it, is a matter of evidence of which particulars will not be ordered.” It was also highlighted in The Bramer Banking Corporation (supra) that it is “also settled that particulars would not be ordered where “it would be oppressive or

16 unreasonable to make such an order; as where the information is not in the possession of either party, or could only be obtained with great difficulty, or where the particulars are not applied for till the last moment”.” Equally relevant is an extract from the case of Mauritius Union Assurance Cy Ltd v Lamco International Insurance Ltd & Ors. [2025 MRC 2] where the Privy Council case of Mirbel Marie Jean Nelson and Others v The State of Mauritius & Others [2009 PRV 46] was relied upon and where Lord Phillips stressed that: “Pleadings are designed to identify the issues to be resolved by the Court, they should not be treated as a tactical game… Particulars should only be sought where they are really needed to elucidate the other party’s case, not as a matter of course.”” (emphasis added) Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to delimit the material facts as an outline of the case only as to what Plaintiff is going to make against Defendant and to bind it to a definite story without giving the evidence as to how they are to be proved in order to support the existence of the constitutive elements of Constructive Dismissal given that the burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that by Defendant’s conduct, he was constructively dismissed. Indeed, learned Senior Counsel was in agreement with the pronouncements of Gujadhur and Ors v Gujadhur & Sons Ltd [1962 MR 49] where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general principle laid down in H.M.C. Rassool & Ors v C.P. François [1914 MR 26] which was further reaffirmed in First Global Funds Limited PCC & Anor v Nomura International PLC & Ors [2023 SCJ 283] as follows: “The object of particulars is to prevent surprise at the trial by informing the opposite party what the case which he has to meet, to explain and limit the pleadings which are vague or require limitation, and generally to define and narrow the issue to be tried to save unnecessary expenses.” It is imperative to note that in Gujadhur(supra), a distinction was made between interrogatories and particulars as follows: “(…) There is however a clear line of demarcation to be drawn between particulars and interrogatories. Particulars are confined to averments in the pleadings and must be such as to give the defendant information which a reasonable man would require respecting the matters against which he is called upon to defend

17 himself (Rennie v. Beresford 153 E.R. 767,771). “To insist upon less would be to relax old, and intelligible principles. To insist on more would be the vainest pedantry” (per Bowen C.J., Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q.B., 524, 553). (emphasis added) Interrogatories stretch further and are governed by other principles. The object of interrogating is twofold: first, to obtain admissions to facilitate the proof of a case, secondly to ascertain so far as may be done, the case of the opponent. Interrogatories are not, like pleadings, confined to the material facts on which the parties intend to rely; they should be, and generally are, directed to the evidence on which the party interrogating relies to establish such facts at the trial (see Odgers on Pleadings and Practice 16 th edn. pp. 274-287) and Halsbury-Laws of England, Vo. 12 p.64 paragraph 87). Not only are interrogatories unknown to our procedure, but as pointed out by the learned judge in Chambers “there is a limit to what may be asked from an opponent under the guise of particulars. The case of Lister Company Ltd against Thompson, 7 T.L.R. 107, amongst many others, affords a clue as to where the line should be drawn. In that case the Court refused to order further particulars, describing the particulars required as a series of interrogatories and as being oppressive and an attempt to evade the practice of the Court.” (emphasis added) It is apposite to note that in Ringadoo R.D.N. v. Jugnauth A.K. [2006 MRC 8] the following extract is useful which reads as follows: “In Odgers on Civil Court Actions 24 th edition, at paragraph 10.27, page 215, it is said that “if the plaintiff alleges that certain customers have ceased to deal with him, he will be ordered to state their names. This is a very useful order, for if the plaintiff cannot give the names, he will be compelled to strike out the allegation……..”. Learned Counsel for the respondent has quoted the case of Bruce v/s Odhams Press Limited 1936 1 Kings Bench page 697 where it was held that “without a statement of those facts and matters it was impossible for the defendants to be in a position to decide how to plead to the statement of claim. Further in Marriott v/s Chamberlain 1886 Vol. XVII QB Div. 154, it was held that “the defendant was entitled to discovery of the names and addresses of such persons as being a substantial part of facts material to the case upon issue on the plea of justification”.”

18 Now given that the arrears of salary were allegedly partly paid months after they were due to the Plaintiff, was a reason raised by him to impute as averred in the plaint that the conduct of the Defendant was to terminate his employment as head of group finance and that the Defendant has already terminated the contracts of employment of 2 other employees holding group positions like him namely the Compliance Manager and the Bid Manager. Thus, I allow the names of the biggest contract in Sudan and the competitors amongst which the contract was split, to be outlined only, as the split allegedly resulted in a significant decrease in the group operating profit. That would be as regards Question 3. As regards Question 5, the names of the said persons the CEO allegedly forced out and when they were forced out are allowed. However, I agree as per the answers previously given that providing particulars of the manner of doing so would be directed to the evidence inasmuch as it is an attempt to fish for evidence and is not allowed. As regards Question 7 which concerns the alleged unethical methods, such particulars would be directed to the evidence inasmuch as it is an attempt to fish for evidence and is in line with the answers previously given and they are not allowed. As regards question 8, how and in what manner the CEO allegedly expected Plaintiff to blindly authorize payments would be directed to the evidence and is not allowed the more so as it has been previously answered that there are no available documents to that effect. But as to when such practices were done can be communicated and are thus are allowed. As regards question 10, I allow communication of all the obligations fulfilled by Plaintiff in an outline form during his suspension period without giving any evidence as to how they were fulfilled. As regards question 13, the full and detailed particulars of the names and addresses of the former employees from whom several calls allegedly emanated, informing Plaintiff that Defendant was trying to manipulate employees into giving statements against him for bullying is allowed. As regards question 15, the full and detailed particulars of the names and addresses of the employees with whom Defendant was allegedly manipulating are not allowed as they pertain to the proof of such manipulation and thus pertain to the evidence.

19 As regards question 16, communication for full and detailed particulars as to how, when and in what manner Plaintiff became aware that an investigation had started in January 2023 is allowed to the extent concerning the date Plaintiff became aware that an investigation had started in January 2023, and as to how and in what manner he became aware of same are also allowed to the extent that whether it was in writing(through a letter or email) or verbally. As regards question 17, insisting on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how, when and in what manner did Defendant make it clear that it had no intention of complying with the further request made under Section 64(5) of the Act and for communication of a document witnessing same are allowed to the extent of the date and the manner it was made clear to him of such an intention whether it was in writing(through a letter or email) or verbally. As regards question 18, the Defendant has moved for the names of the “other colleagues” who allegedly verbally confirmed the email dated 9 April 2023 obtained by his colleague Shakti Bhurosy as regards the severe warning being inflicted to Plaintiff although the charges of misconduct levelled against him had been established, the series of changes applicable on Plaintiff’s return including restrictions on interaction with the Plaintiff, communicated by the CEO of Defendant, I allow the names of the other colleagues to be given in order for the Defendant to be in a position to decide how to plead to that averment (see- Ringadoo R.D.N. v. Jugnauth A.K. [2006 MRC 8]). As far as question 19 is concerned, the Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and when was the alleged complaint made and for communication of any document witnessing same. Such communication is allowed as to when and how the alleged complaint was made as an outline only namely the date and whether it was done verbally or in writing by the very colleague whose alleged complaint allegedly triggered the suspension of Plaintiff and the internal investigation that ensued. As regards question 20 namely that Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to the basis on which Plaintiff considered that the Defendant had put an end to his employment. I agree that it is a matter of evidence as to how it is going to be proved and which is not allowed.

20 As regards question 21 in relation to the communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and in what manner did the Defendant fail to investigate promptly the alleged complaints made against the Plaintiff, I allow an outline to be given as to what is going to be proved against Defendant without stating how it is going to be proved, as it is a ground pressed by Plaintiff to invoke that from such conduct, it could be inferred that his contract of employment was terminated by his employer under constructive dismissal. Finally, as regards question 22, the Defendant has insisted on communication for full and detailed particulars as to how and in what manner was the Plaintiff allegedly belittled at his place of work and for communication of any document in support thereof. An outline is allowed to be given in order for the Defendant to know exactly what is going to be proved against it at the trial without stating how it is going to be proved by Plaintiff (see- Mauritius Union Assurance Cy Ltd v Lamco International Insurance Ltd & Ors. [2025 MRC 2]).

The matter is being fixed proforma on a formal matter day for the plaint to be amended as alluded above and for the Plaintiff to provide the answers in the manner allowed by the Court.

S.D. Bonomally (Mrs.) (Vice President) 6.5.26

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