Car Sales Solutions Limited v V Riekstins

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EAT 72 Case No:EA-2019-000537-RS EA-2024-001232-RS EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL Rolls Building Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1NL Date: 18 May 2026 Before : HIS HONOUR JUDGE JAMES TAYLER – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : Car Sales Solutions Limited (formerly known as Hunter Devine Capital Limited) Appellant – and – Mr V Riekstins Respondent Charlotte Trayers (instructed through Direct Access) for the Appellant Sam Way (instructed through Advocate) for the Respondent Hearing date: 28 April 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – JUDGMENT SUMMARY Practice and Procedure The Employment Tribunal erred in dismissing an application for reconsideration. The reconsideration application is remitted to the Employment Tribunal. HIS HONOUR JUDGE JAMES TAYLER The Issue

1. The issue in this appeal is how the Employment Tribunal should have dealt with administrative and other errors that occurred in the proceedings. The parties

2. Mr Riekstins was the claimant in the Employment Tribunal. I shall refer to him as the claimant. The first respondent was Car Sales Solutions Limited (“CSS”). CSS was formerly named Hunter Devine Capital Limited and now is named Finance a Vehicle Limited. I shall refer to it as CSS, because that is the name used in the judgments, irrespective of the name of the company at the relevant time. The second respondent, Car Sales Hampshire Limited, has been liquidated, and was removed as a respondent to the appeal. I shall refer to it as CSH The Judgments Appealed

3. Two judgments are challenged in the appeal. The first is a judgment in which the claimant was found to be an employee of CSS. The claimant was awarded £5,280.00 (gross) in respect of unpaid wages and £1,956.00 pursuant to section 38(3) of the Employment Act 2002 because CSS had not provided him with a written statement of the particulars of his employment (“the substantive judgment”).

4. The substantive judgment was made after a hearing in Southampton on 4 March 2019 before Employment Judge David Harris. Neither CSS or CSH appeared or were represented. The judgment with reasons was sent out by the Employment Tribunal on 29 March 2019.

5. The second appeal is against a judgment of Employment Judge David Harris dated 9 July 2024, refusing reconsideration, sent out on 20 August 2024 (“the reconsideration judgment”). The procedural history

6. By a claim form received by the Employment Tribunal on 5 March 2018, the claimant brought complaints of unauthorised deduction from wages and failure to provide a written statement of employment particulars.

7. The respondents were named as Paul Taylor (with the address of CSS) and CSH. Mr Taylor is a director of CSS. The claimant had obtained separate ACAS early conciliation certificates naming Mr Taylor, with an address for CSS, and CSH.

8. In attached particulars of claim it was stated:

1. The first Respondent in this case is Mr Paul Taylor. The second respondent in this case is Car Sales Hampshire Ltd.

2. The Claimant's place of work was at the Company premises located at 2 Pegham Close, Laveys Lane, Fareham, Hampshire, PO15 6RX.

3. It is accepted by the Respondent that the Claimant was an employee of Car Sales Hampshire Ltd.

9. It is possible that paragraph 3 included a typographical error and that it should have stated that it was accepted by the claimant that he was an employee of CSH. In any event, it was not asserted in the claim form that the claimant was an employee of CSS.

10. On 13 March 2018, the Employment Tribunal issued a document headed “Notice of a Claim” and “Notice of Hearing”. The document stated that the claim was to be heard on 29 June 2018. The respondent was stated to be CSH. The document was only sent to CSH. A response was required by 10 April 2018.

11. The document stated that: Part of the claim has been rejected, namely the complaint(s) against Paul Taylor. The remainder of this letter does not apply to those complaint(s).

12. Another document headed “Case Management Order” was issued by the Employment Tribunal on 13 March 2018, setting out case management orders for the hearing. The only respondent was stated to be CSH.

13. A third document was issued by the Employment Tribunal on 13 March 2018, with the heading “Acceptance of Part of Claim” that appears only to have been sent to the claimant’s representative, stating: The Acting Regional Employment Judge has decided to reject your other complaints against Paul Taylor for the following reasons; The claim has been served on your employer only Car Sales Hampshire Ltd as a claim for wages and failure to provide wage slips due can only be pursued against the employer.

14. Thus, the claim form was only accepted in respect of, and served on, CSH.

15. The claim against Mr Taylor of CSS had not been accepted. There was no claim against CSS.

16. It is asserted in the skeleton argument for CSS that on 26 March 2018 an application was made by the claimant to the Employment Tribunal to reconsider the removal of Mr Taylor as a respondent. I have not been provided with a copy of that letter.

17. On 10 April 2018, both CSS and CSH sent ET3 response forms. Both responses gave the same postal address and email address (“the AdminCSH1 email address”). CSH did not give details of a representative. CSS gave details of a representative, Mr Tricker, with a postal address (“the Tricker postal address”) and an email address (“the Tricker email address”). I take the date of the submission of the ET3s from the skeleton argument prepared for this hearing by CSS. Both CSS and CSH denied that the claimant was employed by them and contended that he was an independent contractor.

18. CSS and CSH are clearly closely related, as they provided the same postal and email addresses.

19. On 12 April 2018, a letter was sent to the claimant’s representative, Mr Taylor and Mr Tricker stating that: This case has been referred to acting Regional Employment Judge O Harper, who directs as follows: Your letter has been treated as an application to amend the claim to add Paul Taylor as an additional Respondent. The Claim has now bee served upon him. However, if the employer of the Claimant was Car Sales Hampshire Ltd, and not Mr. Taylor personally, the appropriate Respondent is the employing company The Response form received from the First Respondent (Car Sales Hampshire Ltd) will now be referred to an Employment Judge.

20. On 5 June 2018, the Employment Tribunal wrote to Mr Tricker and the claimant stating: The response from each of the first and second Respondent has been accepted and a copy of each is attached for the Claimant. A copy has also been sent to ACAS. The case file has been referred to Employment Judge Livesey. The EJ directs that the hearing listed for 29 June 2018 is postponed because a 1 day hearing is required. Please can the parties supply any dates of unavailability from January to March 2019. Please respond by 12 June 2018. A Latvian interpreter will be made available for the Claimant on the day of the hearing. It is proposed to change the second Respondent’s name to Hunter Devine Capital Limited. Unless either party objects in writing within 7 days of the date of this letter, the change of name will be put into effect.

21. On 11 June 2018, an email was sent from the AdminCSH1 email address setting out the availability of witnesses that CSH intended to call. The email was said to be from Mr Tricker, who had previously been stated to be the representative of CSS, rather than CSH. The uncertainty as to whether Mr Tricker was representing CSH, CSS or both, also suggests a close connection between CSH and CSS.

22. On 2 July 2018, a new notice of hearing was sent to the claimant’s representative by email and to an incorrect email address for Mr Tricker, including the name Ticker rather than Tricker (“the incorrect Tricker email address”) giving the date of a hearing on 4 March 2019. The Respondents were stated to be “Paul Taylor & Others”.

23. On 29 July 2018, the claimant’s representative sent an email attaching a schedule of loss to the Employment Tribunal, copied to the Tricker email address.

24. On 13 August 2018, the claimant’s representative sent an email to the Employment Tribunal, that appears to have been copied to both the Tricker email address and the incorrect Tricker email address, with an index for a bundle of documents that referred to Amended Particulars of Claim.

25. On 11 September 2018, the claimant’s representative sent an email to the Employment Tribunal, copied to the Tricker email address, asserting that “the Respondent” had failed to comply with the case management orders.

26. The Employment Tribunal has provided a file note dated 6 October 2018 that suggest that the Employment Tribunal administration were aware that two email addresses were being used for Mr Tricker.

27. On 9 October 2018, the Employment Tribunal sent an email to the claimant’s representative and to the Tricker email address and the incorrect Tricker email address referring to the respondents as “CSH & another” asking for correct contact details and reminding “the respondent” to provide the “documents asked for by the Claimant”.

28. On 19 October 2018, the Employment Tribunal sent an email to the incorrect Tricker email address attaching a strike out warning referring to the respondents as “Paul Taylor & Others”.

29. That day, the claimant’s representative sent an email to the Employment Tribunal pointing out the error in the email address for Mr Tricker.

30. On 25 October 2018, the Employment Tribunal sent a revised strike out warning by email to the Tricker email address, naming the respondents as CSH and CSS.

31. On 8 November 2018, the responses of CSS and CSH were struck out. The judgment was sent out by email on 13 November 2018, including to the Tricker email address. The respondents were informed that they were entitled to receive notification of hearings but would only be allowed to participate in those hearings to the extent permitted by the Judge.

32. On 13 November 2018, a Notice of Hearing was sent by the Employment Tribunal giving an incorrect hearing date of 14 March 2019 rather than 4 March 2019.

33. On 21 November 2018, the Employment Tribunal issued an amended Notice of Hearing for 4 March 2019. It appears to have been sent by post to Mr Tricker.

34. On 21 November 2018, an email was sent from the AdminCSH1 email address, stated to be from CSH: We understand that there has been some problems with one of our contractors who has not responded to you whatsoever since 2nd July 2018. We have not received any correspondence from you concerning claim 1400798/2018 Mr V Riekstins vs Car Sales Hampshire Ltd. We have just spoken to Andy and he has advised us to email you as soon as possible and explain that we have not. Received any correspondence because of cur representative. We do not want Stephen Tricker to represent us anymore and we would like to ask to reconsider the judgement based cm we did not received any correspondence. We would like to defend the claim so could we please have any correspondence since 2nd July 2918 to be forwarded to our address: Car Sales Hampshire Ltd …. Could we also please have a confirmation of Hunter Devine Capital Limited not being involved with this claim.

35. This suggested that Mr Tricker had not been communicating with CSH. It also raises the possibility that Mr Tricker was not communicating with CSS, which had stated that he was their representative on their ET3 form. The letter was treated as an application for reconsideration by CSH.

36. On 22 November 2018, the Employment Tribunal asked for comments from the claimant’s representative on the email from CSH.

37. On 26 November 2018, the claimant’s representative sent a letter to the Employment Tribunal. It was asserted that CSS should not be removed as a respondent. Neither CSH or CSS are stated on the letter to have been copied.

38. On 13 December 2018, the Employment Tribunal issued a letter stating that the application from CSH would be considered at the beginning of the final hearing on 4 March 2019. The only respondent referred to was CSH. The letter appears to have been sent to the AdminCSH1 email address, that had been provided on the ET3 response forms of both CSH and CSS.

39. On 22 February 2019, the claimant’s representative sent an email to the Employment Tribunal, copied to the AdminCSH1 email address, attaching witness statements for “the hearing scheduled for 4th March 2019”.

40. On 27 February 2019, the Employment Tribunal sent an email to the claimant’s representative and to the AdminCSH1 email address attaching a “Current Position” letter. The only respondent referred to was CSH. The letter stated that there was a risk that the hearing would not proceed on 4 March 2019 as no judge was allocated for the hearing.

41. The hearing went ahead on 4 March 2019. Neither CSH or CSS attended or were represented. The Employment Tribunal decided that CSS was the employer of the claimant, although this was not what had originally been pleaded. It does not appear that the reconsideration application from CSH was considered.

42. On 23 March 2019, at 12.08, an email was sent from an email address AdminCSS1 (“the AdminCSS1 email address”), from CSS asking for the reasons for the judgment. At 12.22 on the same day an email was sent from the AdmnCSH1 email address from CSH stating: Dear Sirs, We seek explanation as to why Employment Tribunal correspondence since 22.11.2018 regards to one respondent namely Car Sales Hampshire Ltd and not Hunter Devine Capital Ltd? Your faithfully, Car Sales Hampshire Ltd

43. On 29 March 2019, the judgment with written reasons was sent to the parties.

44. On 5 April 2019, an email was sent from CCS using the AdminCSS1 email address stating: In previous conversations with you you've advised us that there is no claim form to appeal against the judgement of Car Sales Solutions. We have since done some research on the internet and found this form which is a EAT form

1. We understand that this is our appeal form. Could you please advise also we have requested a transcript of the hearing in previous emails but you haven't responded. Please let us know that there would be a fee or if we can have a transcript of the proceedings on the 4th of March 2019. We've also emailed you with questions relating to this case that you still not responded to. We did let you know that we will be appealing against this judgement but we can only appeal after you've answered the questions that we've posted. Yours faithfully, Car Sales Solutions Ltd

45. The Employment Tribunal responded that day: Thank you for your undernoted email, which has been linked with case file and placed before Regional Employment Judge Pirani, who has directed I write as follows; Any issues relating to appeal should be addressed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal rather than the Employment Tribunal. The employment tribunal hearing was not recorded. Therefore no transcript is available. The judgement sent to the parties on 28th March 2019 was against the first respondent, namely Car Sales Solutions Limited.They are the correct respondents.

46. I have set out my understanding of the proceedings in the Employment Tribunal as best I can. Unfortunately, I was provided with two bundles for this hearing neither of which have the relevant correspondence in chronological order, so it is possible I have missed out some relevant correspondence. The proceedings in the Employment Appeal Tribunal

47. On 9 May 2019, CSS submitted an appeal against the substantive judgment. The EAT1 form included hand written grounds of appeal that stated: The appellant held a reasonable belief at the time of the hearing (04.03.2019) that they were no longer respondent to this claim

48. The basis of the appeal did not appear to be that CSS did not have notice of the hearing, but that it was not a respondent to the claim.

49. The appeal was initially treated as not having been properly instituted until the ET3 of CSH was submitted on 22 July 2019. By an Order sealed on 24 March 2023, Ms A Kerr (authorised to act of behalf of the Registrar) refused an extension of time.

50. By an Order sealed on 12 October 2023, His Honour Judge Wayne Beard allowed an appeal from the Registrar’s Order so that the appeal was treated as having been submitted within time.

51. By Order sealed on 2 November 2023, His Honour Judge Auerbach put the matter through to a Preliminary Hearing to be attended only by CCS, at which consideration could be given as to whether there were any arguable grounds for bringing the appeal. Judge Auerbach noted that it would be necessary for the relevant correspondence from the Employment Tribunal to be available at the Preliminary Hearing in the EAT.

52. On 22 February 2024, the Employment Tribunal sent a copy of the hearing bundle to CSS.

53. On 8 March 2024, CSS applied to amend the grounds of appeal.

54. On 12 April 2024, a Preliminary Hearing in the EAT was held before Michael Ford, Deputy Judge of the High Court. Permission to amend was granted. Grounds 2.1 and 2.2 were permitted to proceed. All other grounds were dismissed.

55. The two grounds that were permitted to proceed were stayed pending the Employment Tribunal answering questions asked by the EAT.

56. The Employment Tribunal sent a document dated 13 May 2024 from Employment Judge Harris answering the questions asked by the EAT, primarily by reference to the Employment Tribunal file.

57. On 20 May 2024, CSS wrote to the EAT raising queries about the answers that had been provided by the Employment Tribunal.

58. By an Order sealed on 31 May 2024, the EAT asked the Employment Tribunal for comments on the questions asked by CSS on 20 May 2024.

59. On 31 May 2024, CSS made a further application to amend the grounds of appeal.

60. On 18 June 2024, CSS applied for reconsideration of the substantive judgment contending that the application was made promptly after the provision of documents from the Employment Tribunal.

61. On 19 June 2024, Employment Judge Harris provided further limited comments, including stating that: I have no direct knowledge as to how communications were sent, including whether correct email addresses or postal addresses were used, by the ET to the parties.

62. On 9 July 2024, the application for reconsideration was refused. The reconsideration judgment of Employment Judge Harris is the subject of the second appeal and was in the following terms: The judgment of the Tribunal is that the Second Respondent’s application dated the 18th June 2024 for reconsideration of the Judgment dated the 8th November 2018 and the Judgment following the hearing on the 4th March 2019 is refused because the application is out of time and, in the alternative, the subject matter of the application is currently before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

63. On 11 July 2024, the Employment Tribunal sent further correspondence to CSS.

64. On 16 July 2024, CSS made a further application to amend the grounds of appeal.

65. On 22 July 2024, CSS, not yet having received the reconsideration judgment, made further submissions, including an application that Employment Judge Harris recuse himself.

66. As stated above, the reconsideration judgment was sent to the parties on 20 Augst 2024.

67. On 28 August 2024, CSS sought written reasons for the reconsideration judgment.

68. On 30 August 2024, an email was sent on behalf of Employment Judge Harris: The written reasons were set out in the written Judgment and Employment Judge Harris does not propose to add to them.

69. On 24 September 2024, CSS submitted an appeal against the reconsideration judgment.

70. At a Preliminary Hearing in the EAT before Judge Keith on 27 January 2025 both appeals were permitted to proceed to a full hearing. The Order was sealed on 28 January 2025. The grounds of appeal were amended by substitution of the following concise grounds of appeal: Appeal 1: EA-2019-000537-RS Ground 2.1 – Procedural impropriety, in that the Employment Tribunal: a. failed to provide the Appellant with all relevant correspondence; b. continued with the Final Hearing in the absence of the Appellant/CSH and failed to consider CSH’s reconsideration application at that hearing; c. failed to consider, of its own initiative, setting aside the 4 March 2019 judgment in light of the Appellant’s emails to the Employment Tribunal sent on/around 23 March 2019. Ground 2.2 – The Employment Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant matter, that being the set aside/reconsideration application made by CSH on 21 November 2018. Ground 2.7 – Procedural impropriety, in that the Employment Tribunal permitted the Claimant to rely on his revised Particulars of Claim dated 11 August 2018 at the Final Hearing on 4 March 2019, without there having been any application made by the Claimant to do so nor permission granted by the Employment Tribunal. Appeal 2: EA-2024-001232-RS Ground 1 – Failure to provide adequate written reasons for the refusal of the Appellant’s set aside/reconsideration application lodged on 18 June 2024. Ground 2 – Failure to consider/address the Appellant’s recusal application lodged on 22 July 2024. The reconsideration appeal

71. I consider it is logical to start with the appeal against the reconsideration judgment The law on reconsideration in the Employment Tribunal

72. The ET Rules 2013, in force at the relevant time, provided for reconsideration:

70. Principles A Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the decision (“the original decision”) may be confirmed, varied or revoked. If it is revoked it may be taken again.

71. Application Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration shall be presented in writing (and copied to all the other parties) within 14 days of the date on which the written record, or other written communication, of the original decision was sent to the parties or within 14 days of the date that the written reasons were sent (if later) and shall set out why reconsideration of the original decision is necessary.

72. — Process (1) The Tribunal shall consider any application made under rule 71 . If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application shall be refused and the Tribunal shall inform the parties of the refusal. Otherwise the Tribunal shall send a notice to the parties setting a time limit for any response to the application by the other parties and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may set out the Tribunal's provisional views on the application. (2) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (1), the original decision shall be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any response to the notice provided under paragraph (1), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. If the reconsideration proceeds without a hearing the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations.

73. Reconsideration by the Tribunal on its own initiative Where the Tribunal proposes to reconsider a decision on its own initiative, it shall inform the parties of the reasons why the decision is being reconsidered and the decision shall be reconsidered in accordance with rule 72(2) (as if an application had been made and not refused).

73. In Tesco Stores Limited v Element & others [2026] EAT 33, I considered the mandatory stages for the determination of a reconsideration application, under the slightly revised wording of the ET Rules 2024.

22. There have been some changes in the wording in the ETR from that in the ETR 2013 and in relation to the composition of the Employment Tribunal that can conduct each step. Taking those changes into account, the parties agreed that the mandatory stages now are:

1. Has an application for reconsideration been made? [Rule 69]

2. If so, the application for reconsideration must be considered by the Employment Judge [Rule 70(1) and PDPC para 6]

3. Was the application for reconsideration submitted in time? [Rule 69]

4. If not, should time be extended?

5. If not in time, and time is not extended, refuse as out of time (time dismissal)

6. If in time, or time extended, is there no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked?

7. If so, dismiss the application for reconsideration because there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked and inform the parties of the refusal. (prospects dismissal) [Rule 70(2)]

8. If not, permit the application for reconsideration to proceed (permission to proceed decision)

9. If a permission to proceed decision is taken a notice must be sent to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application (written representations) must be received by the ET, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing (permission to proceed notice) – the permission to proceed notice may also set out the EJ’s provisional views (provisional views) on the application [Rule 70(3)]

10. On receipt of responses, or expiry of time for response, to the permission to proceed notice the EJ must decide whether the reconsideration should be determined on the basis of written representations or at a hearing – the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the EJ considers, having regard to any written representations, that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice (method of determination decision) [Rule 70(4)]

11. If the judgment subject of the reconsideration application was made by a panel the EJ must decide whether the reconsideration should be determined by an EJ or panel (panel composition decision) [PDPC and PC Guidance para 14]

12. If the reconsideration application is to be determined on the basis of written representations the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations (further opportunity for written representations) [Rule 70(5)]

13. Determine the application for reconsideration (reconsideration decision)

23. This analysis may seem a little overengineered, but it is necessary to follow a structured approach to the mandatory stages of determining a reconsideration application.

74. Reconsideration is particularly apt to deal with procedural problems that have occurred in the Employment Tribunal if they mean that a party may not have had a “fair and proper opportunity to present [their] case”: Trimble v Supertravel Ltd [1982] ICR

440.

75. Mr Way, representing the claimant, accepted that there was insufficient reasoning to support the refusal of reconsideration. The Employment Judge merely stated that “the application is out of time” or “in the alternative” that “the subject matter of the application is currently before the Employment Appeal Tribunal”. The required stages of the consideration of an application for reconsideration were not undertaken.

76. While the application for reconsideration did not expressly request an extension of time it was clearly stated that the request was made after documents had come to light during the course of the EAT appeal proceedings. It was implicit that an extension of time was sought.

77. The fact that “the subject matter of the application is currently before the Employment Appeal Tribunal” is not a reason to refuse to consider an application for reconsideration. If the matter raised in an appeal is apt for reconsideration the EAT will often request that the Employment Tribunal reconsider and/or stay an appeal while a judgment is reconsidered.

78. The Employment Tribunal will often be better placed to deal with procedural problems that have arisen in the Employment Tribunal, which may be best investigated by hearing evidence that is not generally appropriate in an appeal on a point of law. An Employment Judge can ask questions of the Employment Tribunal administration and look at the full file for the case.

79. I have concluded that the appeal against the refusal of reconsideration must be allowed. Mr Way accepted that the reasoning was insufficient but contended that the application was bound to be out of time. I do not accept that is the case due to the manner in which documentation has come to light during the EAT proceedings. The Employment Tribunal should have considered whether to grant an extension of time. Alternatively, the time limit only applies to applications for reconsideration by parties, but not to reconsideration by the Employment Tribunal of its own motion, which may be on a request from the EAT: Banerjee v Royal Bank of Canada [2021] ICR

359. Here I do request that the Employment Tribunal consider the merits of the reconsideration application.

80. I have set out my understanding of the procedure in the Employment Tribunal in the hope that it may assist with considering the application for reconsideration. However, it is likely that evidence will be required on behalf of CSS, supported by a statement of truth, that explains clearly and unambiguously key issues including: (1) the relationship between CSH and CSS, including the role of Mr Taylor in each company (2) the basis upon which Mr Tricker acted for CSH and whether he also acted for CSS, and, if so, for what period (3) precisely when and how anyone acting on behalf of CSS became aware of the strike out warning in respect of the response for CSS (4) why there was no response from CSS to the strike out warning in respect of its response (5) ) precisely when and how anyone acting on behalf of CSS became aware of the hearing on 4 March 2019 (6) why there was no attendance by anyone for CSS at the hearing on 4 March 2019

81. The above are suggestions. Case management will be for the Employment Tribunal, and it may be that the Employment Judge will conclude that there are other matters that should be dealt with in evidence. A comprehensive chronological bundle of the correspondence will be necessary.

82. While it is clear that there were issues with the naming of respondents and the use of inaccurate email addresses etc, the Employment Tribunal will need to know what the substantive consequences were and whether CSS did not have a fair and proper opportunity to present its case. It is incumbent on CSS to be transparent and not to take points on matters of procedure that did not cause any unfairness.

83. The parties requested that the remission be for consideration by a different Employment Judge. I am prepared to accept that joint approach, and allow the appeal against the reconsideration judgment and remit the matter to be determined by a different Employment Judge.

84. It is extremely regrettable that these proceedings have taken so long, and there has been such significant delay in the EAT, because the appeal was initially not properly instituted and then there were two preliminary hearings and a number of requests to the Employment Tribunal to answer questions. It probably would have been better had the Employment Tribunal been invited to reconsider the substantive judgment at an earlier stage. I appreciate that if the substantive judgment is not revoked, the claimant will have been kept out of his money for many years. However, fairness requires that the application for reconsideration be properly determined. I request that the Employment Tribunal expedite the determination of the reconsideration application if that is possible. The substantive appeal

85. The substantive appeal is stayed pending the determination of the reconsideration application in the Employment Tribunal.