Alexander Valeryevich Timokhin v Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1194 (KB) Case No: KB-2024-001456 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 19/05/2026 Before : MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : ALEXANDER VALERYEVICH TIMOKHIN Claimant – and – ANNA ANATOLYEVNA TIMOKHINA Defendant – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Matthew Bradley KC and William Birch (instructed by Brown Rudnick LLP) for the Claimant Charles Samek KC, Jennifer Perrins and Bláthnaid Breslin (instructed by Goodman Ray LLP) for the Defendant Submissions on consequentials: 6 and 23 March 2026 Further evidence and submissions: 6, 23 March, 28 April and 1 May 2026 (Judgment circulated in draft: 11 May 2026 Returned by counsel: 13 May 2026) – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Approved Judgment This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 19 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ……………………….. MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS Table of Contents I. Introduction3 II. Stay3 III. Costs6 IV. Interest8 V. Payment on account8 VI. Disposal9 Mr Justice Dexter Dias: This is the judgment of the court. I. Introduction

1. This is a short judgment on consequential orders. It should be read in conjunction with the trial judgment ([2026] EWHC 439 (KB)). In short, this is a dispute between Russian national former spouses about the recognition and enforcement of two Russian judgments about a contested post-nuptial agreement between them. This court found in favour of the claimant-former husband (Mr Timokhin) and rejected the several objections advanced by the defendant-former wife (Ms Timokhina). The court ruled that the Russian judgments should be recognised and enforced. The debt arising from the Russian judgments is £417,416.67.

2. The representation is as before. The claimant is represented by Mr Bradley KC and Mr Birch of counsel. The defendant is represented by Mr Samek KC, Ms Perrins and Ms Breslin of counsel. Once more, the court has the benefit of first-class submissions from counsel, to whom it remains grateful.

3. Four consequential orders are applied for variously: i) Stay; ii) Costs; iii) Interest; iv) Payment on account.

4. I examine each application in turn. II. Stay

5. The defendant applies under CPR 52.16 to stay enforcement of the court’s trial judgment in two ways. First, a stay pending domestic appeal. Second, a stay pending Russian bankruptcy proceedings. Stay 1: domestic appeal

6. The court has refused the defendant’s application for permission to appeal, but she has indicated an intention to make a further application to the Court of Appeal. The starting-point is that an application to appeal does not operate as a stay. Further, a stay is generally an exceptional course, but can be justified on the specific facts. There must be a solid basis to take that course and depart from the more usual no-stay position.

7. The defendant does not submit that there is a risk of her appeal being stifled. Therefore, following the recognised approach enunciated by the Court of Appeal, the question turns on the balance of harm(Hammond Suddard Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2065, per Clarke LJ, para 22). Harm to Ms Timokhina

8. Ms Timokhina submits that Mr Timokhin has limited assets in this country. However, he has filed evidence in the trial that he is resident in this country and is a British citizen (witness statement, 18 April 2024, para 4; RB3, para 7). On Ms Timokhina’s filed evidence, he is a man of great wealth. On the court’s requesting clarification of his UK-based assets, he filed further evidence on 1 May 2026. The court was provided with a valuation of Mr Timokhin’s investment portfolio from his private bank in the United Kingdom. As at 22 April 2026, the portfolio is valued at £2.8 million (Exhibit RP4). The bank is registered in London and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. He also has a Bentley motor vehicle valued between £140,000 and £250,000 (RP4).

9. I accept the claimant’s submission that the risks of his refusing or obstructing recovery should Ms Timokhina succeed on appeal and thereby exposing himself to bankruptcy is small. One must view the matter in context: Ms Timokhina’s case is that his wealth runs to many millions and he certainly has substantial assets here. Any recovery on her appeal would be a small fraction of his overall wealth and achievable from his confirmed UK assets. It is also worthy of note that Ms Timokhina does not live in the Hampstead property, her sole asset in the United Kingdom, and the likely target of UK enforcement by Mr Timokhin. She lives in St Petersburg and appears to use the London property to generate rental income. Therefore, she will not be evicted from her home, nor is it the home of any relevant children. Should her UK appeal succeed, obvious relief can be granted to rectify the position. I foresee little difficulty in this. Harm to Mr Timokhin

10. The court has concerns about Ms Timokhina’s conduct. Ms Timokhina was declared bankrupt by a Russian court decision dated 4 October 2024. The financial manager in the bankruptcy proceedings is seeking to reverse the defendant’s transfer of her St Petersburg property to her mother. It appears from the Russian bankruptcy court judgment (5 February 2026, Judge Pakhomova) that Ms Timokhina transferred ownership of the apartment to her mother (L.N. Poltavtseva) by a “deed of gift” on 19 April 2021.

11. Ms Timokhina states that her only asset in the United Kingdom is the Hampstead property. Should that be transferred, there would be nothing else to enforce this court’s judgment against. The unilateral notice in favour of the claimant does not bar Ms Timokhina from selling the property, but merely acts to alert a potential purchaser of Mr Timokhin’s claimed interest. This provides tenuous protection to Mr Timokhin. Further, the court cannot ignore that Ms Timokhina has pleaded guilty in Russia to corruption which, as the Russian court found, involved attempting to bribe an official to create difficulties for Mr Timokhin in legal proceedings. She was sentenced to a custodial term in a penal colony in Russia as a result, and while on appeal her sentence was suspended, the seriousness of her dishonesty is reflected in the sanction imposed. I judge that there is a real risk of dissipation. It is difficult to reconcile Ms Timokhina’s claims of having been impoverished by the post-nuptial agreement with her ability to fund protracted and costly proceedings in the King’s Bench Division in which she has instructed King’s Counsel and two juniors, along with an eminent firm of solicitors. Indeed, in her first witness statement to this court, she claimed that the Hampstead property is “my only asset” (para 18).

12. Further, reliance on enforcement in Russia, as will be explained in the next section, presents many difficulties, not least difficulties in transferring any resulting funds from Russia to the United Kingdom, where the claimant is resident (RP3, para 8).

13. In my judgment, the balance of prejudice falls decisively in favour of the claimant. Given that a stay is a departure from the usual course, I do not find solid grounds for the defendant’s application to stay enforcement pending appeal. There is not identifiable and irredeemable harm that may be or is likely to be suffered by the defendant. Conclusion: domestic appeal

14. This jurisdiction is where Mr Timokhin resides and where Ms Timokhina has property that the judgment can be enforced against. The application to stay enforcement pending appeal in this jurisdiction is refused. Stay 2: Russian bankruptcy

15. The application to stay enforcement pending the resolution of Russian bankruptcy proceedings is more problematic still. Ms Timokhina’s submission is founded on conjecture and outcomes that are far from certain. The court asked for an update on the state of progress of the Russian proceedings. On 1 May 2026, solicitors for Ms Timokhina stated that the hearing in Russia on 14 April 2026 was adjourned to 18 May 2026 as the judge had not received documents from the Land Registry. A number of points arise.

16. First, Ms Timokhina claims she has no assets of note in Russia. Her legal representative in Russia filed submissions (13 August 2024) stating that “the debtor [Ms Timokhina] has no movable or immovable property on the territory of the Russian Federation”. Ms Timokhina confirmed this position in these proceedings (witness statement 1 July 2025, para 28).

17. Second, she is resisting the reversal of her transfer of the St Petersburg property to her mother. If the arrangements remain as present, on her case she has no Russian assets Mr Timokhin can enforce against.

18. Third, there is nothing wrong in principle with a creditor attempting to enforce using different methods and/or seeking enforcement in different jurisdictions in parallel. Double recovery must be avoided, but it remains unclear on what basis Ms Timokhina submits that there is a real risk of over-enrichment here.

19. Fourth, I cannot detect any “special circumstances” here for CPR 83.7(4)(a) purposes that “render it inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order” and therefore mandate that Mr Timokhin should rely on a sole mode of enforcement, being in Russia.

20. Fifth, as to the bankruptcy proceedings, initially it was unclear whether Ms Timokhina had any other creditors in Russia. By an email dated 1 May 2026, Ms Timokhina’s solicitors confirmed that she has no other creditors in Russia aside from Mr Timokhin. By a witness statement from his solicitors dated 1 May 2026 (para 10(b)), Mr Timokhin confirms his understanding that Ms Timokhina has no other creditors in Russia. Moreover, while it is unclear what the present value of the St Petersburg property is, the value as at April 2021 was £450,000 (RP3, paras 25-31). This is significantly below the sums falling due once interest and costs are allowed for.

21. Sixth, and recognising that CPR 52.16 factors can be considered analogously, the same points arise as explained above. Conclusion: Russian bankruptcy

22. Therefore, the application to stay enforcement pending the outcome of the Russian bankruptcy proceedings is refused. Overall conclusion: stay

23. Both applications for a stay are refused.

24. I add for the sake of completeness that I judge the strength of Ms Timokhina’s appeal to be weak (Leicester Circuits Ltd v Coates Brothers PLC [2002] EWCA Civ 474, para 13, per Potter LJ). This would be another factor counting against a stay, but I have not factored in the weakness of her appeal prospects. III. Costs

25. The claimant’s Part 36 offer was made on 20 May 2025. The expiry of the relevant period was 10 June 2025. In his offer, the claimant offered Ms Timokhina a 9 per cent discount on the value of his full claim. Thus, the figure specified was £380,000. At trial, the claimant succeeded in full and so has unquestionably beaten the offer. Nevertheless, the defendant submits that it would be unjust for CPR Part 36 purposes to make the orders set out at CPR 36.17(4). This is primarily because the offer was not “a genuine attempt to settle the proceedings” (CPR 36.17(5)(e)).

26. It is agreed between the parties that the burden is on the unsuccessful party to establish injustice. This is well recognised as being a “formidable obstacle” (ABFA Commodities Trading Ltd v Petraco Oil Company [2024] EWHC 706 (Comm), per Foxton J (as he then was) at para 5(i). As put by Briggs J (as he then was) in Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2012] EWHC 3320 (Ch) (“Smith v Trafford”) at para 13(d): “… the court does not have an unfettered discretion to depart from the ordinary cost consequences set out in [CPR] 36.14. The burden on a claimant who has failed to beat the defendants Part 36 offer to show injustice is a formidable obstacle to the obtaining of a different costs order. If that were not so, then the salutary purpose of Part 36, in promoting compromise and the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure of costs and court time, would be undermined.”

27. The court must be vigilant against very high settlement offers being used strategically, and not being used as a genuine attempt to settle the claim but a device to secure an indemnity award.

28. I judge that a percentage settlement offer in the early 90s was justified here given the strength of the claimant’s case. He had a rational and reasonable basis to conclude that his prospects were strong and thus a discount of just under 10 per cent was justified. I do not accept the submission that because the decision on recognition and enforcement is a (yes/no) binary one that a high offer is inappropriate. Binariness is inherent in recognition and enforcement claims. For my part, the more pertinent factor is the strength of the claim. Here Mr Timokhin’s claim was very strong. It was reasonable for him to take that into account at setting a high offer level. That did not render the offer tokenistic and illusory, but sober and realistic.

29. Equally, I do not accept the defendant’s submission that she raised “important arguments with very real merits”. Some of her arguments had poor prospects of success. Some legal arguments were floated and disappeared with little more. The family law aspect of her case was particularly unconvincing. These were not points that can be labelled “entirely reasonable” (D skeleton argument, para 9).

30. I add that the complaints that the Part 36 offer was underspecified, confusing, equivocal or indistinct are without substance. It is perfectly clear that the offer related to the claim in the King’s Bench before the court. Clarification about scope was provided when asked (unmistakably evident from Pickworth 2).

31. The parties dispute the rate of interest, if any, to be granted. The maximum is 10 per cent above base rate. The claimant applies for 8 per cent. The defendant, on a contingent basis, submits that it should be 1 per cent. The defendant’s proposal is unrealistically low. However, I do accept that 8 per cent is too high. In this, I note that while the defendant took a series of bad points, not all of them were fundamentally flawed or highly likely to fail. Further, I am not persuaded that in the three months from offer to trial the disruption to the claimant is as acute as he maintains. The correct interest figure should be 6 per cent. Conclusion: costs

32. Part 36 is a self-contained code designed to encourage settlement. The structural imperative of the relevant rule is that the court “must” order relevant consequences unless it would be unjust. As Briggs J said in Smith v Trafford (para 15): “the essential purpose behind Part 36 is to visit costs consequences upon parties of whom it can properly be said that they ought to have settled by accepting the other party's offer, rather than taken the matter to trial.”

33. The defendant had a reasonable and realistic opportunity to accept a genuine settlement offer from the claimant. She failed to take it. Instead, she persisted in a case that was materially flawed in key respects, with some parts of it largely devoid of merit. She applied very late in the day to amend her initial defence, a recognition of the limitations of her original position, but the amended defence fared no better and had obvious weaknesses of its own. It is to the credit of the claimant’s legal team that even though it could have with little credible resistance applied to adjourn the trial in light of the amendment, it determined to retain the trial listing and do its best to avoid incurring yet more costs.

34. Taking into account all the circumstances (CPR 36.17(5)), I judge that the defendant has not come close to establishing that it would be unjust for the court to order the CPR 36.17(4) consequences. IV. Interest Interest on the debt

35. There is no good reason why the defendant should not pay interest on the debt. At the latest, the debt was incurred as a result of the second Russian judgment on 11 October 2023. The interest should accrue until the expiry of the relevant period. The claimant proposes two bases for determining interest. It seems to me that the most reasonable – and fairest – is the commercial rate of 5 per cent. Pleading point

36. The defendant submits that interest should not be awarded since it has not been pleaded by the claimant as required by CPR Part

16. There is nothing in this objection. The short point is that CPR 16.1 makes plain that Part 16 is inapplicable to a Part 8 claim, which this is. In any event, the Court of Appeal considered the question of a failure to plead interest in El Ajou v Stern [2006] EWCA Civ 120 (“El Ajou”), per Carnwath LJ (as he then was). In El Ajou, in circumstances where interest was not specifically pleaded but awarded at first instance (Kitchin J), the Court of Appeal said (para 39): “In my view, this ground of appeal is without substance. Section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 undoubtedly gave the judge the power to award interest. The rules regulate the exercise of the power, they do not take it away. Had the pleading point been pressed before him, the judge could no doubt have given leave to amend, on appropriate terms, and, if necessary, given the defendants time to prepare their response. As it was, the judge was fully entitled to proceed as he did. I see no grounds for this court to interfere with the exercise of his discretion.”

37. For this reason, the defendant concedes in her skeleton argument (para 14) that “a pleading failure is not necessarily fatal to a claim for interest.” Putting aside for one moment the powerful CPR 16.1 point at the claimant’s disposal, I judge that the failure to plead interest would not be fatal to its award here. Given that Mr Timokhin has alerted the defendant to the point, if she wished to contest it, she could have “pressed” the point before the court. I cannot see what the prejudice to Ms Timokhina could be, and indeed none has been identified in her skeleton argument (para 14) where the complaint is made.

38. I therefore exercise my discretion to award interest. V. Payment on account

39. Approximately 70 per cent of the costs incurred (exclusive of VAT) fall to be assessed on an indemnity basis as a Part 36 consequence (see above). In accordance with Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm), per Christopher Clarke LJ, paras 23-24, the court must arrive at a “reasonable sum” of likely recovery, allowing for uncertainty and margin for error.

40. Given the level of interest granted combined with the indemnity basis also granted, I judge that there are good prospects that the claimant will recover 65 per cent of his costs following detailed assessment. It is close to what the claimant may expect on a standard assessment.

41. As to the defendant’s criticism of the scale of the costs incurred by the claimant, I have fully in mind the scale of the work necessitated by the diffuse array of objections to recognition and enforcement the defendant placed before the court. It took the court over 100 pages of trial judgment to deal with them. The claimant had no option but to undertake the necessary professional work to meet the shifting and expanding case, some aspects of which were first ventilated, or particularised in detail, as the trial was imminent. I reject the defendant’s submission that the lowest figure in the likely range is no more than 55 per cent. VI. Disposal

42. Accordingly, I order: Costs • Costs up to expiry of the relevant period on the standard basis, the claimant unarguably being the successful party (CPR 44.2); • Costs from the expiry of the relevant period on the indemnity basis (CPR 36.17(4), subparagraph b); • Payment on account of costs of 65 per cent. Interest • Interest on the debt from the second Russian judgment (11 October 2023) to the expiry of the relevant period at 5 per cent; • Interest on the debt at 6 per cent above base rate from the expiry of the relevant period (subparagraph a); • Interest at 5 per cent on costs incurred prior to the expiry of the relevant period; • Interest on costs incurred after the expiry of the relevant period at 6 per cent above base rate (subparagraph c); • Interest on costs incurred after judgment at 6 per cent from the date the cost was incurred; • Interest on the debt at 8 per cent from date of order for payment until payment (Judgments Act 1838). Additional payment • 10 per cent additional payment (subparagraph d(ii)).

43. I direct that the parties file an agreed order to reflect the terms of this judgment.