Ali Musa Ebrahim Patel & Anor v Sufyan Patel & Anor

___________________________________________________________________________ Form AP1 application to alter the register pursuant to paragraph 4 Schedule 4 Land Registration Act 2002 – application seeks closure of Disputed Land’s title LAN266209 and to return it to original title LA58168 – whether a mistake in the register following Respondents’ successful ADV1 application in 2022 – Applicants contending Respondents not in exclusive possession of Disputed Land for requisite 10+ years ending on date of their application – whether Respondents are registered proprietors in possession – whether Respondents by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made – whether exceptional circumstances exist which justify not making the alteration Cases referred to Paton v Todd [2012] EWHC 1696 (Ch) Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P&CR 452 J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 Balevants Ltd v Sartori [2014] EWHC 1164 (Ch) Baxter v Mannion [2011] EWCA Civ 120

1. This is my decision in respect of Ali Patel’s (‘the First Applicant’) application to alter the register pursuant to paragraph 5 Schedule 4 Land Registration Act 2002 in respect of land at 1 Shear Bank Close, Blackburn (‘the Disputed Land’). Mr Sadiq (“the Second Applicant”) was joined as a party by Order of the Tribunal because he is now the registered proprietor of what was the First Applicant’s property. The Second Applicant’s wife, Bilkir Sadiq, presented the Applicants’ case. Given the common surname, I shall refer to the Respondents, Mr Sufyan Patel and Mrs Hamida Patel, as “the Respondents” (and “First Respondent” and “Second Respondent” respectively).

2. By way of background and explanation of the lay-of-the-land (using plans that are orientated east to south from top to bottom of the page): 2.1 In 1977, Halmar HH Ltd (“Halmar”) was registered as proprietor of an area of land situated to the east of and behind the Applicants’ Property (Title No. LA58168) which can be seen outlined in the top right quarter of the plan immediately below. Halmar developed this land and sold off various titles including the Respondents’ title indicated by the red arrow (on the right, for those reading in black and white). The green arrow (on the left) points to the Disputed Land (with its title number written in green below). 2.2 On 18 November 2005, the Respondents were registered as proprietors of 1 Shearbank Close (Title No. LA453398) which can be seen outlined in red on the plan immediately below. The green arrow points to the Disputed Land. 2.3 In March 2008, the First Applicant bought 20A Shear Bank Road (Title No. LA26163) (hereafter “the Applicants’ Property” it having belonged to both of them) which can be seen outlined in red on the plan immediately below. The green arrow points to the Disputed Land. 2.4 On 1 August 2022, the Respondents were registered as proprietors of a small parcel of land situated between the parties’ properties (Title No. LAN266209). It is shown edged red below and is, of course, the Disputed Land. I have orientated this title plan so that is it roughly orientated as are the other plans displayed here. Their registration as proprietors of the Disputed Land came about following their having made a Form ADV1 application to the Registry. The Applicants’ Property is indicated by the blue arrow (on the left) and the Respondents’ Property by the red arrow (on the right). 2.5 On 13 January 2023, the First Applicant sold the Applicants’ Property to the Second Applicant. Although the First Applicant no longer holds an interest in the Applicants’ Property, he still pursues these proceedings. The Disputed Land

3. The location of the Disputed Land can be seen on the plans within paragraph 2 above. It is situated between the parties’ properties and is on the same level as the Respondents’ Property and, perhaps, several metres higher than the Applicants’ Property. Although its small northern border abuts a third party’s property, realistically no one else can access or benefit from it other than the parties’ titles. I conducted a site view with the parties present on 29 October 2025 The parties’ respective cases

4. The First Applicant says that he had access to and use of the Disputed Land from 2007 until 2022 when the Respondents erected the fence that is there now. As a result, he says the Respondents’ Form ADV1 application for registration made in 2022 wrongly asserted exclusive possession for that period. Accordingly, he seeks alteration of the register to remove the Respondents as the registered proprietors and have title either to be merged with the title of his former property (Title No. LA26163) or registered in the names of the current proprietor Mr Sadiq or in his name. He says that he did not make an adverse possession claim himself because he always thought that he owned the Disputed Land. He cannot apply now because he does not satisfy paragraphs 1(1) and (2) Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) – not in adverse possession for a 10 year period ending on the date of the application nor removed from the Disputed Land in the six months prior to the date of the application. He does not want to own the Disputed Land but, rather, “wishes to honour the boundaries as they were at the time of sale [to the Second Applicant] which he believes is just and fair.”

5. The Respondents accept that their Form ADV1 application incorrectly claimed adverse possession from 2007 but nonetheless assert that they had exclusive possession from 2012 and accordingly had achieved the requisite 10 years by the time of their application on 1 August 2022. The incorrect start date was immaterial.

6. In opening Mr Paget, for the Respondents, suggested that the evidence about adverse possession could be put to one side and the Tribunal proceed directly to considering whether there were exceptional circumstances for not altering the register. I declined. The legal framework

7. The legal framework for alteration of the Register relevant to this matter is: 7.1 Paragraph 5 Schedule 4 of the 2002 Act provides that the Registrar may alter the register for, inter alia, the purpose of correcting a mistake. 7.2 Paragraph 1 Schedule 4 provides that an alteration to correct a mistake constitutes ‘rectification’ if it prejudicially affects the title of the registered proprietor. 7.3 Paragraph 6(2) provides that such ‘rectification’ requires the registered proprietor’s consent in relation to land in his possession unless (a) he has by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or (b) it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made. 7.4 Paragraph 6(3) provides that if on an application for alteration under paragraph 5 the Registrar has power to make the alteration, the application must be approved, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration.

8. The general legal principles applicable to adverse possession claims are well-established and perhaps best taken from Powell v McFarlane, J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham and Balevants Ltd v Sartori. Insofar as relevant to the present matter, they can be summarised as: 8.1 In order to establish factual possession, an applicant must demonstrate that they have an appropriate degree of exclusive physical control of the land. Their possession must be exclusive and they must deal with it as an occupying owner might have been expected to have done so and that no one else has done so. This is a matter of fact which will depend on all the circumstances which include, in particular, the manner in which the land is commonly enjoyed. 8.2 In order to establish the requisite intention to possess, an applicant must show that they intended to possess (not own) the land to the exclusion of all others. The intention to possess must be manifested clearly so that it is apparent that the applicant was not merely a persistent trespasser. The issues

9. In a case such as this where many allegations have been made, it is important to bear in mind what it is actually about. The Applicants (a) allege that the Registry’s registration of the Respondents as proprietors of the Disputed Land on 1 August 2022 was a mistake because the Respondents did not satisfy the requirements of adverse possession, and (b) that this mistake must be corrected. This is the matter referred by the Registry to the Tribunal pursuant to Section 73(4) of the 2002 Act. Much of the First Applicant’s pleaded case was struck out insofar as it pertained to registration of the Disputed Land in either applicant’s name or under Title No. LA26163 (i.e. the Applicants’ Property) – see Judge Dovar’s Order dated 7 February 2025.

10. Accordingly, in my judgment, the issues are: 10.1 Whether there is a mistake in the Register. If I do not find that there is a mistake, that is the end of the matter. 10.2 If I find that there is a mistake in the Register, whether the Respondents are registered proprietors in possession. I can deal with this shortly here because the parties are agreed that the Respondents are registered proprietors in possession with the consequence that paragraph 5 Schedule 4 comes into play. 10.3 If I find that there is a mistake in the Register and since the Respondents are registered proprietors in possession of the Disputed Land, whether (a) the Respondents by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or (b) would it for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made. I can deal with part of this quite shortly too because Mr Paget accepts that if I find that there is a mistake in the Register arising from the Respondents’ Form ADV1 application, then there has been at the very least a lack of proper care on their part. But, he submitted, it would not be unjust to leave registration in the Respondents’ names. 10.4 Lastly, whether there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration.

11. Since it is the Applicants who have brought this application, they bear the burden of proof to the civil standard (i.e. the balance of probabilities). For the avoidance of any doubt, this means that the Applicants have the burden of proving that the Respondents were not in adverse possession of the Disputed Land for the 10 year period prior to the date that they made their application (note: this differs to the position where a squatter makes the application). But this evidential burden was qualified by the Court of Appeal in Baxter v Mannion: “The legal onus of proof lay upon Mr Mannion. He put in evidence prima facie showing that Mr Baxter’s claim to have been in exclusive possession for upwards of ten years was wrong. That shifted the evidential burden to Mr Baxter. On the facts, he failed to prove that he had been in adverse possession.” At paragraph

38. Put another way, if the Applicants adduce prima facie evidence that the Respondents were not in adverse possession of the Disputed Land for the period 1 August 2012 to 1 August 2022, the evidential (but not legal) burden shifts to the Respondents. How judges decide cases

12. Since the Applicants are representing themselves, they may find it helpful if I say a little about how judges in England and Wales decide civil cases such as this.

13. First, judges have no special abilities or superhuman powers that enable them to determine when someone is mistaken or lying, or to go back in time to see the land as it used to be other than perhaps with the aid of photographs. Rather, they consider the parties’ witness statements and supporting documents, listen to the witnesses giving live evidence at trial, listen to the parties’ arguments and then come to a decision. Judges decide cases on the basis of the material and arguments put before them by the parties; they do not investigate and or look for evidence. Each party is, therefore, responsible for putting forward the evidence and other material that they wish to rely upon, and formulating their legal arguments, so as to persuade the judge to find in their favour.

14. Secondly, there are two important procedural rules which judges have to observe. First, there is the burden of proof. Generally, the party asserting something in a civil case such as this, will bear the burden of proving it. In this case, the Applicants bear the burden of proving his case. This is important because if the person bearing the burden of proof satisfies the Court or Tribunal that something happened, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did happen. Conversely, if that person does not satisfy the Court or Tribunal that something happened, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did not happen. The decision is binary: Either something happened or it did not and there is no room for maybe. Sometimes, therefore, the result of a case will depend upon who bears the burden of proof. Secondly, there is the standard of proof. In civil cases such as this, the standard of proof is simply the balance of probabilities. This means that if the judge considers that something that is in issue in the case is more likely to have happened than not, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did happen. The more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence required to persuade the judge that something is more like to have happened than not.

15. Thirdly, there is the issue of fallibility of memory. It is nowadays generally acknowledged that human memory is notoriously fallible. This can be particularly important in cases where, as here, some of the relevant facts occurred decades ago and memories may well have dimmed over the years. Civil judges prefer to rely upon contemporaneous documentary evidence, where available, as it tends to be more objective and reliable than memory alone.

16. Lastly, civil judges must give reasons for their decisions. They are not, however, required to address every piece of evidence tendered or every argument raised. They deal with the issues that matter most. It should be borne in mind that a judge’s findings of fact are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression made upon the judge by the evidence. Further, that although judgments are unlikely to explain all aspects of a judge’s reasoning, and might well have been better expressed, they should at least address the main issues and enable the parties to understand how the decision was reached. The evidence

17. The parties’ evidence suffered from a lack of focus which was to some extent understandable given their lack of legal representation – the Applicants dispensed with their solicitors long ago and the Respondents only instructed Mr Paget for trial. Neither the Applicants nor the Respondents filed Witness Statements for trial and so relied upon their Statements of Case. I only heard oral evidence from the First Applicant and the First Respondent. I am not going to rehearse all their evidence for reasons that will become apparent below.

18. The First Applicant said that throughout his ownership, from 2007 to 2022, he occupied, possessed, maintained and always believed that he owned the Disputed Land. In his Statement of Case, he describes the Disputed Land as a strip that is a continuation of a raised bed with low stone wall that runs from the front to the rear of the property gradually increasing in height. There is, he says, no discernible difference between his garden and the Disputed Land; they are part of the same garden. He explains that in this area of Blackburn there are lots of “very steep gradients” resulting in “sloping areas and retaining walls”. His belief that he owned the Disputed Land is, he says, evidenced by a planning application that he made in March 2008 and which the local authority approved on 22 May 2008.

19. The First Applicant went on to say that in 2022 the Respondents erected a fence in such a way as to incorporate the Disputed Land into their garden. The Respondents followed this on 29 July 2022 with their Form ADV1 application to be registered as proprietors. He was not notified of this application and says that it contained many untrue assertions of fact as to exclusive possession. He relied upon various photographs of the Disputed Land and a video showing his grandson playing upon it in 2018 which he says support his case. During cross-examination he accepted that it was not possible to see the fence in most of his photographs but he was adamant that the Respondents only erected it in 2022 and that it was not in situ when the video was made in 2018.

20. The First Applicant also made various allegations against the Respondents. He said that they had doctored their photographic evidence prepared for the Tribunal and that the First Respondent had even impersonated him in two calls to his solicitors in June 2024.

21. The Respondents say that at the time they bought their property, in 2005, their conveyancing solicitors advised them that the Disputed Land belonged to the developer of their cul-de-sac (i.e. Halmar) and that they should wait for the requisite period to pass before submitting a claim. The solicitors advised that only they could benefit from the Disputed Land as no one else could see or access it. At that time there was no fence dividing the Disputed Land from the adjoining land and the then owner of the Applicant’s Property had confirmed that it did not belong to her. In 2007 a new owner of the Applicant’s Property, Mr Akram, threatened them over the Disputed Land and erected a fence along the boundary between it and the Respondents’ Property. Mr Akram was then shot dead by the FBI following a terrorist incident in the USA and then the First Respondent bought his property. The First Respondent said that he had many discussions / arguments with the First Applicant about ownership of the Disputed Land and the location of the fence. The First Applicant “only had limited access” to it from 2008 to 2012 when the Respondents excluded all others by repositioning the fence to where it is now and thenceforth maintained it as a vegetable garden. At first the fence panels were placed loosely in-situ but in 2021 new fence panels were concreted into the ground.

22. Before me the Respondents’ accepted that their Form ADV1 application wrongly claimed exclusive possession from 2007. In fact, the period started in 2012. This non-material error was attributable to the First Respondent misunderstanding the law on adverse possession.

23. The First Respondent was asked about the 2018 video. His oral evidence was that the boys in the video went onto the Disputed Land only on that occasion. He told them off and they never returned. When asked to explain why the fence was on the “wrong side” of the Disputed Land, the First Respondent replied, “they lifted the fence panels”. When it was suggested that this was beyond 8-year-olds, he said “Somebody did” but that he had not seen who. When then put to him that the fence looked to be “pretty stuck in”, he agreed and said, “The panels had broken off and someone had put them in between the wooden poles on [his] side.” It had taken him “two seconds” to put the fence back.

24. The Respondents disputed the Applicants’ allegations of doctoring various photographs saying that the alterations made to the dates were explicable but did accept that the First Respondent impersonated the First Applicant in June 2024. Analysis & discussion Whether there is a mistake in the Register

25. The first issue for me to decide is whether there is a mistake in the register. As outlined above, if the Applicants adduce prima facie evidence that the Respondents were not in adverse possession of the Disputed Land for the period 1 August 2012 to 1 August 2022, the evidential (but not legal) burden shifts to the Respondents. Have the Applicants adduced evidence prima facie showing that the Respondents’ claim to have been in adverse possession for the requisite 10 years was wrong?

26. The video taken in 2018 by the First Applicant’s grandson is compelling. Although it did not make much sense to me before trial, I found it very helpful after the site view. In the video the fence is situated along the Disputed Land’s eastern (not western as now) boundary and appears firmly in-place – the First Respondent agreed both when being cross-examined (see paragraph 23 above) and after watching the video a number of times, I agree; the fence is not situated between the Disputed Land and the Applicants’ Property and it looks firmly in-place – see, in particular, at about minutes 1:28, 1:45, 3:30 and 4:39 (see also the stills at pages 283 to 285 of the Trial Bundle).

27. I was wholly unpersuaded by the First Respondent’s evidence on this. I do not accept his claim that some unknown, unseen person had moved the fence panels. Not only is this highly unlikely but also the fence looks to be firmly in-situ in the video. Further, the First Respondent only came up with this explanation whilst being cross-examined; there was no mention of it in his written case. At first, he suggested that the children must have moved the fence but, I think, realised this suggestion was untenable and so fell-back on the “somebody did” explanation. Accordingly, I find that the video is prima facie evidence that the Respondents were not in adverse possession when the video was taken in 2018 and the evidential burden shifts to the Respondents.

28. I find that the Respondents have not discharged that evidential burden because the video alone shows that they were not in adverse possession at the date in 2018 when it was made. This completely undermines the Respondents’ claim to have been in adverse possession from 2012 to 1 August 2012 and so their registration as proprietors was a mistake.

29. Although that disposes of the mistake point, I should say a few words about the Respondents’ evidence. I did not find him to be a reliable witness and prefer the First Applicant’s evidence where they differ. I have already dealt with the First Respondent’s evidence about the moving (or not, as I have found) of the fence at the time of the video. To add to this, there is his admission to having in June 2024 twice impersonated the First Applicant when leaving messages for the First Applicant’s then solicitor. This was thoroughly discreditable conduct.

30. There was also the First Respondent’s evidence about the alterations to photographs (including to their metadata) that he adduced as evidence before me. To give one example, the photograph on page 237 which bears the date “31 August 2012” and “LIVE” with the symbols and letters denoting that the photograph was a high-definition live photograph. The Applicants identified two issues with this photograph. First, the local mosque visible in the background did not exist in 2012 and was only built later that decade. Secondly, “live” photographs were not introduced by Apple until some years later. I do not accept the First Respondent’s explanation that he had simply taken a photograph of an old photograph and adjusted the metadata of the new photograph to reflect the date of the original photograph but got the date wrong; rather, it looks as though he was attempting to present a narrative in line with his case.

31. Another difficulty that I have with the Respondents’ case is that they have never actually given a date for when they claim to have taken exclusive possession. The nearest they got was “2012”. If the date was after 1 August 2012, they would not have achieved the requisite 10 years by 1 August 2022 when they applied to the Registry. They cannot, therefore, satisfy me that they were in exclusive possession at the start of the requisite 10 year period. Whether the Respondents are registered proprietors in possession

32. If there is a mistake in the Register, then we are concerned with “rectification” given that the Respondents are clearly and indisputably in possession and rectification will prejudicially affect their title. The parties agree this. Whether (a) the Respondents by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or (b) would it for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made

33. Accordingly, and since the Respondents most certainly do not consent to rectification, then I cannot order rectification unless (a) the Respondents by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or (b) it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made.

34. As explained at paragraph 10.3 above, Mr Paget accepted that if I found a mistake in the Register arising from the Respondents Form ADV1 application, then his clients would at the very least have substantially contributed to it. Given my finding that the Respondents’ claim to have been in adverse possession from 2012is not made out and so should not have been made, then (a) is made out. At the very least there was a lack of proper care. Whether there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration

35. Since I have found that paragraph 6(2)(a) of Schedule 4 is made out, then I must order rectification unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not doing to. Although this is a matter of discretion, I must, as per Morgan J in Paton v Todd, consider (a) are there such exceptional circumstances in this matter, and (b) if so, do those exceptional circumstances justify not making the alteration? As Morgan J went on to say, “Exceptional is an ordinary, familiar English adjective. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual or special, or uncommon; to be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented, or very rare but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.”

36. The Applicants submitted that there were no exceptional circumstances, that it was they who had an interest in the Disputed Land and that the Respondents were only registered because they gave false information to the Registrar in their ADV1 application.

37. Mr Paget submitted that the circumstances were exceptional because there are no consequences flowing from the mistake. The Disputed Land is not encumbered there are no indemnity issues and the former registered proprietor, the Duchy, engaged in the registration process and accepted the Respondents’ registration. This case is very much at the Patonv Todd end of the spectrum compared to Baxter v Mannion and there would be no purpose in rectifying the Register.

38. I have considered whether the Duchy ought to be given an opportunity to make representations but it has not been joined as a party and I think it important that this matter be concluded rather than invite further representations (including from the parties in response to whatever the Duchy might say) and drag the matter out. On any view, this is not a valuable or significant parcel of land (although I appreciate that it is important to the parties).

39. I think that the circumstances of this case are exceptional. This is not a case where an applicant seeks alteration so as to be registered as proprietor in place of the current registered proprietor – as discussed above, neither of the Applicants are in-line to be registered as the proprietor. It is out of the ordinary and I note that Morgan J considered such a situation to be exceptional in Paton v Todd (at paragraph 76).

40. Does this exceptional circumstance taken together with all relevant circumstances justify or not a refusal to alter the Respondents’ registered title? In considering this, I should consider the effect on the parties of (a) altering the Respondents’ title, and (b) refusing to alter it.

41. Starting with the effect on the Applicants. Neither will benefit directly if the title is altered since neither is in-line to supplant the Respondents. However, they will be vindicated if the Respondents lose the title and the Second Applicant may well be able to buy the Disputed Land from the Duchy, as per the procedure set out in Farrer & Co’s letter, either as the highest bidder or because the Duchy refuses to sell to the Respondents. If alteration is refused, I suppose there will be the disappointment of seeing the Respondents succeed and the loss of an opportunity for the Second Applicant to obtain the title from the Duchy.

42. Turning to the Respondents. If their title is altered, they will be put back in the position that they would have been in but for their Form ADV1 application. It seems to me that this is something that they cannot complain about since that application should never have succeeded, let alone been made. If alteration is refused, they will have obtained title to the Disputed Land in circumstances in which they were not entitled to do so.

43. If I order rectification, the Duchy will be restored as the registered proprietor as it should be. Whilst it is true, as Mr Paget argues, that the Duchy had an opportunity to resist the Respondents’ Form ADV1 application in 2022 and simply put the Respondents to proof, its attitude might have been different if it known that the Respondents did not have the requisite 10 years. There is also the point that the Duchy’s title ought never to have been challenged. Mr Paget might refer me to Farrer & Co letter dated 18 September 2023 in which it was stated that the Duchy “does not get involved in adverse possession applications and leaves the Land Registry to make its decision on the facts.” That may be so, but the Registrar would not have given effect to the Respondents’ Form ADV1 application if aware that the Respondents had not been in exclusive possession for the requisite 10 years.

44. Further, I do not think that rectification would serve no purpose. The Duchy might not be particularly keen on being re-registered as the proprietor but it can (and, I imagine, almost certainly will) sell the Disputed Land as per the procedure set out in Farrer & Co’s letter dated 18 September 2023. It will most likely have two keen prospective purchasers in the Second Applicant and the Respondents and such a sale would benefit the public purse.

45. Accordingly, I must approve the application as there are no exceptional circumstances which justify not doing do. Conclusion and disposal

46. Accordingly, I will direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to Ali Musa Ebrahim Patel’s original application dated 18 July 2023 (made by a Form AP1 of the same date) for alteration of the Register as if Sufyan Patel and Hamida Patel’s objection dated 3 November 2023 (made by letter dated 1 November 2023) had not been made. Costs

47. As regards costs, paragraph 9.1(b)(i) of the Land Registration Division’s Practice Direction provides that if the Tribunal decides to make an order about costs, ordinarily the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the successful party’s costs.

47. My preliminary view is that the Applicants are entitled to payment by the Respondents of their reasonable and proportionate costs (i.e. on the Standard Basis) since referral by the Registry to the Tribunal on 13 May 2024.

48. Accordingly, I direct: 48.1 By 5 pm on 28 November 2025, any party who wishes to make an application for costs should file and serve by email (a) written submissions on the principle of who should pay costs and upon what basis, and (b) a Form N260 (or substantially similar) setting out he costs claimed with sufficient explanation for the Judge and the other party to understand the basis for claiming each element of those costs, 48.2 If such a costs application is served, then by 5 pm 5 December 2025 the recipient of that application should file and serve their representations in response. 48.3 The party applying for costs may then file and serve a response by no later than 5 pm 12 December 2025. Dated this 21st day of November 2025 Judge Alexander Bastin By Order of The Tribunal