Mr Justice Sweeting: Introduction 1. This is a renewed application for permission to appeal following a refusal on paper on 15 December 2025. 2. The application arises from the judgment and order of District Judge Tempia dated 25 April 2025, ordering the extradition of Mr Andrzej Domin (“the Applicant”) to Poland pursuant to a Part 1 European Arrest Warrant (“the EAW”). 3. The EAW was issued on 9 May 2024 by the Regional Court in Białystok and certified by the NCA on 3 August 2024. It relates to two convictions: a. Conviction 1 (II K 294/13) in respect of assaults committed on 10 June 2012, resulting in an activated sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment. The facts of the first assault were that the Applicant punched the victim to the face and body and then kicked him whilst he was on the ground, causing injuries to his to his eye and face. The second offence involved the Applicant grabbing the victim’s arms and punching her in the arm and head causing bruising to the skin of her inner left arm. b. Conviction 2 (II K 52/14) was in respect of an assault committed on 3 May 2013, resulting in an activated sentence of 1 year 3-months’ imprisonment. This involved striking the victim in the face area with a glass mug causing a cut to the left side of his neck and left ear lobe. 4. There was also one accusation matter in respect of non-payment of child maintenance between 13 August and 6 December 2014. The District Judge concluded that this was not capable of being an extradition offence and discharged the Applicant in relation to that part of the warrant. 5. The Applicant was arrested on 27 August 2024, did not consent to extradition, and has remained in custody since. The Extradition Hearing 6. The District Judge found that: a. The Applicant knew he had been convicted and given suspended sentences for both convictions. b. He left Poland for the UK in August 2013 knowing about Conviction 1. c. He had in fact agreed the sentence in Conviction 2 with the prosecutor. d. He was aware of the duty to notify the court of a change of address but failed to do so. e. In respect of both convictions, he knowingly and deliberately placed himself outside the legal process. f. The Applicant was a fugitive. 7. The District Judge rejected his challenges under section 20 and held that extradition was proportionate under Article 8 ECHR. 8. The Applicant now seeks permission to appeal on two grounds. Ground 1: Section 20 9. The Applicant contends the District Judge was wrong to conclude that he was “deliberately absent” from the proceedings in either conviction. 10. As far as Conviction 1 is concerned the District Judge concluded that: “The JA has proved so I am sure that the RP deliberately absented himself from his trial in relation to conviction 1, case ref II K 294/13. Box D 3.1.a confirms he was summoned in person and informed of the date and place of the trial and that a decision may be handed down if he did not attend. The RP also accepted in oral evidence that he knew he had been convicted and sentenced in respect of this conviction when he came to the UK in August 2013.” 11. On behalf of the Applicant, Mr Hepburne Scott submitted that whilst Box D(3)(a) of the EAW states that the Applicant was “summoned in person”, Box D(4) does not specify how or where, so giving rise to uncertainty and, it was asserted, failing to meet the burden on the Respondent to prove deliberate absence to the criminal standard. 12. He argued the District Judge improperly relied on the Applicant’s evidence that he knew of the conviction when he came to the UK in August 2013, because the sentence became final only on 20 June 2013, and was not operative when he arrived in this country. 13. In relation to Conviction 2 The District Judge found: “I also find that in relation to conviction 2, case ref II K 52/14 the JA has proved so I am sure that the RP deliberately absented himself from his trial. The notice of the hearing was sent via the police to his registered address. He had agreed the sentence with the prosecutor so did not need to attend the hearing. He was told of his appeal rights but did not exercise them. He had an obligation to notify the court of any change of address and he did not provide an address. I do not accept his evidence that he returned to Poland in January 2014 to conclude this matter. He had already agreed the sentence with the prosecutor and was fully aware of the condition to notify the court of any change of address.” 14. Mr Hepburne Scott submitted that it was not enough that the summons was “considered served” according to the EAW. Although Box D(4) is completed, the reasons given, reliance on information from the Applicant’s mother, and the assumption that he had left the country, do not, he argued meet the requirements of section 20; a simple failure to attend cannot amount to a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of the right to be present, applying Bertino v Italy [2024] UKSC 9. The Applicant denied knowingly waiving his rights, asserting he was unaware of proceedings and had attempted to resolve matters. 15. The Respondent did not attend the renewal hearing but relied on the submissions accompanying the Respondent’s Notice. In those written submissions it contended that the District Judge was entitled to find deliberate absence for both convictions and that none of the Applicant’s points were reasonably arguable. 16. The EAW, in respect of Conviction 1, clearly records that the Applicant was personally summoned and informed of the consequences of non‑attendance whilst his own evidence confirmed he knew of the conviction and sentence when he came to the UK. The District Judge was therefore entitled to find that he knowingly avoided the process. 17. In relation to Conviction 2, it was submitted that the Applicant actively participated by reaching an agreement with the prosecutor for conviction without trial. The judgment and appeal instructions were sent to the address he provided. He failed to notify the court of a new address, despite a legal obligation to do so, and in those circumstances his conduct met the test for knowing and intelligent waiver under Bertino. Ground 2: Article 8 18. The District Judge conducted a balancing exercise setting factors in favour of extradition against those which militated against it. She found: “The RP has to serve a total sentence of 1 year 11 months for violent offending. He is wanted to serve 8 months for offences of common assault. It may be that by the end of this month the RP would have served that sentence whilst being on remand in the UK but he still has a sentence of 1 year 3 months to serve for an offence of wounding. Furthermore, he is not a man of good character in the UK and notably has a conviction for violence, common assault, for which he was sentenced to a one-year community order on 24th May 2021. I have also found he is a fugitive. I accept he has been in the UK for some time having first come in August 2013 and then returning in January 2014 and I accept he suffered from alcohol addiction when he returned which left him homeless and unemployed. It is to his credit that he has managed to turn his life around and with the help of his GP and other services has been sober for three years. He met his partner in 2017 and they have been living together ever since. I accept she is emotionally dependent on him. In her statement she says the relationship will fall apart if he is extradited but she does not expand about why she says that is likely to happen. Since being employed I accept he has helped her financially, but she is working and is still living in the room they rent. He has also been sending money to his children in Poland. I accept that may impact on them but the accusation part of the warrant relates to non-payment of child maintenance between 13th August 2014 and 6th December 2023 so it can be inferred that the children have been financially supported by the parent with whom they live and this can continue. I do not have any evidence to the contrary. Although I accept the RP has turned his life around and he is no longer abusing alcohol and should commended for that he is a fugitive and has committed serious offences and, even if he has served the 8-month sentence, he still has 1 year and 3 months to serve for the second conviction of violence. The very strong counter-balancing factors required before extradition could be disproportionate and would dimmish the public interest in upholding extradition arrangements and preventing the UK being seen as a safe haven for fugitives as per Celinski [39] are not found in this case and I do not consider that extradition would be disproportionate.” 19. The Applicant argues that the District Judge erred in finding extradition proportionate, contending that he has served most or all of the 8‑month sentence while on remand, and that extradition would cause disproportionate hardship to him and his partner, who is said to be emotionally dependent on him. 20. In addition, it was said that the District Judge did not give adequate weight to delay, his rehabilitation and the impact on his established life in the UK. 21. The Respondent submits that the proportionality finding was orthodox and fully consistent with Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] 2 AC 487; H(H) v Italy Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2013] 1 AC 338; and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2016] 1 WLR 551. The District Judge considered the evidence, applied the correct legal principles, and conducted the proper balancing exercise. In particular she was entitled to give substantial weight to: a. the seriousness of the violent offending; b. the activated custodial sentences; c. the Applicant’s fugitivity, which requires “very strong counterbalancing factors”. 22. The District Judge took account expressly of: a. time already served; b. the partner’s emotional dependency; c. delay and the Applicant’s personal circumstances. 23. The Respondent argues the Applicant’s renewal grounds merely restate factors already considered and do not demonstrate that the District Judge’s assessment was arguably wrong, irrational, or based on any error of law. 24. The Respondent invited the Court to refuse permission to appeal, submitting that neither ground is reasonably arguable and that the District Judge made no error in her findings on section 20 or Article 8. Discussions and Conclusions Section 20 25. Section 20 applies where the requested person has been convicted in the issuing state but did not attend the trial which resulted in the conviction. The Court must determine whether the person deliberately absented himself. If deliberate absence is established, the statutory bar does not arise, and extradition is not prohibited. The applicable principles were correctly set out by the District Judge in her judgment. Conviction 1 26. The EAW states that on 27 May 2013, the Applicant was “summoned in person”, informed of the date and place of the hearing, and notified that the proceedings might continue in his absence. The Applicant submits that, as Box D(4) does not specify how or where service occurred, the District Judge could not be satisfied of proper notification. However, Box D(4) says: “If you have ticked the box under points 3.1.b, 3.2 or 3.3 above, please provide information about how the relevant condition has been met”. The relevant box under Box D(3) in respect of personal service is 3.1.a. Thus, there is no requirement to provide details where the warrant states that personal service was effected on the requested person. In any event the statement on the warrant is determinative. In Cretu v Romania [2016] EWHC 353 (Admin) at [34-35], the Divisional Court observed: “34 In my judgment, when read in the light of article 4a section 20 of the 2003 Act, by applying a Pupino conforming interpretation, should be interpreted as follows: (i) ''Trial'' in section 20(3) of the 2003 Act must be read as meaning ''trial which resulted in the decision'' in conformity with article 4a(1)(a)(i). That suggests an event with a ''scheduled date and place'' and is not referring to a general prosecution process, Mitting J was right to foreshadow this in Bicioc's case. (ii) An accused must be taken to be deliberately absent from his trial if he has been summoned as envisaged by article 4a(1)(a)(i) in a manner which, even though he may have been unaware of the scheduled date and place, does not violate article 6 of the Convention. (iii) An accused who has instructed (''mandated'') a lawyer to represent him in the trial is not, for the purposes of section 20, absent from his trial, however he may have become aware of it. (iv) The question whether an accused is entitled to a retrial or a review amounting to a retrial for the purposes of section 20(5), is to be determined by reference to article 4a(1)(d). (v) Whilst, by virtue of section 206 of the 2003 Act, it remains for the requesting state to satisfy the court conducting the extradition hearing in the United Kingdom to the criminal standard that one (or more) of the four exceptions found in article 4a applies, the burden of proof will be discharged to the requisite standard if the information required by article 4a is set out in the EAW. 35 It will not be appropriate for requesting judicial authorities to be pressed for further information relating to the statements made in an EAW pursuant to article 4a save in cases of ambiguity, confusion or possibly in connection with an argument that the warrant is an abuse of process. The issue at the extradition hearing will be whether the EAW contains the necessary statement. Article 4a is drafted to require surrender if the EAW states that the person, in accordance with the procedural law of the issuing member state, falls within one of the four exceptions. It does not contemplate that the executing state will conduct an independent investigation into those matters. That is not surprising. The EAW system is based on mutual trust and confidence. Article 1 of the 2009 Framework Decision identifies improvement in mutual recognition of judicial decisions as one of its aims. It also contemplates surrender occurring very shortly after an EAW is issued and certified. To explore all the underlying facts would generate extensive satellite litigation and be inconsistent with the scheme of the Framework Decision. Article 4a provides additional procedural safeguards for a requested person beyond the provision it replaced in the original version of the Framework Decision, but it does not call for one member state in any given case to explore the minutiae of what has occurred in the requesting member state or to receive evidence about whether the statement in the EAW is accurate. That is a process which might well entail a detailed examination of the conduct of the proceedings in that other state with a view to passing judgment on whether the foreign court had abided by its own domestic law, EU law and the Convention. It might require the court in one state to rule on the meaning of the law in the other state. It would entail an examination of factual matters in this jurisdiction, on which the foreign court had already come to conclusions''. 27. In Merticariu v Judecatoria Arad, Romania Supreme Court [2024] UKSC 10 the Supreme Court said [24]: “Second, paragraph (1) of article 4a contemplates that the exceptions in article 4a(1)(a)-(d) will be established by statements in the EAW itself. Paragraph (1) does not envisage a general evidential inquiry into those matters, and it does not call for one Member State in any given case to explore the minutiae of what has occurred in the requesting Member State or to receive evidence about whether the statement in the EAW is accurate. The requesting judicial authority is expected to convey the relevant information in the EAW itself, including information relating to absence from trial and the possibility of retrial, which is necessary to determine whether the executing judicial authority has the power to refuse to execute the warrant under article 4a. If the information set out by the requesting judicial authority in the EAW meets the requirements of article 4a that will provide the evidence upon which the executing judicial authority will act. If a requested person is surrendered on what turns out to be a mistaken factual assertion contained in the EAW relating to article 4a, then they will have the protections afforded by domestic, EU and Convention law in that jurisdiction: Cretu at paras 4, 24, 32, 35, 36 and 42.” 28. The warrant provides a clear and unambiguous statement that personal service occurred. Further, the Applicant’s own evidence was that when he left Poland for the United Kingdom in August 2013, he knew of the conviction and the suspended sentence. The sentence became final on 20 June 2013, and there is no inconsistency between the date of finality and the Applicant’s admitted knowledge when leaving Poland. 29. The District Judge found that the Applicant knew he was facing criminal proceedings, understood the consequences of non‑attendance, and thereafter left Poland without maintaining contact or fulfilling his obligation to notify the court of any change of address. She concluded that he had knowingly and deliberately placed himself outside the legal process. Such a finding was properly available to her on the evidence. Conviction 2 30. For Conviction 2, the summons was deemed served in accordance with Polish procedural law. 31. The Applicant argues that this cannot amount to a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of his right to be present, as required by Bertino v Italy [2024] UKSC 9. In Bertino there had been no criminal proceedings of which the requested person could have been aware when he left Italy. The factual position here, on the District Judge’s findings, is very different. It goes well beyond non‑receipt of process or lack of knowledge of a hearing date. The warrant states: “…the notice of the session date was sent through the police. According to police information, it was established in a conversation with his mother that Andrzej Domin had not been residing at his registered address from January 2014, presumably having left the country. Attendance at the session resulting in the decision was not mandatory. Upon a written request from the prosecutor and Andrzej Domin himself, the court issued a convicting judgment without holding a trial, based on an agreement between the prosecutor and the convicted individual. The issued judgment, along with instructions on appeal procedures, was sent to Andrzej Domin at the address he provided, but despite two attempts to notify him of the need to collect the correspondence (notification slips), he did not collect it. Despite the obligation to inform the court of any change of his address, he did not provide a new address, thus the copy of the judgment was deemed served (in accordance with Article 133, paragraph 2, and Article 139, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – the text of the provisions is provided below). The issued decision was not appealed. The judgment is final.” 32. The Applicant actively participated in the process, reached an agreement with the prosecutor to proceed without a trial and allowed service to take place at an address which remained the family home. The District Judge was entitled to find that he had deliberately then absented himself. This was a “knowing” waiver of his right to be present. Conclusion on Section 20 33. For both convictions, the findings of deliberate absence were justified and open to the District Judge. The Applicant has not demonstrated that she was arguably wrong to reach the conclusion that the bar under section 20 was not made out. Article 8 ECHR 34. The Court must consider whether extradition constitutes a disproportionate interference with the Applicant’s private or family life. The principles summarised in Norris, HH, and Celinski apply. These include: the constant and weighty public interest in extradition; the requirement of a balanced, fact‑sensitive assessment; and the respect ordinarily afforded to the first instance findings of fact. 35. Where the requested person is a fugitive, as here, very strong countervailing factors are required to defeat extradition. 36. The Applicant relies on: a. the period already spent on remand, including the possibility that the 8‑month sentence for Conviction 1 may effectively be served; b. the emotional dependency of his partner and the anticipated effect of extradition on their relationship; c. his employment, stability, and alleged rehabilitation in the UK; d. the age of the index offending (2012–2013). 37. The District Judge systematically addressed these matters. She acknowledged that part of the custodial term may have been served on remand but emphasised that the Applicant still has a 1 year 3-month sentence outstanding for a wounding offence. She accepted his partner’s emotional dependence but noted that her evidence did not explain why the relationship would necessarily collapse; she is in employment and remains in their accommodation. The District Judge recognised the delay since the offending but balanced this against the seriousness of the conduct, which she described as “serious offences”, and against the Applicant’s status as a fugitive. 38. She concluded that the public interest in extradition outweighed the personal and private-life considerations relied upon. Conclusion on Article 8 39. The District Judge’s conclusion, that extradition would not be disproportionate and is compatible with the Applicant’s Article 8 rights was plainly within the range of permissible judicial evaluations. The Article 8 ground is not reasonably arguable. Overall Conclusion 40. The Applicant’s grounds do not identify any reasonably arguable error of law, misdirection, or material factual mistake. They largely restate points already considered by the District Judge. The question for this Court is whether the District Judge was arguably wrong. There is no question which ought arguably to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong. Her approach complied with established authority. On the evidence, and given the finding of fugitivity, the balancing exercise could properly result only in the conclusion she reached. No irrationality or misapplication of principle is identifiable. It follows that I refuse the renewed application for permission. END