B v Ofsted

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008 2025-01482.EY Neutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 00718 (HESC) Heard on 30, 31 March and 1 April 2026 At Combined Court Centre Burnley Panel deliberations via video on 17 April 2026 Before Tribunal Judge Goodrich (Specialist Member Smith) (Specialist Member Billington) Between: Mrs B (Restricted Reporting Order made) Appellant and Ofsted Respondent DECISION AND REASONS Amended pursuant to the slip rule – Rule 44 applied Representation The Appellant represented herself and was supported by her partner, Mr DG. The Respondent: Ms Scarlett Milligan, counsel, instructed by Ofsted Legal Services. Preamble We delivered a decision regarding the outcome of the appeal in short form dated 6 May 2026. We now provide our reasons. The Appeal

1. This is an appeal by Mrs B against the decision made on 29 April 2025 to cancel her registration on the Early Years Register to provide childcare as a child minder in domestic premises, and on both the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register. The decision to cancel was made pursuant to Section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006. (“the Act”). The right of appeal lies under section 74 of the Act. The Parties

2. The Appellant is an NNEB qualified childminder. She has been registered with Ofsted as a provider of childminding services at her home since 2007.

3. The Respondent is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) and is the regulatory authority for childminding and childcare providers. Once a provider has been registered, Ofsted’s role is to establish whether the person or entity registered continues to meet the requirements for registration, underthe Regulations made pursuant to the Act, and remains suitable for registration. Restricted Reporting Order

4. The Tribunal makes a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matters likely to lead members of the public to identify children under the age of 18 to whom reference may be made. We also consider it appropriate to make an order regarding the children of Mrs B who are over 18 years old. Although they have attained their majority they are still young and the evidence before us suggests that they are, or may be, vulnerable.

5. Consistent with this, the names of the Appellant, her family members and others with whom she is associated will be anonymised in this decision. We have also avoided any reference to geographical location.

6. It is appropriate at this stage to describe the family relationships: a) Mrs B is the mother of B. B’s father is Mr DG. The original relationship between Mrs B and Mr DG ended many years ago. b) Mrs B was thereafter married to Mr B and they have two children together, both of whom were well under 16 at the time with which we are mainly concerned (2023 -2025). c) Mrs B also has a daughter (E), the child of a previous relationship, who is older than B. d) Mr and Mrs B had been foster parents approved by the local authority (LA). Mr and Mrs B had in the past fostered DA who is referred to in the evidence as B’s foster/”step” brother. e) In February 2023 Mrs B notified Ofsted of events regarding B (see below). At the time Mrs B was living with her husband Mr B and children, including B, at the registered setting. f) At some stage in 2024 Mr and Mrs B separated and they thereafter divorced. It appears that the current fostering arrangement ended in late 2024). g) At some stage in or about 2024 Mrs B began a new relationship with B’s father, Mr DG. The Background

7. This broad chronology appears to be as follows: 1 November 2007: Mrs B was first registered as a childminder on the Early Years Register. Her childminding takes place at her home. 6 February 2023: Mrs B notified Ofsted that her son B, then aged 17, had overdosed on ketamine and had required hospital treatment. 27 February 2023: Mrs Davies, Early Years Regulatory Inspector (EYRI), carried out a regulatory visit following the 6 February notification. The Respondent’s position is that on 27 February Mrs B informed Ms Davies that: • there had been another occasion in the summer of 2022 when B had taken drugs • there had also been a change in Mrs B’s health: she told Ms Davies that she was on prescribed medication for anxiety and had been for around 1 year. Mrs B said that she had safeguarding measures in place which included that B’s bedroom door was locked. However, Ms Davies found that B’s bedroom was not locked. Safeguarding arrangements were reviewed (including the need for B’s bedroom to be locked when childminded children are on the premises). 1 March 2023: Ofsted issued and published an Outcome Summary in relation to the failure to notify Ofsted of significant information. 8 March 2023: At a follow-up, Ofsted noted that the compliance actions (which related to concerns regarding the standards of care and the premises) were satisfied. 14 April 2023: Mrs B told Ms Davies, EYRI, in a telephone conversation that she understood the requirements regarding notification and would notify Ofsted if there were any changes to her health or any other significant event. September–December 2023: B attended residential rehabilitation for drug misuse. Following rehabilitation, B returned to live at the Appellant’s home. The Respondent’s case is that neither event was notified by Mrs B. 30 August 2024: Mrs B informed Ofsted that B was no longer a household member and had not been since 2 August 2024. On a date which has not been identified in evidence before us but which seems to have been in or about late August/early September 2024, B was arrested at an airport in connection with the importation of 95 kilograms of cannabis into the UK. Mrs B learned of this when she received a telephone call from B in custody. On or about 21October 2024: B was convicted upon his guilty plea of a drug trafficking/importation offence. A suspended custodial sentence was imposed. The release address provided to the court was Mrs B’s home (i.e. the registered childminding address). 8 November 2024: Mrs B emailed Ofsted seeking advice about B staying at her address occasionally following his conviction; this was the first notification to Ofsted of the fact of B’s arrest or conviction. 13 November 2024 Ms Raja, Probation Officer (PO), attended a pre-arranged visit to B at Mrs B’s address. Mrs B was present at the end of Ms Raja’s visit. 14 November 2024: Ofsted issued a Suspension Notice (effective in the first instance to 25 December 2024) due to safeguarding concerns and Mrs B’s failures to notify significant events. 27 November 2024: Mrs B lodged an appeal against the suspension. 29 November 2024: Mrs Hulley and Mrs Angela Rowley, Early Years Senior Officer (EYSO) conducted a regulatory visit with Mrs B. On 11 December 2024 Mrs Hulley conducted a further visit. Further information that had been gathered from other agencies was discussed. 18 December 2024: the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) confirmed Ofsted’s decision to suspend registration and dismissed the appeal.The suspension was thereafter extended (and has been further extended on a number of dates pending the substantive hearing of this appeal). 6 January 2025: Ofsted served a Notice of Intention (NOI) to cancel the Appellant’s registration. 10 February 2025: the Appellant responded to the NOI. 1 April 2025: the LADO provided information to Ofsted that Mrs B, following her divorce from Mr B, is in a romantic relationship with Mr DG (B’s father) who stays at her home part-time and has a recent ABH conviction with confirmed cocaine and alcohol use during testing; Children’s Social Care (CSC) had been involved regarding the Appellant’s younger children. 29 April 2025: Ofsted issued the decision to cancel registration 30 May 2025: the Appellant lodged her appeal. 8 July 2025 at 13:44: During a suspension compliance check, Ofsted recorded that the Appellant said that her partner DG was in bed upstairs. The Appellant stated he has “not officially moved in but might be doing so soon.” 17 July 2025: the police were called by Mrs B to her home regarding B and DA, both of whom appeared to be under the influence, and were refusing to leave; a Child Social Care (CSC) record provided by the police states that Mrs B said that she believed cannabis was being smoked at the address. 12 September 2025: the Appellant emailed Ofsted to the effect that B had arrived at her address with ketamine and she had made him dispose of it. She said that when she denied access to his locked bedroom he attempted to force the door, breaking the handle. The police attended. B later threatened suicide in a message. The Decision under Appeal

8. The notice of decision (NoD) dated 29 April 2025 is a matter of record and we need not relate its contents in full. It sets out the facts and matters relied on by Ofsted regarding the history of Mrs B’s engagement with Ofsted since 2023. In summary, the Respondent considers that the prescribed requirements for registration have ceased to be satisfied. It considers that Mrs B is no longer suitable to remain registered as a childcare provider. In outline the core reasons relied on included that: • Mrs B has repeatedly failed to notify Ofsted of significant events affecting her suitability to look after children. • Mrs B has repeatedly failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure that children and assistants are not exposed to risk. She does not demonstrate understanding of situations which may pose risk to children. • There are concerns about Mrs B’s honesty and integrity. She has provided different accounts, such that Ofsted cannot be sure that the version of events that Mrs B provides is truthful, accurate or reliable. The Appeal

9. In section H of the Notice of Appeal Mrs B set out her case. This referred to her dissatisfaction with Ofsted and its process. She did not seek to address the core reasoning provided by Ofsted in the NoD in terms. However, the overall effect is that Mrs B made plain in section H that she disagreed with the Respondent’s decision. The Appellant has since provided a number of formal witness statements including a reflective statement, as well as manyother documents and other material on which she relies. These include (but are not limited to) letters in support from members of staff and parents, texts from B and DA, evidence of text conversations, evidence regarding the many courses she has undertaken, material regarding first instance decisions made by the Tribunal in circumstances that Mrs B considers support her case, material regarding ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) and the effects or impacts of this condition. The Scott Schedule

10. The Scott Schedule (M597 and following) sought to distil or crystallise the issues in dispute and provided the Appellant with the opportunity to state her position regarding facts agreed or denied. Mrs B’s overall position is that she was suspended after emailing Ofsted on 8 November 2024 for advice regarding her son being able to visit her home/the premises. She contends that she has always been open and honest with Ofsted but, because of her ADHD, she struggles to recall facts especially when under pressure.

11. Mrs B’s position is that the decision to cancel her registration is unfair and disproportionate. She has had no support from Ofsted. She was “grilled for hours on end” and should not have been. All the stress had made her ill. She has had suspected mini strokes. Her partner (Mr DG – B’s dad) has been helping her as a carer by driving her to appointments. She will apply for a waiver should she want him to live with her full time. She has the right to a private/family life and not to face discrimination in the pursuit of her private and family life. She is fighting to save her 18 year career and the work she loves. Working with children is the best job for people with ADHD as it keeps (her) “busy and on the go”. The children were happy, safe and thriving. The last inspection had received a judgement of “good” in all areas. She will do anything that Ofsted requires. The Hearing

12. We had received and read a large indexed and paginated bundle consisting of 851 pages pdf, which included witness statements and other material, which we had read in advance. This included the report of Dr Riazdated 9 October 2025 which made clear the diagnosis of ADHD made on 7 October 2025 regarding Mrs B. Reasonable Adjustments

13. The panel noted that the hearing of the appeal had previously adjourned at the substantive hearing in October 2025. The Appellant was taken ill on her way to the hearing. She did attend by video the next day but it was considered that an adjournment was necessary to facilitate a fair hearing. The hearing was thereafter listed to be heard nearer to the Appellant’s home to facilitate her access.

14. We had considered in advance the guidance contained the Equal Treatment Bench Book (ETBB) regarding the nature of ADHD and how Mrs B’s health condition might impact upon her access to a fair hearing.

15. Mrs B told us that she had arranged for her mother, Mrs KP, to be her litigation support but it transpired that her mother could not now do so as her husband was very unwell. In these circumstances Mrs B wished to be supported by her partner, Mr DG.

16. The panel were aware that Mr DG was also to be a witness so asked Ms Milligan if the Respondent had any objections. No objection was raised.

17. The judge asked Mrs B what adjustments she thought would assist her. Mrs B said that it was mainly time to process information and regular breaks.

18. The panel retired to consider reasonable adjustments. On our return, we informed the parties that, in addition to frequent breaks, any questions asked of Mrs B should be short and focussed. The judge also explained to Mrs B that if, at any stage of the proceedings, she did not understand the process, what was happening, or what was being asked she need only say so. She and Mr DG (as her litigation support), confirmed that they each understood.

19. Thereafter the panel ensured that there were frequent and regular further breaks whilst evidence was being given in order to facilitate concentration and allow time to process the oral evidence. Mrs B was supported throughout by Mr DG. The requests made by Mrs B for a break or for more time were always accommodated. We interposed witnesses to accommodate their needs. The judge also asked questions of witnesses and also helped the Appellant and her witnesses to adduce their evidence in chief. The Oral Evidence

20. We heard oral evidence from the following: For the Respondent Susan Scotland, the Local Authority Designated Officer (the LADO – currently in place who has access to the records made in pursuit of business by the former LADO, Donna Green) Miss Aneesa Raja, Probation Officer Mrs Lois Hulley, EYRI Mrs Angela Rowley, EYSO For the Appellant Mrs AB, Mrs B’s cleaner Mrs KP, the Appellant’s mother, (The evidence of Mrs AB and Mrs KP was interposed at the request of the Appellant) Mrs B, the Appellant. Mr DG

21. All witnesses called to give evidence adopted the contents of their statements (or letters in the case of Mrs AB and Mrs KP) as the truth, and these stood as their main evidence. Each witness then answered questions by the other party and some questions from the panel. We will refer to aspects of the oral evidence and submissions as necessary when giving our reasons. The Law

22. The legal framework for the registration and regulation of childminders is to be found in Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 (“the Act”).

23. Section 32 of the Act provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) contains those providers registered to provide early years childminding/childcare for children from birth to the age of five years for which registration is compulsory. The second register (“the General Childcare Register”) is divided into two parts: A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childminding/childcare for children aged between 5 and 8 years for which registration is compulsory (“the compulsory part”). A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childminding/childcare for children aged over 8 years for which registration is voluntary (“the voluntary part”).

24. Section 40 of the Act imposes a duty upon those registered as an early years provider to comply with the welfare requirements of the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS).

25. Section 68 of the Act provides for the cancellation of a person’s registration in certain circumstances. Section 68(2) provides that Ofsted may cancel registration of a person registered on the Early Years Register or on either part of the General Childcare Register, if it appears: (a) that the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person’s registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied, (c) that he has failed to comply with a requirement imposed on him by regulations under that Chapter.

26. Section 74(1) of the Act provides a right of appeal to the Tribunal. Section 74 (4) provides that: (4) On an appeal the Tribunal must either— (a) confirm the taking of the step, the making of the other determination or the making of the order (as the case may be), or (b) direct that it shall not have, or shall cease to have, effect. (5) Unless the Tribunal has confirmed the taking of a step mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (e) or the making of an order under section 72(2) cancelling a person's registration, the Tribunal may also do either or both of the following— (a) impose conditions on the registration of the person concerned; (b) vary or remove any condition previously imposed on the registration. The Early Years Register

27. The prescribed requirements differ in respect of Early Years Provision, Later Years Provision, and Voluntary Registration. However, all three sets of requirements contain a requirement that the registered individual is suitable to provide the relevant type of childminding, and that others who live on the premises are suitable to be in regular contact with young children.

28. The prescribed requirements for Early Years registration are provided for the Childcare (Early Years Register) Regulations 2008. Those which are relevant in this case are as follows:

1. The applicant is an individual who is suitable to provide early years childminding…

5. The Applicant will comply with the EYFS [Early Years Foundation Stage] welfare requirements…

7. The applicant has carried out an assessment to identify any risks to the health or safety of children for whom early years childminding is to be provided, arising from- (a) the relevant premises… (b) any equipment there, and (c) the activities to be provided there”…

10. If the relevant premises are domestic premises, every person… who (a) lives on the relevant premises … is suitable to be in regular contact with young children. The Early Years Foundation Stage welfare requirements are contained in the Early Years Foundation Stage (Welfare Requirements) Regulations 2012. Relevant regulations include: Regulation 3: provides that “the obligatory provisions” of the Department of Education’s statutory guidance, the ‘Early Years Foundation Stage Statutory Framework for Childminders’ in respect of safeguarding, contained in Section 3 also have effect as welfare requirements. Relevant obligatory provisions include: 3.10: “Childminders must also ensure any person who may have regular contact with children (for example, someone living or working on the same premises where the childminding is being provided), must also be suitable 3.75: “Childminders must ensure that they take all reasonable steps to ensure that children in their care, and any assistants, are not exposed to risks and must be able to demonstrate how they are managing risks… Risk assessments should identify aspects of the environment that need to be checked on a regular basis, when and by whom those aspects will be checked, and how the risk will be removed or minimized.” Regulation 8(1) – Provision of Information: a provider “…must notify the relevant person [Ofsted] of the occurrence of any of the events set out in the Schedule to these Regulations and must at the same time provide the relevant person with the information specified in that Schedule in respect of that event”. Relevant provision in the Schedule includes: ·

7. Particulars of any other significant event which is likely to affect the suitability of the early years provider or any person who cares for, or is in regular contact with, children on the premises on which childcare is provided to look after children.” ·

11. In the case of an early years childminder – … (a) if the early years childminding is provided on domestic premises, any change of the persons of 16 years or older living or working on those premises…” Other Relevant Guidance

29. The Respondent also relies upon the following provisions of published guidance, particularly in respect of whether the Appellant meets the overarching requirements of suitability: (a) The ‘Early Years Foundation Stage Statutory Framework for Childminders’ The following items of guidance from the statutory framework are not prescribed requirements under the legislative scheme, but are nonetheless important provisions in respect of children’s welfare: 3.18: “…a childminder must notify Ofsted… of any significant event which is likely to affect the suitability of any person who is in regular contact with children on the premises where childcare is provided….” 3.19 : “…a childminder must give Ofsted… the following information above themselves or about any person who lives with, or is employed in the same household, as the registered childminder: · Details of any order, determination conviction, or other ground for disqualification from registration under regulations made under section 75 of the Childcare Act 2006. · The date of the order, determination or conviction, or the date when the other ground for disqualification arose. · The body or court which made the order, determination or conviction, and the sentence (if any) imposed. · Appellant certified copy of the relevant order (in relation to an order or conviction). 3.20 (in respect of 3.19, above): “Childminders must provide this information to Ofsted, or their CMA, as soon as reasonably practicable, but in any event within 14 days of the date the childminder became aware of the information or should have reasonably become aware of it if they had made reasonable enquiries9” 3.86: “…all childminders must, as soon as reasonably practicable but in any event within 14 days of the change, notify… Ofsted… of any change: · … In the persons aged 16 years or older living or working on any domestic premises from which childminding is provided or to the persons caring for children on any premises where childminding is provided… · …Any significant even which is likely to affect the suitability of any person who cares for, or/is in regular contact with, children on the premises on which childminding is provided…” (b) : ‘Childcare: Significant Events to Notify Ofsted About’ This guidance states, amongst other matters: “When you applied to be registered with Ofsted, we carried out a range of suitability checksbased on information you and others connected with your registration gave us. The kind of check we carry out depends on people’s roles. If there are any significant changes to any of this information after registration or anything significant happens, you must by law notify Ofsted if these changes have a negative impact on your childcare setting or safety of children. We also need to know about anything significant that is likely to affect the suitability ofindividuals to care for, or be in regular contact with, children. We need to know about these events, even if they happen: · when you are not working with children (in the evening or weekend) · when you have no children on roll · away from the registered premises” Who this guidance covers: We need to hear about significant events that are related tothe registered person and people connected with your registration, including: · anyone aged 16 or over who lives or works during childcare hours on domestic premises. This includes a childminder’s home, any home in which a childminder provides care, or any premises where childcare on domestic premises is provided. This is to make sure that we can check that all individuals connected with your registration continue to be suitable.” The Burden and Standard of Proof

30. In so far as any facts are in issue the Respondent bears the burden of proof and the standard is the balance of probabilities.

31. The burden rests on the Respondent to satisfy us that cancellation is justified, necessary and proportionately required in the public interest. The issue of proportionality involves a judgement which balances the public interests engaged against the interests of the Appellant. Our Consideration

32. We are required to determine the matter afresh and to make our own decision on the evidence as at today’s date. This includes consideration of new information or material that was not available at the date of decision which is relevant to the decision made. It is open to any appellant in any given case to rely on evidence to show that the facts were not as alleged and/or to dispute alleged breaches and/or to contend that opinions or views reached were wrong and/or mistaken and/or unjustified and/or that the issues have since been addressed. It is also open to any appellant to show that, whatever the past, there has been a change since the decision made such that the decision to cancel is no longer in accordance with the law and/or is not today necessary or proportionate.

33. In summary, the Respondent’s case is that the requirements for registration have ceased to be satisfied because Mrs B is not suitable to provide child minding services. She did not notify Ofsted of significant events regarding her son B on many occasions. This included the fact that he had been convicted of a drugs importation offence and she had provided her address as his release address. She lacks insight and understanding in relation to safeguarding. She is unable to assess risk. There are significant issues regarding the truth and/or reliability of information she provided to the regulator. The Regulator cannot trust her account. It is necessary and proportionate to cancel registration.

34. In essence, the Appellant’s disputes many of the facts or matters referred to in the evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses. She did not fail to notify Ofsted regarding her son B. Her son B was not living at her home following his release from prison so there was no obligation to notify Ofsted. She has been unfairly treated and/or misunderstood by the professionals concerned and/Ofsted. No or no adequate account has been taken of her ADHD. The decision is discriminatory. She is suitable. She is able to assess risk. Her position is that Ofsted should make a list of what she can or cannot do and she will abide by that. She has worked as a childminder for many years and has the support of parents. The ability to work in the role that she loves is important to her livelihood, health and well-being. Cancellation is disproportionate in all the circumstances.

35. The redetermination in this appeal includes consideration of the more detailed evidence provided by both sides in this appeal as well as the oral evidence which has now been subjected to cross examination. We have considered all the evidence and submissions before us. If we do not refer to any particular aspect of the evidence/submissions it should not be assumed that we have not taken these into account. It is not necessary for us to decide every point in dispute before us. We will not set out all the oral or documentary evidence before us but will refer to parts of it when making our key findings.

36. Mrs B places emphasis on the fact that the issues of concern held by Ofsted impact upon the exercise of her private and family life. However, the Appellant is a registered childminder who chose to provide (and wishes to continue to provide) regulated services within her home (i.e. within a private/family life setting). In our view the regulator cannot seek to dismiss concerns that arise simply on the basis that any regulatory decision might impact on private/family life. A child minder who wishes to use her own home to provide services to children should be able to understand that. The home into which minded children are invited is the setting within which child-minding services are provided. If a provider is not content with the fact that registration involves consideration of the family setting, and the suitability of other household members on a continuing basis, he or she can seek registration to provide services in non-domestic premises, or work in a different child-care setting.

37. The main issue in this appeal is whether the concerns regarding the Appellant’s suitability are proven and/or justified. Suitability is a concept that goes to the very heart of childcare provided by registered childminders. It involves consideration of the ability of the registered person to recognise, understand and respond appropriately to safeguarding concerns and to assess any risk to the interests of childminded children. It also requires consideration of the ability to the registered person to comply with the requirements to notify the regulator of significant events. The obligation under the EYFS (see para 3.77 and 3.78) is to notify Ofsted of any changes as soon as is reasonably practicable, but always within 14 days. This includes: “any significant event which is likely to affect the suitability of the early years provider or any person who cares for, or is in regular contact with, children on the premises to look after children.”

38. The point and purpose of notification is so that Ofsted can carry out its own risk assessment and decide what action, if any, may be necessary to protect the interests of minded children.

39. We kept in mind at all times the pressures and difficulties faced by the Appellant in the context of her own health needs and disability as well as challenges presented by the needs of her own children. We recognise that there had been no substantial history of regulatory enforcement action prior to the events that unfolded regarding her son, B. In the last inspection in October 2022 the provision had been rated as good. Our Findings

40. We have considered all of the evidence in the round. We find that the outline facts are set out in the chronology at paragraph 7 above. A core aspect of this case concerns the issue of non-notification of events regarding B. Mrs B provided a reflective statement (undated but written some nine months after her suspension so in or about August 2025). She has also provided statements dated 3 September 2025 (I 201), 28 September 2025 (K409), 9 October 2025 (N601) and an emailed response to the third witness statement of Mrs Hulley dated 05 November 2025 (S838).

41. To a large extent the issues regarding non notification were accepted by Mrs B in answer to Ms Milligan’s questions, albeit with various qualifications. Having carefully considered the records made contemporaneously, and also Mrs B’s subsequent statements and responses, we noted that Mrs B’s insight or understanding of her obligations regarding notification appears to have fluctuated. For the avoidance of doubt we make findings as set out below.

42. On 14 April 2023 Mrs B told Mrs Davies, EYRI, in a telephone conversation that she understood the requirements regarding notification and would notify Ofsted if there were any changes to her health or any significant event.

43. It is clear that between September–December 2023 B attended a residential rehabilitation unit for drug misuse. Mrs B did not notify Ofsted that B’s drug use was such that he now required residential care. B then returned to reside with Mrs B.

44. On 30 August 2024 Mrs B informed Ofsted in an email that B was no longer a household member. The effect of her email was that she was informing Ofsted that B had moved out on 2 August.

45. On a date that has not been formally evidenced but appears to have been in or about late August/early September 2024, B was arrested at an airport on arrival from Thailand in connection with the importation of cannabis; the Appellant learned of this because B called her from custody.

46. Mrs B subsequently told Mrs Hulley that B said he had been offered £10,000 to smuggle drugs into the UK. The value of the cannabis imported has been said to be £500,000.

47. There is a lack of formal/documentary evidence but the information before us is that on 21 October 2024 B was convicted (upon his guilty plea) of a drug trafficking/importation offence. A custodial sentence was imposed. The actual length of the term of imprisonment is unknown to us, but we are informed that it was suspended for two years.

48. The release address provided to the court was Mrs B’s home (i.e. the registered childminding address). Mrs B’s evidence before us was to the effect that at the last minute, and as the case was called on, she was put under pressure by B’s solicitor to agree to her address being provided because otherwise B would remain in custody. She also said that she had told the judge that she was providing her address “under duress” but the release address was nonetheless accepted by the court.

49. We consider it unlikely that Mrs B’s account that she informed the judge that her provision of her address was under duress is accurate. We accept, however, that she did provide her address so as to enable B’s release. We consider it likely that she felt under pressure as a mother to do so.

50. Mrs B did not notify Ofsted of the fact of her son’s arrest, or his conviction or that she had agreed to her address (the registered setting) being his release address (under duress or otherwise).

51. On 8 November 2024 Mrs B emailed Ofsted seeking advice about B staying at her address occasionally following his conviction for smuggling cannabis. This was the first time that Ofsted received any information regarding the fact of B’s conviction – or even the fact that he had been arrested. Mrs B said that B had been staying at his friends whilst the probation officer found him somewhere to live. In her email she asked: “on occasions would it be OK if he stayed in my house eg. if he has an appointment nearby. I can still ensure that he’s nowhere near the childminded children at all times. We have a separate playroom and are out and about a lot of the time at playgroups and soft play centres and parks….”

52. Pausing there, the reference to the ability to take minded children out of the setting to external playgroups, parks and the like, tends to suggest that Mrs B had in mind that her son would be present in the setting during childminding hours. Shealsoreferred to two assistants always supervising the children and searching B on entry. In our view this would only be relevant if his entry was anticipated/contemplated during childminding hours (i.e. when the assistants were present).

53. We noted that in her reflective statement (I 172) Mrs B said she had emailed Ofsted for advice about B visiting the property if he had appointments in the town (and) as soon as B had told her that the probation officer needed to see the house. This was not, however, the information provided by Mrs B to the Respondent in her email on 8 November 2024. Mrs B did not inform Ofsted on 8 November 2024 or thereafter that her son would be visiting the house with his probation officer who (as Mrs B claims) wanted to see where he had been brought up.

54. On 13 November 2024 Ms Raja, Probation Officer, attended a pre-arranged appointment with B at Mrs B’s address. By all accounts this visit was relatively brief. Mrs B was only present at the end of this visit for about 10 minutes.

55. Ms Raja told us that she had conducted a “home visit” in order to check where B was living. B had showed her his bedroom. We have no doubt that Ms Raja attended the home in order to check where B was living. Her evidence was that B had told her that he was staying at Mrs B's home at night but not during the day. He had to "disappear" during the day; he was finding it difficult to occupy his daytime as he couldn't be at home, whilst the children were there.

56. Mrs B denies that her son B was, in fact, living at her home. Her explanation for non-notification to Ofsted is that B was not living at home so there was no need to notify. Mrs B has maintained that she thought that this visit by the probation officer was to simply check on B’s past background i.e. where he has been brought up. She said in her statement dated 28 September 2025 that B’s probation officer needed to see his last settled address for background checks. Mrs B also said in her statement that she confirmed with the PO (on 13 November 2024) that B was living with DA. She maintains today that B was living with DA, her former foster child and B’s co-defendant in the drugs importation offence. The implication of her evidence is that she thought B living with his co-defendant DA would be acceptable to the probation officer.

57. On any basis Mrs B had provided her address to the court as a release address for her son. In our view it is unlikely that she did not understand that this was a representation to the court that B would be living at her address on his release. We do not accept that Mrs B believed that Ms Raja was visiting the home simply to check on B’s past background. We do not accept that Ms Raja was informed by Mrs B (in the presence of B as she asserts) that B was not living at Mrs B’s address but at DA’s address. We consider that Ms Raja was a credible and straightforward witness. Her account was that B had said that he had to "disappear" during the day and that he was finding it difficult to occupy his daytime as he couldn't be at home whilst the children were there. This is consistent with Mrs B’s address being B’s residence as well as Mrs B’s awareness that there was a very significant regulatory issue regarding her son’s suitability to live/be at the home/setting.

58. We heard evidence from Mrs AB, the Appellant’s cleaner, to the effect that she had not seen evidence that B was living at the home/setting. She said, for example, she had not seen his belongings such as his coats or shoes. We noted that, despite being given the opportunity to reconsider her evidence regarding dates, she was very firm in her evidence that the period to which she was referring was in 2025. On any basis she was being called to attest to the situation in 2024. Even assuming in the Appellant’s favour that Mrs AB made a simple error in this regard, we do not attach much weight to her evidence. We noted that she cleaned the premises for onlythree hours once a week. We noted also that, even on Mrs B’s own evidence, B did stay at the home from time to time which Mrs AB’s evidence seems to dispute. Having considered the evidence in the round we did not consider that the evidence of Mrs AB is reliable.

59. Mrs KP is the mother or Mrs B and the grandmother of B. She said she worked with Mrs B on occasion as an assistant to help out at busy times. It used to be about 4 days per week. She said that on the day of the probation visit, she searched B on arrival and asked him if he was sober which he said he was. Ms Milligan asked whether B could have been lying – given it was known that B sometimes doesn’t tell the truth, Mrs KP said she always knew just by looking at him if he was lying. This struck us as somewhat naive.

60. When asked how often B was at Mrs B’s house, Mrs KP said he was “not always there”. Mrs KP said that she had never seen B there when children had been there. We are, however, aware from the evidence regarding Ms Raja’s visit on 13 September that B, and Mrs KP, had been present when child minded children were also present.

61. We are cautious about the weight to be attached to evidence from family members, each of whom might reasonably be considered to be likely to be affected a range of emotions.

62. We do not attach any significant weight to the evidence provided by way of text by B or by DA. Further, the evidence of B and DA is not supported by a statement of truth and, in any event, has not been tested.

63. On 11 December 2024 Mrs Hulley conducted a further regulatory visit. Mrs B’s adult daughter, E, was present to support Mrs B. Mrs Hulley asked if there were any reasonable adjustments needed but none were raised. Amongst other matters Mrs B said that she did not have B at her house when she was working and that she had taken his key so he could not get in. As the visit progressed Mrs B said that she had told Shannon (Taylor-Flood – the foster care social worker) that B had stayed a couple of times a week, but actually it was once a month. In the context of the chances of B crossing paths with minded children, she referred to B being always up and at the gym. We infer from other evidence that this relates to B getting up in the morning and leaving to go to the gym early.

64. At the visit on 11 December Mrs B explained why she did not think that B was still using Ketamine. However, her daughter, E, was shaking her head whilst Mrs B was saying this. E said that B “self-medicates”.

65. Mrs B also provided concerning information regarding threats made to B both whilst in prison and since his release. Her account to Mrs Hulley on 11 December was that when in prison he was being threatened and money was demanded. B had asked her to send £200 which she said she did. She said that she had had to send money on a number of occasions to various people due to B being bullied by older prisoners. Mrs Hulley asked Mrs B if B was scared for his own safety. Mrs B said: 'He has still got blokes threatening for money still scared to say anything, he has lost 500,000k worth of cannabis he has got dealers saying he owes them money. They are threatening with knives.' [Mrs B] told me that she feels he needs protection, but she can no longer help him. She said, 'He can't look at me I have got nothing, got no job now. It's your mess to clean up. I have to tell him it's time he stood on his own two feet. He has lost me everything.'

66. Mrs Hulley recorded as follows during the visit: “I am concerned that as I am letting KB talk she has not referenced the care of minded children at all. She does not show any signs that she understands the wider safety risks to herself, her family and any minded children associated with this situation at all.”

67. In her statement dated 3 September 2025 and in her oral evidence Mrs B sought to say that the sums she had paid were small sums for vape/cigarettes and for trainers because B’s trainers had been “taken hostage” as a joke and that B had never been threatened in prison. In our view in her oral evidence before us she tried to minimise or deny the seriousness of the issues that we find that she had described to Mrs Hulley. We find that her account to Mrs Hulley was likely to be accurate because it reflected her deep concern at the time for her son and his vulnerabilities. We find that Mrs Hulley accurately recorded Mrs B’s account. What is notable is that Mrs B has since shown in her evidence her willingness to discount the seriousness of the threats to B when it suits her position.

68. In the context of an issue regarding the time of a prison visit on 13 September 2024 Mrs B produced her text conversation on 15 September 2024 with her friend, R: “…way 2 quiet without them defo. I miss the 2am phone calls 2 let him in as he’s forgotten his key lol. Won’t be doing that now as I’ve told him he isn’t coming home now. Had Ofsted round when had to tell them he was an addict, no way I’m having them cancel my registration, fostering too we already had kids ere when he started taking it so was management of a situation. I gotta go through panel again once Michael gone so wouldn’t stand a chance. No way he’s destroying my life too, he’s had a lot of warnings, time to be tough.” (sic)

69. In our view this text tends to show that B had a key to the home (even if he forgot it on occasions and needed Mrs B to let him in at 2am). Mrs B referred in the text to having told B “he isn’t coming home now” (our underlining). The text also shows her awareness that her registration was at risk.

70. We noted also the email sent by Mrs B to Ofsted on 20 November 2024 regarding her having been reminded by B that he had stayed at the home on the night of the 13 September because he went to the gym at 7 am the next day. She said in her email that she wanted to be totally honest but this had slipped her mind. In our view this email appears to have been sent to Ofsted to seek to demonstrate honesty and candour. This email has the appearance of being self-serving. On any basis it amounts to a single representation that B had stayed at the home on one occasion (overnight on 13 September) during the week. By way of contrast, the text sent by Mrs B to her friend (R) on 15 September 2024 has the hallmarks of a genuine conversation. It tends to show strongly that B had been living, or at least regularly staying, at the home. Contrary to the information provided to Mrs Hulley the text shows that B had a key to the home.

71. Having considered all of the evidence in the round we consider it likely that B was staying Mrs B’s home at the relevant time far more than Mrs B has been prepared to acknowledge.

72. Standing back, in our view there is ample and reliable evidence that shows that Mrs B repeatedly failed to notify Ofsted of significant events regarding her son. In our view the evidence overall shows that it is probable that she did not do so because she perceived that this was against her personal interests i.e. her registration might be placed at risk. We consider that the evidence as a whole shows a pattern.

73. Mrs B’s eventual position is that B only stayed at her home occasionally at weekends in order to spend time with his younger siblings and was never present when minded children were at the setting so posed no risk. In our view the overall pattern shows that Mrs B had eventually shared the minimum so as to appear cooperative but that she has never shared the full picture because she did not want to be subject to the scrutiny of the regulator. We find that Mrs B has not been open and transparent with the regulator over a prolonged period.

74. In our view the evidence as a whole shows that it is probable that B was staying at home after his release from custody. He may not have been staying there every night, but this is beside the point. The reasons why Mrs B would want to afford this shelter to her son are understandable. However, we find that Mrs B failed to be transparent with her regulator. We consider it probable that she did not notify Ofsted of the fact of her son’s arrest or conviction or that he was released to her address because she did not want her ability to provide childminding services to be called into question/put at risk. We recognise that Mrs B did inform Ofsted of the incident on 12 September 2025 – albeit she did so in an email to “enquiries” and not on the bespoke form required regarding notification. It could be said that this shows a change or new disposition. However, we consider that the risk of non-notification of significant events in future is high.

75. Quite apart from the issue of non-notification there is a linked and fundamental issue: Mrs B’s ability to assess risk. In our view this is, indeed, the core issue because the ability to understand and assess risk is the bedrock to the provision of safe care. We have studied carefully the contemporaneous record made regarding the regulatory visit conducted on 29 November 2024 by Mrs Hulley, and with Mrs Rowley also present as a senior officer. Mrs B is highly critical of Mrs Hulley’s conduct of the interview. In our view the records shows that Mrs Hulley was painstaking and thorough in her approach. The difficulty she had was that there were a number of apparent inconsistencies in what Mrs B was saying and what she had said in the past, so Mrs Hulley considered it appropriate to ask questions that probed Mrs B’s account. Mrs B’s position is that she felt uncomfortable. Having read the extensive record made, and having heard evidence from all present at this visit, we do not consider that the visit was conducted unfairly. In our view the questions asked were appropriate.

76. Towards the end of the visit on 29 November 2024 Mrs Rowley asked a number of open questions designed to give Mrs B the opportunity to explain the matters she had considered when assessing risk given the fact of B’s conviction. In our view the evidence clearly shows that Mrs B had given no thought at all to the potential risks posed by the fact that B was associated with her address/setting. She did not seem to have considered the risk of gang retaliation or punishment in the context that the persons behind the serious importation offence had, to say the least, had lost a valuable consignment of drugs. It was clear to us from the evidence that the risk that B was living at the home might pose risk of harm to the children at the setting had not crossed Mrs B’s mind. In our view the evidence regarding the visit on 11 December 2024 shows it still had not done so when she spoke to Mrs Hulley.

77. In our view the records made by Mrs Hulley shows numerous examples of Mrs B seeking to minimise the significance or seriousness of B’s drug use. We found Mrs Hulley to be a reliable and conscientious witness. We noted that, in the course of a well-structured and sensitive/courteous cross-examination by Ms Milligan, Mrs B eventually accepted that because of the risk of relapse, the threats made towards B, his involvement/connections with drugs, B should never have been at the home/setting, whether it was at the weekend or not.

78. We have already referred to the incidents on 17 July and 12 September 2025 where the police were called to deal with the behaviour of B (and DA on 17 July). These incidents in and of themselves demonstrate the instability involved when family members/associates (whether they live at all times at the premises or not) are involved in drug taking and/or are addicted/drug dependent. The notion that such incidents can somehow be discounted as illustrative of risk because they did not occur when minded children were actually present at the setting is, in our view, illusory.

79. It was the LADO who brought the events of 17 July 2025 to Ofsted’s attention. In her evidence Mrs B was emphatic that there has never been any suggestion made that cannabis was being smoked in the home on that day. It was she who had called the police. We note that the statement of Donna Green (the then LADO) refers to a referral made by the police on the CSC (Child Social Care) record. The record stated: “on 17/07/2025, police were called to the address by [Mrs B] who told police that her son B and his friend D were refusing to leave her house. [Mrs B] states that she believes B to be smoking cannabis in the house, in addition to possibly taking other drugs, although this is not confirmed. At the time B and D were told to leave the address and go to [Mrs KP’s] address. Brandon has been staying with [Mrs KP] for a while: however, after promising to change his ways [Mrs B] allowed him back into her house. However, H has not kept to his promise and is taking drugs in the address again.”

80. We consider it likely that the record made in the CSC referral, (which we have adapted only to preserve anonymity) was an accurate account of the police involvement.

81. As to the incident on 12 September 2025, we refer to paragraph 6 above. We note that in her oral evidence Mrs B said that it was her neighbour who called the police.

82. What each of these incidents show is that Mrs B/the setting is vulnerable to the erratic and anti-social behaviour of B and DA. Ms Raja told us that B was doing well under probation. However, drug testing shows that he still takes drugs.

83. Mrs B claims that she will cooperate with the regulator but she says that Ofsted should tell her in writing what she can or cannot do. In our view this stance demonstrates her inability to take responsibility for her decision-making regarding risk. We find that Mrs B is unable to fully acknowledge her past failures to notify significant events and/or or to be transparent with the regulator.

84. Mrs B’s attitude to Mr DG’s conviction is also a cause for concern. In our view her position regarding Mr DG is capable of illuminating the issue of Mrs B’s ability to assess risk.

85. Mrs B has said that (if she succeeds on her appeal and her registration is restored) she will apply for a waiver should she want Mr DG to live with her full time. She also wants to resume being a foster carer and will have to apply to a panel in this regard.

86. We consider that it is regrettable that we have not been provided with any documentary evidence regarding Mr DG’s conviction. On his evidence he was convicted of an assault occasioning ABH (actual bodily harm) in about March 2023. According to Mr DG a sentence of 21 months imprisonment was imposed by the Crown Court. On any basis this involved an assault upon his former partner/wife. The account of the offence was provided to Ofsted by the LADO Ms Donna Green. The LADO had received information shared by CAFCASS that Mr DG was convicted of a domestic abuse incident against a previous partner in 2023 which led to a custodial sentence. The LADO also shared that Mrs B knew that Mr DG had been to prison for Actual Bodily Harm committed against a partner.

87. In the course of her oral evidence Mrs Scotland (the current LADO), having made further enquiry with the police service regarding DG’s conviction, said that the police had recorded a domestic violence incident in 2023 where the offender and victim were at a home address. She said that record was to the effect that the offender had stamped on the victim’s head, kicked her in the ribs and strangled her, causing injuries.

88. Mr DG disputes, in particular, that strangulation was involved. His evidence was to the effect that his sentence was imposed on a different factual basis.

89. There is no formal evidence provided to us regarding the basis of the conviction of Mr DG. We recognise the risk that inaccurate information can be recorded/provided/relayed. In our view what is clear is that, in any objective basis, DG was convicted of the offence of committing ABH on a domestic partner, and for which a significant custodial sentence in the Crown Court had been imposed. On his evidence Mr DG served six months and was then, on 7 August 2023, was released on tag and curfew conditions i.e. on license. He said that he understood at the time of his release that if he were to commit an offence (presumably whilst the licence was operational) he would be at risk of having to return to prison to complete his sentence.

90. Mr DG was asked about the information provided to Ofsted on 1 April 2025 via the LADO to the effect that Mr DG had been subject to regular drug testing which confirmed regular cocaine use (several times a month). In his evidence Mr DG said that testing had been undertaken on one occasion only for the purpose of contested family court proceedings regarding his application to see his children. He said that he had, on this single test, tested positive for cocaine and alcohol. He said that the hair test showed past use of cocaine and this related to a period where he used cocaine several times over a period of a number of months whilst he was out playing pool with friends. This he no longer did. As to the alcohol result, this was because he brews beer and gin as a hobby so has to taste the product during the brewing/distilling process.

91. Mrs B’s case is that Mr DG’s conviction is “spent”. It was clear to us that the only source of her belief was information provided by Mr DG. He said in evidence that his probation officer had said that his sentence was spent because he was no longer “tagged”. He agrees now that his conviction is not regarded as “spent” as a matter of law.

92. The evidence suggests that Mrs B has always been aware that her relationship with Mr DG/his presence in the home might poseadditional issues regarding her suitability to be a childminder on domestic premises. Mrs B said that she may in time apply for a waiver to enable him to live in her home. She wants to resume being a foster carer. Her position, and that of Mr DG, is that in the meantime Mr DG is living with his mother and only stays with her occasionally.

93. We also have very distinct concerns regarding Mrs B’s response to the issues regarding the conviction of Mr DG for domestic violence. She told us that Mr DG had told her that his wife had attacked him and that he had retaliated when he should not have done. When asked by Ms Milligan about the injuries involved, she said Mr DG had told her that there were some bruises, and he had bruises as well. He had told her that there was no proof of his injuries. She said that (the person she spoke to under) Claire’s law had informed her that DG had had an argument with someone over a parking space. She told us that she thought that if it was as serious as has been suggested then Mr DG would not have been released.

94. We noted that Mrs B said in her oral submissions that she had found it difficult to give evidence regarding what she knew about Mr DG’s conviction for domestic assault occasioning ABH because her mother was present on the video link when she was giving evidence. She said she had not wanted to give evidence about what she had learned regarding Mr DG’s conviction in her mother’s presence. She also referred to information given under Claire’s law being confidential. We noted from earlier evidence it was Mrs KP who had encouraged Mrs B to use Claire’s Law.

95. As the panel (via the judge) observed at the time it is unfortunate that Mrs B had not raised her concerns about her mother’s presence at the hearing at the time. Had the matter been raised then steps could have been considered.

96. We have real concerns regarding Mrs B’s response to the issues raised regarding the conviction of Mr DG. Whilst her view that everyone is entitled to be redeemed, and to put their past and regrets behind them might be considered commendable, it appears to us that Mrs B is unable to recognise the seriousness of the domestic assault for which Mr DG was convicted. We consider that the evidence overall shows that Mrs B is unable to make an objective assessment of risk.

97. Standing back, we have considered the evidence overall. We have considerable sympathy for the family difficulties that Mrs B has experienced over the years. We sympathise with the dilemma faced by any parent whose child is involved in substance abuse/or addicted, and who then becomes involved in a drug importation offence. We also have sympathy for all the complications and impacts of neurodivergence and poor mental health in the family context. We recognise all the difficulties involved including B’s many vulnerabilities and, indeed, the individual vulnerabilities of Mrs B. There can be no doubt that the circumstances faced by Mrs B in bringing up her children have been challenging.

98. In assessing the evidence we have continuously and actively considered whether the differences and apparent inconsistencies in her accounts to inspectors, and in evidence, may be attributable to difficulties Mrs B has experienced in processing and/or expressing herself due to her ADHD.

99. Having considered the evidence in the round we do not consider that the explanation for Mrs B’s failure to disclose significant events to the regulator is attributable to her ADHD. In our view the evidence shows clearly that the pattern of both non-disclosure and disclosure has been linked to the Appellant’s own interests. In our view Mrs B has made decisions regarding what she did or did not want to disclose and she is responsible for those choices.

100. We fully recognise that the fact of past breaches regarding the failure to notify is not dispositive. We have considered the many positive character references provided by parents who have used Mrs B’s services. We can understand the difficulties Mrs B has faced as a mother and can sympathise with all the dilemmas she has faced. However, it is clear to us that this is not a case where the Appellant did not understand the requirements regarding notification. In our view she understood the requirements but sought to evade the purpose of notification. She provided some information, which did not reflect the truth, as and when it suited her. The reality is that Mrs B has not taken any real responsibility for the fact that she repeatedly failed to meet the requirements regarding notification. In our view she has sought to blame the regulator and to deflect. Even today she seeks to put the responsibility on the regulator to say what she can or cannot do. In our view there is no substance to her claim that she has been treated in a discriminatory manner by Ofsted or that she has been treated unfairly.

101. The primary task before us is to decide whether the decision made should be affirmed or set aside.

102. We remind ourselves again of the positive evidence from parents of children minded by Mrs B. However, the core issue of suitability must be judged on an objective basis. The public, families and children in general are entitled to expect that the regulator will ensure that children receive care in a setting that is run by a provider who is suitable. They are entitled to expect that Ofsted will take steps to prevent the continuation of registration if the provider is not suitable.

103. We have found that Mrs B no longer meets the suitability requirements of the EYFS. She is unsuitable to be registered. The Respondent has satisfied us that the discretionary decision to cancel registration was, and is, very clearly justified under section 68 of the Childcare Act.

104. We agree that the Appellant’s personal interests are such as to merit the protection of the ECHR by reference to Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article

8.

105. The Respondent has satisfied us that that the decision taken was in accordance with the law.

106. We are also satisfied that the decision was objectively justified and necessary in order to protect the public interests engaged

107. In reaching our decision on the issue of proportionality we recognise that the impact of this decision is very serious indeed. Cancellation will bring an immediate end to the Appellant’s registration and with very profound impact upon her long career. It will bring to an end her ability to earn her living by providing childcare services. The decision will also a profound impact upon her future ability to be a foster parent and/or in any post that requires a DBS certificate, such as teaching or allied posts, or health care or related posts. The reasons for cancellation may well also have broader reputational implications for the Appellant affecting her standing in the community and her employability in general.

108. We attach very significant weight to the public interest in children being looked after in a way that is compliant with the regulations i.e. that the provider is/remains suitable.

109. In our view section 74 (5) of the Act precludes the imposition of conditions by the Tribunal in the context of our finding of unsuitability. We accept that, as a matter of principle, the prospect that conditions imposed by Ofsted might conceivably address the public interest is relevant to the issue of proportionality and so must be considered. For the avoidance of any doubt, we should say that for the reasons we have given, we do notconsider that the Appellant could be trusted to comply with any conditions.

110. We have balanced the impact of the decision upon the interests of the Appellant against the public interest. We consider that the facets of the public interest engaged far outweigh the interests of the Appellant and all those affected. In our view the decision to cancel registration was (and remains) reasonable, necessary and proportionate. Decision The decision to cancel registration is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed. Judge Goodrich First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) 14 May 2026 Amended pursuant to the slip rule – Rule 44 applied Judge Goodrich First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) 15 May 2026