1. I have before me an application to commit the respondent for failing to comply with two orders: that of HHJ Hopkins KC and Mrs Justice Lieven DBE. 2. The order of HHJ Hopkins KC was made at the time when the defendant was represented, and the order clearly has on the face of it the penal notice in a box. The recital sets out that there remained on that occasion a dispute about ongoing proceedings in Algeria and the mechanism for returning N. Instructions to the expert which had been granted were also set out, as well as suggested questions for the expert. Thereafter, on the face of order, the ambit of the expert report was stated as: i. Please set out the legal and practical steps that need to be taken in Algeria to remove the “travel ban” currently in place for the child (N) to enable him to travel with his mother from Algeria back to the UK as soon as possible. ii. Please confirm whether the father has to be physically present in Algeria to enable the removal of “travel ban” currently in place. iii. Please confirm whether the father has to be physically present at court in Algeria in order for him to be able to engage in the current legal proceedings between the parties. iv. Please advise whether these steps need to be taken by the father or the mother (or both). v. Please can you set out any financial costs that will need to be incurred by the parents in order to facilitate the above. vi. Please can you provide the likely timescales for the above and when the mother can expect to be able to travel with N from Algeria to the UK. 3. Paragraph B of the recitals of that order states that the one disputed issue is whether the father should return the child as he has welfare concerns about the mother’s care and the maternal family. The order notes that the current form that the father signed, pursuant to earlier order of Mrs Justice Theis, is that N would return alone instead of with the mother. The mother says the father needs to outline return is with the mother, not just N alone. 4. Paragraph D of the recitals to that order says that the father confirmed at the hearing that he is no longer willing to sign the forms, and he was warned of the penal notice. The father confirmed through interpreter he understood those terms but would not comply with order. His position was not that he could not comply, but that he would not – a material distinction. Until further order, the father was required (“must”) to attend the Algerian consulate so the mother and N can leave Algeria and give his consent to their return. 5. Clearly, the penal notice as already placed on face of order, was attached to Paragraph 3 of the order. In terms of Paragraph 4 of the order, on that occasion, the Paragraph provided further context for expert instruction. It sets out that an expert on Algerian Law is to be jointly instructed to determine issues relating to the travel ban and the given form, and nature of order and questions. The clear reasoning behind that paragraph related to the travel ban and the need to facilitate the return of the child to England. Again, the issue on that occasion was not whether or not the father could apply for the order. 6. The matter was listed for review hearing on 10th October at 10.30am before Mrs Justice Lieven DBE. On that occasion, Mrs Justice Lieven DBE heard counsel on behalf of the mother and the father. Again, a properly and fully worded penal notice appears at the top of the order and thereafter makes it clear in recitals that the travel ban remains in place in Algeria, preventing the mother from returning the child. 7. Pursuant to the order of HHJ Hopkins KC, the father has not complied with amending the relevant form to facilitate the child’s return and therefore prima facie he is in beach of the order. Recital B of that order repeats that the father does not intend to comply with the order and accordingly the mother sought timetabling to a committal hearing. Pertinently, recital C separately includes the expert instruction endorsed by HHJ Hopkins KC, with the expert response awaited. It seems that the father’s compliance with the Order of this jurisdiction was separate to the issue and facilitation of return of the child upon which expert instruction was awaited. 8. Turning to the order made by Mrs Justice Lieven DBE, it is clear on the face of the order that the learned Judge on that occasion set out in detail and confirmed all the relevant procedural safeguards that come with an application for committal, with the court accepting and understanding the father’s liberty is at stake. Mrs Justice Lieven DBE went so far as to give a recital to encourage the Legal Aid Agency to grant that funding as soon as possible due to urgency of the matter. 9. Turning to the provisions of the Order of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE itself: the child was to remain a ward of court until further order; at Paragraph 3 the father was required to cause the return of child to this jurisdiction and to use his best endeavours to do so. A penal notice clearly on the face of the order is to be attached to that paragraph. Paragraph 4 of the order stated that pursuant to orders of Mrs Justice Theis and HHJ Hopkins KC, the father must again by 20 October 2025 attend the Algerian consulate and sign the necessary documents. In particular, he must make clear his consent for the mother to return to England with N. Again, a penal notice was attached to that paragraph of that order. 10. There was then provision made for the court, and in particular the mother, to be told whether or not the father had complied with the court orders. Paragraph 6 states that in the event expert instructions provide further steps to be taken, either party can restore the matter by way of a C2 application. 11. Until receipt of the position statement of the father for this hearing, the issue of expert instruction had not been brought back to court. It is in that context that I now consider a properly made application to adjourn made by Mr Rose on behalf of the Respondent. The basis of the adjournment is that the expert evidence is already in process of being received and timescale is between 24 hours to 14 days. Within the position statement filed on behalf of the father I have been alerted to issues said to be pertinent to the instruction of the expert before I consider whether or not the father is in breach of the court orders. In particular, I bear in mind, paragraphs 4,5,6 and 7 of position statement filed on behalf of the father. 12. On behalf of the father, it is submitted that the issues that arise from the matters set out above must be clarified so there can be an effective committal hearing. The granting of the divorce unilaterally lifts the travel ban so the father is no longer required to sign the forms. The granting of divorce has been relatively recent, on 4th November 2025. On behalf of the mother, it is rightfully brought to my attention that it doesn’t mean that in time the mother couldn’t return to this jurisdiction with the child, but there is an issue of timescales. 13. The second matter it is said I need expert evidence to clarify is that travel ban remains in place and the Algerian court is waiting for authorisation to be signed. It is said on the father’s behalf that he believes that if he were to sign the authorisation, he would be contravening an Algerian order, thereby committing offence in Algeria. In effect, he is submitting that it may be that he cannot comply with the orders of this court because of the jeopardy he would be subject to in the Algerian criminal courts. 14. I have had to consider an application for adjournment to receive that expert evidence already commissioned. Having considered the matter carefully, the issues upon which expert is instructed and the purpose for which expert was instructed has clearly been set out on the order of HHJ Hopkins KC and refined by Mrs Justice Lieven DBE on 10th October 2025. The expert is not reporting on the issue of the ability to comply with this court’s order, they are reporting on a different issue, namely what steps need to be taken in light of the fact it is clearly recorded on face of the order of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE that the father refuses to comply. It is said on behalf of the father and I summarise that he may well not have understood or been able to articulate why he was saying he would not comply and/or it may have come to his attention late in the day despite representation before HHJ Hopkins KC and Mrs Justice Lieven DBE that there may be issues putting him at jeopardy in Algeria if he were to sign the documents. 15. I have stood back and also considered that the timescales proposed, although not as certain as I would like, are relatively short in the scheme of these proceedings, which have been ongoing since June 2025. 16. However, it seems to be that the expert evidence does not go to the issue of the father’s ability to comply with lawful orders that were made in his presence, and of which he has notice. It is as simple as this: lawful orders were made by two courts in this jurisdiction and he accepts he has failed to comply with those orders. 17. I therefore find to the requisite standard, the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, that he is in breach of both orders in the following manner: i. I find that he is in breach of Paragraph 3 of the order of HHJ Hopkins KC on 25th September 2025 in that he did not comply with an order of this court, and he did not attend at the Algerian consulate on the date required, by the time required, and sign relevant documents. ii. I find that he is similarly in breach of Paragraph 4 of the order of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE of 10th October 2025. I find that this was a lawful order, and his admissions and evidence of breach meet criminal standard. 18. In determining issues of fact, I have reminded myself at all stages that the father has nothing to prove and burden is squarely on shoulders of applicant. Putting it simply, lawful orders and those two paragraphs were made in the presence of the father when he was legally represented. They are lawful orders, and he is able, if he so wishes, to comply with them. 19. I have been very helpfully provided with the relevant law by Mr Basi and that has been accepted by those representing the father. I am grateful to both counsel for the manner in which they have conducted these proceedings. 20. In considering the issue of breaches of both paragraphs I have outlined, I have reminded myself of paragraphs 35-37 of the position statement on behalf of the mother, in particular to legal principles in summary form which I adopt from Mr Justice Peel. In particular, I have reminded myself of Paragraph 6 of that authority, that contempt of court involves deliberate disobedience. I find in relation to the relevant paragraphs of HHJ Hopkins KC’s order that the father knew the terms of the order, he was there, he was legally represented, he has acted or failed to act in a manner which involves a breach of the order and knows the facts which makes his conduct a breach. Similarly, I make those findings in relation to Paragraph 4 of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE’s order – again the father was represented, he knew precisely what he was required of him, he acted or failed to act in a manner which involves a breach of the order, and he knows the facts which makes his conduct breach. 21. In this case, the applicant has established to the requisite standard that the father was able to comply with the order. This is not a case where he has been prevented from compliance, or he has attended the consulate and been told he cannot sign due to a breach of Algerian law. He has been to the consulate and signed the form but did so erroneously, he has the ability to comply, and he has failed to do so. 22. Having found him to be in breach of those two paragraphs, in relation to Paragraph 3 of the order of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE, I find the first part of that paragraph to be mandatory, but the second part of that paragraph relates to “best endeavours”. As contempt is so serious and perils those who breach orders, I do not consider it appropriate to find the father to be in breach of Paragraph 3 of the order of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE. I would have had it been mandatory in both the beginning and in second phrase of paragraph, but “best endeavours” is wide and given the peril of the father it is not one which is appropriate for me to consider. 23. Having dealt with the issue of breach, it now falls to Mr Rose to say anything in mitigation. 24. Sentencing is adjourned until 16 December 2025.