MR JUSTICE LAVENDER: 1. I am simply going to announce my decision now and then let you have some reasons in writing later. 2. My decision is that I refuse permission in relation to Mr Akayour. 3. I grant permission in relation to Mr Ali in part, namely insofar as he said that “Apex Assure did not make any outbound calls itself” and that “Apex Assure did not create or provide training materials or scripts.” But in part I refuse permission, insofar as he said that “Apex Assure did not transact any deals and/or didn’t have any customers.” 4. I grant permission in relation to Mr Dhimi. (Following further submissions) MR JUSTICE LAVENDER: 1. I am invited to recuse myself from hearing these committal applications. 2. I have been shown a number of helpful authorities, including Otkritie International Investment Management Limited & Ors v Urumov [2014] EWCA Civ 1315, a case which discusses the decision of Andrew Smith J in DarAl Arkan Real Estate Development Company & Anor v Al Refai & Ors [2014] EWHC 1055 (Comm). That was a case in which Andrew Smith J decided that he would recuse himself from hearing the committal application and what the Court of Appeal said about that was as follows [29]: “It is thus clear that in Dar’s case the judge felt that the informed observer could not have the necessary confidence in the proceedings when the judge had already considered the essential evidence that would be deployed on the committal application and had come to the conclusion that the witnesses giving it were lying to him. A recusal application is a very personal matter for the judge to decide and this court will seldom interfere with this delicate jurisdiction. The overall feeling I have from reading Andrew Smith J’s judgment is that he himself felt uncomfortable about reconsidering essentially the same evidence on the very same issue which he would have to decide in the contempt application.” 3. In this case it strikes me that, were I to hear the committal application, I would be reconsidering essentially the same evidence on the very same issues, save only with a different standard of proof. 4. It is also the case that I have already considered the essential evidence that will be deployed on the committal application and I have come to the conclusion that at least one of the witnesses giving it, namely Mr Dhimi, who gave evidence before me, was lying to me. 5. In those circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to recuse myself from the committal application, but not, of course, from any future proceedings in the substantive case. —————