1. On 19 November 2025, I dismissed the application of Mr Suh Dong-Hoon for continuation of a time-limited stay ordered by ICC Judge Prentis on 22 July 2025 upon the court’s recognition of a Korean rehabilitation process as a ‘foreign main proceeding’ under Article 17 of Schedule 1 to the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006/1030 (‘CBIR’ and the ‘Prentis Order’), with written reasons to follow. This judgment sets out my reasons for that order. The parties 2. Samyung Enc Co Ltd (‘the Company’) is a company incorporated in the Republic of Korea. It was listed in the Korean Stock Exchange, KOSDAQ, in 2003. At all material times, the Company has carried on business in the production of navigational and communications technology for use in marine applications. 3. The Respondent is an executive agency of the Ministry of Defence and reports to that public body. The IP Claim 4. On 6 December 2021, the Respondent issued a claim against the Company in the Intellectual Property list (‘the IP Claim’), seeking damages of $86m for breach of contract and intellectual property infringement. Both heads of claim arise out of the Company’s misuse of hydrographic geospatial data in electronic navigational charts (‘ENCs’) that it licensed from one of the Respondent’s distributors. The Company’s misuse of such data (known as ‘AVCS Data’, with ‘AVCS’ referring to the Respondent’s ‘Admiralty Vector Chart Service’) involved it decrypting the ENCs and using the decrypted data to create its own hydrographic mapping products known as ‘S-Maps’, which it distributed alongside its physical maritime mapping products. 5. The breach of contract claim concerns the Company’s misuse of the AVCS Data in breach of the End User Licence Agreements (‘EULAs’). The intellectual property infringement claim is for infringement of rights in the Respondent’s AVCS database and its constituent ENCs. 6. The EULAs are governed by English law and provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. The Company submitted to the jurisdiction in the IP Claim. It filed a defence on liability (which was struck out) and has filed Amended Points of Defence in the Inquiry (as defined below). 7. On 8 November 2022, Morgan J struck out the Company’s defence, entered summary judgment on liability and directed a damages inquiry (‘the Inquiry’). Morgan J also ordered the Company (i) to deliver up the AVCS Data by 13 December 2022, and (ii) to provide evidence of the distribution of the Respondent’s data and the resulting sales. 8. The parties already have a 10-day trial listing for the Inquiry. The trial is listed in a 5-day window from 2 June 2026. 9. The Company is in breach of multiple orders in the Inquiry. On 12 June 2025 UKHO issued a summary judgment and strike-out application against the Company (‘the SJ Application’). It was listed on 17 July 2025 to be heard in a 3-day window starting on 24 July 2025. The Recognition Application 10. The Korean process was initiated by notice on 20 March 2025, but it was only the listing of the SJ Application that caused the Korean administrator, Mr Suh Dong-Hoon (‘the Administrator’) to seek recognition and a stay by application dated 19 July 2025. This was listed on short notice for an urgent hearing before ICC Judge Prentis on 22 July 2025 in the ICCJ Interim Applications list. 11. The Prentis Order made on 22 July 2025 granted recognition but varied the automatic stay in respect of the IP Claim, replacing it with a time-limited stay instead. The Judge ordered the time-limited stay (to 24 October 2025) in order to give the Administrator time to consider whether to contest the IP Claim. As put by ICC Judge Prentis at paragraph [9] of his ex-tempore judgment: ‘Mr Suh’s position is able to be put shortly. It is that he is only recently in office. More, he was only aware of the proceedings at all on 16 June and on 23 June he was able to contact Hill Dickinson and then instruct them, who had been the solicitors involved at an earlier stage of the English proceedings. He recognises that this might be a claim which is best adjudicated on, best determined by the English court, but he wishes to have time to understand the claim and to take advice on it and obviously part of that advice would be the likelihood of the court acceding to any request by the company for relief for serial non-compliance with the court’s directions. In other words, even if the matter does go forward it is not clear that it will end up in a judgment which is the result of submissions from both sides, because it may be that the company can never get over the historic procedural defects.’ 12. At [11]-[13] of his judgment, ICC Judge Prentis continued (with emphasis added): ‘11. As it seems to me, it would be preferable if the amount within the English proceedings could be determined either by agreement or by a hearing at which Mr Suh, as Korean representative, had at least an opportunity to put in submissions. The company is now, as it were, under his management. It ought to be able to consider with a little more time than it has had what its position ought to be and that may include, as I say, making such applications to put itself in good standing with the court and therefore to pursue the points of defence which have already been filed on the quantum claim. That points very strongly to at least a temporary stay and certainly a stay which would cover the hearing on Friday, that stay being aimed actually at the advantage of both parties. 12. It is unlikely that beyond wasted expenditure as to the hearing on Friday that is going to materially prejudice the Hydrographic Office. Yes, more time will have elapsed. That interest may be accruing on its debt is probably not an answer at the moment, because if its debt is as large as it thinks then the company is insolvent and so the extra interest will not be able to be paid. But it is notable, in my judgment, that its application issued in the middle of June was able to come on some five or six weeks later and that would seem to indicate that the passage of time is not going to be very great between the reactivation of the proceedings, if that is what is going to happen, and their potential determination at their next hearing. 13. For those very short reasons, I intend to grant the recognition order on the terms which I have described. I also intend to grant a stay, the terms of which we will discuss now, but they will be in the form of the application I think having a return date. We will discuss that. And that if Mr Suh wants the stay to continue it will be for him to justify that at the return date’. 13. The Prentis Order of 22 July 2025 reflected the foregoing reasoning, providing (by paragraph 2) for a time-limited stay to 5pm (London time) on 24 October 2025 or further order (which was then extended to 19 November 2025 due to lack of court time on 24 October 2025) and (by paragraph 4) providing for a further hearing to be listed for the court to consider, inter alia, ‘any application by the Foreign Representative to continue the stay provided for in paragraph 2 above’. The Application for Continuation of the Stay 14. On 10 October 2025, the Administrator issued in this court his application for a continuance of the stay granted by the Prentis order. The application was listed for hearing on 24 October 2025 but due to lack of court time was adjourned to 19 November 2025 on an expedited basis, with a continuation of the stay until 5pm on 19 November 2025. Evidence 15. For the purposes of this hearing I have considered the following written evidence: (1) the Administrator’s first affidavit dated 18 July 2025 seeking recognition and his second affidavit dated 10 October 2025 in support of his application for continuance of the stay; (2) the first, second and third reports of the Administrator’s Korean counsel, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, dated 10 October 2025, 22 October 2025 and 18 November 2025 respectively; (3) the first and second affidavits of the Respondent’s Korean counsel, Ms Kim Sy Nae, dated 17 October 2025 and 11 November 2025; (4) the Court-Appointed Examiner’s report summary dated 27 October 2025; (5) the statement of the Respondent’s solicitor, Ms Emily Roberts, dated 17 October 2025; (6) the statement of the Administrator’s solicitor, Ms Helene Peter-Davies, dated 21 October 2025; together with other documents contained in agreed hearing bundles, to which reference will be made where appropriate. Current Position in the IP Claim 16. As a result of the modified stay put in place by the Prentis order on 22 July 2025, the hearing of the SJ Application on 25 July 2025 was vacated. The Respondent still wishes to pursue the SJ Application, however, and from enquiries which it has made of listing, maintains that the application can be heard in December 2025/January 2026. If the SJ Application fails, the parties already have their 10 day trial listing for the Inquiry in June 2026. The Rehabilitation proceedings 17. Rehabilitation proceedings are a form of ‘turnaround’ or ‘rescue’ process under the Korean Debtor Rehabilitation & Bankruptcy Act (‘DRBA’). The goal of the process is to rehabilitate insolvent debtors by restructuring their debt, pursuant to a rehabilitation plan approved by creditors and the Korean Rehabilitation Court. The closest equivalent in English law is an administration coupled with a scheme of arrangement or company voluntary arrangement. 18. In very broad summary, the steps following an order for the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings usually include the following: (1) The appointment by the court of an administrator, tasked with managing the debtor’s business and assets, subject to the court’s supervision, and assisting with preparations for/implementation of the rehabilitation plan; (2) The submission by the administrator of a list of known creditors and shareholders; (3) The submission of ‘proofs of claim’ by any creditors who consider that a claim has been omitted or understated; (4) The investigation of claims and the submission by the administrator of a table of acknowledged/contested claims; (5) In relation to any creditor whose claim has been contested, the filing by that creditor of an application for ‘allowance’ of the contested claim (termed ‘claim allowance proceedings’); (6) The preparation and submission of a rehabilitation plan; (7) The meeting of creditors, to review and vote on the plan; (8) The court’s confirmation of the plan; (9) The implementation of the plan and the discharge of excluded claims. 19. In the present case, the Company applied to the Busan Rehabilitation Court in Korea on 20 March 2025 for commencement of rehabilitation proceedings. On 22 May 2025, the Rehabilitation Court ordered the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings and appointed the Administrator within those proceedings. 20. By its order of 22 May 2025, the Rehabilitation Court also set deadlines, of 9 June 2025 and 3 September 2025 respectively, for submission of a list of creditors/shareholders and a rehabilitation plan. The deadline for submission of a plan was initially extended to 24 October 2025 and has since been extended to 6 February 2026. 21. The Administrator considers that a sale of the Company (‘the M & A Process’) is the best way of achieving a rescue of the Company in this case. Deloitte has been engaged to identify suitable buyers. The intention is to find a buyer for the Company by 16 January 2026. 22. The Respondent submitted its proof of claim in the rehabilitation process on 30 June 2025. The proof of claim seeks $86m, interest of $59m and costs of £1.438m. 23. The Administrator rejected the Respondent’s proof on 5 September 2025. He is contesting the Respondent’s claim in full. At the time of rejection, the reason given was that the claim is subject to English litigation. In his second witness statement dated 10 October 2025 in these proceedings however, the Administrator has stated (at [28]) that ‘at no stage has the Company admitted the value of the claim’ and that it ‘remains unquantified’. 24. On 10 October 2025, the Respondent filed its Claim Allowance proceedings (effectively an appeal against proof). An initial hearing was scheduled in the Korean Court for 31 October 2025. The Korean Court directed the Respondent to file a translated version of its Points of Claim and the Administrator to submit a detailed response to the Respondent’s claim. 25. On 27 October 2025, the Korean court-appointed examiner (the ‘Examiner’) filed a report stating (among other things) that, in light of the Administrator’s denial of the Respondent’s claim and the substantial gap in the parties’ respective positions on quantum, the prospect of an early resolution of that claim within the Rehabilitation process ‘remains uncertain’. 26. A further hearing in the Claim Allowance proceedings was listed for 21 November 2025. As at the date of the hearing before me, the Administrator had not filed detailed reasons for contesting the Respondent’s proof, and it was anticipated that a further hearing would be required. 27. The deadline for submission of a rehabilitation plan has been extended from 24 October 2025 to 6 February 2026. 28. There is a creditors’ and shareholders’ meeting scheduled for 6 March 2026 to consider the rehabilitation plan. 29. The time for completion of the rehabilitation proceedings is one year (by 22 May 2026) although an extension of up to 6 months may be obtained in exceptional circumstances. In the view of the Administrator’s expert, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, the Korean Rehabilitation Court would not regard awaiting the outcome of English proceedings to constitute exceptional circumstances and would be likely to determine the Respondent’s claim in the Claim Allowance proceedings. Claim Allowance proceedings 30. Claim Allowance proceedings are a simplified and expedited decision-making procedure in comparison with ordinary civil litigation, generally involving a few short hearings without oral witness evidence. In broad summary, the essential features of the process are as follows: i) When an application is made for a ruling in Claim Allowance proceedings, the Korean Rehabilitation Court will issue a ruling as to the existence and quantum of that claim on a final basis, subject to any appeal. ii) In circumstances where proceedings are on foot outside the jurisdiction, the Rehabilitation Court may await the outcome of those proceedings, or it may proceed to determine the claim itself. That is a matter within the Court’s discretion and depends on factors such as the length of time which the foreign proceedings are expected to take. iii) If the English court gave judgment for a liquidated sum of money after trial, it is likely that the Rehabilitation Court would recognise that decision, subject to satisfaction of the criteria in Article 217 of the Korean Civil Procedure Act, which includes a requirement that ‘a defeated defendant is served, by a lawful method, a written complaint or document corresponding thereto, and notification of date or written order allowing him or her sufficient time to defend… or that he or she responds to the lawsuit even without having been served such documents’ [emphasis added]. iv) There was some debate as to the approach which the Rehabilitation Court would adopt to an English summary judgment, which I will come on to. v) It was common ground that the Korean Rehabilitation Court would apply English law to a contractual dispute where, as here, the governing law of the contract is English law. vi) The practice of the Korean Rehabilitation Court is to schedule hearings in Claim Allowance proceedings with the goal of giving a ruling before the creditors’ meeting to review and vote on the rehabilitation plan. vii) It is possible to appeal the ruling of the Korean Rehabilitation Court in Claim Allowance proceedings. First appeals are heard by the Rehabilitation Court. viii) There is no threshold test for a first appeal in Claim Allowance proceedings. Such appeals are substantive hearings before the Korean Rehabilitation Court in which everything is considered de novo. Each party may submit requests for evidence and undergo evidentiary examination. There are several hearings at four to six week intervals. ix) Thereafter, a party can appeal from the Rehabilitation Court to the High Court, and a further appeal can be brought to the Supreme Court. x) The experts agreed that at each stage, save for the Supreme Court, there is no threshold for appeals and the matter is heard afresh. xi) The experts differed slightly on the total timeframes involved in the appeal process. The Administrator’s expert, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, said that first appeals (before the Korean Rehabilitation Court) typically take 12-18 months, and further appeals between six months to a year. The Respondent’s expert, Ms Kim Sy Nae, said that first appeals tend to take between one and two years, with any appeals to the High Court usually being determined six months after that, and final appeals to the Supreme Court taking a further year; an overall total of between 2.5 and 4.5 years. Applicable Legal Principles 31. By Article 20(1)(a)-(2) CBIR, upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding there is a stay on the commencement of continuation of actions or proceedings which is the same in scope as follows a winding up order under section 130 Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’). 32. Article 20(6) allows the court to modify or terminate the stay. It provides: ‘In addition to and without prejudice to any powers of the court under or by virtue of paragraph 2 of this article, the court may, on the application of the foreign representative or a person affected by the stay and suspension referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, or of its own motion, modify or terminate such stay and suspension or any part of it, either altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit’. 33. Article 21 sets out additional discretionary relief that the Court may grant upon recognition ‘where necessary to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors’. In such circumstances the Court may, at the foreign representative’s request, stay the commencement or continuation of actions which are not stayed by Article 20(1)(a). 34. Article 22(1) provides that ‘[i]n granting or denying relief under article 19 or 21…the court must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors (including any secured creditors or parties to hire-purchase agreements) and other interested persons, including if appropriate the debtor, are adequately protected.’ 35. In Samsun Logix Corporation v DEF [2009] EWHC 576 (Ch), Morgan J granted relief in terms analogous to an administration moratorium under paragraph 43 of Schedule B1 to the IA 1986. This is the conventional approach in cases involving recognition of foreign insolvency processes akin to administration. Paragraph 43(6) of Schedule B1 provides that no legal process may be instituted or continued against the company or property of the company except with the administrator’s consent or the permission of the court. 36. It was common ground that, in cases involving foreign insolvency processes akin to administration, when considering whether to modify or lift the stay triggered by recognition under Article 17 of the CBIR, it is instructive to consider the principles governing the court’s grant of permission for proceedings to continue under paragraph 43(6) of Schedule B1, in addition to the principles governing the court’s grant of permission under s130 of the Act. 37. Addressing the s130 authorities, Mr Judd referred me to the well-known case of Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Armada Shipping SA, STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 216 (Ch), a case involving Swiss bankruptcy proceedings recognised under Article 17 CBIR where there were English proceedings afoot. At paragraph 47 of his judgment, Mr Justice Briggs (as he then was) observed that when considering applications to lift a stay under section 130(2) IA 1986, the Court has a free hand to what is right and fair according to the circumstances of each case. Where the proceedings concerned matters of purely English law, despite the adjudication process being quicker in the Swiss bankruptcy court, the Judge held at [58] that fairness and convenience lay ‘strongly’ in favour of permitting English proceedings to continue. That was because the issues involved questions of English law that would need expert evidence for a foreign court to determine. At [61] he observed: ‘There is in my view an air of unreality in the submission that it would either be fair, just or convenient to visit upon a Swiss bankruptcy court the adjudication of an underlying dispute which is almost entirely governed by English law, concerns shipping matters and which is already the subject of two pending arbitrations before experienced tribunals pursuant to obligations in the contracts out of which the dispute has arisen. The Swiss court would be obliged to rely for the determination of most of the matters in issue upon expert evidence as to English law (whether from a single expert or competing experts) and its own relevant experience would be limited to Swiss insolvency law, as to which, despite having many months to do so, none of the parties have identified any specific issue to be decided.’ 38. Addressing next the paragraph 43(6) authorities, Mr Judd reminded me of the guidance of Nicholls LJ in Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch 505 at page 542A. In summary: (i) it is in every case for the person who seeks leave to make out a case; (ii) the prohibition against proceedings in the absence of leave is intended to assist the company in administration to achieve the purpose for which the administration order was made; and (iii) in other cases when a lessor seeks possession the court has to carry out a balancing exercise. 39. Mr Judd also referred me to the case of CargoLogicAir Ltd v WWTAI AirOpCo 1 Bermuda Ltd [2024] EWHC 508 (Comm), in which Paul Stanley KC (sitting as a DHCJ) determined an application for retrospective permission to continue proceedings against a company in administration. The Judge noted that litigation may provide the best means for determining parties’ rights and held at [17] (with emphasis added): ‘First, where there is real doubt about the existence or extent of a prospective creditor's rights, it will often be necessary to find a mechanism to resolve that doubt. Understanding the company's financial obligations is not inimical to the purpose of administration. Where (as here) the administrators are considering making distributions to creditors, it may positively assist it. As in a liquidation, there may be various ways in which that can be done. Where a prospective creditor has a claim for unliquidated damages there will often be a strong argument that it is just for the claim to be resolved by the court. That does not mean that the creditor will be permitted to enforce any judgment it obtains. But it will often be in the creditors' collective interests, as well as the individual claimant’s, for the parties to have a definitive decision about what the liability is and therefore understand the company's financial position.’ 40. Mr Judd also referred me to BAE Systems Pension Funds Trustees Ltd v Bowmer and Kirkland Ltd [2017] EWHC 1200 (TCC) at [17], which confirmed that important factors to consider are: (i) the stage reached in the proceedings; (ii) whether lifting the moratorium would significantly impede the administration’s objective; and (iii) the impact that permission would have on unsecured creditors. 41. Both parties referred me to the case of In Re Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 1500 (Ch), in which ICC Judge Jones made an order recognising Korean rehabilitation proceedings and varied the stay so that English arbitration proceedings could continue. The parties differed, however, on the aspects of the case that they each relied upon. 42. On behalf of the Administrator, Mr Kulkarni KC (leading Mr Ward) referred me to paragraphs 49 and 51 of the Pan Ocean judgment, submitting that the relevant test was that under s130(2) (to do ‘what is right and fair’), but that in the context of rehabilitation proceedings, this would involve considering the interests of creditors and other interested parties including the debtor company. 43. Mr Kulkarni also submitted that the objective and purpose of rehabilitation proceedings were to be borne in mind when performing this analysis and went on to draw the following propositions from paragraph 59 of the Pan Ocean judgment: a. The decision must take into account the benefits of rehabilitation proceedings and seek to avoid adversely affecting their pursuit to the detriment of creditors and others interested including the Company. b. It is relevant to consider whether the continuation of proceedings otherwise subject to the stay would adversely affect the purpose, objective or results of the rehabilitation process. c. An overriding objective in rehabilitation proceedings is to ensure, so far as possible, that the claims are dealt with in the most efficient and cost-effective manner in the interests of all the creditors. It is not in the interests of the insolvency or creditors for the administrator’s time to be taken up with, nor for the Company’s funds to be used for, proceedings, if there are cheaper and more efficient options. d. It is relevant to consider the size of the insolvency and the funds and time available to commit to legal proceedings. e. It is relevant to consider which forum is best suited to the resolution of matters of English law which are not straightforward. This factors into the efficiency and effectiveness of competing methods of dispute resolution. 44. Mr Judd highlighted the parallels between the present case and that of Pan Ocean, noting that in Pan Ocean, (i) there was an English law governed agreement with clauses referring disputes to arbitration in London; (ii) the company accepted termination but challenged the quantum of the liquidated damages provisions; and (iii) the party seeking to lift the stay had submitted proofs which were rejected, and the objections themselves were dismissed by the Korean court. He went on to note that the Korean process was more advanced in the Pan Ocean case: there were pending proceedings in Korea which amounted to a re-hearing on the merits and the rehabilitation proceedings had begun 16 months before the application to vary the stay. 45. Mr Judd referred me in particular to the following factors taken into account by the Judge in Pan Ocean in concluding that the stay should be lifted: (1) Commenting upon the Korean process at [38]: ‘the application of the legal principles to the facts to be found by the trial judge will present a relatively difficult task even for a court of English law and particular difficulty for a court in a different jurisdiction reliant upon expert evidence’. (2) Under Article 20(2) CBIR, the court applied the same test as under section 130(2) IA 1986, which meant the court had a free hand to do what is right (referring to Cosco Bulk Carrier and the guidance in Re Atlantic Computer Systems): [40, 51]. (3) In exercising that discretion, ‘[g]enerally the stay is required and will be maintained because the system of proving in a liquidation provides a cheaper, quicker and more efficient process for the benefit of the creditors in a context of limited resources which are not best used by resolving disputes through litigation … However, the stay will be lifted (usually) when disputed claims need to be resolved by proceedings and it is right and fair in all the circumstances to accept and implement this need’: [43]. (4) Lifting the stay was not an attack on the Korean judicial system, and deciding whether a dispute should be resolved within an insolvency process or ordinary litigation ‘arises from a legitimate recognition of the fact that insolvency proceedings (wherever they arise) may not be best suited on all occasions for such determination’: [54-5]. The Korean court would be at a disadvantage in having to hear legal submissions and expert evidence concerning English law (referring to Briggs J’s approach at [61] in Cosco Bulk) and the English court was the appropriate forum: [56]. (5) Whilst considerable effort and cost had been expended in Korea and the English arbitration might not be quicker, the issues of dispute were ‘far from straightforward under English law’ and ‘not best dealt with by expert evidence’; given the complexity of the English law questions, it was best for an English-qualified tribunal to determine the dispute, which was after all the jurisdiction which was contractually agreed upon: [59.5-7]. (6) The balance therefore leant ‘heavily’ in favour of varying the stay to permit the arbitration to proceed: [60]. In terms of proportionality, the significant value of the claims justified the cost of the arbitration: [66]. 46. Mr Judd also referred me to Ronelp Marine Ltd v STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Co Ltd [2016] EWHC 2228, a case in which Norris J had lifted the stay to allow English Commercial Court proceedings to continue following recognition of a Korean rehabilitation process after the Korean office holder contested a proof. Mr Judd argued that the case of Ronelp lent support to his contentions that (i) where the body of English law is complicated, it should not be visited upon a Korean Rehabilitation Court through the medium of expert evidence; and (ii) lifting the stay and resolving a genuinely difficult issue of foreign law serves to assist rather than impede the insolvency process: particularly where the English proceedings are well advanced: Ronelp [37], [39], [45]. 47. Mr Kulkarni referred me to the following passage from Norris J’s judgment in Ronelp at [29]: ‘[An affected creditor applying to vary a stay imposed under the Model Law] must first identify the nature of the interest that he wishes to promote by obtaining that relief. He must secondly address the question whether the grant of such relief is likely to impede the achievement of the purpose of the insolvency proceeding (here, rehabilitation). He must thirdly enable the Court to balance his legitimate interests against the interests of other creditors, having regard to the nature and the probability of occurrence of prejudice on either side. An affected creditor making such an application under a modified stay imposed under the Model Law must in addressing these questions bear in mind that he is seeking to persuade the domestic court to interfere in the processes of the insolvency court. The list of relevant considerations is not exhaustive’; and a further passage at [31]: ‘As Patten J pointed out in AES Barry Ltd v TXU Europe Energy Trading [2004] EWHC 1757 at [24] it will only be in ‘exceptional’ cases that the court gives a creditor, whose claim is simply a monetary one, a right by the taking of proceedings to override and pre-empt the statutory machinery. The term ‘exceptional’ is protean: but in this context I think it means that the applicant creditor must demonstrate a circumstance or combination of circumstances of sufficient weight to overcome the strong imperative to have all the claims dealt with in the same way (and in the instant case by the insolvency court). That said, a domestic court, recognising the general desirability of having one insolvency estate under the management of one insolvency court, should not be too ready to find the factors of ‘sufficient’ weight (but, given the nature of the decision, is unlikely to be assisted by the extensive citation of judgments which simply show the assessments made by other judges).’ 48. Mr Kulkarni went on to argue that, whilst in Ronelp, Norris J had ultimately decided to permit the Commercial Court proceedings to continue, it was important to look closely at the particular factors which led to that decision, contending as follows: a. First, it was said that the claim was a ‘particularly complex one’: [33], [36]. The complexity stemmed in part from the defence of illegality pleaded by STX, which would require consideration of the (then recent) Supreme Court decision in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. The application of the law on that issue was ‘uncertain to an exceptional degree’: [37]. It also would involve consideration of the interaction between contractual and common law remedies for repudiatory breach, and whether common law remedies were excluded by the contractual terms: [38]. b. It was also said that ‘The fact that English law is involved is not of itself sufficient’: [35]. Further, although the non-exclusive jurisdiction of English Courts had been chosen, a contractual right may be subject to interference in an insolvency, and the buyers ought to have known that they were contracting with a Korean company and that Korean law would govern its insolvency: [35]. c. Norris J also held that it was a factor of significant weight that the proceedings before the Commercial Court were ‘reasonably well advanced and on which the Buyers and STX have each expended considerable sums in preparation for trial in December 2016’. However, the mere existence of proceedings is not itself sufficient to justify modification of a stay: [39]. d. Further, the buyers wanted the adjudication and quantification of their claim ‘to be determined more speedily than is likely under the confirmatory review and objection proceeding process: and they wish to do that in order to be enfranchised when the rehabilitation plan is put to creditors’: [41]. e. Norris J found that the continuation of the Commercial Court action would not impede the rehabilitation proceedings in Korea. That was because: i. The Commercial Court proceedings were expected to provide a decision quicker than the confirmatory actions in Korea: [42], [45]. ii. There was no suggestion that completing the steps necessary to prepare the Commercial Court action for trial would interfere in any material way with the formulation and prosecution of the rehabilitation plan. The Judge remarked ‘Given the size of the STX insolvency that is no surprise’: [42]. iii. Though the costs of the English proceedings were ‘slightly higher… given the billions of dollars involved in the rehabilitation plan (US$6.7 billion) and the extent of the ‘haircut’ which creditors must take the increase is of no materiality’: [45]. iv. There was considered to be ‘no question of piecemeal realisation or unequal distribution or any undermining of the equal treatment of creditors in any distribution, features that would seriously undermine the object of having a single insolvency estate’: [45]. 49. Mr Kulkarni also referred me to the summary of principles set out in VTB Bank (Austria) AG v Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica AD [2015] EWHC 750 (Ch), an application under Article 20.6 of Schedule 1 to the CBIR to lift a stay on arbitral proceedings following recognition of insolvency proceedings in Montenegro. This summary had made reference to Cosco at [48], where Briggs J had observed in a winding up context: ‘in general, the resolution of disputed matters within the machinery of a liquidation was likely to be cheaper and quicker than if left to ordinary proceedings, and that the often limited resources of the office-holder meant that the court should be cautious before exposing liquidators (or their equivalent) to the burden of coping with difficult and time-consuming litigation’ The Administrator’s arguments in favour of continuation of the stay 50. Mr Kulkarni argued that the stay of the English Proceedings should continue because lifting the stay would cause disruption to the Korean Rehabilitation Proceedings in the following ways: a. Whilst it is argued by the Respondent that the English proceedings would shortly be resolved by the SJ Application: (1) there was, at least, ‘serious uncertainty’ as to whether the SJ Application would be dispositive; and (2) a summary or procedural determination had little advantage over the ‘streamlined procedures’ of the Claim Allowance proceedings. b. If the English proceedings went to trial and the outcome had to be awaited, this would likely prevent the proper consideration of a quantified claim of by far the largest creditor in the rehabilitation plan and M&A Process as currently scheduled. This uncertainty could result in the failure of the rehabilitation process to the detriment of all creditors. c. The English proceedings were considerably more expensive and were likely to take considerably more time to reach a first instance decision than the Claim Allowance proceedings. d. The Claim Allowance proceedings were likely to go ahead in any event, thereby rendering the English proceedings a waste of costs and resources and interfering with the rehabilitation. e. The English proceedings would result in a significant expenditure of resources by the Company in comparison to its assets as a whole thus reducing the funds available to creditors. 51. Mr Kulkarni argued that the SJ Application could not be heard in November or December this year as the Respondent was suggesting. He maintained that it would require a one day hearing rather than a half-day hearing; and that the available dates for a one-day application in the Chancery Division before a High Court judge were from 13 January 2026. 52. Mr Kulkarni also argued that the substance of the dispute involved triable issues of fact (relating to the manner in which data obtained from the Respondent was used in marine navigation devices distributed by the Company) which were not appropriate for summary judgment. 53. Mr Kulkarni maintained that: a. The SJ Application was ultimately premised on non-compliance with disclosure obligations. It was impossible, he argued, for the Respondent to persuade the Court in this application that the resolution of the substance of the case was obvious in circumstances where there is a 10-day trial listed in June 2026 and where the pleadings are significant; observing that of themselves, the Points of Defence run to 24 pages. b. There was a dispute over whether the application for an unless order and the SJ Application were properly served on the Company at a time when Hill Dickinson were dis-instructed. 54. Mr Kulkarni went on to argue that the SJ Application was ‘an interlocutory hearing not a fully contested trial’. He maintained that three points arose from this. 55. First, there was ‘a considerable possibility’, he argued, that the Korean Rehabilitation Court would be ‘slow’ to recognise an English summary judgment as a final and conclusive judgment and accord it the same effect as a full judgment on the merits. 56. Second, whilst the Respondent argued that the English Court was best placed to determine issues of English law, the determination of the SJ Application would involve simply a ‘summary’ or ‘procedural’ hearing and not the full consideration that might be expected at a trial. That in turn limited the extent to which a decision in England could be said to be preferable to a decision in Korea. Mr Kulkarni maintained that there was a ‘tension’ in the Respondent’s position, in arguing on the one hand that the matters of law raised by the Inquiry are complex issues which ought not to be visited on the Korean Rehabilitation Court, whilst on the other hand contending that resolution of the Inquiry is imminent on the basis of a very short interlocutory hearing in which the issues of law may not be fully ventilated and may, depending on the strike out application, be undefended. 57. Third, the prospect of the Company’s Defence being struck out meant that the issues would not be fully contested, whereas in the Korean Rehabilitation Court they would, even if the procedure for doing so was ‘streamlined’. Given the importance of the Respondent’s claim to the whole rehabilitation process, Mr Kulkarni argued, the Claim Allowance process was therefore preferable, on at least that basis. 58. For these reasons, Mr Kulkarni maintained that (1) there was serious uncertainty as to whether the resolution of the English Proceedings was in fact imminent and (2) there were reasons to believe that any such imminent dispositive hearing as there might be will not have major advantages over the Claim Allowance proceedings in terms of its suitability for the resolution of the issues. 59. Mr Kulkarni went on to submit that if the SJ Application did not resolve the case, the Court then had to factor in the potential disruption and negative impact that the ongoing English proceedings may have on the Korean Rehabilitation proceedings if they went all the way to a contested trial in June 2026 or beyond. If the trial date could not be kept, he said, then based on existing lead times it was not expected that a trial of the anticipated length could be heard before December 2026. Whilst the Respondent maintained that the trial timetable is still feasible, the Administrator disagreed, as the revised timetable proposed by the Respondent omitted certain steps contemplated by the original directions. 60. Mr Kulkarni argued that the IP Claim would ‘unduly disrupt’ the Korean Rehabilitation proceedings and therefore ought to remain stayed. A trial in June 2026 was beyond the ordinary maximum timeline within which rehabilitation proceedings should complete i.e. within 12 months of their start date. It was also significantly beyond the scheduled dates for the completion of the M&A Process, the submission of a rehabilitation plan, and the meeting of shareholders and creditors at which that plan was intended to be voted upon. 61. The potential scale of the Respondent’s claim in the Korean Rehabilitation proceedings, Mr Kulkarni continued, was a highly material consideration for the rehabilitation. Its claim in the rehabilitation is in excess of USD 145m whereas the remaining unsecured claims total USD 28,408,707 and the Company’s entire assets amounted to about £29m as of year-end 2024. The recently issued Examiner’s Report stated a “total equity” (assets less liabilities excluding the Respondent’s claim) of approximately £17.5m, with total adjusted assets of about £35.1m. The Respondent’s claim therefore dwarfed the Company’s assets. The determination of the claim could have a significant impact on the repayment ratio for other creditors. 62. Mr Kulkarni contended that the quantification of the Respondent’s claim would be ‘one of the main considerations’ for any potential buyer of the Company. According to the Administrator’s expert, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, if the quantification could not be resolved prior to the completion of the rehabilitation process because the outcome of the IP Claim was awaited, there were three options: a. The first was that the Respondent would be denied voting rights on the rehabilitation plan, with the plan attempting to cater for the unquantified sum by, for example, reserving a portion of acquisition funds in escrow. This option may adversely affect the prospect of acceptance by other creditors. b. The second was that the acquiring company in the M&A Process may not provide for the unquantified sum at all. This option would potentially result in the acquirer taking the risk of a company burdened with a very large contingent liability, which might be unattractive to potential buyers. c. The third was the establishment of a subsidiary company to hold assets corresponding to the anticipated value of the expected repayment, but this was considered unlikely. 63. Mr Kulkarni argued that all three options posed ‘a threat to the successful conclusion of the Korean Rehabilitation proceedings’, because of the prospect that ‘an extremely large but as yet unquantified liability would dissuade potential buyers and/or would cause opposition by other creditors and therefore pose problems for the adoption of the rehabilitation plan’. A failure to reach an approved rehabilitation plan could result in the Company’s bankruptcy, an outcome which the Korean Rehabilitation Proceedings were intended to prevent. When considering the prospects of success of the rehabilitation, the Examiner had noted in his report that delay over determination of the Respondent’s claim would create ‘major uncertainty for both the rehabilitation plan and the ongoing M&A process’ (section 12(b)(2)). 64. Mr Kulkarni also reminded me of the Administrator’s own views on the matter. The Administrator was of the view that the Company was a more attractive proposition in the M&A Process if the quantification were to proceed in Korea pursuant to the Claim Allowance Proceedings. Mr Kulkarni submitted that the Administrator’s judgment in this matter should be accorded very significant weight by this Court. 65. An advantage of the Claim Allowance proceedings, Mr Kulkarni continued, was that they were expected to produce a quantification of the claim within approximately three months. This would be sufficient for consideration to be given to a quantified sum during the M&A Process and prior to the submission and approval of the rehabilitation plan. 66. In addition, from accounts given in evidence of the recent hearings in Korea, it appeared likely that the Rehabilitation Court would proceed with determining quantification regardless of the status of the IP Claim. To have the IP Claim continuing in parallel, he argued, would be a waste of time and resources. 67. Mr Kulkarni also stressed the size of the insolvency. He argued that, unlike cases such as Ronelp and Pan Ocean, the rehabilitation process in this case is not a ‘large multi-jurisdictional process’ or a ‘multi-billion-dollar affair’ where legal costs were insignificant. The total estimated costs in the English Proceedings of £1.4m, he argued, were in stark contrast to the anticipated costs of obtaining a decision in Claim Allowance proceedings, which he maintained were estimated at £21-52,000. There was therefore, he argued, a material difference to creditors between the two courses. A decision in the Claim Allowance proceedings would also ensure parity of treatment with all other creditors. 68. Mr Kulkarnialso arguedthat, in contrast to Ronelp: a. The law in this case was not ‘uncertain to an exceptional degree’. b. A decision was not imminent. There was significant uncertainty as to whether the SJ Application would succeed, and the trial was not due to take place until June 2026 at the earliest. Disclosure had not yet completed. c. The Claim Allowance proceedings would result in ‘a speedier and cheaper determination than a trial in England’, whether that trial took place in June 2026 or had to be postponed to some further date. d. Completing steps to trial in England would interfere substantially in the formulation and prosecution of the rehabilitation plan, both because (1) the delay would potentially imperil the successful conclusion of the whole process and (2) the costs of concluding the English Proceedings would be very substantial in comparison to the assets of the Company and the size of the other creditor claims. e. There was unequal treatment of creditors insofar as no other relevant claim was proceeding outside Korea. 69. For all these reasons, Mr Kulkarni invited the court to continue the stay until the rehabilitation plan was presented in the Korean Rehabilitation Proceedings or, failing that, until a further hearing on 27 February 2025, three weeks after the intended date for submission of the rehabilitation plan according to the current schedule. The Respondent’s case on lifting the stay 70. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Judd maintained that the Inquiry would be the quickest means of resolving the quantum dispute. Whilst Claim Allowance proceedings are designed to be ‘simplified and expedited decision-making procedure[s]’, he argued, they still involved several hearings, oral submissions and consideration of pleadings, written evidence of fact and expert evidence as to applicable foreign law. On the Administrator’s own expert evidence, a ruling could take between 3 and 6 months. Whilst the experts agreed that the Rehabilitation Court would usually aim to deliver a ruling in the Claim Allowance process ahead of the creditors’ meeting to vote on the plan (which if achieved in this case would mean a ruling by March 2026), it was open to either party to appeal that ruling. In this regard Mr Judd addressed me on the appeal process, summarised at [30] (vii)-(xi) above, reminding me that there were no threshold requirements for an appeal and that, save for appeals to the Supreme Court, such appeals were full de novo hearings. He argued that, given the parties’ respective positions on quantum, it was ‘very likely’ that there would be an appeal, as the parties were ‘vastly at odds’. The Examiner’s report (at para 7(c)) had acknowledged the ‘substantial gap’ between the parties’ positions on the damages assessment and had stated that in light of that gap, ‘the prospect of an early resolution remains uncertain’. 71. Mr Judd went on to remind me that, whilst the experts differed slightly on the total timeframes involved in the appeal process in Claim Allowance proceedings (as set out at [30] above), whether one took 2.5 or 4.5 years as the timeframe, the Claim Allowance process (inclusive of appeals) would clearly take much longer than reaching a determination in England (i) this term (or early January 2026 at the latest) if the SJ Application succeeds; or (ii) in June 2026 should it prove necessary to proceed to a trial of the Inquiry. 72. Mr Judd maintained that the Inquiry was at a very advanced stage. Summary judgment on liability was obtained in November 2022, and the SJ Application (originally listed in July 2025, only two days after the recognition hearing) could be heard this term or in early January 2026 at the latest. Even if it failed, the Inquiry already had a trial listing in June 2026. The advanced stage reached in the English proceedings, Mr Judd argued, was a powerful factor in favour of lifting the stay: Ronelp [45]. 73. Mr Judd went on to submit that the Inquiry involved complicated questions of English law that should not be visited upon a Korean court through the medium of expert evidence. In that regard he invited the court to note: (1) The parties’ Korean counsel agreed that English law would govern the determination of damages. Korean insolvency law did not prescribe rules on applicable law for issues arising in insolvency proceedings, and the measure of damages will be that of the governing contract (English, under the EULA). Within thecontext of the Claim Allowance process, that would involve several rounds of expert evidence of English law; and if there was a dispute, the Korean court would reach a view on ‘independent evaluation of the legal authorities presented’. (2) The parties were unable to agree the basis for calculation, and the application of the user principle and negotiating damages under English law was in dispute. (3) Authority suggested the measure of damages was to be assessed by comparable scenarios. As stated in Anan Kasei Co Ltd v Neo Chemicals & Oxides (Europe) Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 11 at [16 (viii)] by Arnold LJ: ‘The reasonable royalty is to be assessed as the royalty that a willing licensor and a willing licensee would have agreed. Where there are truly comparable licences in the relevant field these are the most useful guidance for the court as to the reasonable royalty. Another approach is the profits available approach. This involves an assessment of the profits that would be available to the licensee, absent a licence, and apportioning them between the licensor and the licensee’. (4) The foregoing process often required expert evidence in its own right. As Lord Wilberforce held in General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 819 at 826: ‘In some cases it is not possible to prove either … that there is a normal rate of profit, or … that there is a normal, or established, licence royalty. Yet clearly damages must be assessed. In such cases it is for the plaintiff to adduce evidence which will guide the court. This evidence may consist of the practice, as regards royalty, in the relevant trade or in analogous trades; perhaps of expert opinion expressed in publications or in the witness box; possibly of the profitability of the invention; and of any other factor on which the judge can decide the measure of loss’. (5) As explained by Lord Kitchin JSC in Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] RPC 20 at [28], in identifying terms which are fair, ‘relevant matters will include what a willing licensor and a willing licensee in the relevant circumstances acting without holding out or holding up would agree upon, general practice in the industry, and any relevant comparables. The evidence of the parties may be helpful, as may evidence from appropriately qualified expert witnesses’. (6) Whichever view of the parties’ position was taken, Mr Judd submitted, that complex question was precisely the sort that should not be visited upon a foreign court; Ronelp [37], [39]; Pan Ocean [38-43]; Cosco Bulk [61]. 74. Mr Judd also argued that the Korean court would defer to an English ruling on quantum when assessing the Respondent’s proof in the Claim Allowance proceedings. In that regard he referred me to the following passages from the parties’ expert evidence: (1) At paragraph 71 of her Affidavit of 17 October 2025, the Respondent’s expert, Ms Kim Sy Nae, concluded that, whilst the claim must be accounted for in the Rehabilitation Process, in order to bind other creditors, the Korean Court ‘will probably defer to an English Court’s decision if one is available and consider it as prevailing evidence to find that the claim exists in the amount stated’; and that the Korean Court’s recognition of an English order ‘will consequently have binding effect on all creditors’ [with emphasis added]. (2) At paragraph 41 of his first report, dated 10 October 2025, the Administrator’s expert, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, observed that in the context of final foreign arbitral awards, Korean courts have held that unless there are grounds of refusal of recognition and enforcement under Article V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the New York Convention), a Rehabilitation Court must recognise and give effect to such awards in Claim Allowance proceedings. At paragraph 42 of his first report, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim continued: ‘By analogy, it is therefore likely that the Rehabilitation Court would also recognise a final foreign court judgment, provided it satisfies the statutory requirements for recognition, including reciprocity, set out in Article 217 of the Korean Civil Procedure Act (the “CPA”). Korean Law recognises foreign judgments on the basis of reciprocity: a foreign judgment may be recognised in Korea if, among other conditions, the foreign country similarly recognises Korean judgments, or if any differences in the recognition standards are not material. Once recognised under the CPA, a foreign judgment may be declared enforceable by a Korean court, allowing execution against assets located in Korea pursuant to Article 26 of the Korean Civil Execution Act. Accordingly, if the English court judgment amount is final and enforceable, the Rehabilitation Cout would treat it as a fixed enforceable claim (subject to recognition under the CPA), rather than having to reassess the underlying the [sic] amount.’ 75. I pause here to set out the translated version of Article 217 of the CPA contained in footnote 6 to Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s first report. This provides as follows: ‘(1) A final and conclusive judgment rendered by a foreign court or a judgment acknowledged to have the same force (hereafter referred to as “final judgment, etc”) shall be recognised, if all of the following requirements are met: 1. That the international jurisdiction of such foreign court is recognised under the principle of international jurisdiction pursuant to the statutes or treaties of the Republic of Korea; 2. That a defeated defendant is served, by a lawful method, a written complaint or document corresponding thereto, and notification of date or written order allowing him or her sufficient time to defend (excluding cases of service by public notice or similar), or that he or she responds to the lawsuit even without having been served such documents; 3. That the approval of such final judgment, etc does not undermine sound morals or other social order of the Republic of Korea in light of the contents of such final judgment, etc and judicial procedures; 4. That mutual guarantee exists, or the requirements for recognition of final judgment, etc in the Republic of Korea and the foreign country to which the foreign country court belongs are not far off balance and have no actual difference between each other in important points. (2) A court shall ex officio investigate whether the requirements under paragraph (1) are satisfied.’ 76. Mr Judd rejected the doubts expressed by the Administrator and, (by his second and third reports), the Administrator’s expert, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, on whether the Korean Rehabilitation court would recognise an English summary judgment. He maintained that the fact that the SJ Application sought summary judgment and/or strike out did not change the prospects of recognition in Korea. 77. By his second report dated 22 October 2025, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim, the Administrator’s expert, had opined that ‘because a summary judgment is rendered in truncated proceedings as compared to a full trial involving comprehensive examination of all relevant evidence, there is a considerable possibility that the Korean rehabilitation court will be slow to recognise summary judgments as a final and conclusive judgment and accord it the same effect as a full judgment on the merits.’ Mr Dong-Kyu Kim also referred to a point raised by the Company on service, saying that ‘If the Company was not properly served, I anticipate that the likelihood of recognition would be even lower.’ 78. Mr Judd argued that Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s second report was ‘equivocal’ on this issue – and at odds with the conclusions in his first report (set out at [74(2)] above) that an English judgment would be recognised on the basis of reciprocity, provided it was a final and conclusive judgment and the claim had been served or the respondent ‘responds to the lawsuit even without having been served’, by reference to Article 217 of the Korean Civil Procedure Act (reproduced in translation at [75] above). 79. Mr Judd also maintained that the SJ Application had been validly served: Hill Dickinson had been back on the record for the Company in the Inquiry since 1 September. Before then, the Respondent had been given permission for alternative service of previous orders, because the Company had failed to provide an alternative address for service in breach of CPR 6.23(1), 6.24 and 42.2(3). The Respondent had issued an application for alternative service as the Company was unrepresented and sought service on the email addresses which the Company itself had confirmed that it would use to communicate in the Inquiry. 80. In any event, the Company had ‘responded’ to the SJ Application, regardless of service, which of itself sufficed for the purposes of Article 217: (see [75] above). On 23 June, a Samyung representative, Simon Hong, hademailed the Respondent to say that it intended to contest the SJ Application. 81. Mr Judd also referred me to the evidence of the Respondent’s expert, Ms Kim Sy Nae. Ms Kim Sy Nae was firmly of the view that an order being by way of summary judgment or strike out would not impede recognition in Korea, on the basis that it is a final and conclusive judgment. By her second affidavit dated 11 November 2025, Mr Nae gave examples drawn from Korean caselaw. 82. By his third expert report dated 18 November 2025, prompted in part at least by the Respondent’s skeleton argument dated 23 October 2025 (prepared for the 24 October hearing) and the second affidavit of Ms Kim Sy Nae, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim maintained that the caselaw cited by Ms Kim Sy Nae in her second affidavit did not assist, as it concerned the recognition of foreign default judgments. By paragraph 14 of his third report, he maintained that a foreign summary judgment was ‘unlikely to be treated as conclusively establishing the amount of a rehabilitation claim’ and that (at [16]), even if a foreign summary judgment was ‘technically recognisable under Article 217’, it would ‘at most’ be treated as ‘reference material within the rehabilitation court’s own substantive examination’. Mr Dong-Kyu Kim also denied that there was any inconsistency between his first and second reports, maintaining that his first report had addressed ‘a different question’, which he described as ‘the recognition of a final foreign court judgment rendered after full proceedings’. In contrast, he said, the second report had considered whether an English summary judgment would qualify as such a ‘final foreign court judgment’ for the purposes of Article 217. 83. Mr Judd went on to argue that the Inquiry would not impede the Rehabilitation Process. As a matter of principle, he argued, the speedier determination of a complex question of English law would assist, rather than impede, the Korean court; CargoLogicAir at [17]; Ronelp [37], [39], [45]. 84. Mr Judd also referred me to Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s first report, in which he had stated (at [48]) that the Korean court had a discretion whether to stay the Claim Allowance proceedings in favour of the Inquiry and that: ‘…if the English proceedings are already well advanced and a judgment is expected relatively soon, it is likely that the Court will defer its hearing to await that judgment’. 85. I pause here to note that, having since personally attended a hearing in the Claims Allowance proceedings on 31 October 2025, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim by his third report (at [6]-[8]) had revised his stance on that aspect. He gave evidence that the presiding judge at the hearing had stated that the Rehabilitation Court would examine the Respondent’s claim ‘to the extent possible’ within the Claim Allowance proceedings and that ‘if an English summary judgment were to be issued during that process, the Court would review it as reference material together with the other evidence submitted’. Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s view was that the steps directed by the presiding judge at the hearing indicated that the Rehabilitation Court would be undertaking its own substantive examination, regardless of the English proceedings; and that the Korean Court was not awaiting the outcome of parallel foreign proceedings. 86. Mr Judd also referred to the confirmation given in Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s first report that the Rehabilitation Process and the proposed sale would carry on regardless of any ongoing proceedings to fix the quantum of the Respondent’s claim; and that there would be separate treatment put in place for any unconfirmed creditor claims: Kim(1) [51]-[52]. As put by Mr Dong-Kyu Kim at [51] (with emphasis added): ‘UKHO’s damages claim against the Company constitutes a rehabilitation claim, which must be repaid in accordance with the modification of rights and repayment method prescribed in the Company’s Rehabilitation Plan. If UKHO’s claim remains unconfirmed at the time the Rehabilitation Plan is submitted for approval at the Interested Parties Meeting, the plan may specify the treatment and repayment method applicable to such unconfirmed claims. Accordingly, in principle, the Company’s rehabilitation and M & A process would likely proceed irrespective of when the English litigation concludes. Under Korean rehabilitation practice, it is common for the court to deny voting rights to unconfirmed claims, such as those that remain under litigation, and such a decision by the court is not subject to appeal.’ 87. Mr Dong-Kyu Kim had also confirmed at [53] of his first report that one method of providing for unresolved claims was to ‘set aside a portion of the acquisition proceeds in escrow to cover the potential repayment to UKHO’. 88. At [54] of his first report, Mr Dong-Kyu Kim had added: ‘Another question that may be relevant is whether the Rehabilitation Court would postpone the rehabilitation process in order to await a quantum determination in either the Claim Allowance Proceedings or the English Proceedings. In my view, this appears unlikely. Under Korean rehabilitation practice, the approval or rejection of the Rehabilitation Plan must be determined within one year … or within one year and six months at the latest if an extension is granted due to exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Court is expected to proceed within this statutory timeframe rather than delay the process to await the outcome of either the Claim Allowance Proceedings or the English Proceedings.’ 89. By her first affidavit at [65-6], the Respondent’s expert, Ms Kim Sy Nae, agreed that, as the Rehabilitation process must be confirmed within 18 months of commencement, unresolved contested claims must be accounted for, stating that this was usually dealt with by reserving funds. She also agreed that unresolved claimants may not be allowed voting rights : [66]. 90. Mr Judd went on to submit that the fact that the Respondent’s claim was large and may exceed the funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors was irrelevant. He argued that if the Respondent succeeded in a Claim Allowance process and subsequent appeals and its expert evidence was accepted in Korea, the parties must proceed on the basis that the Korean court would reach the same determination as the English court. The relevant issue, he argued, is where such determination on quantum will be reached most quickly, without a Korean court having to grapple with expert evidence on cumbersome questions of English law. 91. Mr Judd also reminded me that the initial stay granted by the Prentis order was not pinned to any further deadlines in the rehabilitation process, but was instead to give the Administrator breathing space to consider the Respondent’s proof and the Inquiry. As put by Judge Prentis during the course of submissions (at page 16F of the transcript of proceedings on 22 July 2025): ‘I think it would be perfectly possible for this court not to accede to an application to extend the stay, if that is what is made, at the next hearing. It would not be an answer to it that there were these ongoing administration proceedings’. Discussion and conclusions 92. I accept and take into account the guidance given in the authorities cited to me. 93. I remind myself that, in determining whether to lift or continue a stay, the court has a free hand to do what is right and fair according to the circumstances of the case and that, where the foreign insolvency process in question is akin to an administration, this will involve considering the interests of creditors and other interested parties, including the debtor company. It is a balancing exercise. 94. I acknowledge that the court must have regard to the purpose of the stay machinery contained in the CBIR. It must also have regard to the default position within that machinery, which is that, subject to any variation by the court, a stay is granted automatically on recognition. The stay machinery is intended to assist the company in a foreign insolvency process to achieve the purpose of that process. In determining whether to lift or continue the stay, the court must ask itself whether lifting the stay is likely to impede the achievement of the purpose of the insolvency process. Consideration of this issue will include consideration of the impact that permission will have on unsecured creditors. 95. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the court should lift a stay with a view to giving a creditor a right to bring or continue legal proceedings overriding the statutory machinery of the insolvency process: AES Barry Ltd v TXU Europe Energy Trading [2004] EWHC 1757 at [24]. As observed by Briggs J in Cosco at [48], in a winding up context: ‘in general, the resolution of disputed matters within the machinery of a liquidation was likely to be cheaper and quicker than if left to ordinary proceedings, and … the often limited resources of the office-holder meant that the court should be cautious before exposing liquidators (or their equivalent) to the burden of coping with difficult and time-consuming litigation.’ 96. In determining whether to lift the stay, it is relevant to consider the size of the insolvency, the funds and time available to commit to legal proceedings, and the stage reached in the legal proceedings. It is not in the interests of the insolvency or creditors for the administrator’s time to be taken up with, nor for the Company’s funds to be used for, legal proceedings, if there are cheaper, faster and more efficient alternatives. 97. In cases involving complex matters of English law, however, the court must also have regard to which forum is best suited to the resolution of the same. This factors into the efficiency and effectiveness of competing methods of dispute resolution. 98. Having reviewed the evidence in this matter and having considered the authorities cited and the written and oral submissions with some care, I have come to the firm conclusion that the stay should be lifted to allow the IP Claim to proceed to judgment. 99. In reaching this conclusion I take into account the advanced stage reached in the IP Claim. Summary judgment on liability was granted as long ago as 2022. The SJ Application can be listed by January 2026 at the latest. If it fails, the parties already have a ten-day trial listed for June 2026. In contrast, the Claim Allowance process, allowing for de novo appeals with no threshold requirements, is likely to take between 2.5 and 4.5 years. Whilst Mr Kulkarni sought to play down the prospect of appeals within the Claim Allowance process, on the evidence before me, given how far apart the parties are on quantum and the lack of any threshold requirements on de novo appeals to the Rehabilitation Court and the High Court, the prospect of at least one, if not two, appeals within the Claim Allowance process is in my judgment very likely, if not inevitable. 100. The Claim Allowance proceedings are at a very early stage. Even if things go to plan, an initial ruling is not expected until late February/early March 2026. The Administrator’s own expert has stated that first appeals (before the Korean Rehabilitation Court) typically take 12-18 months; the Respondent’s expert says between 1 and 2 years. On any footing therefore, even working from the Administrator’s expert’s estimate, just one de novo appeal from the initial ruling in the Claim Allowance proceedings would not be concluded until February/March 2027 at best and August/September 2027 at worst. In contrast, the trial of the IP Claim is fixed for June 2026. 101. Mr Kulkarni argued that the Administrator would not be ready for trial in June 2026 and would be seeking an adjournment. He also said that the next trial listings available are December 2026. Given the Company’s procedural track record in the IP Claim, however, even if it does survive the SJ Application in December 2025/January 2026, its prospects of achieving an adjournment of the trial are far from certain. Even allowing for the possibility of a trial in December 2026 rather than June 2026, however, it will be noted that December 2026 still pre-dates the date by which, on the Administrator’s own expert evidence, a first de novo appeal in the Claim Allowance proceedings would be concluded. 102. Mr Kulkarni also reminded the court that there could be appeals in the English proceedings as well. The difference, however, is that there are threshold requirements for appeals in England. In addition, appeals in England are not de novo hearings. 103. Taking all such matters into account, on the evidence before me I am satisfied that allowing the Inquiry to proceed will be the quickest means of resolving the quantum dispute. The relatively advanced stage reached in the English proceedings is in my judgment a powerful factor in favour of lifting the stay: Ronelp at [45]. 104. On the evidence before me, I am further satisfied that lifting the stay is not likely to impede the Rehabilitation proceedings. In this regard I accept Mr Judd’s submission that the speedier determination of a complex question of English law will assist, rather than impede, the Korean court; CargoLogicAir at [17]; Ronelp [37], [39], [45]. 105. I reject Mr Kulkarni’s submission that the IP Claim should remain stayed as it would ‘unduly disrupt’ the Rehabilitation proceedings. It is clear from the evidence of both experts that the Rehabilitation Process and the proposed sale will carry on regardless of any ongoing proceedings to fix the quantum of the Respondent’s claim – whether those proceedings comprise the Inquiry, the Claim Allowance process, or both – and that there will be separate treatment put in place for any unconfirmed creditor claims: see [86]-[89] above. Any problems posed by creditor claims which cannot be confirmed and quantified within the timelines for the Rehabilitation process and for which separate treatment has to be put in place will exist whether or not the Inquiry goes ahead. Given the timelines for appeals within the Claims Allowance process, those problems would exist anyway, regardless of the ongoing English proceedings. The lifting of the stay is therefore neutral in this regard. 106. In my judgment very little weight can properly be placed on the view expressed by the Administrator in his evidence that the Company is a more attractive proposition in the M & A process if quantification proceeds exclusively in Korea pursuant to the Claim Allowance proceedings. This appeared to be premised at least in part (at Dong-Hoon (2) para [36]) on quantum resolution being ‘quicker’ within the Claim Allowance process. Given the high likelihood in this case of de novo appeals in the Claim Allowance process, and given also the length of time that the Administrator’s own expert had accepted that such appeals would take, the Administrator’s view on this issue is in my judgment entirely unpersuasive. 107. I take into account that this is not a large insolvency of Ronelp proportions and that defending the IP Claim will entail additional costs, particularly if it goes to full trial. Whilst I very much doubt that the cost of Claim Allowance proceedings, taking into account the expert evidence on English law that would be required in those proceedings, are quite as low as the Administrator and his expert have estimated, I do accept that if the Inquiry is taken to full trial it will involve greater expense than determination of quantum of the IP Claim through the Claim Allowance process alone, even allowing for an appeal within that process. As matters stand however, on a lifting of the stay there is, at the very least, a possibility that the SJ Application will conclude the IP Claim without the need for a full trial, at considerably less cost than the £1.4m estimated for trial. Moreover, even if the Inquiry does have to go to full trial, the additional costs involved must be seen in the context of the value and complexity of the claim itself: Pan Ocean [66]. The additional costs involved must also be considered in the context of the costs regime in operation in this country, which by CPR 44.2 ordinarily allows a successful party to recoup their reasonable costs from the losing party. (In contrast, in the Claim Allowance process, each party bears their own costs at first instance).As with any litigant engaged in litigation in this country, it is open to the Company, acting by the Administrator, to take professional advice on putting appropriate funding measures in place and on the appropriate stance to take on given issues within the Inquiry. If appropriate funding and litigation decisions are taken, it is open to the Company to temper and protect its position on costs. 108. I would add that the costs of the English proceedings are but one factor of many for the court to consider in the balancing exercise involved in reaching a decision on whether or not to lift a stay. 109. In my judgment a further and important factor in this case, which weighs heavily in favour of lifting the stay, is that the Inquiry involves complicated and highly specialist questions of English law that should not be visited upon a Korean court. 110. A brief summary of the IP Claim is set out at [4]-[6] of this judgment. The parties’ Korean counsel are agreed that English law will govern the determination of damages. Within thecontext of the Claim Allowance process, that would involve several rounds of expert evidence of English law and, if there is a dispute, the Korean court will, according to Ms Kim Sy Nae’s evidence, which in this regard I accept, seek to reach a view on an ‘independent evaluation of the legal authorities presented’. 111. The parties are unable to agree the basis for calculation, and the application of the user principle and negotiating damages under English law is in dispute. 112. The Respondent’sposition on quantum in the Inquiry is that the Company should be required to pay it a reasonable royalty or licence fee for its misuse of the AVCS Data by reference to UKHO’s terms and pricing for its AVCS service, which the Respondent calculates as a minimum of $86,153,079.46. This is based upon available sales figures provided by the Company to date, which the Respondent maintains do not tell the whole story. The Company has not given disclosure and the extent of its wider distribution of its S-Maps is unknown. The figure pleaded therefore represents the minimum that the Respondent seeks. 113. In its Amended Points of Defence, the Company (i) takes issue with negotiating damages as a basis to measure damages for breach of contract; and maintains that (ii) any licence fee payable to the Respondent would have to take account of the Respondent’s not owning all data; (iii) the Respondent should have negotiated a retrospective licence fee; (iv) calculation by reference to the more expensive AVCS licence is wrong; and (v) a lower calculation with reference to a DCP licence applies for certain periods. 114. It is clear that the difference in the parties’ approaches on the law is significant. The Respondent claims a minimum of USD $86,153,079.46 and interest of USD $59m. The Company asserts the correct damages figure is much lower, but has never pleaded a figure. 115. I reject Mr Kulkarni’s attempts to play down the complexity of the IP Claim. The pleadings speak for themselves. The Administrator’s own solicitors have acknowledged in correspondence the complexity of the issues involved; by way of example I refer to their letter of 8 October 2025, which states ‘It is clear from a cursory glance of the pleadings that this is not a simple inquiry with the directions order listing a 10-day trial with multiple witnesses and experts’. Leading counsel previously acting for the Administrator also acknowledged the same at the hearing before ICC Judge Prentis in July. In my judgment, the determination and application of the legal principles in this case requires a specialist English court. 116. The mere fact that the Respondent is pursuing the SJ Application does not detract from this conclusion. The SJ Application will be heard in a specialist list of the High Court. Should it not succeed, the Inquiry will proceed to trial in a specialist list of the High Court. 117. In my judgment, the complex questions arising on quantum in the context of this IP Claim are precisely the sort that should not be visited upon a foreign court, reliant upon expert evidence: Ronelp [37], [39]; Pan Ocean [38-43]; Cosco Bulk [61]. 118. I accept that the Claim Allowance process will continue notwithstanding the lifting of the stay in the English proceedings. I reject Mr Kulkarni’s submission, however, that this fact renders the English proceedings redundant or unnecessary. 119. On theevidence before me I am satisfied that there are good prospects that the Korean court will recognise an English ruling on quantum (whether after trial or by way of summary judgment) and treat it as prevailing evidence to find that the claim exists in the amount stated in the English judgment. In this regard I take into account in particular the expert evidence on this issue referred to at [74], [75] and [78] above. 120. I reject Mr Kulkarni’s attempts to play down the SJ Application as simply a ‘procedural’ strike-out application, based primarily on the Company’s earlier failures to comply with directions on disclosure, which would involve ‘no determination on the evidence’. It is clear from the evidence in support of the SJ Application that the application goes much further than this, raising substantive points on the Company’s prospects of successfully defending the claim. By way of example, reference was made at the hearing to paragraph 58 of Mr Thomas Mellor’s second witness statement, which addresses numerous matters going to the substance of the Company’s defence. 121. I reject Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s attempts to cast doubt on the likelihood of the Korean court recognising an English ruling by way of summary judgment. This was not readily reconcilable with the reasoning set out at paragraphs [41] and [42] of his first report, referred to at [74(2)] above. The explanation proffered in Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s third report for any perceived differences between his first and second reports was not entirely persuasive. There was also a marked shift between his second and third reports from the language of ‘possibility’ to that of ‘probability’, for which no persuasive explanation was given. This affects the weight that can be attached to the views expressed in his second and third reports. 122. I also reject the suggestion that the Company has any serious argument on service. In this regard I accept Mr Judd’s submissions on service (and on the Company in any event having ‘responded’ to the SJ Application), as summarised at [79]-[80] above. 123. The Respondent’s expert, Ms Kim Sy Nae, was firmly of the view that an order being by way of summary judgment or strike out would not impede recognition in Korea, on the basis that it is a final and conclusive judgment. Ms Kim Sy Nae supported her opinion with examples drawn from caselaw. I accept Ms Kim Sy Nae’s evidence on this issue. For the sake of completeness I confirm that I reject Mr Dong-Kyu Kim’s attempts to distinguish the caselaw relied upon by Ms Kim Sy Nae as relating to default judgments. His reasoning was not persuasive on this issue. 124. In my judgment on the evidence before me there are good prospects of the Korean Court acknowledging an Englishsummary judgment awarded on the SJ Application as a ‘final’ judgment for the purposes of Article 217 and/or considering it as ‘prevailing’ evidence to find, within the Claim Allowance process, that the claim exists in the amount found due by such English judgment. 125. In conclusion I confirm that lifting the stay is not an attack on the Korean judicial system. In this regard I respectfully concur with the Judge in Pan Ocean that deciding whether a dispute should be resolved within an insolvency process or ordinary litigation ‘arises from a legitimate recognition of the fact that insolvency proceedings (wherever they arise) may not be best suited on all occasions for such determination’: [54-5]. In my judgment the speedier determination by a specialist English court of complex questions of English law will assist, rather than impede, the Korean court and the rehabilitation process, for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. Conclusion 126. On the evidence before me, I conclude that it is right and fair in all the circumstances of this case for the stay to be lifted. 127. For all these reasons, the Administrator’s application is dismissed. ICC Judge Barber