Garry White & Ors v Uber London Limited & Ors

Wednesday, 22 October 2025 MRS JUSTICE O’FARRELL

1. These proceedings concern claims made by some 13,000 London black cab drivers against the defendants, who are all part of the Uber Group, for damages in respect of allegations of unlawful means conspiracy.

2. The claims arise out of Uber’s application for a private hire vehicle operators (“PHVO”) licence, which was granted by Transport for London (“TfL”), allowing Uber to establish and carry out business in London.

3. The allegation is that Uber misrepresented the nature of its business operating model and, on that basis, the licence should not have been granted. As a result, it is said that the PHVO licence, which was unlawfully obtained, enabled Uber to compete with the lawful services offered by the claimants and undercut their tariffs. Therefore, it is said the defendants made a profit at the expense of the claimants.

4. The relevant period of the licence under scrutiny was 2012 through to 14 March 2018, when changes were made to Uber’s mode of operation.

5. There are two claims: a. On 2 May 2024, CL-2024-000252 was issued by about 13,000 black cab drivers, whose total loss is estimated at £199,395,000; b. On 24 June 2024, CL-2024-000366 was issued by the alleged assignee of the rights of two companies called “Kabbee” and “Iride” that are said to have been involved in the provision of private hire in London, whose loss is estimated at £141,000,000.

6. The overall size of the claim is, in relation to both claims, about £340 million, a substantial claim. However, it comprises relatively modest claims by value in respect of each of the numerous claimants, who have sensibly embarked on a group action. Preliminary issue

7. A limitation issue has arisen because the case put forward by the claimants is that the unlawful period of operation of the business was between mid-2012 and 14 March 2018. In addition to a defence on the merits, the defendants have raised the issue of limitation, claiming that the claims were statute barred either: a. by 14 March 2018, when the relevant period for the alleged representations and unlawful operating ceased; or b. by 14 March 2024, when it is said that the six years expired from the date of the changes made to the licence. In either case, the start of proceedings in May and June 2024, it is said, was after expiry of those statutory periods of limitation.

8. The claimants’ response to that, set out in their reply, is that they are entitled to rely on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 by reason of fraud and/or deliberate concealment on the part of the defendants, with the effect that the limitation period did not begin to run before a reasonable period after 25 or 26 June 2018 at the earliest, when they could reasonably have discovered the facts relevant to their claims.

9. The relevance of 25/26 June 2018 is that it was the date on which a hearing was heard by the Chief Magistrate. During the course of that hearing, the Chief Magistrate found that there had been irregularities concerning the operation of the licence by Uber but that, having regard to the changes made to operating conditions in March 2018, the appeal against the refusal to renew the licence would be allowed.

10. The preliminary issue that has been identified and agreed by the parties, subject to the approval of the court, is in the following terms: “Did the claimants discover, or could the claimants with reasonable diligence have discovered, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after 25 or 26 June 2018?”

11. The court is satisfied that it is a sensible way forward for this case, having regard to the relevant authorities, including the applicable principles set out in the case of Steele v Steele [2001] CP Rep 106 per Neuberger J as summarised by Hildyard J in Wentworth Sons v. Lomas [2018] 2 BCLC 696 at [32].

12. In this case, if the issue of limitation were to be resolved in favour of the defendants, then it would be dispositive, potentially, of the whole case. If it were to be resolved in favour of the claimants, then it would resolve an issue that in any event must be resolved.

13. In terms of the issue itself, it can be dealt with in a reasonably short hearing, currently estimated to be five days. Although there will be some factual evidence required, it will be a mixed question of fact and law and can be encompassed within a sensible timeframe, thereby not unduly taking up court time or disadvantaging other court users. The parties have helpfully agreed the basis on which the issue will be dealt with; the primary factual allegations of misrepresentation will be assumed to be true for the purpose solely of the preliminary issue, thereby excluding much of the factual investigation that the court might otherwise have to make.

14. The preparation, hearing and determination of the preliminary hearing will involve some time and expense but the scope of the issue will not unduly increase the costs or delay the trial.

15. For those reasons, the court agrees that this is a sensible preliminary issue for the court to order.

16. The general timetable has been agreed by the parties, which is very helpful, set out in a draft order put before the court. The only change to the draft order that is required is at paragraph 4, where it is proposed that the court should list the matter for five days, rather than four, to include both one day of pre-reading for the court and also one day’s gap between the hearing and closing submissions. That seems to me to be very sensible, and I will make the appropriate change. Sampling

17. Given the total number of claimants, a proportionate approach must be taken to the issue of the date by which individual or groups of claimants had sufficient knowledge to make their claims. It is submitted by Mr Howe KC for the claimants that it would be sensible for the court to include an order regarding sampling, which I agree should be done.

18. It was thought that there might be a dispute between the parties as to the principle on which sampling should be carried out for the purpose of the preliminary issue. In fact, the issue between the parties is very narrow indeed.

19. The first issue concerns the size of the sample group. The claimants suggest that 10 claimants should be used by way of sampling; those individuals should be required to give disclosure in relation to the information they had, on the basis of which they knew, or should have known, that they had a worthwhile claim so as to give them sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to issuing the claim. The defendants suggest that a wider sample pool should be taken of

20.

20. The second issue is the basis on which the sample would be used by the court to determine the preliminary issue. The claimants suggest that it should be illustrative, i.e. not automatically binding. The defendants submit that it should be representative, rather than simply illustrative; the claimants should not be permitted to have a second bite at the cherry if the preliminary issue did not go their way.

21. The court considers that the appropriate size of the sample should be

20. The samples should be representative, so that the findings of the court will apply to all of the claimants, but that the decision will not be automatically binding in the sense of being automatically extrapolated to every single claimant.

22. The court proposes that, following the judgment on the 20 sample cases, the parties would be invited to provide written and oral submissions as to the mechanism of extrapolation and whether or not any different findings should be required in relation to any particular claimant group. The purpose of the exercise is to provide a final decision by the court as to the date by which the claimants had actual or constructive knowledge for the purposes of section

32. However, the court could find that certain categories of claimant, or claimants in particular circumstances, had relevant knowledge by different dates. Therefore, it leaves open the possibility that the decision by the court on this issue might not automatically result in all claimants being within time or statute-barred.

23. In my view, the best way of dealing with it is to make an order that there be a representative sample of 20 claimants for the purposes of disclosure and for the purposes of the preliminary issue. But, once the court has decided on the legal and factual analysis following the preliminary issue hearing, the parties will have a further opportunity to address the court before any order is made in relation to the preliminary issue.

24. My reasons for selecting 20 rather than 10 sample claimants are as follows. Firstly, we are dealing with a cohort of over 13,000 claimants. Therefore, a sample of 20 does not seem to be excessive. It is acknowledged that the more samples that are selected, the greater the workload, the increased possibly of duplication and the increased cost load on the claimants in particular. However, that has to be judged against the overall value of the claim, which is substantial on any view.

25. Secondly, it may be that some of the claimants who were selected no longer have their documents. They may think that they have them but, when they go to look for them, they cannot find them. It may be that when some individual claimants are asked to provide documents, they get cold feet and decide to withdraw from the case. It may be that they discontinue from the case for other reasons. I accept that it is statistically unlikely that the full cohort might disappear. Nonetheless, a claimant who has agreed to sign up to a class action is not the same as a claimant who is then prepared, when asked, to produce all relevant documentation and, potentially give evidence in court. Therefore, it may well be that some of the claimants decide they no longer wish to participate, at least, as sample claimants.

26. In those circumstances, it would be unfortunate if we had an initial sample of 10 and that rather rapidly dwindled to five or six. I consider that the additional cost and work burden is more than compensated for by the security of having a sensible spread of claimants at the outset.

27. So, for all those reasons, I will order the preliminary issue as set out in the draft order, with an estimate of five days. The sampling group will be a representative sample of 20 claimants, to be selected as to 10 by the claimants and 10 by the defendants. Disclosure

28. There are three issues before the court regarding the list of issues for disclosure as set out in the disclosure review document.

29. I start by identifying issue 1, which is agreed: “From what date did the Claimants … discover, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered: 1.1. Enough to plead their case, or 1.2. Sufficient information to realise that they had a worthwhile claim, so as to give them sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to issuing the claim, such as taking legal advice, collecting evidence, or submitting a claim to the Defendants?”

30. Against that background, there are three issues in dispute regarding sub-issues 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.

31. The issue that arises on 1.1 is whether an issue for disclosure should be: “When did the claimants instruct solicitors and/or barristers on any or all of the issues set out in the list of common ground and issues?”

32. The defendants’ position is that the date on which solicitors and/or barristers were instructed by any claimant goes potentially directly to the preliminary issue and to the date on which there was actual or constructive knowledge for the purposes of making the claim. The claimants’ position is that any such information would be of no evidential value without disclosure of the content of those instructions and those would be privileged.

33. I consider that this is an appropriate issue for disclosure in the circumstances of this case. The date on which lawyers in general were instructed by any of the claimants may, I emphasise “may”, be relevant in terms of establishing the date by which that claimant had or is deemed to have sufficient knowledge for the purposes of section 32 of the Limitation Act. It may support the claimants’ case. It may show that a claimant did not have sufficient information until a relatively late date, thereby establishing or supporting its case that it did not have sufficient information until after June 2018. It may support the defendants’ case, in that it may show that the claimant had sufficient information to go to a solicitor or barrister at a much earlier date than June 2018. It may be that it proves to be of little evidential value, but one cannot determine that until the relevant documentation has at least been listed.

34. There may well be issues as to privilege; it may be that the claimants will have to consider whether or not they wish to stand by any such privilege or waive it. But all of those matters are further down the line. I think at this stage it is a relevant question for the defendants to ask. It arises directly as a result of the preliminary issue that is to be tried.

35. Therefore, I will order that issue 1.1 should be included as a disclosure list, but subject to the point I make in relation to the third issue.

36. Turning to the issue that arises on issue 1.3, that relates to a specific request for the relevant sample claimants to make searches in relation to information on social media, WhatsApp, text messages and so forth regarding the issues set out in the list of common ground and other issues.

37. As I have already indicated, the court considers that this is, as drafted, too vague and speculative, which is the position taken by the claimants. A wide-ranging trawl would be expensive and time-consuming and probably would not be very productive. However, the defendants have helpfully taken instructions and agreed that they could draft a model C request, which would be much more precise and targeted.

38. On that basis, I will not order the inclusion of issue 1.3, but I will direct that the defendants draft their model C request. Hopefully it can be agreed by the claimants and, if not, the parties could simply refer it to the court and the court will decide it on the papers.

39. Turning then to the third issue, this applies to issues 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 as currently drafted, which is whether there should be an inclusion of the words, after reference to the Claimants: “… whether in their individual capacity or as a member of an association, society or otherwise …”

40. The defendants have explained that this is essentially for clarification only, so that if documents or information has come into the possession of the claimants through their membership of an association or other society, those documents would still be caught by their disclosure obligations.

41. The claimants submit that that is already covered by issue 1; if they have the documents, then they are disclosable, and if they do not, there should not be any attribution on the part of the claimants by reference to information and/or documents held by an association or society.

42. I decline to include this as a separate issue because it is already included in issue

1. I appreciate that the intention was simply to include it for clarification but, in my view, that is only likely to arise if documents are not included in the disclosure identified by the claimants under issue 1 and it is clear that there are gaps. The reason that any gaps in disclosure might become apparent is because the LTDA has helpfully agreed to cooperate and give its own disclosure. Therefore, it would not be too difficult to work out that there might be a failure on the part of an individual claimant to give disclosure based on documents disclosed by the LTDA showing that they were circulated to that claimant.

43. In those circumstances, I do not consider that the additional clarification is necessary for inclusion in the list of issues. It may well form the basis of communications between the solicitors during the disclosure exercise, but it is unnecessary at this stage. Costs budgeting

44. Before the court is the defendants’ application dated 26 September 2025 for an order that CPR 3.2 and Practice Direction 3D dealing with costs budgeting should not apply in this case.

45. There are three witness statements in relation to the application: firstly, that of Rachel Lidgate of HSF Kramer on behalf of the defendants dated 26 September 2025; secondly, the witness statement of Hazel Chambers of Mishcon de Reya for the claimants, dated 10 October 2025; and thirdly, the witness statement of John Simon of Willis Limited dated 10 October 2025.

46. The circumstances in which the application comes to be made are that the claim forms as served did not contain a statement that the claims were valued at in excess of £10 million. The claims as pleaded however, by way of a class action, indicate that the value of the claims in total is about £340 million. The court has ordered the trial of a preliminary issue regarding the date of knowledge for the purposes of section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, which is currently estimated to be heard in June or July of 2026.

47. The principles that the court should consider and apply are not in dispute and have been very helpfully set out by the parties in their skeleton arguments.

48. Firstly, the court has discretion to do what it thinks is just and appropriate and in accordance with the overriding objective.

49. Secondly, there is no presumption for or against requiring costs budgets for claims that exceed the normal threshold of £10 million. The court's discretion is wholly unfettered, as explained by Nugee J (as he then was) in Sharp v Blank [2015] EWHC 2685 (Ch) at [17]-[21].

50. Third, the threshold at which costs budgeting ceases to apply is in part because the higher the value of the claim, the less likely it is that issues of proportionality will be important or even relevant, as explained by Coulson J (as he then was) in CIP Properties v Galliford Try [2014] EWHC 3546 (TCC) at [27]-[28].

51. Fourthly, the court must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of costs budgeting when deciding whether to exercise its discretion in all the circumstances of the case.

52. The defendants’ case is that it is not appropriate in this case for the court to order costs management. I summarise the reasons for that submission. Firstly, the total amount claimed is estimated at about £340 million, obviously very significantly in excess of the threshold at which costs budgeting would normally cease to apply. Although it does not give rise to any presumption one way or the other, it is nonetheless a very relevant consideration because it can affect the court's assessment of whether costs management is necessary in order to ensure that the costs are proportionate to the case as a whole.

53. Secondly, there is no basis for the suggestion that the defendants have incurred or will likely incur disproportionate costs defending this claim and in support of that, it is said, well, the defendants have proposed the preliminary issue. One of the reasons for that is to facilitate a swift and cost effective end to the litigation. It is also the case that the defendants have indicated their spending to date is approximately £2 million, not indicating that there has been any loose spending or extravagant spending in the case to date.

54. Thirdly, it is submitted that the claimants don't require a costs management order for the purposes of arranging an appropriate ATE insurance policy in contrast to the facts in Sharp v Blank (above). They have already secured their litigation funding and ATE insurance and in particular, the ATE insurance will cover any adverse costs orders to the tune of £14 million. Therefore there is adequate coverage against adverse costs in that sum. It is unlikely that the costs of the preliminary issue trial will come close to exceeding the limit of that funding. And also, the defendants have offered to provide updates as to their total expenditure in relation to costs over the forthcoming months.

55. Fourthly, the disadvantages of costs budgeting are said by the defendants to be clear. They will add to the costs of the proceedings and divert resources that could otherwise be deployed in relation to the substance of the case. It is clear that a cost does attach to the preparation of costs budgets, the attendance at a costs management hearing and any subsequent changes to the costs budget.

56. It is also submitted that it is difficult to assess the various contingencies that are required in this case. In particular, it is not yet clear how many witnesses the claimants are likely to call at the preliminary issue. The DRD document has not yet been finalised and therefore there are a number of question marks over the value of producing costs budget at this stage and in addition, it is likely it add an additional layer of procedural complexity that is not necessary in this case.

57. For their part, the claimants seek to persuade the court that it would be appropriate in this case to order costs budgeting. They submit that it would further the overriding objective, in particular the requirement that the parties should be placed on an equal footing, and that litigation should be conducted without needless expense and at proportionate cost.

58. In support of that submission, it is submitted, firstly, that the claimants are predominantly private individuals of modest means and that the relief that they seek on an individual level is approximately £15,000 per claimant. As a result of that, they are particularly concerned that they are sufficiently protected by ATE insurance against future adverse costs and therefore they need to have a reliable view of their exposure at an early stage of the case. In particular, they are concerned that if they need to top up their ATE insurance at a later stage, it would be prohibitively expensive.

59. Secondly, it is also submitted that the claimants should not be compelled to over-insure as a result of any uncertainty in the costs of the litigation. Again, it is said that if they are required to do that at a late stage, that will prove to be particularly expensive.

60. Thirdly, one of the advantages of costs management is said to be that it will eliminate the known unknowns; it will crystallise the parties’ respective exposure to adverse costs in sums that cannot be exceeded at any subsequent detailed assessment without good reason. That is, if the court does costs budget, the costs budgets that are subsequently agreed or approved usually act as a cap as well as a floor. In those circumstances, the claimants will know in advance what sums they can reasonably draw down from their own funding for their costs and will know the ATE that they need to meet the defendants' costs.

61. Finally, it is said that this is a case where there is a risk that the costs will be disproportionate. It is said in relation to the individual claims, but it is also I think a wider point made in general terms, disproportionate to the nature and complexity of the case, including its value. For all those reasons, it is submitted that the court should make a costs budgeting order in this case.

62. In weighing the advantages and disadvantages, the starting point must be the purpose for which costs budgeting has been introduced into the litigation field. The purpose of costs management is said to be to further the overriding objective in dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost. The overriding objective is designed to ensure that the case can be dealt with ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in the proceedings, saving expense and dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the amount of money involved, to the importance of the case, to the complexity of the issues and to the financial position of each party, in each case ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly.

63. This is a very high value claim when the amount claimed is compared to the usual limit above which the court does not require costs budgeting, that is £10 million. As has been stated, and in particular in the CIP Properties v Galliford Try case, that makes it less likely that the costs will appear to be disproportionate to the value of the case. However, it is not necessarily the position, particularly as the court has to consider a range of factors in terms of proportionality, not just the amount of money that is at stake.

64. Further, I note that the parties have agreed, and the court has ordered, the trial of a preliminary issue which certainly has the potential to shorten, or clarify, and therefore to ensure a speedy resolution to the case. That certainly indicates that the parties are cooperating and adopting a sensible approach to the management of this dispute.

65. However, the court is very aware of the fact that this is a large group action over 13,000 separate claimants and their claims individually are very modest indeed. In those circumstances, I consider that the real advantage of cost budgeting in this case is that the claimants will then have visibility of their exposure in respect of the defendants’ costs.

66. Of course, I take the point that if the defendants succeed on the preliminary issue, that could well be an end to the litigation as a whole. The defendants have already indicated that they will keep the claimants aware of their incurred costs in the run-up to that trial and therefore, provided the claimants have sufficient funding and ATE insurance for the preliminary issues trial, which they clearly do at this stage, there is no issue. The costs will be subject to a detailed assessment, if not agreed, in the usual way and there will be no real advantage to any costs budgeting that the court embarks on at this stage.

67. However, the court also has to consider what might be the position if the claimants were to prevail at the preliminary issue trial. That would not necessarily be the end of the road for the litigation. The concern that is raised by the claimants is that there may have been too much eaten into their funding and ATE insurance at that stage so that it could impact adversely their ability to fight the subsequent proceedings.

68. This is a case where the individual claimants are entitled to carry out their own cost-benefit analysis of the proceedings at each stage. That will involve, not only tracking their own costs exposure through the percentage of damages, if any, that they might have to forego, but also in tracking the funding and ATE that gets eaten up by their own costs and by exposure to the other side’s costs in terms of the wider funding for the litigation in general.

69. As against that, I acknowledge that ordering costs budgeting at this stage increases the burden on both sides, both in terms of the work that is required and the costs of preparing, exchanging, commenting on their costs budgets and potentially attending a costs budget hearing, although I note that that wouldn't be necessary if the parties were able to agree their costs budgets. However, those burdens are outweighed by the real advantage in having visibility at this stage as to the estimates of costs in respect of the period up to the end of the preliminary issue trial that will more easily enable the court to keep an eye on and manage the costs of this litigation.

70. For those reasons, the court will make a costs budgeting order.