Grzegorz Przybys, R (on the application of) v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1159 (Admin) Case No: AC-2025-MAN-000454 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE COURT Manchester Civil Justice Centre 1 Bridge Street, West Manchester, M60 9DJ Date: 15/05/2026 Before : MR JUSTICE COPPEL – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : THE KING (ON THE APPLICATION OF GRZEGORZ PRZYBYS) Claimant – and – THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE Defendant – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – The Claimant (in person) Alex Ustych (instructed by Legal Services Branch, Greater Manchester Police) for the Defendant Hearing dates: 22-23 April 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Approved Judgment This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on Friday 15 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ……………………….. Mr Justice Coppel: The Claim

1. On 4 January 2024, Ludwika Przybys died whilst in the care of the Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”), at the North Manchester General Hospital (“the Hospital”). She was 87 years’ old and suffered from heart disease. The Claimant, her son, maintains that the care that she received from doctors and nurses employed by the Trust was seriously inadequate, to the extent that it caused her death. He has engaged extensively with the Trust, the General Medical Council (“GMC”) and the Senior Coroner for the Manchester City area (“the Coroner”) in order to secure investigations into what he regards as the failings in Ludwika’s care.

2. He also complained to the Defendant, on 19 February 2025, that the crime of gross negligence manslaughter had been committed against Ludwika and should be subject to police investigation. The Defendant’s initial response, on 25 March 2025, was that he should continue to pursue the matter with the GMC and that the Defendant would not investigate the crime alleged by the Claimant. Following informal and formal complaints by the Claimant to the Defendant and a review of the Defendant’s response to his formal complaint by the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (“GMCA”), a much more detailed response was provided to the Claimant by the Defendant, by letter dated 18 November 2025, defending its decision not to investigate his report of a crime against Ludwika.

3. In the meantime, on 26 September 2025, these proceedings were issued. They raised several grounds of challenge, procedural and substantive, based on the common law and the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”), attacking both the Defendant’s initial decision not to investigate the crime reported by the Claimant and its handling of the Claimant’s complaints about that decision. On 25 November 2025, HHJ Sephton KC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) granted permission for judicial review on two grounds only: “a. The defendant failed promptly to investigate the claimant’s report of a crime, namely the manslaughter of Ludwika Przybys. b. The defendant decided to close the investigation into the manslaughter of Ludwika Przybys. Such a decision was unlawful because there was no rational basis for the decision”.

4. On 24 March 2026, following a renewal hearing at which the Claimant sought permission to proceed on additional grounds, Hill J confirmed (§3 of her Order) that the full hearing of the claim would be limited to the grounds for which permission had been granted by HHJ Sephton KC.

5. At the hearing before me, which took place on 22-23 April 2026, the Claimant pursued his complaints with dignity and no little eloquence, ably assisted by interpreters who had been appointed by the Court. However, for the reasons set out below, I have decided to dismiss the claim, in summary because it was, in my judgment, a rational exercise of the Defendant’s broad discretion in this regard to decide that he would not investigate the alleged manslaughter of Ludwika when there had been no previous suggestion (such as from the Coroner) that there should be police involvement in investigating the circumstances of her death and the Claimant was awaiting the outcome of his complaints to the GMC against the doctors who had treated Ludwika. The facts The circumstances of Ludwika’s death

6. The Claimant has gathered an extensive array of evidence which, he says, proves the mistreatment of Ludwika. In his oral submissions, he helpfully grouped the evidence under a number of headings.

7. First, there are photographs of Ludwika in hospital which, according to the Claimant, show clear and obvious clinical signs of dehydration, such as dry skin and sunken eyes. Second, there was statistical evidence of Ludwika being dehydrated, namely fluid balance levels which showed a large negative fluid balance (that is, she was losing significantly more liquid than she was ingesting). Third, there were laboratory analyses of Ludwika’s blood which also – according to the Claimant – provided obvious evidence of dehydration, including heightened levels of urea but a proportionately much smaller rise in levels of creatine. Despite this evidence of dehydration, Ludwika was subjected to aggressive diuretic therapy, by the drug furosemide, the purpose of which was to encourage her body to expel fluid and urea in urine. The Claimant believes that dehydration contributed significantly to her death.

8. Fourth, the hospital had access to cardiology reports on Ludwika in the period prior to her admission. These explained that she had been taking medications for her heart condition called Digoxin and Amlodipine for many years but that her dosage of Digoxin had been significantly reduced, 19 days before her admission to hospital, because of elevated levels of toxicity which had showed up on a blood test. Ludwika’s treatment with Amlopidine had been withdrawn but this had caused side-effects and it was reinstated before she was admitted to Hospital. However, the Hospital did not ensure that the dosage of Digoxin was reinstated even though the previous toxicity had subsided. Similarly, Ludwika had been taking anticoagulant medication, to protect (amongst other things) against ischaemic heart disease, for around 16 years, most recently Edoxoban. This was also not administered to her during her stay in hospital. The Claimant believes that these failures to treat her heart condition contributed to her death from heart failure.

9. Fifth, in correspondence with the Claimant following Ludwika’s death, in particular in letters dated 22 May and 1 November 2024, the Trust admitted a series of failures in the care provided to Ludwika by the Hospital. These included wrongly recording that Ludwika was diabetic, claiming to have administered Metformin (a drug used in the treatment of diabetes) when they did not do so, failure to follow standard procedures for mental capacity assessments and the deprivation of liberty safeguards prescribed by the Mental Capacity Act 2004, serious failings in communicating with Ludwika and her family and inappropriately describing the Claimant and his sister as “difficult” in Ludwika’s medical notes. Correspondence with the Coroner

10. On 13 January 2024, the Claimant wrote a long email to the Coroner, explaining his concerns about the circumstances of Ludwika’s death and arguing that these gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that her death had been “unnatural”, such that it should be the subject of an inquest (as per s. 1(2)(a) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009). The Coroner made enquiries of the Hospital which reported Ludwika’s death as having been caused by congestive heart failure, valvular disease, atrial fibrillation, diabetes and frailty. On 19 January 2024, the Coroner’s officer indicated that the Coroner had accepted that Ludwika’s death was a natural one (and, accordingly, did not direct that an inquest be held). She reported to the Claimant on the same day that “[T]he coroner has directed that there is no evidence that any suspected failings have contributed to the death; as such, no further investigations will be made by this office”. Further representations made by the Claimant on 17 April and 3 December 2024 produced the same response from the Coroner. Reports to the Defendant

11. On 19 February 2025, the Claimant sent by post a lengthy letter to the Defendant himself, entitled “Notification of suspicion of committing a crime”, in which he reported that a consultant who had been responsible for Ludwika’s treatment, Anicia Ali, had committed a crime causing Ludwika’s death. He enclosed a package of hard copy documentation. On 19 March 2025, the Chief Constable’s office replied to the Claimant, informing him that they were not able to record the Claimant’s report because they did not have access to the necessary systems, and that he should make his report by calling 101 or on the Greater Manchester Police (“GMP”) website. The Claimant’s hard copy documents were returned to him and the Defendant did not retain a copy of them.

12. On 22 March 2025, the Claimant followed that advice and made a report on the “Single Online Home” reporting service, which was available on GMP’s website. This permitted only a limited amount of information to be provided. The Claimant named the victim of the crime as Ludwika, the suspect as Dr Ali and described the offence committed as “serious breach of the obligation to treat leading to death as a result of treatment or omission”. In answer to a specific question about communication needs, the Claimant stated that he required a Polish to English translator. He also noted that he had already sent a complete set of documents regarding the case, quoting the reference number which the Chief Constable’s office had used when writing to him. An incident report was automatically created by virtue of the report to “Single Online Home”.

13. The following day, 23 March 2025, an officer of the Defendant contacted the Claimant by phone, leaving a message, and then by SMS text message to ask him to contact GMP on 101 in order to provide further information about his report. The Claimant responded by making a further report on the Single Online Home service, directing the Defendant to the report he had made to the Chief Constable on 19 February 2025, and again providing the correspondence reference for that report. He requested that the Defendant link the information he had already provided to the current report or provide a postal address so that he could send in the relevant documents again.

14. The Claimant made a further report via Single Online Home on 25 March 2025 in which he requested that the GMP secure evidence in the form of the body of Ludwika, which the Trust was demanding should be collected by her family or else it would arrange for burial itself. The Claimant wanted her body preserved “until General Medical Council (GMC) information determining whether a crime has actually been committed is obtained. … the circumstances of Ludwika Przybys' death have been appealed to the General Medical Council and we are waiting for its review”.

15. Just over an hour after that report was made, at 07.47 on 25 March 2025, the Defendant texted the Claimant stating: “Regarding the online form you have submitted to us I am aware you have already reported this to the General Medical Council. This is something you would need to proceed with them as the police are unable to get involved with this matter as we are unable to stop the hospital from going forward with the burial. Please be assured that if there was anything which indicated the death occurred as a result of a crime then GMP would have been involved at the earliest stages and a full investigation would have taken place.” It is apparent from the Defendant’s log of the correspondence with the Claimant that the officer who wrote that text message had taken advice from “Crime Reporting Supervision”, an individual within a dedicated team responsible for ensuring the appropriate reporting and recording of crimes on the Defendant’s internal systems.

16. Around the same time, the Defendant’s internal incident log was updated to state that the incident report was closed, for the reason “Not for police. Advised to proceed with GMC”.

17. The Claimant then pursued complaints against the Defendant’s refusal to investigate the crime that he had reported. He complained to the Defendant’s Professional Standards Department and initially also to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (“IOPC”), which referred his complaint back to the Defendant to address in the first instance. The Defendant upheld his complaint but only on the limited basis that his request for a translator had not been considered and that more effort should have been made to speak with him before the log of his initial report was closed (letter of 27 September 2025). The following day, the Claimant requested a review of that decision, which was conducted by the GMCA.

18. In a letter to the Claimant dated 17 October 2025, the GMCA’s reviewer concluded that the Defendant had not made reasonable enquiries into the Claimant’s complaint, as the complaint-handler, Natalie Gee, had not contacted the Claimant nor reviewed GMP’s decision not to record a crime, which was the nub of the Claimant’s grievance. It was unclear whether Ms Gee had considered only the initial response to the Claimant’s report of 22 March 2025 asking him for further information or also the response of 25 March 2025, telling the Claimant to pursue his complaint to the GMC. Also, once a complaint had been made, the Claimant should have been told whether or not his concerns about the circumstances of Ludwika’s death would be recorded as a crime and, if not, a full explanation should have been given to him.

19. The GMCA’s reviewing officer made recommendations to the Defendant which included that it check with Ms Gee whether she was aware of the decision reached on 25 March 2025 that the Claimant’s report was not a police matter and if not that there should be a review by a trained crime recorder to assess whether or not there was sufficient material available to record a crime.

20. The Defendant wrote to the Claimant (via the GMCA) on 18 November 2025 detailing the steps it had taken to comply with the GMCA’s recommendations. It is not made explicit that Ms Gee had been unaware of the 25 March 2025 response to the Claimant but this seems to me to be implicit in the fact that an experienced officer, Inspector Andrew Hofmann, had been tasked with assessing whether or not there was sufficient material available to record a crime and whether any further police action was required.

21. Inspector Hofmann concluded that there had been no requirement to record a crime in response to the Claimant’s reports to the Defendant in March 2025 and that the decision that no further police action was required had been correct, in particular because: i) Relevant Home Office guidance on the recording of crimes (the “Home Office Counting Rules 2024/25”) provided in relation to Gross Negligence Manslaughter, the primary offence of which the Claimant complained, that (see §004/10): “For reports amounting to possible corporate or gross negligence manslaughter a crime related incident should be registered, and it should remain as such until either: An inquest concludes with a verdict of unlawful killing or; The CPS authorise a charge (or direct that it is not in the public interest to do so)”. On that basis, there was – according to Inspector Hofmann – no requirement for GMP to formally record a crime, just to register a Crime Related Incident, whether an Incident Log or a PoliceWorks Crime Related Incident record. ii) Crown Prosecution Service guidance in relation to Gross Negligence Manslaughter states that the degree of negligence needs to be “very high” before conduct can be considered to be a crime. As the Court of Appeal noted in R v Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375, §§25-26: “Mistakes, even very serious mistakes, and errors of judgment, even very serious errors of judgment are nowhere near enough for a crime as serious as manslaughter to be committed”. iii) The Claimant’s complaints had been brought to the attention of the GMC, the independent regulator of doctors, which had not expressed any concerns in connection with the treatment of Ludwika. There is GMC guidance on the reporting of suspected criminal offences to the police, including gross negligence manslaughter, and no such report had been made. (The latest iteration of this guidance appears to be “Decisions on sharing information related to a doctor with the police”, §§22-25 of which are concerned with reporting possible gross negligence manslaughter). In the absence of interest from the GMC, it was reasonable to conclude that the high threshold required to establish gross negligence manslaughter could not be made out. iv) The Claimant had also reported his concerns to the Coroner, who had concluded that there was no requirement to hold an inquest. That indicated that Ludwika did not die of unnatural causes and that there was no indication of third-party involvement in her death or reasonable grounds to suspect that a criminal offence has been committed. The Claimant’s complaints to the GMC

22. The Claimant’s initial contact with the GMC was by an email dated 25 March 2025 but sent the following day. (It would appear that his report to the Defendant early on 25 March 2025, stating that he was awaiting a decision of the GMC, was not correct at that time). The Claimant asked the GMC to initiate an investigation of various doctors, including Dr Ali, on the grounds (in her case) that “she committed gross negligence in the treatment of the deceased and, being aware of the problem, delayed the diagnosis of dehydration, failed to provide assistance in the form of redirecting the patient to the intensive care unit in connection with the need to prevent dehydration, failure to do so posed a huge risk of causing death which ultimately led to congestive heart failure and death”.

23. The GMC sought further information from the Claimant on 14 April 2025, including the outcome of any complaint he had made to the Hospital about Ludwika’s treatment. A further email of 9 May 2025 requested a complete copy of the Trust’s letter to the Claimant of 22 May 2024. On 5 August 2025, the GMC informed the Claimant that the issues he had raised did not warrant further GMC action being taken. It relied in particular on the Trust’s response to the Claimant’s complaint which “appears reasonable, and also does not raise concerns about the actions of any doctor including their diagnoses, treatment, or timeliness of care provided to Ludwika”. Was the Defendant’s decision not to investigate the alleged manslaughter of Ludwika irrational?

24. This is the second ground for which permission has been granted but it is convenient, and logical, for it to be addressed first. The wording of the ground in the Order of HHJ Sephton KC (see §3 above) is inapposite because the Defendant did not close the investigation into Ludwika’s death. Rather, it decided not to open an investigation into her death. That decision was communicated summarily to the Claimant, when he was told (on 25 March 2025) that he should pursue the matter with the GMC and that if there had been any indication of a crime, the police would have been involved at an earlier stage.

25. In resisting this ground of challenge, Mr Ustych for the Defendant emphasised two significant obstacles to a finding of irrationality. The first is that “only in highly exceptional cases will the court disturb the decisions of an independent prosecutor and investigator” not to investigate or prosecute an alleged crime (R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 756, §30). That is because the powers in question are entrusted to the relevant authority and to no one else; such decisions are typically “polycentric” in nature, involving a balance of policy and public interest considerations which are inter-connected; and the powers are conferred in very broad and unprescriptive terms (Corner House, §31). A decision whether or not to investigate is even more difficult to challenge than a decision whether or not to prosecute because the relevant discretion is even more open-ended and will involve consideration of the manner in which available resources should be deployed and whether particular lines of inquiry should or should not be followed. Hence, “it will take a wholly exceptional case on its legal merits to justify a judicial review of a discretionary decision .. to investigate or not” (R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin), [2007] QB 727, §64).

26. The second obstacle emphasised by Mr Ustych is the exceptional nature of the crime of gross negligence manslaughter. The elements of the crime were summarised by Fordham J in R (Smith) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] EWHC 2032 (Admin), §14 as follows: “Gross negligence manslaughter is a common law offence requiring proof of the following elements: [i] The defendant owed an existing duty of care to the victim. [ii] The defendant negligently breached that duty of care. [iii] That breach of duty of care gave rise to an obvious and serious risk of death. [iv] It was also reasonably foreseeable that the breach of that duty gave rise to a serious and obvious risk of death. [v] The breach of that duty caused the death of the victim. [vi] The circumstances of the breach were truly exceptionally bad and so reprehensible as to justify the conclusion that it amounted to gross negligence and required criminal sanction.”

27. It is only in very rare cases that a breach of the duty of care owed to a victim will be “truly exceptionally bad and so reprehensible as to justify the conclusion that it amounted to gross negligence and required criminal sanction” so as to satisfy the sixth element identified by Fordham J. In the particular context of medical treatment, even very serious mistakes and very serious errors of judgment will be nowhere near enough to satisfy this element of the crime (see §21(ii) above).

28. Mr Ustych then relied upon the detailed explanation given in the Defendant’s letter to the Claimant of 18 November 2025, following the review by Inspector Hofmann (see §§20-21 above), as to why it had been correct not to open an investigation into the alleged mistreatment of Ludwika. That explanation was also encapsulated in a witness statement dated 8 January 2026 by the author of the letter, Detective Chief Inspector Thomas Willis of the Defendant’s Professional Standards Directorate.

29. For his part, the Claimant argued: i) DCI Willis’s explanations amounted to a post hoc rationalisation of decisions that were taken hastily and without proper evidential assessment in March 2025. ii) He had presented clear and compelling evidence to the Defendant which was capable of satisfying each limb of the legal test for gross negligence manslaughter. It was irrational for the Defendant to refuse to investigate the failings in Ludwika’s care which he had documented without any proper analysis of the evidence. The Defendant was not entitled to delegate its functions in investigating whether a crime had been committed to the GMC and/or the Coroner. iii) The Defendant should in any event have recorded the allegation that a crime had taken place.

30. The Claimant is correct that the focus of the Court should, in the first instance at least, be on the Defendant’s decision-making in March 2025 and in particular the position taken on 25 March that, as of that date, this was not a police matter and that he should pursue it with the GMC. As to that, no evidence was filed by the Defendant to explain the thinking of the officer who had taken and communicated the relevant decision, including the advice which they had received from the CRS. That is unfortunate, and leaves the Court in the position of having to proceed by interpretation of and inference from the contemporaneous records.

31. It is apparent from those records that the officer will have been aware that: i) The Claimant was alleging that Dr Ali (primarily) had committed a criminal offence in treating or failing to treat Ludwika, leading to her death (see §12 above). Clearly, this was an allegation of gross negligence manslaughter. ii) The Claimant had stated that he had reported the matter to the GMC and was awaiting its decision (see §14 above), albeit that the true position appears to be that he complained to the GMC very shortly after the officer’s response. iii) The Coroner had not sought to involve the Defendant in an investigation of the circumstances of Ludwika’s death, which had occurred more than a year earlier. This would have been apparent from searches which were conducted of the Defendant’s records system when the Claimant’s reports were made. The officer did not have access to any of the evidence which the Claimant had sent to the Chief Constable in hard copy as this had been returned to him, and the online reporting form had not permitted him to upload any evidence.

32. The time taken by the officer for consideration of the Claimant’s reports, as is apparent from the timing of the Claimant's latest communication and the response to it, was short. The reasons for the stance adopted by the Defendant, both in the response to the Claimant and as recorded on the Defendant’s internal systems, were very shortly stated. However, the substance of the Defendant’s response was, in my judgment, far from irrational: i) Cases of death following medical treatment which are capable of satisfying the conditions for gross negligence manslaughter are extremely rare. It would be rational for a police force to adopt the position that it will not routinely investigate allegations of gross negligence manslaughter by medical treatment and only consider doing so where there is some support for the allegations from another authority which has looked at the case, such as the employer of the relevant doctor, the doctor’s regulator and/or the Coroner. It is, after all, very likely that another public body, with greater expertise in matters of medical treatment, will investigate a case which is serious enough to be capable of constituting gross negligence manslaughter. (It is unclear whether this factor was, in effect, a policy position of the Defendant or to what extent it influenced the ad hoc advice given by the CRS but it was, in my judgment, implicit in the Defendant’s response). ii) In this case, having been informed by the Claimant that the GMC, the expert regulator of doctors’ conduct, was seised of a complaint against Dr Ali, the person who had been named by the Claimant as the suspect, and that its decision was awaited, it was rational for the Defendant to take the view that it would not investigate the matter at least until the GMC’s decision was known. The police are not medical experts and are ill-equipped to investigate allegations of medical negligence or misconduct, in contrast to the GMC. The Defendant’s view that Ludwika’s death was not a police matter was not set in stone but, as confirmed by DCI Willis in §21 of his witness statement, would have been reviewed by the Defendant if, upon considering the complaint against Dr Ali, the GMC had reported pursuant to its guidance that criminal conduct may have taken place or the GMC had made other findings which suggested that this may after all be a police matter. iii) Put another way, the Defendant had good reason for not embarking upon an investigation of Dr Ali’s treatment of Ludwika when it had been told by the Claimant that the expert regulator of doctors’ conduct was in the middle of its own consideration of the Claimant’s complaint against her. The fact that the Coroner had not reported any concerns to the Defendant regarding Ludwika’s death provided further support for a cautious, “wait and see” approach. iv) Although the Claimant urged me to find that the medical evidence of Ludwika’s mistreatment was self-evidently compelling, I am not able to do so. That evidence was not before the Defendant’s officer who responded to the Claimant, but even if it had been, they would not have been in any better position than I am to assess the force of medical evidence. The Claimant did not seek permission to file any expert evidence in these proceedings and it is apparent from the responses to the Claimant of the GMC and the Coroner that more than one view of the evidence is tenable. v) I do not accept that the Defendant’s response constituted illegitimate delegation of the Defendant’s functions to the GMC or the Coroner. Rather, in the face of manifold competing demands on its resources, it was legitimate, indeed sensible, for the Defendant not to embark on a potentially complex investigation of the medical treatment of Ludwika, which was unlikely to lead to a charge of gross negligence manslaughter (as hardly any such cases do) without first understanding whether any of the expert bodies which had considered her case, or were currently considering it, had expressed any cause for concern. This was the Defendant exercising its own functions, whilst leaving open the possibility that it would exercise them again in the future if new information came to light.

33. In short, the present case is some distance from being in the category of “a wholly exceptional case on its legal merits” which could justify judicial review of the Defendant’s decision not to investigate the Claimant’s reports of a crime (see §25 above).

34. As to the Claimant’s complaint that the Defendant should have recorded a crime in response to his reports (even if the Defendant did not propose to investigate them), this is outside the scope of the permission for judicial review granted by HHJ Sephton KC. In any event, however, the Home Office Counting Rules are clear that the crime of gross negligence manslaughter should only be recorded where an inquest has concluded with a verdict of unlawful killing or the Crown Prosecution Service authorises a charge of gross negligence manslaughter or would have done so but for a direction that it is not in the public interest to prosecute in the case in question. None of those events had yet happened here.

35. Even if I had found that the consideration given to the Claimant’s reports in March 2025 had not been sufficient to give rise to a rational decision, I would not have granted relief because the Defendant did subsequently, in response to the review by the GMCA, give much fuller consideration to whether or not an investigation should be opened into Ludwika’s death, and had concluded, on rational grounds, that it should not be. The reasons given by DCI Willis in his letter and witness statement were much more fully expressed than those which were given in March 2025 and included consideration of the medical evidence which had not been considered prior to the earlier decision. Did the Defendant fail to act promptly upon the Claimant’s reports?

36. The only other ground of challenge for which HHJ Sephton KC granted permission was the ground that the Defendant “failed promptly to investigate the claimant’s report of a crime, namely the manslaughter of Ludwika Przybys”. Insofar as this ground complains that the Defendant failed to investigate the Claimant’s report of a crime against Ludwika, that has already been covered by my findings in §§24-35 above. Insofar as it complains merely of the speed of the Defendant’s response rather than the contents of that response then it is plainly a bad point, as the Defendant responded (on 25 March 2025) within a few days of the Claimant making his initial report through an appropriate channel (22 March 2025). Conclusion

37. For the reasons given above the claim is dismissed.