DJ VEAL: Introduction 1. I am concerned with J. He was born in May 2020 and is five years old. His mother is M, and his father is F. 2. These proceedings started life as enforcement proceedings commenced by the father on 21 February 2025 in respect of a final order that I had made in previous proceedings only two months before that, on 16 December 2024. I will come back to the procedural history later. The father’s application said that the mother was refusing to allow J to live with him on the basis that the father had scabies, which he had passed on to J. The father’s position was that he had been acting on medical advice. The father’s application also set out that the mother had previously said that she “doesn’t give a fuck about court orders”. 3. In fact, at a hearing on 29 May 2025, the mother accepted that she stopped J going to see the father for the reason that the father had given, and also saying that she did “not give a fuck” about court orders. She also accepted breaching an undertaking that she had given on 16 December 2024, and having fabricated evidence within these proceedings, namely, WhatsApp messages between her and the paternal aunt. For those reasons, I attached a penal notice to the interim child arrangements order I made on the last occasion. I also deemed an application by the father for a change of residence, and that is because the child impact report produced by BCP Council dated 1 April 2025 had recommended that outcome. 4. Neither party sought that the social worker attend court to give evidence at this hearing, which is listed for a final hearing today. 5. I have read the very full bundle of evidence. I have been assisted during the course of the hearing by the evidence I have heard from the parents, and I have heard submissions from the mother and counsel on behalf of the father. 6. The parties’ positions are, in summary, that the father seeks that the Court determines whether or not the mother breached the previous child arrangements order and whether there was a reasonable excuse for that. He also seeks an order that J lives with him and spends time with the mother. He set out his proposals in a position statement, which he filed and served on 14 July 2025. The mother seeks that an equal shared care arrangement subsists to provide consistency for J. She says that there were good reasons why she stopped J spending time with the father in February and May 2025. The legal context 7. The issues for the Court focus primarily on J and his needs. In determining questions about his upbringing, it is J’s welfare that is the Court’s paramount consideration: section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. 8. Other principles derived from section 1 include that any questions about J’s upbringing are questions that I need to resolve without delay, because delay prejudices children’s welfare. I should not make orders unless I think it would be better for J than not. And, importantly, this: subject to any questions around risk of harm, the presumption is that the involvement of both of his parents in J’s life will further his welfare. So when parents separate, it follows from that that the starting point is that J should remain in contact with both of his parents, but that starting point is always subject to concerns around his welfare. 9. When coming to the conclusions I do, I have regard to certain welfare considerations, including those set out in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. 10. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged, and so orders that this Court makes have to be weighed against the right of everybody affected, that is, both the parents and J, to respect for their private and family life and their home. 11. The power for the Court to make enforcement orders is set out in the Children Act from section 11J onwards. The approach that the father invites the Court to take is that he wishes the Court to make the findings one way or the other, but if findings are made that the mother did breach the previous court order, then it would be his position that the enforcement application should effectively be adjourned generally, with liberty to restore it later if appropriate. 12. In resolving disputed issues of evidence, if somebody asserts a particular fact, it is that person who has to prove it. Because, in some senses, both parents, in the context of these proceedings, assert particular matters, they each therefore have the burden of proving them. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. If a particular fact is shown to be more likely than not to be true, then that fact is treated as having happened. If it is not proved, then the fact is treated as not having happened. That is sometimes called “the binary effect”, and there is a case called Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 which deals with that. I have regard to the totality of the evidence, and I do not compartmentalise it. 13. I remind myself that it is common for witnesses to lie in the course of an investigation or hearing. They can do so for all sorts of reasons, for example, shame, misplaced loyalty, fear or distress. Just because somebody lies about something on one occasion, it does not mean that they have lied about everything else: R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. 14. Witnesses can also be fallible, which goes to the reliability of their testimony rather than their credibility: Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited & another [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm). 15. I remind myself also that the courtroom is an alien environment for most witnesses and, in particular, in the emotionally-charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute, I do not make my assessment of the parties’ evidence solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box: Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147. 16. In the context of the opinion evidence expressed by the social worker who produced the child impact report, I remind myself that that is to be considered in the context of all of the other evidence, and I remind myself of the bounds of the professional expertise of that social worker: A County Council v K, D & L [2005] EWHC 144 (Fam); Tower Hamlets v MK [2012] EWHC 426 (Fam); Re S [2009] EWHC 2115 (Fam). The evidence 17. I heard evidence from both parents. I thought that the father’s evidence was given, in general terms, in a pretty clear and measured way. He accepted the reasonable propositions put to him during the course of cross-examination. However, when he disagreed with things that were suggested to him, he said so, but then went on to give an explanation as to why he disagreed and provided context as he went. 18. The mother’s evidence was essentially that she wanted what was best for J. In contrast to the way in which the father presented, she presented in the witness box in a much more fiery, argumentative and sometimes downright rude way. She accepted during the course of her evidence, that sometimes emotions get the better of her, and I have given myself that direction that I have just set out about a witness’ demeanour, recognising the difficulties in a case such as this. However, unfortunately, she presented throughout this hearing in a way which showed very little respect, really, for anyone involved, including the Court. 19. As I understand the background, the parents were in a relationship from about 2018 initially until about December 2021. During the course of their relationship, J was born in May 2020. By that time, the mother had an older child called K, who, I think, lives with her, and the father has two older children, L and M. Each of those children was born from a relationship other than the relationship between the parents. The mother has since had another child, N, who was born in April 2025. L is now nine, M and K are both eight, and J is five. 20. During the relationship, the police were called at least twice in connection with arguments that took place between the parties. At the time of the parents’ separation, the mother made an allegation of physical abuse against the father. J and his half-brother, K, were subject to child protection plans from January to July 2022, and that was stepped down to child-in-need planning after that. Post-separation, the father had unsupervised contact with J on alternate weekends. 21. On 22 August 2022, the father commenced proceedings under case number BH22P00305, seeking a child arrangements order. Within those proceedings, both parents made allegations against the other in relation to substance use. Both parents accused the other of using J as a weapon. For example, the father said that the mother would demand money from him before he could have contact, and the mother said that the father would threaten not to return J after contact. 22. It also appears that the mother obtained a non-molestation order on 4 October 2022 against the father without notice to him under case number BH22F00407. Those proceedings were ultimately resolved without admissions being made by the father, and he gave undertakings on 9 January 2023, at which point, the non-molestation order fell away. 23. The child impact report in the Children Act proceedings recommended that J live with the mother and spend regular time with the father on an unsupervised basis, including overnight time. A final order was made by District Judge Bridger on 8 December 2022 by consent. The parties agreed that J would live with both parents, and the split of time between agreed between them was broadly 50/50. 24. It appears, in fact, that the parents attempted to rekindle their relationship in December 2023, but then separated again in April 2024. 25. On 1 July 2024, the mother applied for a non-molestation order against the father. The case number was BH24F00286. District Judge Bridger made an order against the father, again, without notice. 26. On 25 July 2024, then, the father commenced Children Act proceedings. The case number was BH24P00402. His concern was, at that time, that the mother was not adhering to the court order agreed at the conclusion of the previous proceedings, and that his contact with J was sporadic. 27. The matter came before HHJ Williams on 31 July 2024, who gave directions. The Court also made a specific issue order to permit the father to take J on holiday. It looked, at one point, as if the mother was not going to comply with that order, and the father, as a result, then issued an enforcement application. It was on 2 August 2024 that the mother accepted having left a voicemail saying that she did not “give a fuck about court orders”, and during the course of this hearing, she explained that she did not mean that at the time, and that it was a reaction, effectively. I think she characterised it as “reactive abuse”. That said, she also said during the course of her evidence today that she did not agree with court orders that had been made in the past. 28. There was a Public Protection Notice on 18 September 2024 in which it was suggested that the father had threatened to drive off a cliff with J in the car and had threatened to kill the mother. That was promptly followed by an application made by the mother on 23 September 2024 to stop contact between J and the father. In the child impact report then produced in those proceedings, at the end of September 2024, the Local Authority said that it would have recommended shared care until that PPN was received. 29. On 4 October 2024, I determined that there would not be any fact-finding hearing in relation to allegations that had pre-dated December 2022, but that there would be a need for a hearing of subsequent allegations made by the mother. In the interim, I directed that the father’s time with J was to be supervised. 30. On 4 November 2024, I had concern that the mother had not particularised her allegations as I had directed her to, and I gave updating directions. The mother did set out then what her allegations were. Those were, effectively, allegations against the father of coercive and controlling behaviour, assaults of and threats to assault the mother’s partners, harassment and stalking, calling the mother names, physical abuse and the issue about threatening to drive J off a cliff. All of those allegations were denied by the father. 31. At the hearing on 16 December 2024, which was supposed to be the fact-finding hearing, the mother applied to withdraw all of the allegations. Whilst she did not go so far as to accept that they were not true, she accepted that they would not impact arrangements for J, and she said that she would not pursue the allegations again in the future. Accordingly, the Court made an order for shared care and slightly updated the arrangements set out in the order made in December 2022. I should say also that both parties were represented at that hearing by experienced counsel. 32. At the same hearing, the non-molestation order was amended to permit communications in relation to child arrangements, and cross-undertakings were given by both parties on the Family Law Act 1996 application. Those undertakings remain in force until 16 December 2025. That is relevant because those address issues that the Court is required to consider in the context of Practice Direction 12J in ensuring that communications between the parties can be conducted in a way which has regard to their welfare. 33. Only two months afterwards, on 21 February 2025, the father then issued the present enforcement application. I have set out what the father said in his application. 34. Within her statement within these proceedings on 17 June 2025, the mother made allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour against the father dating back to 13 October 2024. That pre-dates the final order I had made in the previous proceedings and, given what the mother agreed at the final hearing of the previous proceedings, I do not need to consider that issue any further. 35. The mother then raises issues about the medical care given by the father to J, including around what I am going to call “the scabies issue”. Again, what is interesting about that is that it appears that those were issues which were, to an extent, known by the mother at the time of the final hearing in the previous proceedings, when she agreed, of course, that shared care was the appropriate order to make. That tends to suggest that she did not consider that the father’s parenting of J had fallen below a good enough standard, even knowing what she says she already knew at the time. 36. The mother’s statement suggested the issues around scabies were ongoing from 17 December 2024, which I have noted was the day after the final order was made in the previous proceedings, and that those continued into January 2025. There is no dispute that J had a rash and that he was itching. The father’s position is that he sought and followed medical advice in respect of himself, and that the mother had sought advice from her doctor for J, he understood. J was accordingly treated for scabies. 37. The advice that the father received was that he, the father, had hives rather than scabies. The mother invites the Court to conclude that that was incorrect, that the father did have scabies and had failed to seek treatment for himself. There is no medical evidence before the Court to assist me one way or the other in relation to that issue. The father said that he was advised that the itchiness was liable to continue for six weeks. That was something which the dermatologist had told him, and that he felt able to apply lotion to J in just the same way as the mother was. 38. During this period, the time spent by J with the father was stopped by the mother or was inconsistent. It was controlled by the mother, in effect. The father did not accept that it was reasonable for the mother to have put a stop to that contact. Ultimately, he said that he was concerned that J’s issues were not being addressed by the mother either, and he took J to a dermatologist. 39. Pre-proceedings, on 18 February 2025, the mother emailed the father’s solicitors saying that the appropriate thing for the father to do in terms of co-parenting was to shut up and do the treatment. On the following day, 19 February 2025, the father’s solicitors passed on the advice from the dermatologist that the itching could persist for six weeks. The mother’s response to that email was to call the father and his solicitors, “bare-faced liars”. These proceedings were then started. 40. A child impact report was produced by BCP Council. That is dated 1 April 2025. The recommendations are that the Local Authority would support J living with the father and spending time with the mother and K. That was because the Local Authority is concerned about the continuous parental conflict to which J is exposed, and the impact on J of the inconsistency of time spent with, I have inferred, his father. 41. Either on the same day that the child impact report was produced or very shortly afterwards, the Court adjourned the application with liberty to the parties to restore. That was a consent order agreed by the parties. 42. However, also, on 1 April 2025, I have seen WhatsApp messages passing between the mother and I think it is the paternal aunt. The mother said: “Can you please let [F] know that J’s woken up itchy again over the last couple of days. Not blaming anyone. I reckon there’s a kid at school that isn’t being treated or something, but I’ve ordered him some more, and I’ll treat before he comes to his dad’s. So, if [F] feels itchy, can you please ask him to do a treatment and not wait around like last time? If he doesn’t feel itchy, that’s fine”. 43. The response was: “Hi [M], [F] noticed he was a little itchy. He thinks it’s good to treat him as a precaution (by which I think that must be a reference to J). He said if you pack the treatment, we’ll treat him when we’re on holiday, so that he’s out of the house for 10 days, which may be the best option. [F]’s house will be deep-cleaned in the meantime whilst away”. 44. The mother responded to say that she appreciated that. 45. As I understand it, the mother’s baby was born on 12 April 2025. I heard some evidence that the mother asked the father to keep J for a little longer than usual, to which he agreed shortly after the birth of the baby. There then came a time when the mother asked the father one morning to drop J back to her by 6pm or so that evening. However, he was not able to do so. He said that that was because he needed a family member to effect the handover because of the undertakings or the non-molestation order, and he therefore said that he would drop J back at 9am the next morning. He was asked about that, and he did not accept that it was effectively one rule for him and another rule for the mother. 46. In any event, I then looked at subsequent text messages between the mother and the maternal aunt. The mother’s messages from 18 April 2025 are in somewhat more strident terms, and she accused the father of not keeping up with the treatment of J. The mother was then asked if she had taken J to the doctor’s, and the mother’s response to that was, “I’ve seen the worms in his bum; I don’t need to take him to the doctor’s for fuck’s sake”. 47. On 23 April 2025, the maternal aunt said: “Not accusing or disputing, but in future, can you please take [J] to see a doctor? They’re medically trained to diagnose any medical issues”. 48. The mother’s response to that was: “I can see worms, you fucking fool. Shut up and fuck off. You’re such a freak”. 49. The father made an application to restore his application and, in his statement of 22 May 2025, he set out that there had been further breaches of the child arrangements order. He was concerned that the further breaches that he alleged were as a result of him having commenced a new relationship, and the mother’s reaction was to stop his time with J. The mother suggests in her evidence that the father had told J to lie to the mother about the facts of the father’s new relationship. 50. The mother also made an allegation against the father of physical abuse towards J, by being rough with him on or about 15 May 2025 when fastening his car harness, which she alleged caused bruises to J’s arms. She says that J had told her that the father had lost his temper and grabbed him. The mother told the Court that, after J had told her about that, she then asked J to repeat what he had said and videoed him making the allegation. The father acknowledged in his evidence that the physical abuse would be a concern if it were true, but that he had not caused the bruising. He did not think that it was reasonable for the mother to have stopped contact, and that J had been due to be in his care from 21 May 2025. 51. It appears that the Children’s Services investigated. On 22 May 2025, the Local Authority set out that J had shared no concerns about having come to harm in his father’s care, and there was nothing about the bruises, either, which raised the Local Authority’s concerns. The Local Authority’s email was sent to the mother by the father’s solicitors on the same day. Despite replying to the father’s solicitors a few minutes after that email was sent, the mother told the Court today that she had not seen the Local Authority’s email before now. 52. The mother then fabricated a WhatsApp message exchange between her and the paternal aunt, whereby the maternal aunt purportedly confirmed that the father agreed to the mother having J for the half-term holiday in May 2025, which, of course, was the following week. The mother confirmed that she fabricated that evidence because she did not think anybody was taking her allegations about the bruising seriously. 53. I made the order that I have already described on 29 May 2025, and directed further evidence prior to this hearing. It now appears from a position statement served by the mother dated yesterday, that she has also made further reports to the police about the father’s partner on 12 May 2025, and about abuse which she says was received from a third party on 12 June 2025. She has also made an allegation against the father about an incident which she says took place at a school sports day on 9 July 2025. Set against that, though, is that the mother has also called the father’s partner a “coke whore” in a WhatsApp message, also dated 12 May 2025, and the paternal aunt, who has been facilitating communications between the parties, she has called a “cunt”. 54. The mother told the Court today that the father creates separation anxiety in J. She is concerned in relation to the impact on J of a change of residence, worsening that situation and also causing some damage to the sibling relationship between J and K and N if those proposals made by Father are accepted. The mother has told the Court today that she is willing to engage in parenting work if that is what the Court deems appropriate. Discussion and analysis 55. When I consider the welfare considerations in section 1(3), there are a number of matters, when standing back, which I think are important for all purposes. 56. The first is that there is very clear evidence from both parents that they each love J deeply, and nothing that I say in the course of this judgment is intended to diminish or undermine that in any way. That is something that I accept as a given. 57. The second is J’s own ascertainable wishes and feelings. What comes through, in particular, from the child impact report is that J values his relationship with both of his parents. It is reasonable to assume, also, given the law that I set out at the start, that, provided it is safe, J would wish to live with or have the involvement in his life of both of his parents. He would want, also, to live with his half-siblings or to have regular contact if he could not. 58. Thirdly, at five years old, J remains heavily reliant on his primary caregivers to meet most of his day-to-day needs, whether those are his physical, emotional or developmental needs. What follows from that is that he needs to receive care which is both safe and predictable. He would wish to live in a home where he is loved, well-cared for and feels secure. 59. In this case, the evidence is that both parents are able to meet J’s day-to-day basic needs. Both parents have accepted previously that a shared-care arrangement should be in place, which is consistent, I think, with that conclusion. The mother continues to assert even today that that is the appropriate arrangement to continue. 60. The issue, it seems to me, is whether the parents are able to provide the sort of safe and attuned care to which I have just referred on a consistent basis, given the concerns of the Local Authority and, indeed, given the concerns of the parents themselves. The Local Authority’s concerns have not been subject to challenge and centre around parental conflict and the inconsistency of time spent by J with his father. Those, it seems to me, are factors which are the primary sources of risk of harm for J. 61. What is clear from the background that I have described is that there has been a great deal of acrimony in the communications between the parents, and so I have had to consider the responses of the parents to situations in which conflict arises, and to what extent they have informed the likelihood of harm resulting for J. 62. In some situations, children exposed to dysregulated behaviour of adults can find themselves at immediate risk of physical harm. Fortunately, that does not appear to have been the case in the context of the evidence before this Court, save in one respect of one allegation, which I will come back to shortly. In other circumstances, children exposed to parental acrimony or dysregulated behaviour of adults are at risk of emotional harm, and what comes through from the social work evidence is something which the Court is often told, which is that that has deep and lasting effects on children. Children who find themselves in the centre of their parents’ conflict can often start to feel conflicted themselves. That can manifest itself in all sorts of ways and, perhaps, not straightaway. For example, children can start giving mixed messages, saying one thing to one parent and another thing to the other, in order to try and make them happy. On other occasions, children can start to align more with one parent than the other. 63. The key allegations that I have had to focus on are about the scabies issue in February 2025 and the physical abuse alleged by the mother in May 2025. My starting point is that, whatever the Court concludes about those risks, the mother’s position continues to be that the father should have unsupervised contact with J, including time overnight. That tends to suggest, in itself, that the mother either does not believe that these were concerns which can realistically be attributed to the father, or that they were not serious enough to affect the child arrangements. That, in my judgment, undermines her assertion that there was a reasonable excuse to stop contact. 64. When I drill down into the scabies issue, what the parents’ evidence reveals, on my most charitable analysis, is that there was a miscommunication about who was providing treatment to J and when. However, I do accept, having heard his evidence, that the father sought medical assistance for himself and for J, and that he tried to engage in communications, indirectly, given the undertakings, with the mother. The correspondence, which I have set out already, speaks, to a great extent, for itself. I have reached the conclusion that, within that correspondence, the mother was even more rude and uncooperative than she was in court today. 65. In any event, in my judgment, the scabies issue was not a reason to put a stop to contact. It was perfectly apparent that the father was trying to engage with the issue, and his family were keeping the mother informed, as were his solicitors. The appropriate way of addressing the issue, in my judgment, would have been for the mother to have engaged more constructively in the correspondence and to co-parent in a more mature way. Instead, what she decided to do, unilaterally, was put a stop to contact. 66. There are multiple concerns about the allegation of physical abuse in May 2025, in my judgment. Those include not only that the mother tried to capture evidence by videoing J, in other words, putting him in the middle of the parental conflict; but also that the mother had, on one view, properly raised a concern with professionals, but when she did not like the outcome of the Local Authority’s investigation, she cast around then for other reasons not to let J spend time with his father. I have already referred to the fabricated WhatsApp message. 67. On balance, I do not believe that the mother ever considered the father to have physically abused J. She, herself, said that it was a struggle to get J into his car seat at times, and that was something that she had experienced. Rather than ask questions of the father about the bruises, her default was, again, unilaterally to put a stop to contact. The concern that I have is that allegations of this sort continue. Allegations of similar sorts have been made throughout the previous proceedings as well. 68. Even though the mother told me, during her submissions before lunch, that things have been okay since May 2025, I have noted that is only two months ago. Also, during the course of these proceedings, the mother has raised new allegations as recently as yesterday. She has not raised those allegations in a balanced way, given what I have said about the competing evidence about what happened on 12 May 2025, for example. The mother came to court today, shouted and argued her way throughout her evidence for the best part of an hour and a half, but then submitted at the end of it all that shared care remained the right outcome for J. 69. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied so that I am sure that the mother did breach the order that I made in December 2024, in February and May 2025. On the balance of probabilities, the mother has failed to prove that she had a reasonable excuse for doing so. 70. The mother appeared to accept that she can be emotionally dysregulated at times. It is, in those circumstances, to her credit that she has told the Court that she is seeking support for her mental health through the perinatal mental health team, but she also said that the nature of the appropriate therapeutic intervention has not yet been identified by that team or started. I hope that the mother does continue to seek out that assistance, and that her own well-being will improve as a result of it. 71. On an analogous note, the father was asked what he would do if J were to report that he was being bullied at school and whether he would keep J home from school if something like that were raised with him. The father, in response, said, “No”. In the first instance, he said he would speak to J’s teacher. That, in my judgment, shows a measured approach to that sort of issue. 72. The central plank of the mother’s case is that a change of residence will not resolve the issues around parental conflict, which she says is something that the parents need to address. I agree with that. It is a very sensible proposition to put forward. The father accepted that a change of residence would not resolve the issues of parental conflict either, but he considered that his proposals would provide J, at least, with security and routine around the time spent with both of his parents, whilst the parents continue to work on their co-parenting relationship. 73. The task that I have necessarily had to consider then, in the context of the application for a change of residence, is about the parents’ comparative ability to promote the relationship between J and the other parent. For the reasons that I have explored, I have reached the clear conclusion that the mother has taken steps, time and time again, to undermine the relationship between J and his father. That is not something which can be said on the evidence to be the same in respect of the father, who, in my assessment, has tried to co-parent with the mother. 74. The parents do need to improve their co-parenting skills. I directed that they attend the Planning Together for Children Programme in the order that I made in December. I think, through no fault of either of them, neither was contacted by Cafcass to put the arrangements in place for them to attend, so I am going to direct, again, that the parents undertake that programme in the order that I make today. I hope that that will give the parents some tools with which to better co-parent J going forward. 75. The parties were also using a co-parenting app, which the mother, as I understand it, has stopped using. That, in my judgment, was counterintuitive for the reasons that I have been exploring. I am going to direct the use of a co-parenting app in the future. 76. The mother, it seems to me, has run into something of a mental block when it comes to how to improve the co-parenting relationship. At the last hearing, she was at something of a loss to see how it would ever work. However, at this stage, in my judgment, she has more work to do in relation to this issue than the father does. The ball is in her court and it has been for some time, which is a factor which, in my judgment, feeds into the proportionality of the conclusions that I have reached. 77. For J, his welfare and his Article 8 rights are impacted by the dysfunctional co-parenting relationship between his parents. The shared care arrangements in December 2022 and December 2024 have not achieved security and consistency for him. I do not see what measures I could put in place to protect against that, given the mother’s expressed attitude towards court orders if that were to continue to be the status quo. The father’s proposals at least achieve an outcome whereby the father can be tasked with ensuring that J has the consistent involvement of the mother in his life and an increased level of protection for him from the harm caused by parental acrimony. 78. I have concluded, therefore, that the father’s proposals would represent a better outcome for J and that I should make an order. J is used to spending time with both of his parents. I do not think the change of circumstances will be a change with which he will not be able to cope. It would also continue to see the involvement of his half-siblings in his life, and, therefore, preserve the importance of those sibling relationships. 79. Accordingly, taking those things together and considering the range of powers available to the Court, in my judgment, on balance, the right outcome for J in the context of these proceedings is to make an order giving effect to the proposals set out in the father’s position statement of 14 July 2025, subject to one point that I am going to come back to in a moment. 80. In addition, I consider that I should also make a prohibited steps order backed by a penal notice against the mother, to prevent her from removing J from the care of his father or anyone to whom he entrusts J’s care, including his school, for example, and requiring her to return J to the father’s care at the end of any contact ordered by the Court or agreed between the parties. That is for the same sorts of reasons that I gave for attaching a penal notice to the order that I made in May 2025, and because I am satisfied, given the findings that I have made, that the mother has behaved unilaterally and without any real insight into the impact on J in failing to return J to the father’s care in the past. If the mother feels the need to return matters to court to avoid a breach of that prohibited steps order in the future, I will also say that those applications should be referred to me if I am available. 81. I am also concerned, not only because of the way in which she presented in court today, but also because of the way in which she has communicated in correspondence in the past, that the mother’s immediate reaction to this order may, in itself, be dysregulated. For that reason, I do not agree that the term-time and summer holiday arrangements proposed by the father should start on 25 July as he has proposed. I am going to say that they should start on 8 August 2025, in order to give time for the dust to settle after the conclusion of these proceedings. 82. Between now and then, I am going to say that the mother should have contact, which is supervised, ideally, by an agreed third party on 27 July, which, I think, is Saturday week. That contact can be either 26 or 27 July, supervised by an agreed third party, which can be contact in the community. The mother should then, again, have supervised contact for a teatime contact on 30 July, which is the Wednesday, for three hours, and then the FaceTime contact proposed through the father’s proposals the following week, before unsupervised contact then starts on 8 August 2025. 83. Subject to any points of clarification, I think that concludes my judgment. End of Judgment. Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 [email protected] Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. This transcript has been approved by the judge.