KT v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 21 October 2024 was made in error of law. Under section 12(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 I set that decision aside and remit the case to be reconsidered by a fresh tribunal in accordance with the following directions. DIRECTIONS

1. This case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration.

2. The FTT should reconsider whether the case can be re-determined on the papers or whether an oral re-hearing is required after seeking a fresh indication from the Appellant as to her preference (she previously sought a paper determination before the FTT). If there is to be an oral hearing, the form of that hearing (whether by phone, video or in person) will be a matter for the First-tier Tribunal to direct.

3. The Appellant is reminded that the tribunal can only deal with her situation as it was as of 15 February 2024 when the Secretary of State made her decision regarding Personal Independence Payment and not any changes after that date.

4. If the Appellant has any further evidence that she wishes to put before the tribunal that is relevant to her health conditions and their effects on her functioning as of 15 February 2024, this should be sent to the First-tier Tribunal’s office within one month of the date that this decision is issued.

5. The First-tier Tribunal should have regard to the points made in the documents set out in the following paragraph, (6).

6. A copy of: the appellant’s grounds of appeal in the letter dated 30 May 2025 enclosed in the application for permission to appeal; the Upper Tribunal’s decision granting permission to appeal dated 2 October 2025; the Respondent’s submission 4 November 2025, should be provided to the First-tier Tribunal re-hearing the appeal together with this decision. These Directions may be supplemented by later directions by a Tribunal Judge in the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals to the Upper Tribunal from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) dated 21 October 2024. The FTT determined her appeal on the papers, upholding the decision of the Secretary of State (“the Respondent”) refusing the Appellant any award of Personal Independence Payment (“PIP”).

2. In that decision the FTT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 15 February 2024 not to award her PIP. The FTT confirmed the decision that the Appellant was not entitled to any award of the daily living component (scoring 4 points on daily living activity descriptors, insufficient for the standard rate which requires 8 points) nor the mobility component (scoring 0 points).

3. The issue in the appeal is whether the FTT erred in law, by failing to take into account relevant evidence and failing to give adequate reasons, in deciding that the Appellant was not entitled to the standard rate of the daily living component of Personal Independence Payment (“PIP”).

4. The structure of this decision is as follows:- Introduction1 Factual background and procedural history5 The First-tier Tribunal’s decision21 The grounds of appeal and the parties’ submissions23 Discussion and analysis26 Factual background and procedural history

5. A claim was made for PIP by the Appellant on 22/11/2023. A PIP2 questionnaire form dated January 2024 was submitted by the Appellant and she underwent a telephone consultation, on 25/01/2024. The Decision Maker (“DM”) on behalf of the Respondent considered the available evidence and awarded the Appellant 4 daily living points in total (2 points each under descriptors 8b and 9b). As such the Appellant scored insufficient points to be awarded any rate of daily living or mobility component of PIP from 22/11/2023. This decision was made on 15/02/2024 and a decision letter was issued to the Appellant. The entitlement threshold of an award of PIP is 8 points for either component (daily living or mobility) at the standard rate and 12 points are required for either component to be awarded at the enhanced rate.

6. The Appellant requested a Mandatory Reconsideration (“MR”) of the Respondent’s decision dated 15/02/2024 and on reviewing the available evidence, the DM decided that the decision remained unchanged. The Appellant lodged an appeal dated 02/03/2024 against the decision.

7. The FTT upon determining the Appellant’s appeal on the papers (on 21/10/2024) awarded the Appellant awarded 4 points for daily living descriptors 9(b) and 8(b). As such the Appellant scored insufficient points to be awarded any rate of daily living or mobility component of PIP from 22/11/2023.

8. The FTT provided a statement of reasons for decision (“SOR”) dated 17 January 2025. The District Tribunal Juge refused permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 15 May 2025.

9. The Appellant applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal in a notice of appeal (“UT1”) received on 16 June 2025, relying on grounds of appeal contained in a letter dated 30 May 2025 drafted by her representative, Nisar Ali, a Welfare Rights Officer from Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council.

10. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) was granted by me in a decision dated 2 October 2025. Determining the appeal on the papers

11. The Respondent, in the submissions from Miss R. Howard dated 4 November 2025: a) did not request an oral hearing of this appeal; b) supported the appeal being allowed and the FTT’s decision being set aside; c) consented to the Upper Tribunal giving a decision without reasons pursuant to Rule 40(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008; and d) submitted that the Upper Tribunal should remit the Appellant’s case to a freshly constituted First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration of whether PIP should be awarded.

12. The Appellant was given an opportunity to reply to the Respondent’s submissions. On 5 November 2025 her representative provided an Appellant’s reply stating she did not wish to make any further observations, agreed to the UT Judge giving a decision without reasons and that she did not want an oral hearing of the appeal to the UT. She thereby consented to a paper determination without oral hearing.

13. First, I am satisfied that I should proceed to decide this appeal on the papers without any hearing pursuant to Rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I have taken into account the parties’ preferences in making this decision. The Appellant, has indicated she does not request an oral hearing.

14. Taking into account the overriding objective, I am not satisfied that I should conduct an oral hearing of the substantive appeal because it is on a point of law only and will not involve the consideration of evidence and the finding of facts. The Upper Tribunal’s primary jurisdiction is to decide whether the FTT erred in law in making its decision, not to substitute its own view on whether PIP should be awarded nor to make primary findings of fact.

15. For the reasons set out below I have decided to remit the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing to award her PIP to a freshly constituted First-tier Tribunal to decide rather than re-make the decision myself. Nonetheless, the Appellant has ‘won’ her appeal and I do not consider a further hearing would be necessary.

16. Both parties had an opportunity to present their cases in writing in the application for permission and in respect of the substantive appeal. I have considered all the arguments of the parties in full. The Appellant and Respondent have had a reasonable opportunity to make arguments as to issues of law. I have fully considered the written evidence and arguments on behalf of the parties in making my decision.

17. In respect of the FTT’s decision, I had all the relevant papers and arguments in the bundle before me in order to determine this appeal, the issue was an appeal on a point of law only. A further hearing would not therefore assist in determining issues of law. Further, to hold a hearing would only have caused further delay in a case that already has a lengthy history (the decision of the FTT under appeal being over one year old and the Respondent’s original decision nearly two years old).

18. Most importantly, the Appellant should understand that I am allowing her appeal which is an outcome in her favour, even though I am not going on to re-make the decision. My holding a further hearing in relation to this appeal before the Upper Tribunal would only cause further delay if I were then to remit the case thereafter for a further hearing before the FTT.

19. As above, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to proceed to determine the appeal without a hearing and issue a decision to the parties. I am satisfied it is just and fair and in accordance with the overriding objective not to hold an oral hearing of this appeal.

20. I therefore proceed to decide the appeal on the papers pursuant to Rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I am satisfied it is in the interests of justice to do so – just and fair and in accordance with the overriding objective. Both parties had an opportunity to present their cases in writing, I had all the relevant papers in the bundle before me, the issue was an appeal on a point of law only and to hold a hearing would only have caused further delay in a case that is already old. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision

21. At paragraphs 22-25 of the SOR, the FTT decision relied heavily on preferring the HCP assessment to the written evidence provided by the Appellant’s mother: “22. The Tribunal were alarmed by the Appellant’s mother’s claim in the SSCS1 Appeal form that the Appellant started self-harming during the assessment due to the way in which she was treated by the HCP. There was no recorded history of self-harm or mental health conditions in evidence before us. The HCP’s observations during the assessment did not disclose any concerns of that nature. The Appellant’s mother did not provide details of what she meant by self-harm and did not explain why she would allow the assessment to continue if that were the case. On balance, the Tribunal could not accept that this had occurred.

23. An important feature of this Appeal was the discrepancy between information provided by the Appellant's mother and the family friend who filled out the PIP2, versus the direct evidence from the Appellant as recorded by the HCP.

24. The Tribunal concluded that much of the evidence and information in the PIP2 and SSCS1 was exaggerated, and that the HCP report was the most reliable evidence. We drew this conclusion as the contents of the HCP report was the only record of the Appellant’s own account. Further, we found that the information set out in the HCP was far more consistent with the Appellant’s life in that she was a 17-year-old attending college independently on public transport, who had made some friends and wanted to leam to drive (we noted the Appellant’s mother’s comment in the SSCS1 that the Appellant has support from SEN workers at college).

25. This was wholly inconsistent with extreme claims made by the Appellant’s mother that the Appellant 'cannot even butter a piece of toast', that she is required to wipe the Appellant’s mouth and eyes during eating, that the Appellant cannot use cutlery, and that the Appellant requires support for washing and bathing as she ‘is unable to be alone in a room as this may cause harm to herself to others' (page 3). This evidence was incredible.”

22. As noted in the permission to appeal (“PTA”) decision the FTT found that the Appellant did not satisfy any of the points scoring descriptors for daily living activity 1 – preparing food, activity 2 – taking nutrition, activity 3 – managing therapy or monitoring health condition, activity 4 washing and bathing, activity 6 – dressing and undressing. It confirmed the Respondent’s decision and granted the Appellant two points each for activity 8 – reading – and activity 9 – engaging with others. The FTT provided the following reasons detailed at paragraphs 26–37 of the SOR: ‘“Preparing food:

26. The reference to toast was made in both the SSCS1 and HCP report. It was far more likely that as the HCP recorded, the Appellant ‘won’t’ make toast as opposed to she ‘can’t’ make toast. There was no physical or motivation reasons why the Appellant could not make a simple meal from fresh ingredients. Whilst the Appellant’s ADHD would impact her concentration, we could not accept that the impact was so great as to restrict this activity, bearing in mind her attendance at college and the care for animals involved. Further, by the date of decision the Appellant was taking medication in respect of her ADHD.

27. The Tribunal found the most likely explanation as to why the Appellant did not cook to be found in the HCP report where it states (page 101) that the Appellant is ‘not interested in learning to cook and although she could learn, she doesn't want to.’

28. The Appellant’s eye sight was not so restricted that it would cause a danger to her preparing a simple meal. No points could be awarded. Taking nutrition:

29. The Tribunal could find no reason linked to the Appellant’s health condition why she could not use cutlery and that her mother would have watch her while eating and wipe her mouth and eyes. This evidence of restriction was incredible and not accepted. Managing therapy or monitoring a health condition:

30. At the time of the HCP the Appellant was only taking a laxative. There were no prescribed medication. The Appellant was prescribed ADHD medication just before the date of decision. There was insufficient evidence of a prompt being reasonably required on the majority of days for prescribed medication, and we did not award any points. Washing and bathing:

31. The Tribunal preferred the HCP’s evidence (page 101) as the contents of the SSCS1 under this activity was incredible. No points were awarded. Dressing and undressing:

32. Again, for the reasons set out above the Tribunal preferred the evidence of the HCP. Further, the Tribunal could not accept that the Appellant’s eye sight was so restricted as to cause her difficulties in dressing and undressing. Communicating verbally:

33. There is no suggestion that the Appellant has any difficulty in hearing or speaking. Nor does she have a severe cognitive impairment that would cause her difficulty in understanding basic or complex verbal information to the standard required for this activity. The functional restrictions raised were better considered under the activity of engaging. Reading and understanding signs, symbols and words:

34. The DWP had awarded 2 points for use of an aid. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant has been prescribed a blue overlay. The Appellant was studying at college and hoped to learn to drive. There was no scope for awarding a higher point scoring descriptor. The Tribunal did not interfere with the DWP’s points. Engaging with other people face to face:

35. The DWP had also awarded 2 points in respect of the need for prompting. The Appellant maintains good relationships with her family and has made 2 friends on her course at college. She was able to engage with the HCP via phone with her mother present. There was insufficient evidence that social support was required in order for the Appellant to engage face to face with others on the majority of days. Therefore, The Tribunal endorsed the DWP’s points awarded. Making budgeting decisions:

36. This was not raised in the SSCS1 Appeal form, but for the sake of completeness we considered it. The Appellant does not have a cognitive impairment. She was aged 17 at the date of the decision, and by virtue of her age would not undertake much complex budgeting. There was a suggestion that she struggled with calculated change; however, the Tribunal could see no reason linked to her medical conditions why this would be the case. On balance the Tribunal were not satisfied that the Appellant’s conditions caused her to be restricted in this activity on the majority of days. Planning and following journeys:

37. Similarly, this activity was not raised in the SSCS1 Appeal form. The Appellant attends college independently using public transport and is eager to learn to drive. She has no diagnosed mental health conditions and no cognitive impairments. There was no reason why the Appellant could not plan and follow a journey on the majority of days to the required standard.” The grounds of appeal and the parties’ submissions Grounds of appeal and Appellant’s submissions

23. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal were contained in the representative’s letter dated 30 May 2025. The letter included the following submissions: “…The Tribunal confined itself to the facts as they stood at the time of the decision on 15 February 2024, as required by section 12(8)(b) of the Social Security Act 1998. However, it dismissed the Appellant's ADHD diagnosis even though it had been confirmed prior to the relevant date. This amounts to an error of law, as the Tribunal was required to fully consider all relevant evidence available prior to the decision. Ignoring a confirmed diagnosis when assessing eligibility for Personal Independence Payment constitutes a failure to apply the correct legal test, particularly in relation to regulation 4A and regulation 7 of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013. The Tribunal also dismissed key elements of evidence provided by the Appellant's mother without fully engaging with its relevance. This includes a claim that the Appellant began self-harming during the assessment due to the way the healthcare professional conducted the interview. The Tribunal rejected this assertion on the basis that there was no recorded history of self-harm, yet it failed to request additional evidence or consider whether the Appellant's ADHD or suspected Autism may have contributed to heightened distress during the assessment. By failing to properly examine the context and basis of the claim, the Tribunal did not appropriately weigh the available evidence. Further, the Tribunal relied disproportionately on the Health Care Professional's report while disregarding other sources of evidence, including the PIP2 claim form completed by a family member and signed by the Appellant, as well as the Appeal Form raising further concerns about the Appellant's difficulties. The Tribunal dismissed testimony from the Appellant's mother as exaggerated without providing sufficient legal reasoning for preferring the observations recorded by the HCP. A Tribunal must weigh all evidence fairly rather than assuming a single source to be definitive. The failure to conduct a balanced assessment of the evidence amounts to an error of law. The Tribunal also failed to properly apply the correct legal tests when assessing the Appellant's eligibility for PIP. While regulation 4A and regulation 7 were acknowledged, the Tribunal did not appropriately evaluate whether the Appellant could perform activities safely, repeatedly, and to an acceptable standard. The evidence presented indicated difficulties in various daily activities, yet the Tribunal dismissed these claims without adequate consideration of their impact. In relation to engaging with others, the Tribunal overlooked the possibility that the Appellant's ADHD and suspected Autism could significantly affect social interactions, instead relying on overly simplistic reasoning that the Appellant had made two friends at college. … The Tribunal accepted the Department for Work and Pensions' allocation of 2 points for engaging without support from the HCP and without independent verification. If the Tribunal required HCP confirmation for other activities, they should have applied the same standard to engaging. By accepting the DWP's allocation without questioning its basis, the Tribunal may have failed to properly assess whether the Appellant's difficulties warranted a higher score. This selective evaluation of evidence reinforces concerns that the Tribunal did not conduct a balanced and independent assessment but rather endorsed the DWP's conclusions without sufficient scrutiny…”

24. In my grant of permission to appeal dated 2 October 2025 I observed: “11.Regarding the [first paragraph above] of the grounds, I do not accept that it is arguable that the FTT ‘dismissed the Appellant’s ADHD diagnosis’. The FTT accepted the Applicant had received the diagnosis, and the medication prescribed, at paras 17-18 of the SOR. Nonetheless, the FTT arguably did not consider its effect in relation to each daily living activity. The FTT did rely heavily on the HCP’s report at paras 21-25 of the SOR to reject the Applicant’s account but which report was written on the premise that the Applicant had not been diagnosed with ADHD and was not in receipt of any medication. Whereas the FTT was in possession of the diagnoses, medication and medical reports in support of the Applicant’s condition. Furthermore, the HCP report suggested that the Applicant did not need any prompting for mixing or engaging socially with people or need any visual aids or appliances to read and understand signs, symbols and words (activities 9 and 8). Both of the HCP’s assessments on these activities were conceded to be wrong [by the Respondent] where the Applicant was awarded points for both activities after considering the medical evidence. Therefore, it is arguable that the FTT failed to take into account that there were evidential deficiencies in the HCP report when relying on it so heavily to reject the Applicant’s account. 12.Regarding the [third paragraph above] of the grounds, the FTT’s reasoning at para 35 of the SOR to reject the Applicant scoring more than two points for prompting was arguably inadequate. It is arguable that the Applicant had provided evidence she needed social support in order to mix with (socially engage) with other people and the reasons for rejecting this were arguably insufficient and in error of law. The fact that the Applicant was able to maintain good relations with family and had two friends on her course at college arguably did not engage with the definition of ‘engage socially’ in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the PIP Regulations 2013. It did not address whether she was able to establish new relationships or engage contextually. The FTT relied on the Applicant’s ability to engage with the HCP via telephone but this required the assistance, presence and support of the Applicant’s mother (even if the FTT was correct in finding, which the Applicant disputes, that the engagement with the HCP had no ill effect on the Applicant). 13.As for materiality, it is arguable that there was a failure to take into account the impact of the Applicant’s medical conditions on the full range of daily living activities, not simply mixing with people (activity 9). This would include consideration of her claimed inability to attend to tasks and need for prompting.” The Respondent’s submissions

25. The Respondent filed submissions dated 4 November 2025 prepared by Miss Howard. The submissions supported the appeal being allowed for material error of law and the case being remitted for re-hearing by a fresh panel of the FTT. I adopt and incorporate the submissions in the reasoning below. Discussion and Analysis

26. I am satisfied that the FTT has erred in law both in failing to take into account relevant evidence when making material findings of fact and failing to provide adequate reasons for material parts of its decision.

27. The reasoning by the FTT as to how it assessed the Appellant’s functional abilities at paragraphs 26-37 of the SOR is limited. The UT recognises that the FTT is not expected to refer to every piece of evidence and operates under pressures of work and time in preparing its SOR. The reasoning need only be adequate. Nonetheless, the reasoning the FTT has provided at paragraphs 26- 37 of the SOR with regards to the Appellant’s medical conditions and how they impact the full range of daily living activities does little more than rehearse part of the evidence and provide a conclusion. As noted above, the Appellant was awarded 2 points for daily living descriptors 9(b) and 2 points for daily living activity 8(b) but was not awarded any points for the mobility descriptors.

28. The Appellant was diagnosed with ADHD in January 2024 and at the time of the FTT decision was awaiting an Autism assessment, (she has subsequently been diagnosed with Autism in February 2025). The evidence before the FTT demonstrated that this manifests in symptoms of distractibility, fidgeting, anxiety, sound sensitivity and frustration. The evidence also demonstrated that Appellant takes Concerta XL 36mg for ADHD, that she is also dyslexic and experiences aching legs and constipation. The evidence included that the Appellant takes Laxido sachets for the constipation, has Coloboma of the right eye and Duane Syndrome diagnosed since birth by specialist. The evidence before the FTT also stated that she has a small hole in the iris of her right eye which causes vision blurring and so she must squint. Symptoms include limited mobility in both eyes to move inwards or outwards, so she has limited peripheral vision and has tunnel vision. The Appellant was also diagnosed as colour blind in 2023.

29. The FTT in its reasoning in relation to the descriptors (in paragraphs 26-37 set out above) appear to have summarised the evidence before it and then concluded that at the date of the decision under appeal, the Appellant did not satisfy descriptors across most daily living activities. However it provided inadequate reasoning to support and explain how it reached the conclusion that the Appellant was able to dress and undress, prepare food, take nutrition, manage treatments, wash and bathe, and engage with others with prompting but without support in accordance with the provisions of Regulations 4(2A) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 (the PIP Regs 2013).

30. Turning to the first ground of appeal, the FtT failed to record or acknowledge the evidence that the Appellant claimed restrictions in her ability to prepare food. The SOR simplified the Appellant’s restrictions as simply not wantingto prepare food. For instance, the SOR states “It is far more likely that as the HCP recorded, the Appellant ‘won’t’ make toast as opposed to she ‘can’t’ make toast”.

31. However, the FTT did not take into account or consider the evidence stating that the Appellant always needs her mother to cook her meals as she cannot concentrate for too long and she is unable to focus on making a simple meal due to her ADHD traits (PIP2 form, FTT bundle, p.49). The evidence also stated that the Appellant’s eyesight impacts her ability to safely use sharp knives, peeler or a tin opener. It is stated that “she does not feel confident with a knife as she has accidently slipped and cut herself in the past as reported she became confused and loses concentration”. The FTT does not record that it considered this evidence or give reasons for rejecting it.

32. In view of this, it is unclear how the FTT reached the conclusion that the Appellant is capable of preparing food and whether she is able to do so within the requirements of Regulation 4(2A) of The Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013.

33. Although the FTT is entitled to give due weight to the evidence that it chooses to be the most reliable and probative, where there is conflicting evidence, it must explore and consider it as a whole and provide sufficient reasons explaining why it preferred the evidence that it relies on. In this appeal the FTT does not appear to have done that in relation to material findings. Consequently, the FTT has given inadequate reasons for its conclusion in the treatment of activity 1 as well as the treatment of other evidence.

34. Turning to the second ground of appeal, it is stated in the SOR that the Appellant’s health condition did not explain why she could not use cutlery. However, the FTT has failed to consider evidence that did link these restrictions with the Appellant’s disability. For example, it is outlined in the PIP2 form that was filled out by a family friend that the Appellants “…reluctance to cut up her food is mainly due to her lack of confidence, because of her eyesight disability”.

35. Moreover, the evidence also states that the “[Appellant] often doesn’t feel hungry and even needs reminding to eat when she is at college”. Although the FTT found that this does not relate to the Appellant’s disabilities, this is contradicted by evidence that suggests that she has lost her appetite due to her ADHD medication. The clinical update letter outlines that the “[Appellant’s] appetite has decreased, and she has lost weight, going from 77kg to 61kg, stating that she now hates food”.

36. The FTT did not consider whether the Appellant may need prompting or requires assistance to eat (which is now supported by the independent evidence that her appetite and weight has decreased). Consequently, the FTT has given inadequate reasons for its conclusion in the treatment of daily living activity

2.

37. Additionally, the FTT appears to have relied solely and heavily on the HCP report and failed to consider all evidence. The SOR stated that there was insufficient evidence of a prompt being reasonably required the majority of days for the Appellant to take her medication. However, the PIP2 form indicates that the “[Appellant] wouldn’t remember to take her medication and has to be reminded to have it”. The evidence before the FTT was that the ADHD team is supporting the Appellant to minimise the risk of her not taking her medication however, she does require reminding to monitor the amount of medication she takes and when a new prescription will be required due to her lack of attention (Senior ADHD nurse practitioner letter, FTT bundle, p.135). This evidence was not considered with reasons given for rejecting it.

38. Additionally, the SOR in relation to washing and bathing relied on the HCP report to arrive at a conclusion. However, the PIP2 form offers relevant evidence that suggests that the Appellant does require the assistance of her mother to wash her and her hair (PIP2 form, FTT bundle, p.60). Again, this evidence was not considered with reasons given for rejecting it.

39. The FTT relied heavily and solely on the HCP report at paragraphs 21-25 of the SOR to reject the Appellant’s mother’s account yet it failed to consider that there were evidential deficiencies within it. This was best demonstrated by the fact that two of the HCP’s findings were overturned after the Respondent considered further medical evidence on behalf of the Appellant and made its decision on 15 February 2024. Thus there had already been medical evidence that contradicted the HCP report (and the HCP assessment was undertaken by telephone so that the Appellant was not visually observed or examined).

40. The FTT failed to consider all the other and independent evidence when relying so heavily on the HCP report to reject the Appellant’s (or the Appellant’s mother’s) account. The Appellant stated in her written evidence that during the HCP assessment, she was not comfortable talking to the assessor (letter of complaint, FTT bundle, p.133). The SOR relies in part on the lack of corroborating observations from the HCP of the Appellant’s distress for rejecting their accounts but the assessment was conducted by telephone. The FTT did not provide reasoning as to whether the HCP assessment was carried out in such a way as to gather accurate evidence in light of the Appellant’s claim to being distressed during the process.

41. In view of this, the FTT reached the conclusion that the Appellant can take medication and wash and bathe unprompted and without assistance without taking into account relevant evidence and giving sufficient reasons.

42. Furthermore, the PIP2 form explains that the “[Appellant] doesn’t like wearing jackets to college as she worries about doing her zips up or un-zipping her jacket” (FTT bundle, p.66). She, therefore, requires the help from her mother to undo and do up zips and buttons. The Appellant claimed she also needs prompting when to change her clothes as she would wear the same clothes for 2-3 days (PIP2 form, FTT bundle, p.66).

43. In rejecting these claims, the SOR relied on the HCP report and has stated that the Appellant’s disability does not impact her ability to dress and undress. However, there was evidence from a clinical psychologist that the Appellant has difficulties in her motor planning and ideation skills (Autism assessment report, FTT bundle, Addition M, p.21). These restrictions are said to impair someone’s physical ability to dress and undress as it is said to impact coordination and the understanding of the steps involved.

44. Therefore, given that the Appellant claimed she struggled to dress and undress and required support when doing so, it was incumbent upon the FTT to take the evidence into account and give reasons for rejecting it or at the very least explain what weight to give this evidence.

45. The Appellant claimed she also struggles to engage with other people face-to-face. For example, it is stated in the PIP2 form that the “[Appellant] does not like mixing with people even with people that she has met before if she doesn’t feel comfortable, she won’t want to be there” (FTT bundle, p.74). It is also expressed by the Appellant’s mother that she is reluctant to mix with people at college as she believes people are staring at her, judging her or talking about her (PIP2 form, FTT bundle, p.74).

46. The SOR has concluded that there is insufficient evidence that suggests that the Appellant requires social support when engaging with others, albeit it did accept she required prompting to do so.Whilst the FTT awarded 2 points for descriptor 9b, requires prompting to be able to engage with others face to face, the FTT does not address why prompting is sufficient to enable the Appellant rather than social support. It does not address how the Appellant’s ADHD and, at that time, potential Autism diagnosis, and the evidence as noted above, would impact on her ability to engage with others. It appears that the FTT assumed that prompting would be sufficient without more yet at paragraph 24 of the SOR it accepted – that “the Appellant has support from SEN workers at college”. Given that the FTT accepted that the Appellant has difficulty mixing with others to the extent it required prompting, it was incumbent upon the FTT to give reasons explaining why the Appellant will or is able to engage with others face to face with prompting but without the need for social support.

47. In view of the above, I am satisfied that the FTT failed to take into account relevant evidence and gave inadequate reasons in relation to material parts of its decision. Furthermore, the errors of law identified and detailed above are material, as had the Appellant been awarded at least 4 additional point for the daily living descriptors of PIP she would have scored sufficient points to be awarded the daily living component of PIP. Conclusion and disposition

48. I therefore conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved material errors of law. I allow the appeal and set aside the FTT Decision.

49. In light of the evidential matters that will need to be reconsidered and fact finding that is preferably undertaken by a full specialist panel of the FTT, I remit the appeal to be re-heard by a differently constituted FTT with the directions set out above. The FTT will need to reconsider whether there should be a paper determination of the appeal, as the Appellant originally sought, or whether it should direct an oral hearing at which the Appellant can give oral evidence and have her account investigated and tested directly. The further points I raised at paragraph 11 of the grant of permission to appeal to the UT, will be subsumed in the appeal to heard by the newly constituted FTT. Judge Rupert Jones Judge of the Upper Tribunal Authorised by the Judge for issue on 6 November 2025