Mark Wood v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00693 (GRC) Case Reference: FT/D/2025/1360 First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Transport Heard by Cloud Video Platform Heard on: 1 May 2026 Decision given on: 19 May 2026 Before JUDGE SIMON BIRD KC MEMBER RICHARD FRY MEMBER MARTIN SMITH Between mark wood Appellant and THE REGISTRAR OF APPROVED DRIVING INSTRUCTORS Respondent Representation: For the Appellant: Mr Mark Wood For the Respondent: Mr Andrew Heard Decision: The appeal is Dismissed REASONS Introduction

1. This appeal concerns a decision of the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (“the Respondenty”) made on 5 November 2025 to refuse the Appellant’s application for re-registration as an Approved Driving Instructor. The decision was taken on the grounds that the Appellant did not meet the condition in section 125(3)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, that is, he could not considered to be a fit and proper person to have his name entered on the Register by reason of having been charged by South Yorkshire Police with two offences of sexual assault against his pupils and was due to appear in the Crown Court.

2. The proceedings were held by video (CVP). The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way. The Appeal

3. The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal dated 3 December 2025 in summary relies on the grounds that: (a) The criminal charges related to what were just allegations. The Appellant had voluntarily attended his local police station to give his version of events relating to the allegations. His statement was taken and he had been free to leave without any conditions. A DVSA investigation had been suspended pending outcome of a decision by the CPS on the allegations; (b) On 19 March 2025 he began the process of securing his DBS ready for the renewal of his re-registration. This came back all clear on 18 May 2025. The Appellant heard nothing from the CPS until 5 August 2025 when he was texted to say that he was going to be charged. (c) At the end of September 2025, his registration expired and he was late reapplying, doing so on 3 October 2025. On 4 October 2025 he received a court hearing date (28 October 2025) following which, on 7 October 2025, the Appellant emailed him to say that he would not be allowed to have his name entered on the register due to the upcoming court date. (d) On 28 May 2025 he pleaded not guilty to the allegations and elected for trial in the Crown Court. He attended Sheffield Crown Court on 25 November 2025 and entered not guilty pleas. He was given the next hearing date of 18 May 2028 for his trial. (e) Throughout, he has had no restrictions or limitations set on him by the Police or the Courts and he is on unconditional bail. He asks what has happened to the presumption of innocence.

4. The Respondent’s Statement of Case dated 19 February 2025 resists the appeal. The Respondent says that: (a) On 5 August 2025 he was advised by the South Yorkshire Police that the Appellant had been charged with two offences of sexual assault against his pupils and was due to appear before Doncaster Magistrates’ Court 28 May 2025. In the light of this information, he considered removing the Appellant’s name from the Register on the grounds that he had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name entered in it. On 3 November 2025, the Appellant was advised of this and invited to make representations; (b) The Appellant responded by e-mail dated 23 October 2025 stating that his DBS had been returned clear and therefore he did not understand how he could not be considered a fit and proper person. He pointed out that the allegations were just that, he had never had any other allegations or complaints made against him during his 12 years as an ADI and he was being deprived of his profession based on what were allegations. He stated that he was happy to work under any restrictions the Respondent considered appropriate whilst he proved his innocence. (c) On 24 October 2025 the Appellant had been informed that the Respondent was unable to process his re-registration application pending the outcome of the Court case. In an email response dated 30 October 2025 the Appellant stated that he felt he was being discriminated against. The allegations related to one person’s allegations and that person has recommended him to a number of her friends and then made the allegation he was defending, He had not been found guilty of anything, was not prevented by any condition from being in the company of minors and queried what the position would have been had his licence not expired. (d) On 30 October 2025, the Respondent responded stating that, had his name still been in the Register, his licence would have been suspended reflecting the Respondent’s standard practice in such situations. (e) On 5 November 2025 the Respondent had made the decision refusing the Appellant’s application for re-registration. Whilst he accepted that, at the time of the decision, the Appellant had not been convicted of any offence, he had been charged with two offences of sexual assault against pupils. The conditions for entry on the Register extend beyond instructional ability alone and require that the applicant is a fit and proper person. Teaching (generally) young people to drive as a profession is a responsible and demanding task and should only be entrusted to those with high standards. He would therefore be failing in his public duty if he allowed a person who had been charged with these offences to have his name entered in the register. (f) Registration represents official approval; the title prescribed for use by instructors is “Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency Approved Driving Instructor. The Respondent is concerned that the good name of the register would be tarnished and the public’s confidence undermined if it were generally known that he had allowed the Appellant’s name to be retained in the Register. It would also be offensive ADI’s and persons trying to qualify as ADIs who had been scrupulous in their professional conduct for the Respondent to ignore the inappropriate and unprofessional conduct displayed by the Appellant. The Law

5. Entry of a person’s name in the Register is subject to the conditions set out in section 125(5) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (the Act). One of those conditions, at section 125(2)(e), is that the person is a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register.

6. In Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 , the Court of Appeal described the “fit and proper person” condition as follows: “.. the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval…It seems to me that the maintenance of public confidence in the register is important.” (paragraph 30).

7. The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out in section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit (section 131(3)). The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence available to it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s decision as the person tasked by Parliament with making such decisions (in accordance with R (Hope and Glory Public House Limited) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court [2011] EWCA Civ 31).

8. We have considered a bundle containing 33 pages along with oral submissions made at the hearing. Evidence and Submissions

9. Both the Appellant and the Registrar made submissions at the hearing.

10. The Respondent summarised his Statement of Case and, in response to questioning from the Tribunal, explained the Respondent’s practice where an ADI is charged with an offence, but has not yet convicted of it. Whilst each case is considered on its merits, where the charge relates to sexual assault, the Respondent would always take action. The Respondent relied on the charging with the offence as demonstrating that the CPS had concluded that the evidential threshold for bringing a prosecution had been met, which was a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the fit and proper person condition was not met.

11. The Respondent explained that had the Respondent’s name still been on the Register, the decision would have been taken to suspend his registration. However, the Appellant had allowed his registration to lapse and suspension was not an option open to the Respondent or the Tribunal. Further, whilst the grant of a licence to a person defending outstanding criminal proceedings coupled with immediate suspension of the licence, might seem a less draconian response, a licence may only be suspended where the Respondent believes that the person would pose a significant threat to the safety of members of the public if the person's registration were not suspended (section 128(7A)(c) of the Act). It would be inconsistent for the Respondent to conclude that a person was a fit and proper person in order to include their name on the register, whilst also being of the view that they posed a significant threat to the safety of the public justifying immediate suspension. The Respondent also explained that there is no power to restrict the category of person who an ADI can offer instruction to.

12. The Respondent explained that he had been supplied with no further information in relation to the alleged offences than was before the Tribunal, but that that was not unusual.

13. The Appellant stated that he had been an ADI for just over 12 years and had never experiences anything like this before. He remains on unconditional bail and his trial date is 15 May 2028. He has denied the allegations which contained inconsistencies and which were not consistent with the dates when he was providing instruction to the complainants. He was seeking to extend his registration in order to avoid having to re-start the registration process. Conclusions

14. This appeal raises the difficult issue of the tension between the principle that a person charged with the criminal offence is innocent until proved guilty and the need to protect the integrity of the ADI Register in the public interest.

15. The Tribunal has some sympathy with Mr Wood. He has been charged with offences which he denies and which he has elected to have tried before a jury. The Tribunal has no detail relating to the allegations and it is not its role to reach any conclusion in respect of them. Unless and until the Appellant is found guilty of them, he is presumed innocent, yet he has lost the ability to practise as an ADI because the Respondent has concluded that, notwithstanding the absence of a conviction, he is not a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register.

16. However, compelling as this argument may look, it overlooks the different standard of proof required in deciding whether an ADI meets the conditions for entry on the Register when compared with the standard of proof which applies in criminal proceedings. In deciding that the Appellant is no longer a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register, the Respondent need only be satisfied that the threshold for prosecution has been met. i.e. in the view of the CPS it is more likely than not that, on the evidence available to it, a reasonable jury will convict. That may be compared with the higher standard of proof required in criminal proceeding i.e. that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that a defendant has committed the offence alleged.

17. The use by the Respondent of the threshold for prosecution in making the decision as to whether a person is a fit and proper one to have his name entered in the register, in our view strikes a reasonable and appropriate balance between ensuring that the integrity of the Register and the safety of the public is robustly protected and also ensuring that an ADI does not have his name removed from the Register( or a person seeking to have their name entered in the Register does not have their application refused) unless the CPS is satisfied that there is sufficient substance in the allegation to justify prosecution.

18. Under the Act there is no less draconian which the Respondent could reasonably have taken to ensure adequate protection for the public and appropriate and the integrity of the ADI register than the action he took in relation to the Appellant. As the Respondent points out, it was not open to it to grant the Appellant’s application and immediately to suspend it, as he could not rationally conclude that a person was at the same time a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register and also such a threat to public safety that the registration needed to be suspended. Further, because the Appellant allowed his registration to lapse, suspension as a means to avoid the need to re-qualify, was not an option which was available.

19. In these circumstances, whilst acknowledging the impact on the Appellant, the Tribunal concludes that the refusal of his application was the only reasonable course in all the circumstances. The CPS decision to charge him is sufficient evidence to satisfy the Tribunal that the condition contained in section 125(3)(e) is not satisfied and we conclude that the Registrar’s decision was correct. We dismiss the appeal. SignedJudge Simon Bird KC Date: 7 May 2026