R v Daniel Baverstock
MR JUSTICE LAVENDER: 1. The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against a total sentence of two years and three months' imprisonment imposed on him on 18 June 2025 in the Crown Court at Maidstone for four offences to which he had pleaded guilty. The individual sentences were as follows. (1) One year's imprisonment for a count (count...
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MR JUSTICE LAVENDER: 1. The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against a total sentence of two years and three months' imprisonment imposed on him on 18 June 2025 in the Crown Court at Maidstone for four offences to which he had pleaded guilty. The individual sentences were as follows. (1) One year's imprisonment for a count (count 1) of acting in breach of a restraining order, contrary to section 5(5) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. (2) A consecutive sentence of one year and three months' imprisonment for a second count (count 2) of acting in breach of a restraining order. (3) No separate penalty for an offence of using a motor vehicle without insurance, contrary to section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. (4) A concurrent sentence of two months' imprisonment for an offence of impersonating a police officer, contrary to section 91 of the Police Act 1996. 2. The complainant had been in a relationship with the applicant, but after it ended he stalked her and assaulted her in front of her children, as a result of which a restraining order was made by the Maidstone Magistrates' Court on 7 December 2023 prohibiting the applicant from having any contact with the complainant or any of her children for a period of 10 years. 3. Count 1 concerned breaches of the restraining order in February and March 2024. The applicant repeatedly emailed and called the complainant and sent messages to her daughter. 4. Count 2 concerned further breaches in February and March 2025, when the applicant sent to the complainant's daughter a friend request on Facebook and requested contact on TikTok and Snapchat. The applicant also sent emails and messages to the complainant and went to her home on several occasions. Although going to her home was not in itself a breach of the restraining order, it was an aggravating factor. The offence of impersonating a police officer was committed when the applicant sent to the complainant what purported to be an email from a police officer. 5. The applicant had been convicted of 20 offences committed between 2002 and 2023. These included: harassment, for which he received a community order on 19 April 2016 and a restraining order was made; three offences of breach of that restraining order and an offence of stalking, for which he received 360 days' imprisonment on 7 September 2016; breach of a restraining order, for which he received a community order on 5 May 2022; stalking and battery of a previous partner, for which he received 120 days' imprisonment on 3 August 2021 and a restraining order was granted; and stalking and battery, as we have mentioned, of the complainant, for which he received three months' imprisonment on 7 December 2023. 6. There were before the court a pre-sentence report, a victim personal statement and a reference from a prison officer. 7. In his clear and well-ordered sentencing remarks the recorder placed counts 1 and 2 in category A2 in the relevant sentencing guideline, with a starting point of one year's custody and a range up to two years' custody. There is no dispute about the categorisation of these offences. 8. The applicant's previous convictions were significant aggravating factors. The recorder also treated as an aggravating factor the applicant's contact with the complainant's daughter as well as with the complainant herself. The recorder said that he would have sentenced the applicant to 36 months' imprisonment after a trial. He reduced this by one quarter by reason of the applicant's guilty pleas. 9. The proposed grounds of appeal are: first, that the overall sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in that the sentences for counts 1 and 2 should have run concurrently and not consecutively; and secondly, that even if it was right to sentence for the breach offences consecutively, the overall sentence should have been reduced to reflect the totality principle. 10. In refusing leave to appeal, the single judge said as follows: "1. The problem here was not just that the applicant was in serious and sustained breach of a Restraining Order, resulting in two counts, but also that he had a very bad record, which included convictions (and custodial sentences) for harassment, stalking, breaches of a restraining order and assault, relating to a number of other victims. As the Recorder said, the applicant had 'an appalling history of disobedience to court orders seeking to protect women'. 2. I can see no error in the Recorder's categorisation for sentencing guideline purposes and, as he pointed out, there were also significant aggravating factors. Mitigation was relatively limited. A significant immediate custodial sentence was inevitable; and I do not consider, given all the circumstances, that there is any viable argument that a total sentence of 2 years 3 months imprisonment was as a matter of totality excessive." 11. We have considered the grounds of appeal and all of the documents afresh, together with Miss Chapman's very helpful submissions, but we have concluded that we entirely agree with the single judge that, for the reasons which he gave, the proposed appeal has no prospect of success. We note that in her submissions to us today Miss Chapman submitted that the recorder did not adequately explain his reasons for imposing consecutive sentences or for imposing sentences of the length which he did. However, at the end of the day we have to consider whether the total sentence was manifestly excessive having regard to the totality principle. In our view it is not arguable that it was. Accordingly, we refuse this application. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: [email protected]
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Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).
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