Mrs Justice Hill: Introduction 1. This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, permission having been refused on the papers by HHJ Saffman sitting in retirement, by an order dated 12 September 2024 and sent to the parties on 19 September 2024. 2. The Claimant seeks judicial review of the decision of the Defendant, Leeds Trinity University (“the University”), to prevent him from participating in the Annual General Meeting of the Interested Party, the Leeds Trinity Student Union (“the Union”), on 11 March 2024 (“the AGM”). 3. The University and the Union are separate legal entities. The Claimant’s case is that the Union is a charity; and that only the University, and not the Union, is a public authority for the purpose of judicial review proceedings and the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”). The factual background 4. At the time of the AGM the Claimant was a postgraduate student at the university and had been elected Chair of the Student Council of the Union. He was also the Chair of the Student Executive Committee of the Union. 5. It is clear that prior to the AGM difficulties had developed in the relationship between the Claimant and the Union. 6. The Claimant’s case is that during his tenure as chair of the Student Council he challenged alleged malpractice within the Union and justifiably reported certain matters to the Charity Commission. These matters are said to have resulted in regulatory advice and guidance being given to the Union’s trustees by the Commission. At [4] of his statement of facts and grounds, the Claimant contends that he intended to “draw attention to these matters as well as express views / protest” at the AGM. 7. The Union’s position, which has been elicited from the complaint documentation provided by the University, is that they had received complaints from Union staff and officers that they had been harassed, intimidated and threatened by the Claimant over a period of time beginning in November 2023. It was said that he had been repeatedly aggressive and intimidatory, dismissed others’ contributions, interrupted staff and refused to accept when others had a different point of view, especially female officers, to such an extent that the wellbeing and health of some of the staff had been adversely affected. 8. On 7 March 2024 the Union informed the Claimant by e-mail that the concerns about his conduct that had been raised were going to be investigated as part of the Union’s duty of care to its staff and members. The Claimant was invited to a meeting to discuss the allegations. A date of 13 March 2024 for this meeting was suggested. The e-mail confirmed that in accordance with Union Bye-Law 3 (7.1), the Claimant was being placed under interim sanctions. These were to the effect that he was not permitted to enter on to Union premises, use Union facilities, represent the union at any event or contact staff members. 9. The effect of these interim sanctions was said to be that the Claimant’s role as Student Council Chair was suspended and he would not be able to represent the Student Council at the AGM or chair the AGM. 10. The Claimant made clear that he did not accept the validity of these interim sanctions. He has contended variously that they were ultra vires the Union’s powers; and that the Union acted contrary to its Constitution and Bye-Laws in failing to give him sufficient notice of the allegations against him and failing to organise a meeting promptly. 11. The Claimant made it clear that he intended to attend the AGM. I have seen e-mail correspondence from the Claimant in which he said that he would not be representing the Union at the AGM but in acting as chair of the Student Council, he would be the impartial intermediary between the Union and its members. There is documentation suggesting that he said that any unlawful attempts to prevent him from attending the AGM or any other unlawful acts would be “met with measured and reasonable responses as appropriate”. The Union’s position was that this response was concerning, in the context of their previous experiences with the Claimant, and was interpreted as a threat. 12. The AGM was due to take place at 1.30 pm on 11 March 2024. In light of the Union’s concerns, at around 10.04 am on that day, the CEO of the Union informed the University security staff that the Claimant was not permitted to attend the AGM in any capacity, either to represent the Union or as a student, because of the risk he presented to the safety and wellbeing of the Union staff, officers and other students. The Union asked the University to provide security assistance at the AGM. 13. On the afternoon of 11 March 2024, the Claimant arrived at the AGM and attempted to gain access. He indicated to the security staff that he had documentation which would illustrate that he did in fact have the right to attend. It is alleged that he became argumentative, confrontational and violent. Security staff prevented him from accessing the AGM. The police became involved and arrived at 4.56 pm. The Claimant was arrested on suspicion of assaulting a security guard. He contended he had acted in self-defence. I was told that ultimately no further action was taken against the Claimant by the police. The procedural history 14. On 10 June 2024 the Claimants’ claim was filed. He advanced three grounds of judicial review. 15. Ground 1 was to the effect that the University had acted in contravention of the HRA, section 6(1) in that it had breached his rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. These comprise, respectively, the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of assembly and association. 16. Ground 1 also contended that the University’s actions were unlawful on the basis that by arbitrarily preventing the Claimant from taking part in the AGM and/or enabling the Union to do so, the University had breached the Education Act 1994, section 22(1). This requires a University to take “such steps as are reasonably practicable to secure that any students’ union for students at the establishment operates in a fair and democratic manner”. 17. Ground 2 argued that the University’s security staff had failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely that the Claimant remained entitled to participate in the AGM, as Chair of the Student Council, Chair of the Student Executive Committee and a full member of the Union; and Charity Commission guidance indicating that those entitled to participate in charities’ general meetings cannot be prevented from doing so. 18. Ground 3 submitted that by preventing the Claimant from participating in the AGM without justification, the University acted irrationally in a Wednesbury sense. 19. On 9 July 2024 the University filed an Acknowledgment of Service, summary grounds for defending the claim and a bundle of supporting documents on 9 July 2024. 20. The University’s bundle included a witness statement from Simon Parker, the Defendant’s Facilities Services Manager. This confirmed the factual position I have outlined, namely that during the morning of 11 March 2024 the Union had requested that the University security team provide assistance at the AGM to ensure that the Claimant did not access it. Mr Parker’s statement also described the altercation that followed and the calling of the police. 21. The bundle also included evidence relating to the investigation of a complaint that the Claimant had made about his treatment on 11 March 2024 and the University’s Complaints Policy and Procedure. 22. No Acknowledgment of Service has been filed by the Union. 23. Under CPR 54.8A a Claimant may file a Reply, within 7 days of service of the Acknowledgment of Service. 24. Under the CPR PD 54.8A(1), a Reply should only be filed “if necessary for the purpose of the court’s decision to grant permission to apply for judicial review, for example, where a discrete issue not addressed in the Claim Form is raised in the Acknowledgement of Service”. It is emphasised that a Reply is not “the occasion to rehearse matters already referred to in the Claim Form”. 25. Under CPR 54.8A(2) a Reply shall be as concise as possible and shall not exceed 5 pages. 26. The Claimant did not file a Reply within the 7 days’ time scale. He was in communication with the court suggesting that he needed more time to do so due to his health. He made an application for an extension of time to file his Reply on 17 July 2024, supported by some medical evidence. He sought an extension of time of 7 days. It appears from the court file that this application could not be properly processed due to the Claimant’s failure to file the necessary evidence in support of his help with fees application. 27. The net result was that as at the morning of 12 September 2024 no extension of time had been granted to the Claimant for the filing of a Reply. Moreover, no Reply had been received from the Claimant despite the fact that on 17 July 2024 he had only sought an extension of 7 days to file it. 28. The papers were placed before HHJ Saffman on that day and he refused permission. He did so for three overarching reasons. First, he concluded that none of the grounds were arguable as a matter of law. Second, he held that the Claimant ought not to be permitted to proceed because he had failed to pursue alternative remedies, namely the internal complaints process including as appropriate a referral to the Office of the Independent Adjudicator and a claim in the civil courts. Third, he found that the claim is academic because it relates to a refusal to permit attendance at a meeting that has already taken place. 29. Shortly after 4 pm on 12 September 2024 the Claimant filed a Reply with the court. It follows from the above chronology that this had not been seen by HHJ Saffman before he refused permission. 30. The Claimant’s Reply did not comply with the CPR in various respects. It is some 40 pages long. Around the first half of it expands on points made in the claim form. It also had appended to it a bundle running to some 85 pages including much material that would have been in existence when the claim was filed with no explanation for why it had not been provided earlier. The Claimant also provided three supplementary documents, namely the Union’s constitution and extracts from its Bye-Laws, again with no explanation for why these had not been provided earlier. Nor did the Claimant make an application to rely on this additional evidence or, to the extent necessary. an application to amend his claim form. Finally, it is not clear whether the Claimant served the Reply on the University or the Union. 31. On 26 September 2024, permission having been refused on the papers, the Claimant filed a Form 86B indicating his intent to renew the application for permission. 32. In section 4 of that form the Claimant wrote “please see appended renewal bundle”. This included another lengthy set of submissions, running to some 34 pages, and a further bundle of evidence. The submissions and evidence were very similar, but not identical, to the material provided at the Reply stage. Again, to the extent necessary, no application was made to rely on further evidence or amend the claim form. Further relevant developments 33. Shortly before the renewal hearing the Defendant filed a skeleton argument which confirmed the following. 34. On 11 July 2024 the Defendant expelled the Claimant from the University with immediate effect. The letter informing the Claimant of this indicated that the reason for this was that a Student Conduct Panel had upheld a series of allegations against him. These included allegations that he had disrupted the activities of the University, obstructed the students and staff in carrying out their functions, duties or activities and engaged in behaviour which was likely to cause fear, distress or offence to others. He was advised he had a right of appeal against the expulsion, to be exercised within 10 working days. 35. On 19 July 2024 the Defendant informed the Claimant of the outcome of the complaint he had made about the events of 11 March 2024 (and a separate complaint). The Claimant’s complaint that he had been wrongly barred from attending the AGM and that a member of the security team had made a malicious complaint to the police about him were not upheld. The Claimant was advised that he could progress the complaint to stage 3 provided he did so within 10 working days. 36. The University’s position is that the Claimant did not appeal his expulsion or progress his complaint to stage 3. For his part the Claimant contests having received all the relevant documentation. 37. On 10 March 2025 the Claimant issued a claim against the University in Sheffield County Court seeking £3,000 in damages under the HRA for alleged breaches of Article 10 and 11 on the basis that he was not permitted to attend the AGM. The University entered a Defence disputing the claim. On 14 May 2025, District Judge Childs stayed that claim pending the outcome of this hearing. The legal framework 38. It is necessary for me to decide, afresh, whether to grant permission to apply for judicial review. 39. Permission should only be granted if the judge is satisfied that there is an arguable ground for judicial review which has a realistic prospect of success. 40. Even if a claim is arguable, the judge must refuse permission if it appears to be highly likely that the outcome for the Claimant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred. The latter requirement derives from the Senior Courts Act 1981, section 31 which provides in material part that: “(3C) When considering whether to grant leave to make an application for judicial review, the High Court— (a) may of its own motion consider whether the outcome for the applicant would have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, and (b) must consider that question if the defendant asks it to do so. (3D) If, on considering that question, it appears to the High Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different, the court must refuse to grant leave. (3E) The court may disregard the requirement in subsection (3D) if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest”. 41. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. If there is another route by which the decision can be challenged, which provides an adequate remedy for the Claimant, that alternative remedy should generally be used before applying for judicial review. If the court finds that the Claimant has (or had) an adequate alternative remedy, it will generally refuse permission to apply for judicial review. The renewal hearing 42. At the outset of the renewal hearing, I raised the procedural question of how to deal with the Claimant’s extensive Reply and renewal documents. Counsel for the University, Mr Greatorex, took a commendably pragmatic view and invited me to hear the Claimant’s submissions on his case at its highest and then to revisit any procedural issues as required. 43. The Claimant indicated to me that he has mental health issues and was recovering from the flu. He was granted reasonable adjustments to the extent that he was permitted additional time to make his submissions. However, his submissions ultimately took very much longer than the 30 minutes allocated to the hearing and the hearing itself took some 2¼ hours, which is why it was necessary to reserve judgment. 44. It is fair to say, however, that the issues for me to resolve crystallised quite significantly during the oral submissions. Analysis and conclusions 45. Having considered the competing submissions I am satisfied that this judicial review claim should not proceed in the Administrative Court for the following reasons. 46. First, the claim is entirely academic. The issues around whether or not it was lawful to prevent the Claimant from attending the AGM on 11 March 2024 are entirely historic. He has now been expelled from the University and so there is no prospect of any judgment in relation to what happened on 11 March 2024 being of any practical assistance to him in the future. He suggested to me in oral submissions that there have been similar difficulties between the University and other students since 11 March 2024 but none of them are Claimants in this litigation and I have no details of the allegations to which the Claimant alluded. 47. Second, it is clear that the background to the imposition of the interim sanctions on the Claimant preventing him from attending the AGM is heavily contested as between the Claimants and the Union. While there is some evidence before this court as to the basis on which the University security staff became involved in preventing the Claimant from attending the AGM, the Claimant indicated in oral submissions that matters are more complicated than they would first appear because the University was aware of the background of difficulties between the Claimant and the Union. Judicial review is not the appropriate forum for resolution of factual issues of this kind. 48. Third, a private law claim in the County Court is the appropriate alternative remedy for the Claimant to pursue for a range of reasons. It is the proper way to address the historic wrong to which the Claimant contends he has been subjected. It is the appropriate forum for resolving factual disputes of the kind I have indicated. If the Claimant succeeds, he may be awarded the damages which he seeks. The County Court could through its judgment declare that his rights under Articles 10 and 11 were breached. 49. Although the Claimant contended that the County Court was not an appropriate alternative remedy because it could not consider the arguments under the Education Act 1994, section 22(1), I do not see why that is the case. 50. If the Claimant satisfies the County Court, as he may well do, that the University’s actions amounted to an interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article 10(1), the court will need to go on to consider whether that interference was justified under Article 10(2). 51. This will require consideration of whether the restrictions placed on the Claimant by the University were “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for one of the stated aims in Article 10(2). These include, as may be relied on by the University here, “public safety”, “the prevention of disorder or crime” and “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”. 52. If the Claimant proves an interference with his rights to freedom of assembly and association under Article 11(1), a similar exercise with respect to Article 11 (2) would be necessary. 53. The University’s case is likely to be that the requirements of Articles 10(2) and 11(2) were met because of the security concerns raised with the University by the Union, on which it was entitled to rely and to which it was required to respond in the exercise of its duty of care to students and staff. 54. However, as far as I understand it, the Claimant wishes to argue that the University’s actions did not meet these requirements because it failed to comply with its duties under section 22(1) to ensure that the Union was operating in a fair and democratic manner. This is, I understand, on the basis that the University breached the section 22(1) duty by failing to see the request for assistance in the context of its knowledge of the prior conflict between the Claimants and the Union and/or failing to interrogate the information provided to it by the Union about his conduct and/or failing to check that the interim sanctions had been properly imposed. This would, on his case, show that the Union was not operating in a fair and democratic manner towards him. I should add that this understanding has emerged during the oral submissions, and has not been particularised in his documentation before this court or the County Court. The documentation provided in this claim generally suffers from the defect that it focusses in detail on the actions of the Union rather than on the actions of the University who are the only Defendant. 55. I observe that the Particulars of Claim in the County Court do not, at least yet, address section 22. However, if the Claimant does wish to rely on it as part and parcel of his claims under Articles 10 and 11, or indeed as some kind of free-standing claim under section 22, I see no reason why the County Court cannot determine that issue. 56. For these reasons I have decided that insofar as the Claimant’s claim for judicial review relies on Articles 10 and 11 under Ground 1, these issues should be ventilated in the County Court. 57. Mr Greatorex has urged me to give an indication of the arguability of the Claimant’s Article 10 and 11 claims given the time devoted to them in these proceedings and the extensive costs incurred by the University to date, in part, because of the Claimant’s conduct in filing voluminous submissions and evidence without permission. 58. While I have considerable sympathy with the position the Claimant’s conduct of this claim has placed the University in, I do not consider it appropriate to give the indication sought. In my judgement there is force in the Claimant’s submission that if there exists an alternative remedy, that should be permitted to proceed without interference by this court. Further I am not persuaded that the merits of the Claimant’s Article 10 and 11 claims are as straightforward or as poor as the University contend, not least due to the factual issues to which I have alluded and the lack of detailed argument before me about the proper scope of section 22. 59. Ground 2 relies on a failure by the Defendant to take relevant matters into consideration. This appears to me to be again part and parcel of the arguments around Articles 10(2), 11(2) and section 22 and is therefore properly to be determined by the County Court not this court. 60. I therefore refuse permission on Grounds 1 and 2 on the basis that there exists, and is currently being pursued, an appropriate alternative remedy for the Claimant. 61. I am, however, persuaded that the Claimant’s Ground 3 contending that the University acted irrationally is not arguable for the reasons given by his HHJ Saffman. Given the information provided to the University to the effect that the Claimant was not permitted to attend the AGM there is no realistic prospect of a finding that refusing access to the AGM was irrational, given the high public law threshold that applies to that test. I therefore refuse permission on ground 3. 62. For completeness, I would not have refused permission on the basis of the Senior Courts Act 1981, section 31. At a high level, the Claimant’s case is that the conduct complained of is that the University unlawfully refused him access to the AGM. If that had not occurred, the outcome would have been different as he would have been permitted to enter. Insofar as the Claimant’s case relies on the failure by the University’s security staff to take into account particular information, there is no direct evidence before me, only submissions, as to what the outcome would have been. 63. Permission is nevertheless refused on all three grounds for the reasons I have given. Judgment amended under CPR 40.12 on 11 November 2025