Supreme Court of Mauritius, 8 mai 2026, 2026 INT 116 – Louise v Louise & Anor

Louise v Louise & Anor

2026 INT 116

THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS (Civil Division) In the matter of: CN 273/2025

Marie Vivianne LOUISE (born BRASSE) PLAINTIFF v.

1. Jean Henry LOUISE 2. Marie Annaëlle Guenaelle SARAH DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff is the widow of late Jacques Rosnay Louise, who passed away on the 7 th of January 2017. Defendant No.1 is the adopted child of the Plaintiff and late Jacques Rosnay Louise whereas Defendant No.2 is the concubine of Defendant No.1. In her proecipe, the Plaintiff avers that, during her marriage to late Jacques Rosnay Louise, the latter bought a portion of land situate at Bambous, on which stood a house in concrete under slab. Plaintiff also avers that they extended the ground floor level and added another floor to the existing building and that the whole house served as their “logement principal du ménage”. In August 2023, the Plaintiff authorised Defendant No.1 to occupy the

first floor of the house, free of charge. On the 1 st of January 2024, Defendant No.1 brought Defendant No.2 to occupy the first floor together with him.

2. Plaintiff further avers that since the Defendants have been occupying the first floor of the house, several of her jewellery and garments have gone missing and when she queried the Defendants, they ill-treated and insulted her. Defendants had also denied her access to the first floor, threw down excrements of dogs from the first-floor terrace to the ground floor where she resides, threw her flower pots, altered the water system at the house and failed to contribute to the electricity bills. As a result of the attitude and unlawful acts and doings of the Defendants, the Plaintiff terminated the license given to the Defendants to occupy the first floor and summoned them, through a notice “mise en demeure”, to quit, leave and vacate the first floor, which they failed to do. The Plaintiff also avers that she has suffered great hardship and prejudice because of the Defendants’ actions. She is hence praying for a judgment condemning and ordering the Defendants to:- (i) Quit, leave and vacate the first floor of the residential building, within a delay to be fixed by the court; (ii) Stop interfering with the Plainitff’s peaceful use and occupation and quiet enjoyment of her property; (iii) Settle half of the electricity bills for the months of January 2025 to March 2025; and (iv) Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Rs 1,000,000/- as damages.

3. The proecipe was duly served upon both Defendants personally at their domicile. They, however, left default and did not file any plea to rebut the plaint against them. The case came for make out on the 12 th of December 2025 and the Defendants were still absent. The court therefore allowed the case to proceed on make out by virtue of Section 16 (1) of the District and Intermediate Courts (Civil Jurisdiction) Act.

4. During the hearing, the Plaintiff and a police officer from Bambous Police Station were called to depone under oath and to produce documents on behalf of the Plaintiff’s case (Documents A to J).

5. In court, Plaintiff stated that she contracted civil marriage with the late Jacques Rosnay Louise on the 21 st of October 1986 under the legal system of community of goods (Document B) and she produced the title deed of the property bought by late Jacques Rosnay Louise during their marriage on the 12 th December 1996 (Document F). Plaintiff also explained that the house was for their sole use only and they were occupying the rooms of both floors every day. There was a staircase inside the house connecting the two floors and they would come downstairs during the day and go upstairs to eat dinner and sleep at night. After her husband’s death, Plaintiff continued living in the house. She further explained that she and her late husband had adopted Defendant No.1 by way of an “adoption pleniere” in 1994 (Document E). When Plaintiff became aware that Defendant No.1 got evicted from the place he was renting and was staying with friends, she felt sorry for him and asked him to come stay on the first floor of the house. She also gave permission for Defendant No.2 to stay with Defendant No.1 on the first floor.

6. The Plaintiff also testified regarding the problems she encountered since the Defendants came to live on the first floor, as averred in her proecipe. Her jewellery and clothes went missing and Defendants started to cause trouble (Document A). She also produced photographs to show a dirty nappy, her potted plant and dog excrements which were all thrown down by the Defendants from the first floor onto the ground floor (Documents H, H1 and H2). Furthermore, the Plaintiff stated under oath that she would no longer be insisting on the payment of the electricity bills and the damages of Rs 1,000,000/- as initially claimed in the proecipe. She however prayed that Defendants be ordered to leave the property, over which she had a right as surviving spouse.

7. I have duly considered the testimony of the Plaintiff given under oath and the unchallenged documents produced by her, as well as the submissions of Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff and the authorities filed by him.

8. It is the Plaintiff’s case that she is the surviving spouse of late Jacques Rosnay Louise and that by virtue of Article 768 of the Code Civil Mauricien, she retains a right of usufruct on the house at Bambous which served as their “logement principal du ménage”. It was submitted that, even if Defendant No.1, being an heir, has a right to a share of the property in lite, Plaintiff is entitled to ask the court to grant an order against the Defendants to quit, leave and vacate the “logement principal du ménage”. Reliance was placed on the cases of Mussoo v Mussoo [1994 SCJ 208] and Mohaddi v Soobrattee [1997 SCJ 21].

9. I am alive to the fact that in accordance with S. 111 of the Courts Act, the Intermediate Court does not have jurisdiction in relation to rights of usufruct over an immoveable property, where the value of that right exceeds the prescribed amount of the court. However, it was up to the Defendants to raise an issue as to jurisdiction by way of a plea or otherwise; it is not for the court to invoke the absence of evidence with regards to the value of the usufruct. On this aspect, I shall refer to the case of Allyman v Peerboccus [2007 SCJ 145] where the Supreme Court held that, since the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the respondent, “it was not incumbent on the appellant to bring evidence to prove that the value of the right of usufruct did not exceed the prescribed amount” and the trial court ought not to have ordered a non-suit in the absence of such evidence. Since the Defendants left default and failed to take up any defence in this case, I find that this court is perfectly entitled to determine the present matter.

10. Having considered the testimony of the Plaintiff and the documents produced by her, which have both remained unrebutted, I find that the house in lite, situate at Bambous, belonged to the legal community which existed between the Plaintiff and late Jacques Rosnay Louise up to the time of his death. I have also had the opportunity of seeing the Plaintiff depone in court and assessing her demeanour. I find her testimony to be credible and have no reason to doubt its veracity. I therefore accept as true the Plaintiff’s evidence that both the ground floor and the first floor of the house in lite constituted the “logement principal du ménage”. In her capacity of surviving spouse, the Plaintiff is hence entitled

under Article 768 of the Code Civil Mauricien to occupy both floors of the house to the exclusion of the other heirs, including Defendant No.1.

11. Moreover, I accept the Plaintiff’s testimony that the Defendants caused her much trouble and inconvenience, which testimony is supported by Documents A, H, H1 and H2. I am further satisfied that the Plaintiff expressly terminated the licence previously given by her to both Defendants to occupy the first floor of the house, as evidenced by the mise-en demeure, Document J, duly served upon them on the 17 th of March 2025. Since the Plaintiff did not pursue her prayers for damages and part payment of the electricity bills, I shall not make any determination in respect thereof.

12. In the light of all the above, I find that the Plaintiff has been able to establish her case against the Defendants on a balance of probabilities. I therefore order the Defendants to quit, leave and vacate the first floor of the house situate at Bambous by the 12 th of July 2026. With costs.

8 th May 2026

Y. NATHIRE BEEBEEJAUN Magistrate Intermediate Court