Benmusa (No 3), Re

1. I have twice in recent weeks, first on 14 March 2017 and again on 12 April 2017, struck out applications by Malika Benmusa to unseal the will of her late Royal Highness Princess Margaret, Countess of Snowdon: Re Benmusa [2017] EWHC 494 (Fam) and Re Benmusa (No 2) [2017] EWHC 785 (Fam). In the second of these judgments I characterised Ms Benmusa’s claim as being “a farrago of delusional nonsense.” The second of the applications was accompanied by a copy of a death certificate of a woman, who was born in 1904 and died in 1997 and who, according to the applicant, was “my late Aunt.” That, as I pointed out, was nonsense, because, quite obviously, “a woman born in 1904 could not have been, as the applicant asserts, her mother’s elder sister if, as she also asserts, her mother was HRH Princess Margaret.”

2. Undaunted, Ms Benmusa has made two further applications, one dated 15 April 2017 and the other dated 17 April 2017, both received by the court on 24 April 2017. The basis of both applications is essentially the same. The first asserts that “this death certificate is a flake [sic; I assume “fake” is intended] and I believe foul play has been committed, as the date of birth is not correct.” The second makes the same assertion but substituting the word “fraud” for “flake”. So, Ms Benmuisa is now repudiating the very document on which she previously sought to rely. This is all nonsense. Her latest applications must each suffer the same fate as the previous two: I strike them out.

3. Ms Benmusa’s wasting of the court’s time – a phrase I use advisedly and deliberately – has been facilitated by the surprising fact that an application of the kind made by Ms Benmusa is, rara avis, one that can be made without payment of any court fee: see Tristram and Coote’s Probate Practice, ed 31, paras 25.234 and 25.265. I cannot help thinking that even someone like Ms Benmusa might be deterred from such forensic incontinence if she had to pay a fee.

4. What is to be done? As a matter of high constitutional principle (1) court staff cannot refuse to issue process – such a decision can be taken only by a judge – and (2) a judge cannot make an order absolutely barring access to the court; even a vexatious litigant so declared, or a litigant subject to a civil restraint order or a Grepe v Loam order (see Grepe v Loam (1887) 37 ChD 168) retains the right to apply to a judge for permission to bring proceedings. So, there is no kind of order I can properly make to prevent Ms Benmusa continuing to bombard the court with further nonsensical applications which will have to be put before a judge. What I can do, and this is what I propose to do, is to direct that if any further application is received from Ms Benmusa it is, before being issued, to be put before the President of the Family Division who can then either direct, if appropriate, that the application is, by order of the President of the Family Division, to be returned, unissued, to Ms Benmua, or direct, if appropriate, that the application is to be issued, whereupon it can then be considered by the President of the Family Division in the usual way.