KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Can France Refuse an Italian DNA Exhumation Request? The CJEU’s C-196/24 Ruling

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Can France Refuse an Italian DNA Exhumation Request? The CJEU’s C-196/24 Ruling

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 16 July 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered a decision that places a very intimate family dispute at the centre of European judicial cooperation. In Case C-196/24, Aucrinde, an Italian court asked a French court to obtain genetic evidence by exhuming the body of a putative father buried in France. The request was made in proceedings about parentage. French substantive law normally treats post-mortem genetic identification with exceptional strictness, particularly where the deceased did not expressly consent during his lifetime.

The Court nevertheless held that a French court cannot refuse the cross-border measure solely because French substantive law would prohibit the same exhumation in an ordinary domestic case. The ruling does not create a private right to open any grave, does not decide the parentage dispute, and does not remove the rights of heirs, the dignity owed to the dead or the need for a properly framed judicial request. It does, however, draw a hard line between the law governing the merits of a family claim and the European mechanism used to obtain evidence for that claim.

For an international family, the practical question is now precise: when an Italian court requests a measure to be carried out in France, can the French court invoke its own prohibition on post-mortem DNA testing and stop the request at the threshold? This analysis explains what Aucrinde changes, what French law still controls, how counsel should prepare the file, and why the decision matters beyond this unusual grave-and-DNA dispute.

I. Can a French court refuse an Italian request to exhume a body for DNA evidence?

A. What C-196/24 changed about the cross-border evidence request

The case began with a parentage proceeding in Italy. The applicant sought a genetic expert report concerning a putative parent whose body was buried in France. The Italian court transmitted a request to the French judicial authorities under the European Union system for taking evidence between Member States. The requested measure was not an Italian administrative instruction sent to a cemetery. It was a judicial request asking the French court with territorial control of the evidence to arrange the exhumation and the collection of material needed for a post-mortem genetic test.

The relevant instrument is Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 on cooperation between the courts of Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. Its purpose is practical: a court hearing the merits in one Member State should not have to run a second, uncoordinated lawsuit in another Member State merely because a witness, document, object or other evidentiary source is located there. The regulation creates direct judicial communication, standardises the request and limits the grounds on which the requested court may refuse to act. The official text is available in the Evidence Regulation.

That distinction matters. The Italian court remained responsible for the parentage proceedings. The French court was asked to assist with an evidentiary operation taking place in France. France could therefore insist on a lawful method of execution, respect for the parties’ procedural rights and safeguards around the body and the genetic material. But the French court could not collapse those two roles into a single merits veto. The fact that French law would not ordinarily permit a domestic judge to order the same post-mortem identification did not, by itself, answer whether France had to execute a properly transmitted request from another Member State.

The Court’s press release states the decisive proposition in unusually direct language: a requested court “cannot refuse to execute a request … solely on the ground that the exhumation concerned is prohibited under its substantive national law.” The same release explains that “the grounds for refusal of enforcement provided for by that regulation are exhaustive.” Those short formulations are important because they identify the error the Court rejected. A court cannot add a new refusal ground simply by relabelling a domestic rule about the merits as a general principle that defeats all European evidence cooperation.

The full judgment is Case C-196/24, ECLI:EU:C:2026:587, delivered on 16 July 2026. It is a Grand Chamber ruling, and its practical importance is not limited to DNA. The same reasoning can affect any cross-border request where the requesting court needs an evidentiary operation that appears unfamiliar, intrusive or unavailable under the domestic law of the requested State. The first legal question is no longer simply, “Would a French court order this measure in a French case?” It is, “Does the European instrument permit France to refuse this particular request for this particular reason?”

That does not mean that every request must be executed regardless of its defects. The regulation still requires a judicial request within its material and procedural scope. The requesting court must identify the proceedings, the evidence sought and the measure required. The requested court may still examine the grounds for refusal authorised by the regulation, the practical possibility of execution and the safeguards needed to carry out the measure. The parties must have an opportunity to make the objections available under the applicable procedure. The Grand Chamber removed one automatic objection; it did not abolish procedural discipline.

The ruling also protects the allocation of adjudicative responsibility. A French court executing the request does not decide that the applicant is the child of the deceased. It does not decide the evidentiary weight of a DNA result, the limitation period for the Italian action or the civil consequences of a declaration of parentage. Those questions remain for the court hearing the Italian case, subject to the applicable European and national rules on jurisdiction, recognition and the status of persons. France supplies the evidence through the cooperation mechanism; Italy decides what the evidence means in the case before it.

That allocation prevents two opposite mistakes. The first is to treat the French court as a mere courier that must obey any request in any form. The second is to treat French law as an absolute wall that makes European cooperation impossible whenever the evidence would be difficult to obtain domestically. Aucrinde rejects the second approach while preserving the first court’s duty to test the request against the regulation and against the concrete safeguards required for its execution.

B. Why French genetic and dignity rules still matter

French law remains central because the measure is carried out in France and concerns a human body. Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code strictly limits identification by genetic fingerprints. In civil matters, the rule links identification to a judicial investigation ordered in an action concerning the establishment or challenge of parentage, and it states that post-mortem identification cannot be carried out without the deceased person’s express consent given during life. The current text of Article 16-11 of the Civil Code is therefore not a technical detail; it is the domestic rule that created the conflict in C-196/24.

Article 16-10 is also relevant. It regulates examinations of a person’s constitutional genetic characteristics and makes consent and information important safeguards for genetic testing. The wording and field of application differ from Article 16-11, but a request for post-mortem sampling can raise questions about the handling of genetic information, accidental findings, storage, communication and the use of the sample for purposes beyond the Italian case. Counsel should therefore read Article 16-10 of the Civil Code alongside the specific rule on identification after death, rather than assuming that the CJEU judgment makes genetic privacy irrelevant.

The French legal order also protects the deceased body independently of the parentage dispute. Under Article 16-1-1 of the Civil Code, respect for the human body does not end at death, and remains must be treated with respect, dignity and decency. The family’s private and emotional interests may engage Article 9 of the Civil Code, which protects private life and permits a judge to order measures to prevent or end an infringement. The European Charter adds its own vocabulary: Article 1 protects human dignity and Article 7 protects private and family life. The CJEU’s official case summary expressly identifies those Charter rights alongside the right to know one’s genetic origins.

The correct reading is therefore not that French law has been displaced in full. The CJEU has displaced a particular use of French law: using the domestic prohibition, standing alone, as a refusal ground under the Evidence Regulation. French law continues to shape the way an execution takes place. It can influence the location, supervision, handling, sealing and transfer of samples. It can protect heirs and other persons whose procedural rights are engaged. It can require the French court to confront a real impossibility, an abusive request or a safeguard problem that is distinct from the mere fact that French law would not authorise the same measure in a purely domestic case.

French case law shows why the distinction must be handled carefully. In First Civil Chamber decision no. 13-21.018 of 13 November 2014, the Cour de cassation dealt with an action seeking recognition of a genetic ancestry that required an exhumation. It held that the heirs of the deceased had to be brought into the proceedings, and treated that procedural requirement as one the judge had to raise because it concerned the status of persons and the rights of the defence. That decision does not answer the European cooperation question, but it demonstrates that an exhumation file must identify and involve the people whose interests are directly affected.

In First Civil Chamber decision no. 03-14.101 of 25 October 2005, the Cour de cassation accepted that a legitimate reason could justify refusing a biological examination where the evidence about the alleged relationship was inadequate and the presumed father had refused an examination before his death. Again, that was a domestic parentage action, not a request under Regulation 2020/1783. Its value after Aucrinde is analytical: it helps identify the type of concrete, case-specific objection that is different from a blanket assertion that French law prohibits post-mortem testing.

The recent judgment in First Civil Chamber decision no. 23-50.006 of 19 November 2025 is also useful. In an adoption-related filiation proceeding, the Cour de cassation described genetic expertise as a right where the public prosecutor requested it, unless there was a legitimate reason not to proceed. The context was different, and the decision should not be transplanted mechanically to a cross-border exhumation. It nevertheless confirms that French law approaches genetic expertise through the procedural posture of the action, the standing of the person requesting it and the existence of a legitimate reason, rather than through an unstructured presumption that every genetic measure is forbidden.

For the requested court, the practical sequence is consequently two-stage. First, it must identify whether the request falls within the European evidence mechanism and whether the stated objection is one the regulation recognises. Second, if execution is required, it must organise the operation in a way that respects the deceased, the heirs, the parties, the cemetery and the integrity of the sample. Treating those stages as one would either make the regulation ineffective or make the protection of the body illusory. The judgment requires the French court to do the harder work of separating them.

II. What should families and counsel do after CJEU C-196/24?

A. How to build an admissible cross-border parentage request

The first task is to establish the procedural foundation of the parentage action. Under Article 310-3 of the Civil Code, filiation may be proved by civil-status documents, an acknowledgment or an act of notoriety, and, when an action is brought under the relevant title, by all means of proof subject to the action being admissible. The provision is broad, but it is not permission to ask for genetic testing without a legally viable action. The file should identify the action, the person entitled to bring it and the precise fact the proposed evidence is intended to prove.

Where the issue is a claim of paternity outside marriage, Article 327 of the Civil Code states that paternity may be declared judicially and that the action for a declaration of paternity is reserved to the child. That rule can be decisive in a family that has spent years searching for a biological truth. A relative, heir or researcher may possess the strongest factual interest in the result while lacking standing to initiate the action that makes a genetic measure legally relevant. The Italian request should therefore explain the applicant’s capacity and the action pending in Italy before asking France to disturb a grave.

The second task is to show why this measure, rather than a less intrusive alternative, is necessary. A request should state what documents have already been collected, whether living relatives can provide comparison samples, whether medical or civil records exist and why those alternatives cannot answer the question. This is not a demand that the requesting court satisfy an impossible standard before seeking evidence. It is a way to demonstrate that the exhumation is connected to a real dispute and is not a speculative search for a family story.

French procedural law expresses the same principle. Article 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure prevents an evidentiary measure from being ordered merely to compensate for a party’s failure to produce evidence that it could have obtained. Where evidence must be preserved or established before the merits action, Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows a legitimate interested person to seek a legally admissible measure on application or in summary proceedings. Those French provisions do not replace Regulation 2020/1783, but they are valuable benchmarks for the quality of the reasoning that should accompany a request and for urgent evidence that might otherwise disappear.

The third task is to identify the people who must be heard. The heirs, the person who manages the burial place, the person whose filiation is in issue and any person whose procedural rights are affected should not learn about the measure only when the grave is opened. The 2014 Cour de cassation decision shows that failure to bring the deceased’s heirs into an ancestry action can make the proceedings inadmissible. In a cross-border file, the requesting court should provide the French court with current identity and address information, proof of service where required, the status of each heir and an explanation of how objections will be handled.

The fourth task is technical precision. The request should identify the cemetery, grave, burial date, body or remains concerned, proposed expert, type of sample, chain of custody, laboratory, language of the report, storage period and intended recipients. It should state whether the Italian court wants the French court to supervise the whole operation or only to obtain and transmit a sample. It should explain how the body will be restored, who bears the cost, how religious or family requests will be treated and what happens if the remains are unavailable or incomplete. A vague request increases the risk that the French court will treat the operation as unmanageable or that the heirs will challenge its proportionality.

The fifth task is translation and legal characterisation. The requesting court should use the forms and channels required by the Evidence Regulation and distinguish clearly between a request for a measure of inquiry and a request to enforce the Italian judgment on the merits. The French court should not be asked to declare parentage, amend an Italian civil-status record or decide the final use of the DNA evidence. It should be asked to perform a defined evidentiary operation. That distinction gives the French court a manageable mandate and prevents an argument that the request is attempting to transfer the entire family dispute into France without jurisdictional safeguards.

Finally, the file should anticipate the objection that genetic evidence might reveal information unrelated to the stated parentage question. The expert’s mission should be narrowly framed. The parties should know whether the laboratory will generate a full genetic profile or only a comparison result, whether unrelated characteristics will be deleted, who can access the raw data and whether the material will be destroyed after the Italian court has completed the proceeding. The more intrusive the method, the more important the explanation of necessity and containment becomes.

A properly built request will therefore contain more than a citation to Aucrinde. It will contain the Italian court’s order, the legal basis of the parentage action, the identity and participation of the heirs, the evidentiary alternatives considered, a defined expert mission, a proportionate handling protocol and a plan for returning the body and disposing of the sample. The CJEU ruling makes that work more important, not less, because the French court can no longer end the analysis with one sentence stating that French domestic law would have prohibited the measure.

B. What French courts, heirs and burial authorities can challenge—and what the judgment does not decide

The most important limit is that Aucrinde is not an automatic exhumation order. It decides how a requested court may reason under the European evidence regulation. It does not give a litigant the power to instruct a cemetery, a funeral operator or a laboratory without a judicial act. Nor does it declare that every request transmitted by a court is properly within the regulation. The French court still has to receive a request that is sufficiently intelligible, legally connected to proceedings and capable of execution under the authorised framework.

Heirs can therefore challenge defects in notification, standing, relevance, proportionality and the protection of personal data. They can ask the French court to ensure that the operation does not exceed the Italian court’s mandate. They can contest the identity of the grave, the reliability of the proposed chain of custody or the qualifications of the laboratory. They can raise a concrete impossibility, such as the destruction or commingling of remains, rather than relying only on the general proposition that French law disfavors post-mortem genetic identification. They can also ask for confidentiality measures where the DNA result could expose unrelated family information.

Burial authorities and local operators have a different role. They do not decide the international legal dispute, but the execution must identify the person authorised to open the grave, the conditions for public-health compliance, the presence of a forensic expert and the process for restoring the burial site. A court order should address those questions. If the request leaves them unanswered, the French judge may need to seek clarification or set conditions before execution. That is not an attempt to revive the domestic prohibition rejected by the CJEU; it is the practical administration of a measure affecting human remains.

There is also a difference between an objection to the measure and an objection to the use of the result. A party may accept that a sample can be obtained while arguing in Italy that the report is unreliable, outside the scope of the expert mission or insufficient to establish filiation. Conversely, a party may object to the exhumation itself while accepting that the Italian court has jurisdiction over the parentage action. The French and Italian courts should keep those objections in the correct procedural lane. A refusal by the French court to execute the request cannot be justified by a merits disagreement that belongs to Italy, while an Italian court cannot assume that execution proves the legal parentage claim.

Article 16-1-1 remains an operational safeguard throughout the process. Respect, dignity and decency require the measure to be carried out discreetly and only to the extent necessary. Article 9 can support protective orders around private information. The Charter’s Articles 1 and 7 require the national courts applying EU law to balance the deceased person’s dignity, the family’s private life and the applicant’s interest in discovering genetic origins. The CJEU did not rank those interests in the abstract for every future case. It rejected a categorical refusal based on one rule of substantive national law and left the concrete balance to the courts applying the regulation.

French case law provides further warnings against treating the judgment as a shortcut. In First Civil Chamber decision no. 18-18.473 of 19 September 2019, the Cour de cassation held that a request for genetic expertise capable of revealing filiation with a third person required the child to bring the relevant paternity action. The case concerned a domestic request, but its procedural lesson travels well: the person asking for a test must show that the legal action makes the test relevant. A court should not authorise an intrusive measure for someone who is not entitled to pursue the status claim that the measure is meant to support.

The result also does not eliminate the need to protect the adversarial process. An heir who disputes the request should have access to the material necessary to respond, subject to legitimate confidentiality restrictions. The report should record the condition of the remains, the sample taken, the seal, the persons present and each transfer. If the result is contested, a second expert or a controlled re-analysis may be necessary. A dramatic DNA headline is not a substitute for a reliable forensic record, and a cross-border chain of custody will be examined by a court that may be several hundred kilometres from the cemetery where the sample was obtained.

The relationship between the evidence ruling and the final status judgment also needs care. Recognition of the Italian parentage decision in France, changes to civil-status records, inheritance consequences and rights to nationality may be governed by different instruments and national rules. A successful request under Regulation 2020/1783 does not itself amend a birth certificate, confer citizenship or open a succession. Counsel should map those consequences separately and warn the family that the evidence stage is one step in a longer process.

There may be urgent cases. A burial place may be due to be moved, remains may be at risk of loss, or a limitation period in the parentage action may be approaching. Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure can provide a domestic route for preserving evidence where its conditions are satisfied, but it does not replace the European request when the case is already being managed by an Italian court. The correct strategy may involve coordination between the Italian judge, the French requested court and the parties’ counsel, rather than parallel applications that produce inconsistent instructions.

For a family or lawyer confronting a live request, the working checklist is short but demanding:

  1. Identify the Italian action, the applicant’s standing and the precise parentage issue.
  2. Attach the judicial order and use the Evidence Regulation’s communication route, with an accurate French translation.
  3. Join or notify the deceased’s heirs and explain the safeguards available to them.
  4. Define the exhumation, sample, laboratory, chain of custody, data retention and restoration protocol.
  5. Separate objections to execution from arguments about the weight or legal effect of the DNA result.
  6. Ask the French court to test the request against the regulation’s actual refusal grounds, not against a general domestic prohibition alone.

That checklist captures the practical consequence of Aucrinde. The decision is favourable to cross-border access to evidence, but it is not favourable to poorly prepared litigation. The family seeking the truth must show why the evidence is legally relevant. The heirs must be heard. The requested court must protect the body and the data. The Italian court must decide the parentage claim. European judicial cooperation works only when each court performs its own task without turning its task into a veto over the other court.

Conclusion

Case C-196/24, Aucrinde, answers a narrow question with consequences for the wider architecture of European civil justice. A French court cannot refuse an Italian evidence request for a post-mortem genetic examination merely because French substantive law would prohibit that examination in an ordinary domestic case. The Evidence Regulation has its own logic, and its refusal grounds cannot be expanded by a general reference to the domestic merits rule.

That conclusion should not be mistaken for a general European power to exhume bodies. The request must arise from a proper judicial proceeding, identify relevant evidence and respect the parties’ rights. French rules on genetic identification, dignity after death, private life, heirs, expert evidence and the handling of remains remain part of the execution. The Grand Chamber has changed the starting point: French domestic law is no longer the end of the analysis merely because it would have produced a different answer in a case litigated entirely in France.

For international counsel, the safest approach is to draft the file around the division of responsibilities. The requesting court decides the parentage dispute and explains the necessity of the evidence. The French court supervises a lawful and proportionate execution. The heirs challenge defects and protect the deceased’s dignity. The laboratory preserves the integrity of the sample. The result then returns to Italy for an adversarial assessment on the merits. That is the route by which the right to know one’s origins can coexist with the dignity owed to the dead and with the procedural autonomy of two Member State courts.

📄 Official circular