On 3 September 2026, with the Belgian Prime Minister visiting New Delhi, India’s foreign ministry confirmed what fugitive-watchers had waited months to hear: Mehul Choksi, the diamond merchant accused in the Punjab National Bank fraud worth nearly 1.8 billion dollars, remains in a Belgian jail and India is pressing Belgium every week to hand him over. Arrested in Antwerp on 11 April 2025 on an Indian extradition request, refused bail as a flight risk, cleared for surrender by the Antwerp Chamber of Indictment on 17 October 2025 and left without further appeal when Belgium’s Court of Cassation dismissed his challenge in December 2025, the 66-year-old businessman has now run out of ordinary remedies. His last shields are his failing health, including claimed cancer treatment, and the diplomatic assurances India has given about the Mumbai cell waiting for him. This analysis explains, step by step, how the Belgian track reached this point, whether illness and prison conditions can still stop a surrender, and what France would test if New Delhi ever sent the same request to Paris — because the French examining courts apply some of the toughest extradition filters in Europe, and every defence lawyer in a cross-border case studies them.
I. Will Belgium Surrender Mehul Choksi to India?
A. How the Antwerp Arrest Became a Cleared Extradition: Timeline of the Belgian Case
The story starts with one of the largest bank frauds in Indian history. Between 2011 and 2018, according to the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Enforcement Directorate, companies linked to Mehul Choksi and his nephew Nirav Modi obtained fraudulent letters of undertaking from a Mumbai branch of the Punjab National Bank, causing a loss officially pegged at about 13,500 crore rupees — roughly 1.8 billion dollars. Choksi left India in January 2018, days before the case became public, and later took citizenship of Antigua and Barbuda. In May 2021 he surfaced in Dominica, where his lawyers alleged an abduction and his detention triggered a separate legal battle over unlawful entry; he was eventually returned to Antigua. Indian media report that an Interpol Red Corner Notice against him was published in December 2018, which is how his name stayed live on every border system in the world.
Belgium entered the picture in the spring of 2025. Acting on an extradition request from India, Belgian police arrested Choksi in Antwerp on 11 April 2025. He has been in detention ever since, and every attempt to get out on bail has failed. In August 2025 a Belgian court rejected his bail plea, accepting the prosecution’s argument that a man with the means to cross three continents and the record of having done so presents a textbook flight risk, and that neither age nor claimed illness removed that risk. Reporting from the courtroom noted that Choksi’s team offered health grounds and supervision conditions; the court was unmoved, pointing to the gravity of the alleged 1.8-billion-dollar fraud and the carefully prepared nature of his 2018 departure from India.
The decisive ruling came on 17 October 2025, when the Antwerp Chamber of Indictment — the Belgian court that reviews whether an extradition request meets the legal conditions — gave the green light for surrender. According to Indian press reports of the order, the court found that dual criminality was satisfied because large-scale bank fraud, criminal conspiracy, money laundering and corruption are punishable in both countries, and it rejected the defence arguments based on health and on the conditions of Indian detention. Choksi appealed to Belgium’s Court of Cassation, which dismissed his appeal in December 2025, exhausting the judicial phase of the Belgian proceedings. What remains is the political phase: the Belgian government’s formal surrender decision and its physical execution.
That is where the file stood when India’s foreign ministry spokesman briefed the press on 3 September 2026, during the Belgian Prime Minister’s visit to India. The spokesman said India was working closely with the Belgian side to complete the extradition as early as possible and confirmed that New Delhi had given formal assurances on Choksi’s future detention: lodging in Barrack Number 12 of Mumbai’s Arthur Road Jail, no solitary confinement, adequate medical facilities, and production before a court with detention under judicial custody. A separate report described a hearing expected in Antwerp in mid-September 2026, suggesting the calendar is still moving; whether that hearing concerns the final surrender mechanics or a last defence motion, the direction of travel is clear. A fugitive who fled in 2018, fought in Antigua, Dominica and now Belgium, and lost at every Belgian judicial level, is closer to an Indian courtroom than at any point in eight years. Defence teams in the same position always play the same final cards, and Choksi’s team is playing them now: health, age, and prison conditions. The next section tests whether those cards can still win.
B. Can Cancer Treatment and Age 66 Block Surrender? Health Defences and Diplomatic Assurances
Choksi is 66, and his lawyers say he is undergoing cancer treatment in Belgium and cannot safely be transferred. Similar arguments have been raised at every stage since April 2025: release on bail for treatment, refusal of surrender on medical grounds, and demands for guarantees about Indian prison healthcare. The Belgian courts have so far answered no at each step, treating the health claims as a matter for medical management rather than a bar to surrender. That answer follows the mainstream European approach, and the French comparison is instructive. When a person sought by Switzerland argued before the Paris courts that a rare and serious illness, with enrolment in a clinical trial at a French university hospital for experimental treatment, made his surrender impossible, the Cour de cassation upheld the courts below. In its ruling of 14 October 2025 (No. 25-82.263), the criminal chamber approved judges who had found that the medical evidence already produced was sufficient to assess compliance with the European Convention on Extradition and its protocols and to rule on continued detention under extradition custody: “Pour rejeter la demande de renvoi, l’arrêt attaqué énonce que les éléments déjà produits par l’intéressé pour justifier de sa situation médicale et de sa personnalité apparaissent suffisants pour apprécier le respect, par les autorités judiciaires suisses, des conditions posées par la Convention européenne d’extradition et ses 2e, 3e et 4e protocoles additionnels, et pour se prononcer sur son maintien sous écrou extraditionnel.” The lesson for the Choksi file is blunt: European extradition judges do not surrender their decision to a medical certificate. They ask whether the requesting state can manage the illness, and they treat that question as a sovereign assessment of the evidence, not as an automatic veto.
The second half of the health battle is fought over prison conditions, and here India’s assurances do the heavy lifting. The package reported by the Indian press is detailed and individualized: a specific barrack in a specific Mumbai jail, an explicit exclusion of solitary confinement, guaranteed medical facilities, and detention under judicial custody with production before a court. That level of detail matters because European courts no longer accept blanket promises; since the European Court of Human Rights tightened its case law on detention conditions, judges look for assurances that name the place, the regime and the medical care, and that can be verified afterwards. India’s letter appears drafted with exactly that case law in mind, down to the barrack number. Belgium’s judges cleared surrender after receiving it, and the September 2026 MEA briefing suggests New Delhi keeps topping up the file with compliance signals.
None of this means the health argument is dead. In serious cases, defence teams commission independent medical reports, document the exact treatment protocol that cannot be interrupted, and challenge whether the receiving prison can genuinely continue it. They also attack assurances as unenforceable promises from the executive that the judiciary of the requesting state may not honour. But the burden is heavy and it grows heavier with each lost round: after the Antwerp green light of October 2025 and the cassation dismissal of December 2025, a Belgian judge hearing a health motion in September 2026 starts from the premise that two levels of courts already found surrender lawful. The pattern is familiar from other long-running sagas, including another opposition leader currently fighting a United States extradition request, where each lost appeal narrows the next judge’s room to differ. For Choksi, the realistic objective of the health litigation may already have shifted from winning a refusal to buying time and shaping the conditions of the flight home — escorted transfer, medical accompaniment, handover protocols. Time, however, is precisely what the MEA briefing of 3 September 2026 suggests is running out.
II. What Would France Test if India Requested Extradition from Paris?
A. Which Bars Stop Extradition: Political Offence, Prescription, Prison Conditions and Double Criminality
Suppose New Delhi sent the same file to Paris instead of Brussels. French law would run it through a gauntlet of mandatory refusal grounds listed in Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a provision the French courts apply strictly and the government cannot waive: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique ; 3° Lorsque les crimes ou délits ont été commis sur le territoire de la République ; 4° Lorsque les crimes ou délits, quoique commis hors du territoire de la République, y ont été poursuivis et jugés définitivement ; 5° Lorsque, d’après la loi de l’Etat requérant ou la loi française, la prescription de l’action s’est trouvée acquise antérieurement à la demande d’extradition, ou la prescription de la peine antérieurement à l’arrestation de la personne réclamée et d’une façon générale toutes les fois que l’action publique de l’Etat requérant est éteinte ; 6° Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français ; 7° Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense ; 8° Lorsque le crime ou le délit constitue une infraction militaire prévue par le livre III du code de justice militaire.” Applied to a Choksi-type file, four of these filters would do the real work. Nationality would not help an Indian citizen, and bank fraud is not a military offence, but the political-offence filter, prescription, the French public-policy filter on punishments, and the fair-trial guarantee would each be litigated hard.
Double criminality comes first in practice, because without it there is nothing to discuss. France surrenders only for conduct punishable in both states, and its courts verify the match concretely rather than by label. In a 27 May 2026 ruling on an Algerian request (No. 25-84.904), the Cour de cassation approved judges who had worked through each filter in turn before giving a partially favourable opinion: “la chambre de l’instruction, composée de M. Morgan, président, de Mme Assouline et de M. Beckers, conseillers, a, dans les arrêts rendus avant l’arrêt attaqué, statué sur la détermination de la convention d’extradition applicable, l’absence de caractère politique des faits reprochés, la complétude des pièces fournies à l’appui de la demande d’extradition, l’examen des conditions d’extradition relatives au quantum de la peine prononcée, à la non-acquisition de la prescription et à la double incrimination des faits, et a rejeté les moyens du demandeur pris des risques de détention arbitraire et de traitement inhumain ou dégradant concernant la réclusion criminelle prononcée, de l’imprécision de l’exposé des faits et de ce que les faits auraient été commis en France.” A bank-fraud file of the PNB type would pass this stage comfortably — fraud, criminal conspiracy, breach of trust and money laundering exist on both sides — but the passage shows the method: applicable treaty first, then political character, then file completeness, then sentence threshold, prescription and double criminality, then detention-risk arguments. Any hole at any step can sink the request.
Prescription is where old fraud files live or die, and French case law gives both sides weapons. The Cour de cassation recalled on 23 May 2023 (Nos. 22-81.169 and 22-81.172) the governing principle: “Il résulte de ces textes que sont interruptifs de prescription les actes qui ont pour but de constater une infraction, d’en rassembler les preuves ou d’en rechercher les auteurs. Il en est de même lorsque de tels actes sont accomplis à l’étranger.” Acts done abroad that investigate the offence, gather evidence or seek its authors interrupt prescription just like French acts. The same ruling illustrates how fiercely parties fight over the political-purpose label: the Paris judges had refused to treat Kazakh and Russian extradition requests as interruptive, finding a political purpose behind them, and the Cour de cassation quashed that reasoning. For a fraud running from 2011 to 2018 with an Indian request in 2025, prescription pressure is real but manageable for the requesting state, provided each investigative act is documented and dated — which is exactly why India’s CBI and ED charge sheets run to thousands of pages.
The specialty rule then locks the file shut after surrender, and France enforces it more rigorously than most states. The person must be told, within two days of arrest and in a language they understand, that they may refuse to waive specialty: “Il l’informe également qu’elle peut renoncer à la règle de la spécialité.” And the Cour de cassation drew the full consequence on 12 April 2022 (No. 22-80.284): “lorsque la juridiction qui a émis le mandat d’arrêt a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue en vue de l’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté pour un fait quelconque antérieur à la remise et autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure.” In plain terms, India could try Choksi only for the PNB facts named in the Belgian surrender decision, not for any other earlier matter unless Belgium consents or Choksi waives the protection. Finally, the requesting file itself must meet strict formal conditions — diplomatic channel, original or certified copy of the warrant or committal order with the precise facts and their date, plus the applicable legal texts: “Sous réserve des dispositions du quatrième alinéa, toute demande d’extradition est adressée au gouvernement français par voie diplomatique et accompagnée soit d’un jugement ou d’un arrêt de condamnation, même par défaut, soit d’un acte de procédure pénale décrétant formellement ou opérant de plein droit le renvoi de la personne poursuivie devant la juridiction répressive, soit d’un mandat d’arrêt ou de tout autre acte ayant la même force et décerné par l’autorité judiciaire, pourvu que ces derniers actes renferment l’indication précise du fait pour lequel ils sont délivrés et la date de ce fait.” The Antwerp experience suggests India’s file meets that standard, but in Paris every page would be re-examined, including through the lens of Interpol Red Notice arrests handled outside the European Arrest Warrant system.
B. Who Decides in France: Prosecutor, Examining Chamber, Supreme Court and the Belgian Connection
French extradition procedure gives the requested person three successive shields, and each has teeth. Within forty-eight hours of arrest, the person must be brought before the territorially competent prosecutor general, who verifies identity, serves the request in a language the person understands, and records the position on surrender and on specialty: “Toute personne appréhendée à la suite d’une demande d’extradition doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent.” If the prosecutor does not leave the person at liberty, the first president of the court of appeal orders detention under a special extradition custody regime, with judicial supervision or electronic monitoring as alternatives where representation at future hearings is sufficiently guaranteed: “Le premier président de la cour d’appel ou le magistrat du siège désigné par lui ordonne l’incarcération et le placement sous écrou extraditionnel de la personne réclamée à la maison d’arrêt du siège de la cour d’appel. Toutefois, s’il estime que sa représentation à tous les actes de la procédure est suffisamment garantie, le premier président de la cour d’appel ou le magistrat du siège désigné par lui peut soumettre la personne réclamée, jusqu’à sa comparution devant la chambre de l’instruction, à une ou plusieurs des mesures prévues aux articles 138 et 142-5 .” That early choice between jail and supervision is the French equivalent of the bail battle Choksi lost in Belgium, and French first presidents apply the same flight-risk logic — now with an explicit statutory menu of alternatives the defence can propose with evidence.
The heart of the French system is the chambre de l’instruction, the appellate examining chamber that delivers a reasoned opinion on the request when the person does not consent: “la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition.” The same article sets the standard and the remedy: “Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente.” and “Le pourvoi formé contre un avis de la chambre de l’instruction ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis des conditions essentielles de son existence légale.” Three points matter for a Choksi-type defence. First, the opinion must be reasoned and must answer the parties’ essential arguments — an unreasoned or contradictory opinion is quashed. Second, an unfavourable opinion ends the case: the government cannot surrender despite it. Third, review before the Cour de cassation is confined to formal defects going to the opinion’s very legal existence, so the real trial happens before the chambre, within about a month of appearance, and the defence must put everything — prescription computations, political-purpose evidence, prison-condition dossiers, medical files — on the table there. Only after a favourable opinion that survives cassation review does the file reach the Prime Minister, who authorises surrender by decree: “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre pris sur le rapport du ministre de la justice.” That decree is itself open to challenge for excess of power within one month — a final administrative lock that has killed requests before.
The Belgian connection makes the French comparison unusually concrete, because France and Belgium constantly surrender people to each other and the Cour de cassation polices the traffic in both directions. On 2 December 2020 (No. 19-87.428), the criminal chamber quashed a Paris opinion that had authorised extradition to Morocco of a man previously surrendered to France by Belgium under a European Arrest Warrant without waiving specialty, recalling the governing rule: “lorsque le ministère public qui a délivré un mandat d’arrêt européen a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être extradée vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne sans le consentement de l’autorité compétente de l’Etat membre qui l’a remise.” The Brussels chamber that authorised the 2014 surrender without a specialty waiver therefore controlled the Paris file two years later — a warning to requesting states that every link in the custodial chain must be clean. Conversely, on 27 May 2025 (No. 25-83.265), the same chamber upheld a Paris decision authorising surrender to the Belgian judicial authorities under a European Arrest Warrant, even correcting the appeal judges on the applicable re-extradition rule while preserving the outcome: “l’article 21 de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil n’oblige l’État membre d’exécution à solliciter le consentement de l’État d’où la personne recherchée a été extradée, de manière à ce qu’elle puisse être remise à l’État membre d’émission, que lorsque la convention internationale liant le premier au deuxième prévoit expressément le consentement de ce dernier en vue de la réextradition.” The contrast is the whole point for the Choksi file: inside the European Union, surrenders run on the fast rails of Framework Decision 2002/584/JAI, while an Indian request to Belgium or France runs on classic extradition law — treaties, dual criminality, specialty consent, ministerial decisions — which is slower, more formal, and far more litigable. India has navigated that slower track successfully in Brussels; in Paris it would face the same track with even stricter judicial filters and a Conseil d’État backstop.
Conclusion
Mehul Choksi’s Belgian saga is entering its final chapter. Arrested in Antwerp on 11 April 2025, refused bail, cleared for surrender on 17 October 2025, dismissed by the Court of Cassation in December 2025, and now the subject of weekly India-Belgium contacts confirmed at the highest level on 3 September 2026, he has exhausted the ordinary Belgian remedies. The remaining defences — age, cancer treatment, and the conditions of Arthur Road Jail — are real human concerns that courts must examine, but under European case law they are managed through assurances and medical arrangements, not through refusal, unless the defence proves an exceptionally serious, otherwise unavoidable risk. India’s unusually detailed assurances, down to the barrack number and the exclusion of solitary confinement, were drafted to survive exactly that test. If the mid-September 2026 hearing calendar reported by the Indian press holds, the next news from Antwerp could be logistical rather than legal: escorts, medical accompaniment, and a one-way ticket to Mumbai. And the French mirror shows why requesting states take these files so seriously: in Paris, a 48-hour prosecutor presentation, an extradition-custody decision, a fully reasoned examining-chamber opinion, cassation review, a prime-ministerial decree and administrative-court challenge would each have to be won in turn, with specialty locking the trial to the surrendered facts afterwards. Belgium has already walked that road; France would walk it no faster. For fugitives who count on time, that is the grimmest lesson of the Choksi file: time eventually runs out.