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CJEU Data-Retention Opinion: Can France Keep Every Subscriber’s Traffic and Location Data?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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CJEU Data-Retention Opinion: Can France Keep Every Subscriber’s Traffic and Location Data?

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On 3 September 2026, an Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered an opinion that puts a very practical question back on the European agenda: can a state require telecommunications operators to keep a detailed record of where people connect, when they connect and with whom they communicate, even when no one is suspected of an offence? The reference is Case C-661/24, Académie Fiscale and Others, concerning Belgian legislation on the retention of identification data, traffic data and location data for the fight against fraud, malicious use of networks and threats to security. The opinion is not yet a judgment. As the Court’s own release states, “The Advocate General’s Opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice.”

That qualification matters for businesses, investigators and individuals in France. The opinion does not automatically erase data already retained under the French Code des postes et des communications électroniques. It does, however, sharpen the question that every French retention or disclosure request must answer: what category of data is involved, what precise threat or proceeding justifies it, for how long, and under whose effective control? French law is already divided between ordinary retention, national-security retention, rapid preservation and access in a criminal investigation. The European debate is now moving toward the technical design of those compartments, not merely their labels.

This analysis explains what the CJEU opinion changes in practical terms, what French operators may retain under the current framework, and how a person or company can test an apparently blanket request. The focus is cross-border: a Belgian measure may be litigated in Luxembourg, implemented by a multinational provider and relied on in France. A French lawyer therefore has to read the European rule, the French statute and the individual procedural record together.

I. Can France keep every subscriber’s traffic and location data after the CJEU opinion?

A. What does Case C-661/24 actually say about blanket metadata retention?

The starting point is the nature of the C-661/24 proceeding. The Belgian legislation examined by Advocate General Maciej Szpunar was described in the official press release as a system requiring providers to retain identification data and metadata for objectives including the prevention of fraud, malicious use of networks and security risks. The question was not whether a police officer could ask for one suspect’s connection record after a properly opened investigation. It concerned the upstream obligation imposed on providers and the conditions under which different categories of information could be retained and later combined.

That distinction is central. Identification data can tell an authority who holds an account. Source data can connect an internet protocol address or terminal to a subscriber. Traffic data can show technical features, dates, times, duration and the parties or services involved. Location data can place a mobile terminal in an area. None of those categories is the content of a message, but a long series of them can reveal movements, contacts, professional relationships, religious attendance, medical appointments or political activity. The legal analysis therefore cannot treat “metadata” as harmless simply because the words of an email or message are not stored.

The Advocate General’s approach, as reported by the Court, is that retention of traffic and location data interferes with the rights to privacy and protection of personal data. A retention obligation can be compatible with European law only where it has a legal basis and is strictly necessary and proportionate to a legitimate objective. The opinion also examines whether a technical separation between categories could prevent providers or authorities from reconstructing a detailed profile by combining all available fields. A watertight separation may matter because the risk comes not only from each field in isolation, but from the inferences created by their combination.

This is a demanding test. A statute cannot become proportionate merely by adding a security-related purpose to a list of general objectives. The relevant question is whether the retention method is capable of addressing a sufficiently serious risk, whether a less intrusive method would work, and whether access is surrounded by safeguards that are real rather than decorative. A retention period, a category label and a formal authorization do not answer those questions by themselves if providers can decide the practical scope of the data or if several reservoirs can be recombined without a meaningful barrier.

The opinion sits within a line of CJEU decisions on electronic communications. In La Quadrature du Net and Others, Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, the Court addressed the limits of general and indiscriminate retention and the conditions for targeted or security-based measures. In H.K. v Prokuratuur, Case C-746/18, it treated access to retained data as a separate interference whose seriousness depends on the data and the conclusions that can be drawn. In Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, Case C-140/20, it again examined the boundaries of general retention and access for serious crime. These authorities make one point unavoidable: the retention question and the access question must be analysed separately.

The applicable European framework is Directive 2002/58/EC, read with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 15 of the Directive permits national measures restricting confidentiality in defined circumstances, but it does not create a free-standing authorization for permanent surveillance. The restriction must remain appropriate, necessary and proportionate. The Charter analysis also explains why a measure that appears remote from the subscriber—an obligation imposed on an operator—can still be a direct interference with the lives of millions of people.

French criminal case law has already absorbed that European logic. In its decision of 12 July 2022, no. 21-83.710, the Criminal Division of the Cour de cassation quoted the governing principle as opposing a « conservation généralisée et indifférenciée » of traffic and location data. The exact French words are important: they mean generalized and indiscriminate retention, not a rule that every form of retention is forbidden. The same decision explains that a general measure may still be contemplated for a serious, current or foreseeable threat to national security when the legal conditions and effective control are present. It also distinguishes targeted retention, generalized retention of source or identity data and rapid preservation.

That decision does not turn the C-661/24 opinion into an immediate French invalidation notice. It does provide a working method. An operator or court must identify the exact data field, the legal trigger, the retention period, the authority that ordered it and the safeguards that make review possible. If a French authority describes every category as “connection data” and asks for an entire subscriber population without explaining the statutory gateway, the label is not enough. The European proportionality analysis operates at the level of the measure actually imposed.

It is also essential not to confuse metadata with correspondence content. The European cases do not say that an operator may open messages because it holds routing information. French law protects that boundary separately. Article 226-15 of the French Criminal Code penalizes bad-faith opening, deletion, delay, diversion, interception, use or disclosure of correspondence sent, transmitted or received electronically. A location history may be extremely revealing, but it is not automatically the text of a message. Conversely, calling a request “metadata only” does not make a broad and intrusive measure proportionate.

For an international audience, the immediate takeaway is therefore narrower and more useful than a headline saying that the CJEU has banned data retention. The opinion asks whether a national architecture gives providers and authorities too much power to retain and recombine information about everyone. The final answer will come from the Court’s judgment, and the judgment may refine the Advocate General’s reasoning. Until then, the opinion is a serious warning for any organization relying on a broad retention notice, but it is not itself an order to delete French telecom records.

B. What does French law already require from telecom operators?

The current French framework begins with Article L34-1 of the Code des postes et des communications électroniques. The provision sets a general principle of erasure or anonymisation, subject to defined exceptions. Those exceptions do not all have the same purpose or duration. In particular, civil identity data may be kept for five years after the contract or service ends. Other information relating to the subscriber or account, including payment information, may be kept for one year after the contract or account closes. Those periods are not a licence to keep every technical trace for the same length of time.

The same article addresses source and terminal data. For the purposes of investigating and prosecuting criminal offences, preventing serious threats to public security and safeguarding national security, certain technical data identifying the source of a connection or the characteristics of the terminal may be retained for one year from the day of the connection or use. That is materially different from a rule saying that the operator may retain a complete behavioural history indefinitely. The statutory category and the trigger matter, as does the starting point for the clock.

French law also contains a distinct route for national security. Article L34-1 allows the Prime Minister, or a delegated authority under the statutory scheme, to require operators to retain certain traffic and location data for one year where there is a serious and current or foreseeable threat to national security. The period can be renewed in the conditions set by the law. The existence of that route is precisely why a legal analysis must ask which purpose is invoked. A national-security retention notice cannot be defended by silently substituting an ordinary fraud or criminal-investigation rationale, and an ordinary police request cannot automatically borrow the national-security exception.

Article L34-1 also recognizes rapid preservation. Preservation is not the same thing as a fresh, generalized retention obligation. It freezes data that is at risk of disappearing so that a competent authority can seek lawful access. That temporal distinction protects proportionality: a provider may be told to preserve a defined record connected with a defined event without being ordered to build a permanent archive of everyone’s movements.

The implementing categories are set out in Article R10-13 of the same Code. The text separates identity information—such as name, date and place of birth, addresses, email address and telephone number—from account and payment information. It separately identifies source and terminal information, including the IP address and port used, the subscriber or user identifier, the terminal identifier and the originating telephone number. Traffic and location information covers technical characteristics, date, time and duration, supplementary services and their providers, technical identifiers of recipients and mobile-terminal location.

This classification has practical consequences. A request for the civil identity attached to an IP address is not identical to a request for all connections made from that address over months. A request for a mobile terminal’s location at a specified time is not identical to a continuous location trail. A request for the date and duration of a connection is not identical to a request for the identity of every person communicating with the subscriber. The same account can generate several legally distinct questions, each requiring its own justification.

The current national-security retention mechanism is supplemented by Decree no. 2024-901 of 3 October 2024, whose official text implements the retention of the traffic and location data identified by the Code for the national-security framework. The decree does not abolish the need to identify the legal purpose and the relevant category. It is an implementing instrument, not a universal answer to every request from a prosecutor, investigator, regulator or private litigant.

French data-protection guidance helps illustrate the boundary between retention and access. The CNIL’s guidance on public internet access explains who may be concerned, what traffic data means, which data must be retained and for how long, and how users’ rights operate. The page is useful because it addresses ordinary operators and public-access providers, not only intelligence agencies. It also shows why an employer, hotel, university or public Wi-Fi provider cannot assume that a broad internal policy removes the legal limits applying to communications data.

French law therefore permits significant retention, but the answer to the title question is not “yes, everything.” It allows identified classes of data for identified periods and purposes, with a special national-security route for traffic and location data. The European question raised by C-661/24 is whether the architecture is sufficiently precise and separated in practice, particularly where the same provider holds multiple data sets and a public authority can request them through different channels.

That distinction should be written into contracts, compliance manuals and litigation strategy. A multinational provider should map each field in its systems to the French category rather than using a generic “metadata” bucket. A French subsidiary receiving a request from an authority in another Member State should record the legal basis, territorial connection and requested period before exporting anything. A subscriber should ask whether the information sought is identity, source, traffic, location or content. A court should be able to see the answer without reconstructing it from a provider’s technical jargon.

II. When can a French operator store or disclose connection data?

A. Which criminal and intelligence safeguards control access to traffic and location data?

Retention answers the question “what may remain available?” Access answers a different question: “who may obtain which record now?” The distinction is decisive under European law. A record may have been retained lawfully under Article L34-1 and still be inaccessible for a particular investigation because the request lacks the required seriousness, judicial control, necessity or scope. Conversely, an urgent preservation request may be lawful even though it does not authorize investigators to inspect the preserved material immediately.

In criminal proceedings, the Code of Criminal Procedure contains specific gateways for technical source data and traffic or location data. Article 60-1-2, in the version applied in the relevant case law, limits certain requisitions to situations in which the needs of the proceeding require the measure and identifies conditions linked to the seriousness of the offence, the purpose of identifying a person, a victim’s device or a missing person. The official text can be consulted at Article 60-1-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Because versions of this provision have changed, the date of the investigation and the applicable version must be checked before relying on a general summary.

Article 77-1-2 provides another procedural route for requisitions in a preliminary investigation. The historical text is available at Article 77-1-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In its decision of 28 May 2024, no. 23-85.848, the Criminal Division of the Cour de cassation held that requisitions made under the first paragraph, in the version resulting from Law no. 2022-299 of 2 March 2022, « valent injonction de conservation rapide ». The exact phrase means that they operate as a rapid-preservation injunction in the sense of the Budapest Convention. It does not mean that every requisition automatically authorizes unrestricted examination of all data held by the provider.

The same 23-85.848 decision is useful for another reason: it connects French procedural safeguards to the CJEU’s data-retention case law. The court examined the seriousness of the offence, the need for the data, the legal basis of the retention and the role of an independent authority. The person challenging the evidence should not focus only on whether the operator had the record. The challenge should identify the missing link between the retained record and the procedural authorization to obtain or use it.

The investigating judge’s control is not a ceremonial step. In its decision of 25 October 2022, no. 21-87.397, the Cour de cassation required the file to show that access was carried out « sous le contrôle effectif de ce magistrat » and according to the authorized « durée et périmètre ». In English, the judge must exercise effective control over both the duration and the scope of the access. A generic signature on a request cannot substitute for a record showing what was authorized and what was actually collected.

Standing also matters. In decision no. 21-84.096 of 12 July 2022, the Cour de cassation explained that a person relying on European data-retention rights must claim to be the owner or user of one of the identified lines, or establish that the measure interfered with that person’s private life. The relevant wording is « titulaire ou utilisatrice de l’une des lignes identifiées ». The point is practical: an abstract objection to surveillance is not always enough to obtain exclusion of evidence. The file must connect the contested data to the applicant’s rights.

Intelligence collection follows a separate statutory logic. Article L851-1 of the Internal Security Code concerns the collection from operators and providers of identifiers, numbers, terminal location, lists of calls made and received, and dates and duration, within the intelligence framework. Article L851-2 addresses real-time collection for the prevention of terrorism in relation to an identified person who may be connected with a threat, including associated persons under the statutory conditions. These provisions should not be used as shorthand for ordinary criminal access: they belong to a different purpose, authorization chain and oversight system.

The authorization and oversight rules are equally important. Article L821-1 of the Internal Security Code makes intelligence techniques subject to prior authorization by the Prime Minister after the opinion of the Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement, with a route to the Conseil d’État in case of an adverse opinion. Article L821-3 sets the framework for the CNCTR’s opinion. The physical and technical operations at an operator’s premises are addressed by Article L871-6, which requires an order and qualified agents for the operations covered by the text.

A provider receiving a request should therefore record whether it is a preservation instruction, a criminal requisition, an intelligence request, a regulatory demand or a private litigation request. The answer affects the competent authority, the permitted data, the period, the secrecy rules and the available challenge. A person receiving notice of a disclosure should request the procedural basis where lawfully possible, preserve the notice and compare the requested fields with the fields actually delivered. A provider should maintain an auditable log that makes that comparison possible without exposing unrelated subscribers.

Cross-border requests add a second layer. A Belgian authority may rely on Belgian law, a French operator may hold the data in several countries, and the resulting evidence may be sent to a French court. Mutual-assistance or European-investigation procedures do not erase fundamental-rights review. The requested state must still ask whether the data was obtained and transmitted under a sufficiently precise legal basis, whether the authority was competent, and whether the scope was necessary. The C-661/24 opinion is particularly relevant to this chain because a provider’s internal separation may affect whether a foreign request receives only the intended category or a much richer behavioural profile.

B. How can a user or operator challenge an unlawful data-retention request?

The most effective challenge starts with an inventory, not a slogan. “Mass surveillance” may accurately describe the practical concern, but a court needs a precise objection tied to the record. The first step is to obtain or reconstruct the request: date, issuing authority, investigation or intelligence purpose, statutory article, data fields, subscribers or terminals concerned, period, urgency, preservation instruction and deadline. If the notice is confidential, the provider’s compliance team should still preserve the internal metadata that can later show what was requested and what was disclosed.

A useful review can be organized around eight questions:

  1. What exact field is requested: civil identity, account or payment data, source or terminal data, traffic data, location data, or correspondence content?
  2. What event or statutory purpose activates the request: an identified criminal proceeding, a serious and current national-security threat, terrorism prevention, rapid preservation, or a private evidence application?
  3. What is the minimum time period needed, and does the request seek a snapshot, a defined sequence or a continuous history?
  4. What is the geographic and personal scope, and does it sweep in people who have no connection with the suspected conduct?
  5. Which authority authorized the measure, and was prior independent or judicial control required?
  6. Does the authorization specify duration, perimeter, technical fields and permitted uses, or does it leave the decisive choices to the provider or investigator?
  7. Can the provider technically keep categories separate so that identity data cannot be freely combined with detailed movement and contact histories?
  8. What remedy is available now: objection to the request, application to preserve evidence, challenge to admissibility, appeal, complaint to a data-protection authority, or proceedings before the competent administrative or judicial court?

For a user, the connection between the data and private life should be documented. The person may need to show ownership or use of the identified line, as the Cour de cassation explained in no. 21-84.096, or show how the requested location and traffic history concerns that person’s movements, contacts or home. A company should identify whether an employee’s device, a company account, a visitor network or a customer’s line is implicated. The objective is not to disclose more personal data than necessary, but to establish standing and the concrete interference.

For a company, compliance should include a data map and a legal escalation path. The team should preserve the original request, hash or otherwise protect the relevant logs, restrict access to the response team, and prevent a request for one field from silently generating a larger export. If the request is ambiguous, the provider should seek clarification through the permitted channel. If it is facially overbroad, the provider should record the objection and the legal reason for narrowing or refusing the response. These governance steps can later demonstrate that the technical separation discussed in C-661/24 was real.

Private litigants may have a route to preserve evidence before a trial. Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows a party with a legitimate reason to preserve or establish, before proceedings on the merits, evidence of facts on which the dispute may depend. That provision does not turn a civil claimant into an intelligence authority. A request must remain targeted, legally admissible and proportionate, and it must respect secrecy and personal-data constraints. When the evidence is connection data, the application should explain why the requested field and period are indispensable.

Data-protection law supplies another checkpoint. Article 5 of the French Data Protection Act of 6 January 1978 lists legal bases for processing, including consent, performance of a contract, a legal obligation, a public-interest task and a legitimate interest balanced against the rights and freedoms at stake. A telecom retention obligation will usually require a specific legal obligation rather than a provider’s general commercial interest. The legal basis must be matched to the actual processing operation: keeping the record, combining it, disclosing it and reusing it for a new purpose are not necessarily the same operation.

Content-related allegations must be kept in their own lane. Where the request or investigative technique reaches correspondence content, Article 226-15 of the Criminal Code provides a separate criminal-law protection. A party should not allow an authority or opposing litigant to obtain content through a request drafted as if it concerned only traffic metadata. The description of the technical interface may be opaque, but the legal distinction remains clear: routing, time and location information can be highly sensitive, and message content is subject to an additional prohibition on unlawful interception or disclosure.

In criminal litigation, the challenge may concern the retention itself, the authorization to access, the execution of the authorization or the use of the result. The Cour de cassation’s decisions no. 21-83.710 and no. 23-85.848 show why the stages should be pleaded separately. A person may accept that a provider was required to preserve a record while arguing that the subsequent disclosure exceeded the permitted scope. Another challenge may argue that the initial generalized retention had no qualifying national-security trigger. A third may show that the investigator never exercised effective control over the duration or perimeter, contrary to no. 21-87.397.

For operators, the best defense is an evidence trail that matches each disclosure to an authority, legal purpose, data category, time period and technical export. For individuals, the best first move is to obtain the record of the request and identify the line or device involved. For both, the legal question is not whether connection data is “just metadata.” It is whether a defined interference with privacy and data protection rights was authorized by a precise rule, for a sufficiently serious purpose, with limits that can be independently reviewed.

The next procedural development is the CJEU judgment in C-661/24. The Advocate General’s reasoning may be adopted, narrowed or rejected. Until the judgment arrives, a party should not claim that the opinion alone invalidates a French retention order. It can, however, cite the opinion as a current interpretive signal, ask a national court to apply the existing Directive 2002/58 and Charter standards, and request that a disputed issue be referred to Luxembourg where the legal conditions for a reference are met. A court considering a live request should also avoid creating irreversible disclosure before the proportionality question has been examined.

There is a final cross-border practical point. If the provider is outside France, the location of the server does not by itself decide the legality of the request. The relevant issues may include the provider’s establishment, the authority issuing the demand, the country where the person is located, the instrument used to obtain the evidence and the safeguards attached to onward use. A French company should avoid assuming that a foreign “lawful request” is self-authenticating. A foreign company serving French users should avoid assuming that a French retention category follows automatically from its own national data policy. A field-by-field, purpose-by-purpose analysis is slower at the front end and far safer when the evidence reaches court.

Conclusion

Can France keep every subscriber’s traffic and location data? Not as an unlimited, undifferentiated behavioural archive justified by the mere existence of a telecommunications service. French law currently permits retention of defined identity, account, source, terminal, traffic and location categories for defined periods and purposes. It also provides a national-security route for certain traffic and location data and a rapid-preservation route for evidence at risk of loss. Each route has its own trigger and safeguards.

Case C-661/24 makes the practical issue sharper. The European test will look at necessity, proportionality, technical separation and the ability of providers and authorities to prevent the combined data from revealing an exhaustive picture of private life. The opinion is not binding, and the CJEU’s judgment remains decisive. But the opinion gives operators, investigators, companies and individuals a clear checklist now: classify the data, identify the purpose, measure the scope, verify the authority, document the period, preserve effective control and challenge any unexplained combination of datasets.

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