KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Berlin Weapons Cache, Romanian Bomb Plot: If Two EU States Seek the Same Suspect, Which Warrant Wins?

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Berlin Weapons Cache, Romanian Bomb Plot: If Two EU States Seek the Same Suspect, Which Warrant Wins?

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

Germany’s weapons-cache investigation near Berlin has become a cross-border arrest question. The Associated Press reported that German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt confirmed the discovery of weapons and ammunition near the capital, while a suspect was arrested in Romania and was also linked by investigators to alleged plans for attacks there. The public record remains an investigation, not a conviction, and the precise procedural instruments issued by Germany and Romania will determine what happens next. The story’s overlooked legal issue is therefore not simply whether Germany wants the suspect returned. It is what France would do if both Member States sought him under separate European arrest warrants and he were found on French territory.

That distinction matters because an EAW is not a traditional diplomatic extradition request. It is a judicial surrender mechanism operating on mutual recognition, with a French court checking the warrant, the statutory refusal grounds and the person’s procedural rights. This article examines the possible Berlin and Romanian tracks as a focused procedural scenario, without treating an allegation as established fact. It adds a different question to the firm’s earlier analysis of the Berlin weapons-cache extradition issue: if the alleged conduct generates two competing European arrest warrants, which one would a French court execute first, and what can the defence still contest?

I. What do Germany and Romania have to prove before France can act?

A. Why the Berlin cache and Romanian parcel-bomb allegations are legally separate

The first discipline is to separate the facts. A weapons and ammunition cache found near Berlin points toward German territorial jurisdiction. Alleged plans for parcel-bomb attacks in Romania point toward a Romanian investigation. The two narratives may concern the same person, the same network or the same alleged objective, but those possibilities do not automatically create one offence or one warrant. Each issuing authority must identify the conduct for which it seeks surrender, the national arrest decision supporting the request, and whether the warrant is for prosecution or for enforcement of a final custodial sentence.

Article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure describes an EAW as “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire”, a judicial decision issued by one EU Member State so another can arrest and surrender a person for prosecution or for the execution of a custodial sentence. The full definition is set out in the official text of Article 695-11. The wording is important in this case: the French court does not receive a political request from Berlin or Bucharest and then choose a diplomatic response. It receives a judicial instrument whose scope must be identified precisely.

Germany would therefore need to describe the Berlin conduct with enough detail to connect the suspect to a German criminal investigation. Romania would need to do the same for the alleged Romanian plot. The legal question is not whether the media description sounds alarming. The question is whether the warrant supplies a coherent account of dates, locations, participation, legal classification and the applicable penalty threshold. Article 695-13 requires an EAW to contain, among other matters, the person’s identity, the issuing authority, the national warrant or enforceable judgment, the nature and legal classification of the offence, and the circumstances of the offence. Those requirements can be checked against the current Legifrance presentation of Article 695-13.

This is where a cross-border weapons case can become procedurally fragile. “Weapons offence” is not a sufficient description if it hides several transactions, different locations or different accused people. The warrant must make clear whether the alleged conduct is possession, trafficking, preparation, participation in an organised group, attempted violence or another offence. The same care is needed for the Romanian allegations. A planned attack may be described in the press as a parcel-bomb plot, but the EAW must translate that narrative into the issuing state’s legal categories and the facts supporting each charge.

Article 695-23 creates a split between offences for which France may examine double criminality and a defined list for which that examination is removed when the issuing state’s law provides at least a three-year custodial penalty. Its first sentence states that execution “peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française”. The official Article 695-23 text then limits that safeguard through the listed categories and the penalty threshold. The classification in Berlin or Romania is therefore consequential, but it is not the end of the analysis.

The French Supreme Court’s decision of 18 February 2014, appeal no. 14-80.484, shows why the factual description matters in an armed case. In that official decision, Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 14-80.484, the court examined a complaint that the person had not been informed of the exact nature of the Italian proceedings and reviewed how weapons, ammunition, explosives and organised armed offences had been characterised. The lesson is practical rather than rhetorical: France does not need to retry the foreign investigation, but it must be able to understand what the foreign authority is actually asking it to surrender the person for.

The distinction also prevents an early mistake about “two warrants”. A national arrest warrant, a detention order, an EAW and a request for transfer of evidence are not interchangeable. Germany might first request surrender for the Berlin investigation. Romania might hold the person under its own national proceedings while considering an EAW. One state might seek prosecution, while the other might later seek enforcement of a sentence. Those differences affect the Article 695-42 priority exercise and the time limits in the French procedure.

The alleged connection between the two matters can still be legally useful. Investigators may exchange evidence, ask Eurojust to coordinate, or agree which state is best placed to prosecute the broader conduct. But coordination between prosecutors does not remove the French court’s task. If a person is arrested in France, the court must assess each EAW as a judicial request and then decide whether several requests should be ranked. It cannot simply assume that the most dramatic public account identifies the correct forum.

That is also why the current public reporting should be read conditionally. The Associated Press account identifies the German minister’s statement and the Romanian arrest, but it does not establish that two executable EAWs have already been issued. The legally significant future event would be the transmission of one or both instruments to the judicial authority in the state where the suspect is found. Until then, the competitive-warrant issue is a forward-looking analysis of the procedural fork created by the reported facts.

For families, employers or counsel trying to assess exposure, the immediate document request is not a press article. It is the exact EAW, its issuing national decision, the identity confirmation, the alleged dates and places, the penalty classification, and any indication that the request is for prosecution rather than sentence enforcement. Those documents determine whether the German and Romanian cases are genuinely overlapping or merely adjacent investigations reported together.

B. What the French court reads in an EAW before authorising surrender

If the suspect were located in France, the case would move rapidly before the chambre de l’instruction. Article 695-30 provides that, at the appearance of the requested person, the chamber verifies identity and records the person’s statements. The official wording begins “Lors de la comparution de la personne recherchée, la chambre de l’instruction constate son identité”. The Legifrance text of Article 695-30 also confirms the role of the public prosecutor, the person sought, counsel and, where necessary, an interpreter.

This appearance is not a mini-trial on whether the Berlin cache existed or whether a Romanian attack was planned. The French chamber is the executing judicial authority. It checks the legal conditions for surrender, the completeness of the instrument, mandatory and optional refusal grounds, and the rights attaching to the person’s consent or refusal. That separation explains why a strong factual defence may still need to be framed as a defect in the warrant, a refusal ground, an identity problem or a rights-based obstacle rather than as a request for the French court to determine guilt.

Consent changes the timetable and the available remedies. Under Article 695-31, the chamber must explain the legal consequences and the irrevocable character of consent. If the person consents, the decision is normally made within seven days of the appearance, unless complementary information is ordered. If the person refuses, the decision is normally due within twenty days of the appearance, again subject to a request for more information, and a cassation appeal is available under the conditions in the article. These points are set out in the official Article 695-31 text.

The word “irrevocable” is not a detail to overlook. A person who agrees to surrender may also be asked whether they waive the rule of specialty, which limits prosecution in the requesting state to the offences supporting the surrender unless an exception applies. In a case with possible German and Romanian tracks, consent to one warrant must be documented with precision. It should not be treated as a general agreement to be transferred anywhere in Europe or to answer every later allegation.

Where the defence sees a factual gap, Article 695-33 provides a targeted procedural tool. The chamber may ask the issuing authority for complementary information when the EAW does not contain enough information to rule on surrender; the article sets a maximum period of ten days for receipt of the necessary information. The exact rule is available in the official Article 695-33 text. In this scenario, the request might concern whether the Berlin cache and Romanian allegations are distinct, which national order supports each charge, or whether the described conduct satisfies the listed-offence and penalty requirements.

Complementary information is not an invitation to rewrite the warrant after the hearing. It is designed to allow the executing court to understand the request. If the German instrument says “weapons trafficking” but does not identify the dates, the alleged role or the facts supporting that label, the defence can ask whether the French court has enough information to decide. The same applies if the Romanian instrument uses a broad reference to planned attacks without specifying the person’s alleged acts, the location of the conduct or the national warrant on which surrender is based.

France then applies the mandatory refusal grounds in Article 695-22. The official provision states that execution is refused “dans les cas suivants” and includes, among other grounds, final adjudication for the same facts, the person’s age below thirteen at the time of the conduct, and a request shown to be based on discriminatory reasons. The rule is narrow but powerful. A genuine double-jeopardy problem or evidence that a warrant is being used for a prohibited discriminatory purpose cannot be replaced by a general appeal to mutual trust.

Optional refusal grounds appear in Article 695-24. The official Article 695-24 text covers situations such as French proceedings or a French decision not to prosecute, facts committed wholly or partly in France, certain extra-territoriality limits, an earlier final third-state decision, and limitation. For a Berlin cache or a Romanian parcel-bomb investigation, the territoriality questions would be fact-specific. A French location used for storage, planning or communication could matter, but only if the EAW’s factual account supports that assertion.

The Supreme Court decision of 23 August 2023, appeal no. 23-84.608, provides an important warning about how the optional double-criminality ground is raised. In Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 23-84.608, the court held that, in the absence of a defence argument based on Article 695-23’s optional refusal ground, the judges were not required to raise that issue on their own. The procedural point is decisive: a person cannot rely on the French court to invent every possible objection. The defence must identify which alleged fact is not an offence under French law, or why the listed-offence exception does not apply.

That decision also helps clarify the difference between a broad factual denial and a legally useful submission. Saying “the press account is wrong” may not engage the executing court’s statutory test. Saying “the EAW asks for surrender for a factual episode not covered by the national warrant”, “the alleged conduct is not a listed category and is not criminalised in France in the form described”, or “the mandatory identity and chronology fields are inconsistent” gives the chamber a concrete legal question to decide.

Finally, the French court does not ignore the adversarial principle while moving quickly. The Cour de cassation decision of 21 August 2024, appeal no. 24-83.417, concerned an EAW-related detention procedure and held that the forty-eight-hour summons period under Article 695-34 must also be respected when a hearing is adjourned at the defence’s request. The official decision in 24-83.417 illustrates how a short statutory timetable can still carry concrete defence consequences. Speed is part of the EAW system; it is not permission to make the hearing unintelligible.

II. If both countries issue warrants, which one would France execute first?

A. How Article 695-42 ranks competing European arrest warrants

The answer is not “the first state to call” and not automatically “the state where the weapons were found”. Article 695-42 deals expressly with several Member States issuing EAWs against the same person, whether for the same facts or different facts. Its opening words are “Lorsque plusieurs Etats membres ont émis un mandat d’arrêt européen à l’encontre de la même personne”. The official Article 695-42 text directs the chambre de l’instruction to choose the warrant to execute after considering all the circumstances, including the seriousness and place of the offences, the dates of the respective warrants, and whether a warrant seeks prosecution or sentence enforcement.

For the reported Berlin–Romania scenario, the first factor is the place of the alleged conduct. Germany would point to the cache, the location of the discovery and any acts of acquisition, transport or storage that German prosecutors attribute to the suspect. Romania would point to the place where the alleged parcel-bomb planning, preparation or target selection occurred. Place is not an automatic jurisdictional trump card, but it gives the chamber a rational anchor for deciding which court has the closest connection with the conduct.

The second factor is gravity. A warrant for a completed violent offence or an offence carrying a substantial sentence may weigh differently from a warrant limited to possession or preparatory conduct. Yet the French chamber is not entitled to substitute its own view of the evidence for the issuing state’s classification. Gravity is assessed within the information available in the warrants and the applicable national decisions. If the Romanian instrument alleges a planned attack but does not explain the suspect’s role, the court will need to distinguish the seriousness of the alleged objective from the legal strength of the specific request.

The third factor is timing. An earlier warrant can matter, but Article 695-42 does not create a simple chronological race. The chamber must examine when each warrant was issued, whether one concerns prosecution and the other a final sentence, and whether the later instrument responds to facts or proceedings not covered by the first. A German warrant issued for immediate prosecution may not automatically displace a Romanian sentence-enforcement warrant, and a Romanian warrant issued first may not automatically prevail if Germany has the principal connection to the alleged conduct.

The fourth factor is the procedural purpose. Article 695-11 itself distinguishes prosecution from execution of a custodial sentence. That distinction becomes concrete under Article 695-42. A surrender for prosecution sends the person to a pending investigation or trial. A surrender for sentence enforcement sends the person to serve an already imposed sanction. The French court must know which situation it is choosing because the person’s position, the likely timetable and the relevant safeguards are different.

Eurojust may assist the analysis. Article 695-42 allows the chamber to consult the agency when choosing between warrants. Consultation does not transfer the decision to Eurojust and does not turn the French hearing into a diplomatic negotiation. It can help identify whether Germany and Romania have coordinated, whether one state will prosecute the wider course of conduct, whether evidence should be transferred, and whether the requests are genuinely cumulative or reflect the same factual core described twice.

In practical terms, the court could ask both authorities for a consolidated chronology. It may need to know when the suspect allegedly acquired materials, when the cache was placed near Berlin, when the alleged Romanian planning occurred, and which acts each state says occurred in its territory. It can also ask whether one state has already taken evidence that the other requires. The purpose is not to build a joint European indictment inside France. The purpose is to select the warrant that best fits the statutory factors and preserves a coherent prosecution.

The existence of two warrants would not allow France to surrender the person to both states at the same time. The chamber chooses the warrant to execute. The other state may need to cooperate with the chosen forum, seek a later transfer, issue a request for evidence or wait for the specialty rules and any subsequent judicial decision. That sequencing is particularly important when the two alleged episodes are connected by a common suspect but not by identical legal elements.

Article 695-42 also contains a separate rule for a conflict between an EAW and an extradition request from a non-EU state. That is not the present fact pattern, but it shows the breadth of the French priority analysis. The chamber can wait for documents and then decide which request has priority by considering the circumstances. The EU-to-EU scenario is more streamlined, yet it still requires an individual judicial choice rather than automatic obedience to the most politically prominent requesting state.

The current article remains the operative reference for an August 2026 case. Legifrance displays Article 695-42 as in force through 31 December 2028, with a future abrogation linked to the 2025 codification order. That future change does not alter the legal framework for a person arrested now. Counsel should, however, identify the version applicable on the date of the French hearing, particularly if a procedure continues across the scheduled legislative transition.

Applied carefully, the likely French question would be framed as follows: does Germany’s territorial connection to the cache, the nature of its prosecution and the quality of its warrant outweigh Romania’s connection to the alleged attack planning, the dates of its warrant and any sentence or prosecution already underway? There is no responsible answer without the documents. Article 695-42 supplies the factors; it does not predetermine their weight.

B. Which defences can still delay or stop surrender

A priority decision does not cure a defective warrant. Before choosing between Germany and Romania, the French chamber must still ask whether either request falls within a mandatory or optional refusal ground. The defence should therefore run two analyses in parallel: first, whether the warrant is executable at all; second, if both are executable, which request should receive priority under Article 695-42.

The first line is identity and scope. The person must be the person named in the warrant, and the warrant must identify the conduct with enough precision to allow a meaningful response. Article 695-13 is central here. If Germany’s instrument describes the cache but omits the alleged role, or Romania’s instrument describes a planned attack but does not identify the concrete acts attributed to the suspect, the defence can request complementary information under Article 695-33. The French chamber may not need proof beyond reasonable doubt, but it must have a legally intelligible request.

The second line is the double-criminality and listed-offence analysis. For a listed category meeting the statutory penalty condition, Article 695-23 removes the ordinary French-law comparison and leaves the legal classification principally with the issuing authority, subject to the limits recognised by the text and the case law. For a non-listed category, the defence should explain precisely why the described conduct does not constitute a French offence. It is not enough to argue that the German or Romanian label has no French translation. The court compares the facts and legal elements, not the vocabulary alone.

The weapons decision in appeal no. 14-80.484 is useful here because it shows that the defence can challenge the information supplied about the nature of the foreign proceedings even when the allegations concern serious armed conduct. The argument must remain tied to the warrant and the notification record. If the person is told one set of offences and the instrument contains another, that discrepancy can affect the ability to consent, refuse or prepare a response.

The third line is mandatory refusal. Article 695-22 covers final adjudication for the same facts, age below thirteen at the relevant time and prohibited discriminatory purpose, among other statutory situations. A final decision in Germany or Romania does not automatically defeat the other state’s request if the facts are different, but the defence must compare the factual episodes rather than rely on the titles of the offences. A Berlin cache charge and a Romanian planning charge may be related without being the same facts; the record has to show where the legal identity ends.

The fourth line is optional refusal under Article 695-24. France may have jurisdiction over facts committed in France, may already be prosecuting the relevant conduct, or may face a limitation issue. A cross-border investigation often contains communications, purchases, travel or storage in several countries. Those links can matter, but the defence must map them against the actual allegations in the EAW. A vague assertion that the person visited France is not equivalent to showing that a charged act occurred in France or that French courts have already seized the same facts.

Human-rights objections are also fact-dependent. The Cour de cassation’s decision of 21 November 2007, appeal no. 07-87.499, concerned an EAW issued by Germany against a person who had refugee status in France and feared onward persecution in a third country. In the official decision in 07-87.499, the court examined whether the requesting state offered sufficient guarantees concerning what might happen after surrender. The case does not create an automatic refusal for every asylum claim, but it shows that a French court can have to examine a concrete onward-removal risk when the defence properly raises it.

That principle could become relevant if the German or Romanian authorities indicated that the suspect might later be transferred outside the EU, exposed to prohibited treatment, or placed in conditions incompatible with fundamental rights. The facts would need to be current and specific. A general criticism of another Member State’s criminal system would not replace evidence about this person, this request and this foreseeable chain of custody.

Specialty is the fifth line. A person may refuse to waive the rule that restricts prosecution in the issuing state to the offences for which surrender was granted. In a case involving two national investigations, the exact wording of the selected EAW becomes critical. Surrender to Germany for the Berlin cache would not silently authorise prosecution in Germany for every Romanian allegation, and surrender to Romania for an alleged attack plan would not silently authorise a separate German case. Later cooperation must respect the applicable specialty rules and any required judicial consent.

Time limits can be used by both sides, but they must not be confused with an automatic release or refusal. Article 695-31 sets the basic seven-day decision period after consent and twenty-day period after refusal, subject to the statutory exceptions. Article 695-33 allows a request for additional information. The defence should identify the exact information that is missing and explain why it affects the decision. A general request to postpone the hearing may be less persuasive than a targeted request asking Germany or Romania to clarify the national warrant, the date of the alleged conduct or the prosecution-versus-sentence purpose.

The 2024 decision in appeal no. 24-83.417 reinforces the importance of procedural preparation. The Cour de cassation dealt with the forty-eight-hour convocation rule for a later hearing and confirmed that the rule continues to apply when the defence sought the adjournment. The published decision 24-83.417 is not a ruling on the merits of the Berlin or Romanian allegations, but it is a precise reminder that an EAW defence operates inside short, formal deadlines. Counsel must obtain the prosecutor’s submissions, monitor the file at the registry and preserve an opportunity to respond.

The practical defence file should contain the EAW itself, every national warrant or judgment identified in it, the identity record, the notification and appearance minutes, the translation, the chronology of the alleged acts, prior proceedings in Germany, Romania and France, any final judgment bearing on ne bis in idem, residence and nationality documents, evidence relevant to French territorial jurisdiction, and current material on detention or onward-transfer risks. If the person refuses surrender, the file should state each legal objection separately and identify the precise article or case law supporting it.

The Cour de cassation’s 30 May 2017 decision, appeal no. 17-82.943, illustrates another point: the court upheld a German EAW for sentence enforcement after reviewing the national decision, the factual precision required by Article 695-13 and the statutory refusal provisions. The official decision in 17-82.943 shows why the status of the warrant matters. A request for prosecution and a request for sentence enforcement should not be analysed as though they were the same legal event, even when they involve the same person and the same state.

For the Berlin–Romania scenario, the strongest defence may therefore be a sequencing defence rather than a claim that the entire international case disappears. Counsel could argue that one warrant is incomplete, that the two instruments describe overlapping facts inconsistently, that the listed-offence exception does not cover a particular count, or that a concrete French jurisdiction or human-rights ground requires refusal or delay. If both warrants survive those objections, the argument turns to Article 695-42: seriousness, territorial connection, timing, procedural purpose and the value of Eurojust coordination.

That is the sharp legal difference between a competing-warrant case and a conventional extradition headline. The French chamber does not choose a country because it approves of that country’s narrative. It applies a statutory sequence: verify the person and instrument, hear the defence, obtain missing information where necessary, test refusal grounds, and only then rank executable requests. The same sequence protects the integrity of the surrender system and prevents the first public accusation from becoming the first automatic transfer.

Conclusion

The Berlin weapons cache and the Romanian allegations may develop into one coordinated investigation, two separate prosecutions or no second EAW at all. The public facts cannot answer that question yet. They do show why the next procedural move matters. If Germany and Romania both seek the same person and France becomes the executing state, Article 695-42 gives the chambre de l’instruction a structured choice based on gravity, location, dates and the purpose of each warrant. It does not impose a first-come, first-served rule.

The defence should not wait for the media narrative to settle. It should obtain the exact instruments, test their factual precision under Articles 695-13 and 695-33, raise any applicable refusal ground under Articles 695-22 to 695-24, preserve the rule of specialty, and build a documented argument for the warrant that should be executed—or for refusal of both. The French court is not deciding guilt in Berlin or Bucharest. It is deciding whether a legally sufficient judicial request can trigger surrender, and which request has priority when the European system produces two.

📄 Official circular