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C-427/25 Uffida: Can France Access IP Log Files for Online Identity Theft?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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C-427/25 Uffida: Can France Access IP Log Files for Online Identity Theft?

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On 18 August 2026, the European Union’s e-Evidence Regulation became applicable. A French prosecutor can now use a European Production Order Certificate to seek electronic evidence directly from a service provider, or its European representative, in another Member State. The practical question is no longer only where a platform stores its servers. It is what kind of data the investigator is asking for, how serious the suspected offence is, and which authority must validate the request. The Commission says the new route can reduce a cross-border request from months to ten days, or eight hours in an emergency.

The first important test is already before the Court of Justice. In Case C-427/25, Uffida, the Tribunale di Catania asks whether login and logout records, linked to IP addresses and time stamps, are sensitive “traffic data” or more limited user-identification data. The underlying complaint concerns an online identity theft allegation that Italian law treated as too minor for access to traffic data. The issue has an immediate French analogue: Article 60-1-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure contains a special one-year threshold for an online offence when the request has the sole purpose of identifying its perpetrator. This article explains what the new European route changes, what it does not change, and how a person or lawyer should challenge an overbroad request before evidence becomes the foundation of a prosecution.

I. Can a French prosecutor obtain IP log files for online identity theft?

A. What C-427/25 Uffida asks about login, logout and IP-address data

The Uffida case is not a judgment. It is a pending request for a preliminary ruling, lodged by the Italian court on 26 June 2025. That distinction matters. No French or Italian investigator can cite C-427/25 as a final answer, and no defence lawyer should present the reference as though the Court of Justice had already approved access to log files for every minor online offence. The value of the case is that it isolates the exact boundary that investigators, providers and defence teams must now apply during the first operational period of the e-Evidence system.

For the wider architecture of European Production Orders, Preservation Orders and cloud evidence, see our general e-Evidence guide for messages, IP addresses and foreign-held data. This analysis takes the narrower question that guide does not decide: whether a sequence of IP log files used only to identify an alleged online impersonator remains a lower-intensity identifier or becomes traffic data requiring the serious-offence threshold.

The facts are unusually concrete. A 19-year-old complainant reported a Facebook profile using his name, photograph and former family identity without permission. The profile remained active and allegedly created distress or reputational harm. The Catania public prosecutor asked for access to log files linked to the account: IP addresses used to create the profile, IP addresses used to access it, and the relevant dates and times. The referring court describes the purpose in terms that should guide every proportionality analysis: the data were sought when “the sole aim is to identify the perpetrator of an offence.” The official case summary is available in the InfoCuria record for Case C-427/25, Uffida.

That request sits between three categories of information. Subscriber data may identify the holder of an account or a service contract. Data requested “for the sole purpose of identifying the user” may include an IP address, a source port and a time stamp when those identifiers are needed to connect a digital act to a person. Traffic data, by contrast, may reveal the beginning and end of a session, the route or destination of a communication, the device’s location, its duration, the size or format of a transmission, or other metadata. Content data may disclose the substance of an email, message, file or conversation. The categories overlap technically, but the legal intensity of the interference is not identical.

Article 3(10) of the Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 uses the formulation “data requested for the sole purpose of identifying the user.” Article 3(11) separately defines traffic data and expressly refers to data relating to the commencement and termination of a user access session. The Uffida question is therefore not a semantic exercise. A log file may contain an IP address that identifies a user, but a sequence of logins and logouts may also provide a time series capable of revealing habits, relationships and private choices. The classification determines whether the order may concern any offence or only a serious offence under the European framework.

The Court of Justice has already supplied the constitutional vocabulary. In the joined cases Tele2 Sverige and Watson, C-203/15 and C-698/15, EU:C:2016:970, the Grand Chamber treated the retention and access to communications data as an interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The judgment does not create a blanket rule that every identifier requires the same threshold. It requires the national authority to examine the seriousness and duration of the interference, the type of data and the safeguards surrounding access.

In Ministerio Fiscal, C-207/16, EU:C:2018:788, the Court accepted that access to limited identity information associated with a telephone number may be justified in an investigation that does not concern the most serious crime. The lesson is not that any identity request is automatically lawful. It is that the intensity of the intrusion must be measured by the information actually sought. A request for the name and address of a subscriber is different from a request that reconstructs movement or communication patterns.

The later judgment in Prokuratuur, C-746/18, EU:C:2021:152, reinforces the need for prior review by a court or an independent authority when access to communications data can produce serious interference. A public prosecutor cannot simply assume that an investigative objective supplies its own proportionality justification. The order must identify the offence, the evidential purpose, the category of data, the period requested and the reason less intrusive measures would not work. That is particularly important for a foreign provider receiving a European Production Order Certificate without the ordinary experience of the issuing jurisdiction.

The French connection is not speculative. The Uffida summary expressly compares the Italian problem with French law. It identifies Article 226-4-1 of the French Criminal Code, which punishes identity theft with one year’s imprisonment and a fine of €15,000, including when it is committed on a public online communications network. The official text states: “Le fait d’usurper l’identité d’un tiers ou de faire usage d’une ou plusieurs données de toute nature permettant de l’identifier” is punishable in the circumstances defined by the provision. In English, the provision targets the misuse of information capable of identifying another person, not merely a forged paper document. The current text of Article 226-4-1 of the French Criminal Code is the starting point for a French analysis.

The important point is that the Court of Justice has not yet decided whether a limited set of IP log records falls on the identity-data side or the traffic-data side of the line. A defence submission should preserve both arguments. First, the requested records may be sufficiently limited that the one-year online-identity threshold is relevant. Second, if the records are treated as traffic data, the investigator must show why the French statutory conditions and the Charter’s necessity and proportionality requirements are met. The public interest in identifying an anonymous online actor is real, but it does not erase the obligation to ask for the smallest technically useful data set.

The case also exposes a problem created by digital investigations. A platform may retain information for a short period, while a criminal file can remain at the complaint or preliminary-investigation stage for months. The Catania court asked for an expedited procedure because delay could cause the evidence to disappear. That urgency is legitimate, but urgency should change the timetable, not the legal test. A preservation request may be necessary to stop deletion. It does not by itself prove that later production of every available log, location record or message content is proportionate.

B. What Article 60-1-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure already permits

French law already contains a tailored mechanism for technical connection data. Article 60-1-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the words “A peine de nullité,” meaning that non-compliance can expose the request and the resulting evidence to nullity. It then provides that requests for technical data identifying the source of a connection, terminal-equipment data, traffic data or location data are possible only when the needs of the proceedings require them and one of the listed situations exists. The official text of Article 60-1-2 should be read before any French request is converted into a European certificate.

The provision contains four routes. The first concerns a crime or an offence punishable by at least three years’ imprisonment. The second concerns an offence punishable by at least one year when it was committed through an electronic communications network and the request has the sole purpose of identifying the perpetrator. The third allows a victim to request technical data concerning the victim’s own terminal equipment in an offence punishable by imprisonment. The fourth covers missing-person procedures and a special organised-crime procedure. Article 226-4-1 identity theft committed online can therefore fall within the second route, but only if the actual request is limited to identification and the other procedural requirements are satisfied.

This is where the wording of a European order becomes decisive. “Identifying the perpetrator” is narrower than proving the entire case. A French prosecutor who seeks the IP address used to open a fake account may have a defensible identification purpose. A request that also seeks all login history, the contents of private messages, the account’s complete contact graph and the user’s location history is a different measure. The authority should explain why each additional category is necessary. A provider, a validation judge and a defence lawyer should be able to tell from the certificate where identification ends and general surveillance begins.

Article 60-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure supplies the general requisition power for information likely to assist an investigation, including information from a computer system or nominative data processing. Its official wording allows a prosecutor or police officer to request information “notamment sous forme numérique,” while preserving the specific limits of Article 60-1-2. The official text of Article 60-1 also provides a sanction for a person who fails to answer a lawful requisition in the required circumstances. The general power cannot be used as a way around the special safeguards for connection and location data.

The file becomes more sensitive when the target is a lawyer. Article 60-1-1 requires a reasoned order from the judge responsible for liberty and custody when the requisition concerns connection data issued by a lawyer and linked to the use of an electronic communications network. The order must state plausible reasons to suspect that the lawyer committed or attempted the offence, or a related offence, and must assess proportionality. The bar president must be notified. These safeguards are not optional drafting details: the statute expressly attaches nullity to the required formalities. The official text of Article 60-1-1 is therefore essential whenever an international investigation touches a law firm, counsel’s account or professional communications.

The same discipline applies during a judicial investigation. Article 99-3 permits the investigating judge, or an authorised judicial police officer, to requisition documents likely to assist the investigation, including computer-system records, while preserving the protection of legally privileged persons and the rules linked to Article 60-1-2. The official text of Article 99-3 uses the expression “sans motif légitime” in relation to professional secrecy. In practice, the judge should identify the exact provider, account, date range and data category rather than issue a general order for the provider’s entire archive.

French counsel should also distinguish a provider requisition from more intrusive technical surveillance. During a preliminary investigation, Article 77-1-1 provides a separate route for requesting information likely to assist the inquiry, subject to Article 60-1-2 and its data safeguards. The official text of Article 77-1-1 should be checked when the authority describes an IP request as a routine information requisition. At the other end of the scale, Article 706-102-1 concerns a technical device that can access, record, retain and transmit computer data without the person’s consent. The official text of Article 706-102-1 makes clear that this is a different investigative technique, not a substitute for the conditions governing a narrow cross-border identification request. An order authorising that type of capture must itself identify the offence and duration, with the nullity safeguard set out in Article 706-102-3.

There are at least five immediate French defence questions. Was the offence correctly classified as an online offence? Is the maximum statutory penalty sufficient, rather than the sentence that the investigator expects to obtain? Does the certificate genuinely seek only identification, or does it quietly seek traffic, location or content data? Was the competent judicial authority involved where the measure requires it? And is the requested period no longer than the period needed to connect a specific act to a specific account?

The answer to the last question is often evidential rather than abstract. If the fake profile was created on 4 July and the complaint identifies three suspect messages on 5 July, a request for IP access records from the creation date to the service of the order may be explainable. A request for five years of account activity requires a different justification. The fact that a platform can technically export more information does not establish that the French procedure authorises the export.

The pending Uffida reference may eventually clarify how this French threshold interacts with the Charter and Regulation 2023/1543. Until then, investigators should draft conservatively and defence teams should preserve a record of each data category requested. The most useful challenge is often not a general objection to digital evidence. It is a targeted objection showing that the authority used a permissible identification objective to obtain a much broader behavioural dataset.

II. What does the live EU e-Evidence system change for French cross-border cases?

A. How an EPOC or EPOC-PR reaches a foreign service provider

The new European route changes the location question. Under Article 1 of Regulation 2023/1543, a Member State authority may issue a European Production Order or a European Preservation Order to a service provider offering services in the Union and established, or represented, in another Member State, regardless of where the data are physically stored. That design responds to the reality of cloud services: a French investigator may deal with an Irish or Luxembourg establishment even when the account user, the offence and the relevant device are in France.

A European Production Order seeks the production of electronic evidence. A European Preservation Order seeks to preserve evidence for a later production request. The two instruments must not be confused. Preservation protects against deletion. It does not automatically disclose the data to the issuing authority. Production requires a separate legal basis and a category-specific request. The certificate should identify the service, the account or identifier, the period, the data sought and the offence under investigation.

The Commission describes the operational promise in precise terms: the provider will be “obliged to respond within 10 days, and within 8 hours in cases of emergency.” That is a major change compared with the time commonly associated with a European Investigation Order or mutual legal assistance. The European Commission’s e-Evidence guidance also explains that an order may seek emails, text messages, application messages or information needed to identify a perpetrator as a first step.

The shorter timetable creates a new practical risk for the defence. A person may learn of the request after the provider has preserved or transmitted the data. A lawyer should therefore ask early whether the French investigation involves a foreign service provider, whether a preservation request has been sent, and whether a production order is being prepared. A challenge made after the data have been integrated into the file can still matter, but it is harder to prevent unnecessary dissemination once copies exist in several systems.

Article 5 of the Regulation is the key classification provision. Subscriber data and data requested solely to identify a user may be requested for any type of offence. Traffic data and content data are subject to a serious-offence limit, subject to the Regulation’s detailed exceptions and conditions. The rule makes the Uffida question unavoidable: if an IP address and time stamp are treated as user-identification data, the order may be available in a minor online-identity case; if the same records are treated as traffic data, the serious-offence safeguard becomes central. The official Regulation text must be read together with the certificate annexes, not reduced to the label “IP address.”

The issuing authority also remains responsible for legality. The fact that the provider is abroad does not transfer the French authority’s duty to apply French procedural law, the Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Regulation’s own conditions. Direct transmission is not a licence to avoid judicial validation. If French law requires a judge for the requested data, the certificate should show that the required judicial decision exists and identify its reasoning.

The provider’s role is structured but not passive. It must act expeditiously to preserve the relevant data, maintain confidentiality and integrity, and respond within the applicable deadline. It may have grounds to refuse or seek clarification, particularly where the order is incomplete, conflicts with immunities or privileges, or concerns a category of data for which the Regulation’s conditions are not met. A French provider receiving an order from another Member State should not assume that the foreign label “production order” resolves the question of legal privilege under French law.

The system is not identical to mutual legal assistance. Article 1(4) excludes proceedings initiated for the purpose of providing mutual legal assistance to another Member State or a third country. An order issued under the Regulation is a direct judicial-cooperation instrument aimed at a provider or its designated establishment. A request involving a non-EU country, a provider with no Union establishment or a category outside the Regulation may require another instrument. The correct route must be decided before the authority promises the court that the evidence will arrive within ten days.

The companion Directive (EU) 2023/1544 matters for the recipient. Providers offering services in the Union must designate an establishment or appoint a legal representative able to receive and comply with orders. That representative is not necessarily the location of the data or the company’s headquarters. It is the procedural address through which the order operates. A company that has ignored its designation duties may create avoidable disputes about service, deadlines and the identity of the person authorised to respond.

Finally, the Commission’s implementation material warns that written communication through the decentralised IT system does not become mandatory on exactly the same timetable as the Regulation’s substantive application. The Commission lists contingency arrangements and technical guidance for the transition. That distinction is important in a live case: a temporary technical channel should not be mistaken for a substantive waiver of the order’s legal conditions, and a technical delay should not be used to extend a preservation request without a reasoned decision.

B. How should a person or lawyer challenge data collected abroad?

The first step is to identify the decision to challenge. There may be a French criminal investigation, a judicial decision authorising the request, a European Production Order Certificate, a provider response, and a later decision admitting the data into evidence. Each document can raise a different issue. A person should not wait for the trial court to discover the chain. The defence should ask for the certificate, the underlying decision, the provider’s designation, the requested categories, the period, the emergency justification if any, and the record of transmission.

The second step is to classify the data with precision. “IP data” is not enough. Ask whether the request seeks a subscriber name, an account-registration IP, a login history, source ports, timestamps, device identifiers, location data, message content or a complete export. The more the request reveals the person’s habits or relationships, the stronger the argument that it concerns traffic or content data rather than a narrow identity check. The French Article 60-1-2 and the European definitions should be placed next to the certificate in the defence file.

The third step is to test the offence threshold. A prosecutor may rely on a one-year maximum penalty for an online identity offence only when the request has the sole purpose of identifying its perpetrator. If the order is designed to establish motive, prove communications, reconstruct the user’s movements or identify other participants, the “sole purpose” condition becomes contestable. The wording should be compared with the technical fields in the provider’s production. A certificate asking for “all logs” is difficult to reconcile with a narrow purpose unless the authority explains the exact fields and time window.

The fourth step is to test prior judicial review and independence. The Prokuratuur judgment, C-746/18, EU:C:2021:152, is a useful reference where the access could seriously interfere with private life. The question is not whether a prosecutor is a judicial authority in the abstract. It is whether the authority that approved access provided an independent and proportionate review of the actual data requested. For lawyer data, the French route is more specific: Article 60-1-1 requires a reasoned liberty-and-custody judge order, plausible suspicion and notification to the bar president.

The fifth step is to use the French nullity framework. Article 60-1-2 begins “A peine de nullité.” If the request falls within the article and the statutory conditions are not met, the defence should identify the defect and the prejudice caused by the use of the data. The same analysis can cover an order issued without the required judge, a request that exceeds the offence threshold, a missing explanation of necessity, or a production that materially exceeds the certificate. A technical error in the provider’s export may add an integrity challenge, especially if the authority cannot show what was preserved and when.

The sixth step is to use European case law without overstating it. La Quadrature du Net, C-470/21, EU:C:2024:370, arose from a French reference concerning IP addresses and an online graduated-response system. The Court examined the conditions for access to identity information associated with an IP address, including safeguards against abuse and unlawful use. That judgment is especially useful because it shows that a French authority may access limited identification data in an online enforcement system only within a carefully designed framework. It does not mean that a production order may silently expand into general monitoring.

The Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Bolzano judgment, C-178/22, EU:C:2024:371, belongs in the same chain of analysis. The Court’s electronic-communications case law distinguishes the seriousness of different categories of metadata and insists that a national measure be necessary and proportionate. A defence team should cite the exact case number and paragraphs relevant to the data category, then connect them to the certificate’s fields. A general citation to “privacy law” is less effective than showing that the order asks for data the authority did not need to identify the account user.

The seventh step is to preserve the cross-border objection. Direct service on a provider in another Member State does not remove the possibility of a conflict with French professional secrecy, legal privilege or fundamental rights. Article 99-3 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure remains relevant where the request touches documents in a judicial investigation. The provider’s Member State may also have a role in a refusal or enforcement procedure, depending on the category of data and the ground relied upon. Counsel should identify the forum and deadline rather than send an informal objection to a generic compliance email.

The eighth step is to distinguish preservation from production in the remedy sought. A person may accept that a provider must preserve a narrow set of records while disputing the later disclosure of the full set. A court can also be asked to exclude data that were collected beyond the certificate, to order destruction of irrelevant copies, or to prevent dissemination to a third authority. The remedy should track the defect. If the problem is only overbreadth, a narrowed production may be more persuasive than a demand to erase every record connected to the account.

The case law also prevents a false choice between cybercrime enforcement and privacy. In Ministerio Fiscal, the Court recognised that identifying the user of a device can be important in an investigation that is not classified as the most serious crime. In Tele2 Sverige and Prokuratuur, it insisted that access capable of a serious interference needs stronger safeguards. In La Quadrature du Net, it examined the particular structure of IP-address access in a public enforcement scheme. The correct response to Uffida should follow the same graduated method: identify the exact data, measure the interference, apply the offence threshold, and verify independent review.

The practical checklist for a French lawyer is therefore short but demanding. Obtain the underlying order and the EPOC or EPOC-PR. Identify the provider’s Member-State establishment or representative. Separate subscriber, user-identification, traffic, location and content fields. Compare the request with Article 60-1-2. Test the one-year online-offence route against the actual purpose. Check the Article 60-1-1 safeguards if a lawyer or professional account is involved. Verify the emergency reasoning and preservation date. Challenge excess data before the first hearing, and ask the court to state what can lawfully remain in the file.

Conclusion

The European e-Evidence Regulation has changed the speed and direction of cross-border criminal investigations, but it has not abolished the distinction between an IP identifier and a behavioural record. The pending C-427/25 Uffida reference places that distinction in a live online identity-theft case. Its answer could affect how French authorities use the one-year route in Article 60-1-2 and how providers classify login histories, source ports and timestamps.

For now, the safest legal position is precise rather than absolute. A narrow request genuinely limited to identifying the user may fall within the lower threshold. A request for a history of access, communications or locations requires a more serious justification and stronger review. The new European certificate is a faster channel, not a shortcut around French procedure, the Charter, privilege or proportionality. Anyone whose account, device or professional communications are targeted should obtain the documents quickly and challenge the data category, purpose, period and judicial authorisation before the evidence is treated as settled.

If a French or foreign authority has requested your IP logs, cloud data, messages or account records, an early review can identify the correct remedy before the evidence is used in court.

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