KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
European Arrest Warrant in France: Why the EU’s 57.65-Day Figure Makes Every Deadline Matter

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

European Arrest Warrant in France: Why the EU’s 57.65-Day Figure Makes Every Deadline Matter

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

European Arrest Warrant in France: Why the EU’s 57.65-Day Figure Makes Every Deadline Matter

New European Commission figures put a precise number on the pressure created by a European Arrest Warrant (EAW): where the person did not consent to surrender, the average procedure lasted 57.65 days from arrest in 2024. Across the Member States that supplied the relevant data, 7,955 people were arrested and 5,272 were effectively surrendered. Those figures are a news signal, but they are also a practical warning. A person arrested in France cannot treat the EAW as an ordinary extradition request, and cannot assume that the figure of sixty days is a safe period in which to wait before preparing a defence.

This article explains what the new data changes for a person sought by another European country while physically present in France. The decisive questions are procedural: when did the French clock start, did the person consent, was the warrant complete, were the hearings held within the statutory sequence, and has the issuing authority supplied the information needed for a lawful decision? The answer depends on the French Code of Criminal Procedure, the Framework Decision system and the individual record, not on the European average. A French lawyer’s role is to turn the published statistics into a day-by-day audit of the file, while preserving arguments on identity, refusal grounds, detention, specialty, family life, health and the conditions of surrender.

The immediate practical message is simple: an EAW hearing in France is not a trial about guilt. It is a rapid judicial decision on identity, legal conditions and surrender. The file must therefore be reviewed before the first hearing, and every date must be recorded. The Commission’s official statistical page reports the 2024 average and the underlying 2024 EAW quantitative-information working document; the French procedural rules explain how an individual case moves through the courts.

I. What do the EU’s new EAW statistics mean for a person arrested in France?

A. Why do 7,955 arrests and 5,272 surrenders not equal automatic surrender?

The first mistake is to read the European figures as a surrender rate that applies mechanically to every person arrested in France. The Commission’s working document is a questionnaire-based snapshot of the practical operation of the EAW in 2024. It records activity reported by national authorities, and the Commission warns that the answers are not complete for every question. The total therefore measures a system under pressure, not the legal outcome of any particular warrant. A person must still be identified, heard, assisted and placed in the statutory decision-making framework of the executing State.

The second mistake is to confuse an arrest with a completed proceeding. The document records 7,955 requested persons arrested in the reporting group, while 5,272 people were effectively surrendered. The figures do not mean that every difference represents an unlawful delay or an eventual refusal. Some proceedings were opened in a different reporting period, some warrants were withdrawn, some persons were not surrendered for reasons outside the executing court’s control, and the national returns were not perfectly symmetrical. The number is still significant because it shows the scale of liberty decisions being made across the Union, but it cannot replace a file-specific chronology.

The Commission reports that 66.27% of the arrests in the relevant dataset resulted in surrender, and that 71.12% of the proceedings recorded as initiated resulted in effective surrender. The figures may sound reassuring to issuing authorities, but they are equally important for defence lawyers: more than one third of arrests in the first comparison did not end in a recorded surrender during the dataset. The reason may be procedural, factual or statistical. It is precisely why a person should not accept a narrative that the EAW is merely an administrative transfer.

French law places the first control on the executing State’s judicial authorities. Under Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the opening words are categorical: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants”. The provision then sets out mandatory refusal situations, including extinction by amnesty in the circumstances described by the statute, a final decision for the same facts subject to the statutory conditions, an age below thirteen at the time of the facts, and a discriminatory purpose or discriminatory risk. These are not arguments about whether the foreign accusation is persuasive. They are legal conditions for execution.

Other controls are optional or depend on the offence and the information supplied. Article 695-23 states: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.” The same article removes the double-criminality check for listed categories carrying the required level of punishment in the issuing State. That distinction matters in urgent practice. A lawyer must identify the precise category relied upon, the penalty threshold and the wording of the warrant; a generic objection that the foreign offence has a different label may not be enough.

Article 695-22 and Article 695-23 therefore create a legal filter that sits beneath the European statistics. The executing court does not reopen the foreign trial. It checks whether the statutory refusal grounds, the information in the warrant and the applicable safeguards allow France to surrender the person. The defence should frame its submissions in that language. A long account of innocence may be emotionally compelling but legally misdirected if the issue is an incomplete warrant, a prior final judgment, an absent-trial problem, a limitation issue, a constitutional identity problem or a concrete fundamental-rights risk.

The case-law confirms the limited but real function of the French hearing. In Criminal Chamber, 5 December 2023, no. 23-86.232, the Cour de cassation described the EAW hearing as a procedure that does not ask the French courts to gather accusation evidence about the requested person. It held that the hearing is directed to identity, observations about the procedure and the choice to consent or not to consent, rather than an interrogation about the facts covered by the warrant. That distinction is a protection and a limitation: the hearing is not the place to conduct the foreign trial, but it is the place to preserve procedural objections before the decision becomes final.

The recent French decision dated 29 July 2026, Criminal Chamber, no. 26-84.072, is another reminder that the first appearance is preliminary. The Court’s published summary states that the hearing under Article 695-30 serves to establish identity, receive observations on the procedure and allow the person to consent or refuse, and that it takes place before the merits debate. A person who uses that first stage to speak about every foreign allegation without first checking identity, consent and the warrant’s legal structure may lose the chance to present the arguments that the French court can actually decide.

B. What does a 57.65-day average reveal about the French deadline clock?

The Commission’s central sentence is unusually useful for practice: “From the day of arrest, the surrender procedure took an average of 24 days, when the requested person consented, and 57.65 days when the person did not consent”. The average is not a new legal deadline. It is an operational measurement. Yet it exposes the difference between two cases that may look identical on a police notice: consenting may produce a seven-day French decision route, while refusing surrender triggers a more elaborate timetable, a possible cassation appeal and a different detention strategy.

The Commission also records that the average is not a guarantee of compliance. Its public summary notes that “some Member States do not always take the decision on whether or not to execute an EAW within the prescribed time limits.” The 2024 working document records 195 cases in which the ninety-day maximum was exceeded in the Member States reporting that item. France reported no cases beyond that limit in the relevant answer, but a national “zero” is not a substitute for checking the dates of an individual file. It may reflect the reporting period, the definitions used, incomplete answers or a genuinely compliant procedure. The lawyer’s task remains to establish the dates from the record.

At European level, the Commission describes ten days as the period where the person consents and sixty days after arrest where the person does not. In exceptional circumstances, the decision period may reach ninety days, with the issuing authority informed of the reasons. The important legal distinction is between the deadline for the final decision on execution and the later act of physical surrender. Once a final decision has authorised surrender, the person is not entitled to remain in France merely because the transport date is inconvenient. Conversely, the authority cannot turn a transport problem into an indefinite extension of the judicial decision period.

French law expresses the consent choice in Article 695-31. The text provides: “Si la personne recherchée déclare ne pas consentir à sa remise, la chambre de l’instruction statue par une décision dans le délai de vingt jours à compter de la date de sa comparution”. The same provision gives the consent route a seven-day decision period, states that consent is irrevocable after the person has been informed of its legal consequences, and allows a cassation challenge to a non-consensual decision under the statutory conditions. Consent is therefore not a courtesy response. It changes the legal route and should be given only after the person understands the foreign proceedings, the specialty rule and the consequences of losing the French challenge.

The twenty-day period in Article 695-31 must not be confused with the sixty-day European period measured from arrest. They operate at different points in the French procedure. The twenty days concerns the instruction chamber’s decision after the person’s appearance. The sixty-day framework concerns the final decision on execution after arrest, subject to the conditions of the European system and to exceptional extension. A calculation that begins on the wrong date can make a valid application appear late or make a lawful period look expired.

The French implementing provision on the exceptional extension is Article 695-43. It provides that, where the final decision cannot exceptionally be rendered within sixty days from arrest, the competent prosecutor general must immediately inform the issuing judicial authority and give the reasons for the delay; the period is then extended by thirty additional days. If no final decision has been taken within ninety days, the prosecutor general informs the Minister of Justice, who informs Eurojust with the reasons. That sequence creates an accountability trail. It does not make ninety days an ordinary planning target, and it does not erase the need to ask what happened in the individual case.

The Court of cassation’s recent EAW decisions illustrate why the clock must be read with the record. In Criminal Chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.256, the Court considered the handling of assurances relating to medical care in the issuing State. The practical point is that mutual trust does not prevent the executing court from seeking concrete information when a serious and individualised health concern is raised. A medical issue can affect both the substance of the surrender decision and the management of detention, but it must be documented promptly rather than asserted in general terms.

A second recent authority, Criminal Chamber, 13 January 2026, no. 25-88.250, concerns the procedural handling of an appeal in the EAW context. It is a reminder that a defence strategy cannot stop at the hearing date. The notice of the decision, the exact form of the appeal, the record transmitted to the Court and the dates on which each procedural act occurred can determine whether a challenge is examined. Criminal Chamber, 10 February 2026, no. 25-87.769, also shows that the legal effects of surrender, including the principle of specialty, continue to matter after the person has crossed the border. An EAW plan must therefore cover the pre-surrender and post-surrender phases.

The statistic changes the urgency because a non-consensual case can move through the French system quickly while still requiring a dense legal audit. A 57.65-day average leaves little time to obtain a translated warrant, contact counsel in the issuing State, locate a prior judgment, gather medical records, prove residence, verify a conviction in absentia, or test whether the alleged conduct falls within the double-criminality exception. The average is thus a planning warning: the defence should be prepared on day one, not when day fifty-nine appears on the calendar.

II. How can a person challenge an EAW and protect release prospects in France?

A. What must happen during the first 48 hours and the first chamber hearing?

The French process begins with an arrest and a transfer to the competent prosecutor general. Article 695-27 states: “Toute personne appréhendée en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent.” The same article requires information, in a language the person understands, about the existence and content of the EAW, the right to a chosen or appointed lawyer, immediate communication with that lawyer, and the possibility of requesting a lawyer in the issuing State. It also makes the recording of those informations in the official record a condition backed by nullity.

Those first hours should produce a document pack. It should include the arrest notice, the EAW or the information supplied about it, the identity used by the issuing authority, the language of each document, the date and time of arrest, the date and time of presentation, the name of the French authority, the appointed lawyer’s details, any translation request and any indication of a parallel French prosecution. The person should identify immediately any different spelling, date of birth, nationality, photograph, fingerprints or address. Identity is not a minor technicality: if the wrong person is sought, the French court must not treat the foreign narrative as a substitute for proof of identity.

The French prosecutor general checks the regularity of the request and the original or certified copy must arrive within the statutory period described in Article 695-26. That provision directs that, where the requested person is at a known place in France, the EAW may be sent directly by a written-trace method to the territorially competent prosecutor general, who executes it after checking the request’s regularity. It also says that the original or certified copy must arrive no later than six working days after arrest. Counsel should not wait for a final hearing to ask whether the file received is complete, authentic and the correct version.

After the first prosecutorial stage, the instruction chamber is brought into the case. Article 695-29 uses the words: “La chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure.” It then requires the person to appear within five working days from presentation to the prosecutor general. This is the point at which a calendar becomes a defence instrument. The five-working-day period, the date of the first appearance, the consent declaration and every adjournment should be written down separately; merging them into a single “sixty-day deadline” creates avoidable errors.

At the appearance, Article 695-30 provides: “Lors de la comparution de la personne recherchée, la chambre de l’instruction constate son identité et recueille ses déclarations, dont il est dressé procès-verbal.” The hearing is public subject to the statutory exceptions, the public prosecutor and the requested person are heard, and the person may be assisted by counsel and an interpreter. The lawyer should make sure that the client understands what the court is asking: consent to surrender, consent to waive specialty, identity, and observations on the procedure are not interchangeable answers.

The first hearing is not the moment to make a rushed consent decision simply to leave custody more quickly. Article 695-31 requires the chamber to inform a consenting person of the legal consequences and irrevocable character of consent. A client may have a strong reason to accept rapid surrender, but that decision should be informed by the foreign lawyer’s ability to receive the person, the existence of a conviction or a pending prosecution, the possible sentence, any return-to-France guarantee, the specialty rule and the practical conditions of detention abroad. A person who does not consent keeps the right to have the French executing court examine the legal grounds and keeps the statutory cassation route, subject to the procedural rules.

Missing information is not a reason for the defence to remain passive. Article 695-33 states: “Si la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’Etat membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit Etat la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires.” The request should be targeted. Counsel should identify the missing field, explain why it affects a refusal ground or a fundamental-rights assessment, and ask the court to place the response and translation in the record.

Recent French case-law on the first hearing is useful in this respect. The summary for Criminal Chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, explains that the identity-and-statements hearing is a preliminary formality before the debate. It does not authorise the chamber to skip the later legal analysis, and it does not turn the hearing into a merits trial. The defence should use that division of functions to keep the submissions ordered: identity first, procedural regularity second, refusal grounds third, detention and surrender consequences fourth.

The record should also address language. An English-speaking client in France may understand everyday French while lacking the ability to follow a rapid criminal hearing or a technical EAW form. The request for an interpreter and translated documents should be made early and recorded. A translation that omits the description of the conviction, the issuing authority, the period of custody or the procedural status can affect the ability to challenge the warrant. The European Commission’s EAW guidance recognises interpretation, translation, information, access to a lawyer and legal aid as procedural safeguards; those safeguards only help if they are requested and used in the actual file.

B. What remedies exist when the decision or surrender runs late?

Detention is the immediate pressure point. A person may be released, kept in custody or placed under judicial control or electronic home detention depending on the procedural stage and the court’s assessment of the risk of evasion. Article 695-34 states that release may be requested at any time before the instruction chamber, subject to the statutory forms. It requires the lawyer to be summoned at least forty-eight hours before the hearing and requires a decision as soon as possible, and no later than fifteen days after receipt of the request, subject to the special rule where the first appearance has not yet occurred.

A release application should be practical rather than generic. It should give a stable address, identity documents, employment or family evidence, proof of residence in France, a proposed reporting schedule, passport arrangements, a proposed electronic-monitoring address where appropriate and a clear explanation of why the client will attend every hearing. If the defence relies on illness, it should attach current medical evidence and explain the care required. If the person has already answered a foreign summons, that fact should be documented. The court will assess risk in the actual case; a bare promise to remain available is less useful than a verifiable plan.

Judicial control and electronic home detention can be modified or lifted. Article 695-35 allows the instruction chamber to order the lifting or modification of those measures at any time and requires it to rule within fifteen days of referral. A defence lawyer should therefore review the restrictions as the case develops. A condition that was proportionate on the arrest date may become excessive after the person has attended the first hearing, supplied the documents requested by the court and offered a reliable surrender guarantee. Conversely, missing an obligation can damage the release position and lead to a new arrest warrant under Article 695-36.

The remedies differ depending on the decision. If the person consented, the French chamber’s decision on the statutory conditions is not ordinarily open to the same challenge as a non-consensual decision. If the person refused, Article 695-31 allows a cassation appeal by the prosecutor general or the requested person under the conditions of Articles 568-1 and 574-2. The appeal is not a second trial on the foreign facts. It is a review of legal errors, procedural defects, failure to answer submissions, misapplication of a refusal ground or insufficient reasoning. The lawyer must identify the exact decision, the notification date, the procedural record and the legal point that can be argued at cassation.

A delay can create several different questions. First, has the instruction chamber taken its final decision within the applicable period? Second, if the sixty-day period was exceeded, did the prosecutor general notify the issuing authority and state reasons, and was the exceptional thirty-day extension properly engaged? Third, if ninety days passed without a final decision, was Eurojust informed through the route in Article 695-43? Fourth, is the person still detained, and is detention still necessary and proportionate? Fifth, has a later cassation decision with remand created a new twenty-day period for the chamber? Each question has a separate legal consequence; no single “late” label answers them all.

Physical surrender has its own deadline. Article 695-37 requires the prosecutor general to take the necessary measures for surrender no later than ten days after the final decision, subject to the statutory exception. The Commission describes the same general principle at European level: the person should be surrendered as soon as possible on a date agreed between authorities and no later than ten days after the final execution decision. Counsel should ask for the final decision, the date on which it became final, the proposed transport date, the authority responsible for the handover and the reason for any postponement.

Health and age can justify a temporary stay, but the route is narrow. Under Article 695-38, the chamber may postpone surrender temporarily for serious humanitarian reasons, particularly where surrender may have grave consequences because of age or health. The text states that this possibility does not prevent the measures under Article 695-37 and requires the prosecutor general to inform the issuing authority and agree a new date. A health argument should be backed by a clinician’s report addressing the concrete consequences of travel, detention or interruption of treatment, not by a diagnosis alone. The requested person must also understand that postponement is not a refusal of the EAW.

France may have its own proceedings or sentence. Article 695-39 allows the instruction chamber, after ruling on execution, to defer surrender where the person is prosecuted in France or has been convicted there and must serve a sentence for facts different from those in the EAW. The provision also allows temporary surrender by written agreement with the issuing authority. This can be decisive for a client who has a French trial, a French custodial sentence or an imminent release date. The defence should provide the French file references and ask the court to address the sequencing expressly rather than treating the foreign warrant as the only proceeding in existence.

Residence and family ties can also be relevant, but they must be connected to a statutory guarantee or a rights argument. A French national or a person regularly resident in France for at least five uninterrupted years may ask for the execution of a surrender to be conditioned on the ability to return to France to serve the sentence that may be imposed by the issuing State, under Article 695-32. That guarantee is not a general power to stop prosecution abroad. It is a specific condition whose wording, eligibility and consequences must be checked against the warrant and the foreign sentence.

Fundamental-rights objections must be individualised. Mutual recognition is the operating principle of the EAW, but it does not remove the executing court’s duty to examine a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, denial of a fair trial, a structural deficiency combined with an individual risk, or another applicable refusal ground. The defence should identify the receiving prison, the detention conditions, the medical need, the trial status, the availability of a remedy and the link between the evidence and the person concerned. A general report about a country may be a starting point, but the court will need a reasoned connection to the proposed surrender.

Finally, the specialty rule must be protected. A person surrendered for the offence described in the EAW is not simply delivered into unrestricted foreign jurisdiction. The law of the issuing State and the EAW framework restrict prosecution or detention for other conduct unless the relevant conditions and consents are met. The issue can arise immediately when the foreign authority asks for a waiver and later when prosecutors seek to add charges. The case-law link for Criminal Chamber, 10 February 2026, no. 25-87.769 belongs in that post-surrender analysis. The client should keep the final French decision, the EAW, the consent record and any specialty waiver in a secure file for the foreign defence team.

The best response to the Commission’s 57.65-day figure is a written checklist. On day one, record the arrest and request the warrant, translations and counsel in both States. Before the first French appearance, audit identity, authenticity, the issuing authority, the procedural status, the sentence or prosecution, limitation, prior judgments, absent-trial safeguards, double criminality, nationality or residence, family ties, health, detention conditions and any French proceedings. At the hearing, state clearly whether consent is given and whether specialty is waived. After the decision, calendar the notification, cassation route, detention review, finality date, ten-day surrender period, transport and any guarantee. The numbers show how little room there is for an unstructured defence. For the procedural meaning of the first appearance, see the firm’s analysis of the 29 July 2026 French decision on the preliminary EAW hearing; that companion page explains why the first hearing does not decide the foreign accusation, while this article adds the statistical and deadline analysis needed to plan the rest of the surrender procedure.

Conclusion

The EU’s 2024 EAW figures make the French procedure more visible, not less legal. A 57.65-day average for non-consensual cases is a system-level measurement; it is not permission to delay a defence and not proof that a person will be surrendered on day sixty. The relevant questions are the arrest date, the first forty-eight hours, the five-working-day appearance, the consent choice, the twenty-day chamber route, the sixty-day decision framework, the exceptional ninety-day reporting path, the ten-day surrender period and the remedies available at each stage.

For a person arrested in France, the central advantage is that the EAW is decided by a court under a defined legal framework. The central risk is that the framework moves quickly and a missed objection may become difficult to repair after a final decision or physical surrender. The answer is a file-specific audit supported by the warrant, the official record, certified translations, medical and residence evidence, the relevant Légifrance provisions and the current Cour de cassation decisions cited above. The foreign accusation will ultimately be tested in the issuing State; the French hearing decides whether the requested person can lawfully be sent there and on what conditions.

📄 Official circular