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Rima Hassan’s October Trial: Can France Prosecute an EU Lawmaker for Online Terrorism Apology?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Rima Hassan’s October Trial: Can France Prosecute an EU Lawmaker for Online Terrorism Apology?

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France is preparing to try European Parliament member Rima Hassan on 19 and 20 October 2026 over a social-media post that reportedly referred to Kozo Okamoto, one of the authors of the 1972 attack at Tel Aviv airport. The case has an unusually international profile: the defendant is an elected European lawmaker, the post is part of a political argument about Palestine and armed resistance, and the French investigation has reached across borders for travel and communications records. A report by Le Monde on 27 August 2026 says the Paris criminal court adjourned the case to that October hearing after the proceedings opened in July. The question is not whether a controversial political opinion is automatically criminal. It is whether the precise words, viewed in their full context, crossed France’s statutory line against publicly praising terrorist acts or their authors, and whether the investigation respected the procedural and parliamentary protections that apply to a serving MEP. This article analyses the legal architecture without predicting guilt. The separate narcotics inquiry connected with legal CBD reportedly ended after laboratory testing; it is not the charge that will be tried in October.

I. Why can France prosecute Rima Hassan for a post published online?

A. What the October hearing actually concerns

The October hearing concerns an alleged offence of public apology of terrorism, not a prosecution for holding a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That distinction is decisive. French criminal law does not punish every harsh, shocking or politically one-sided statement about an armed conflict. It punishes conduct that satisfies a defined statutory offence, and the court must identify the words and acts that supposedly satisfy each element.

The central provision is Article 421-2-5 of the French Penal Code. Its first paragraph provides: “Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l’apologie de ces actes est puni de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 75 000 € d’amende.” In English, the provision covers two different behaviours: direct provocation to terrorist acts and public praise of those acts. The online form carries higher penalties, seven years’ imprisonment and a €100,000 fine, when the conduct is committed through an online public communication service.

Public apology is not identical to operational assistance, membership of a terrorist organisation or direct instructions to attack. Its distinctive legal question is whether the communication presents terrorist acts or their perpetrators in a favourable light. In Cass. crim., 25 April 2017, no. 16-83.331, the Criminal Division gave the governing formulation: “le délit d’apologie d’actes de terrorisme […] consiste dans le fait d’inciter publiquement à porter sur ces infractions ou leurs auteurs un jugement favorable”. That short formula is the line the Paris court will have to apply to the post, the account, the linked material and the circumstances of publication.

The procedural description reported publicly is narrow but important. According to Le Monde, the prosecution relates to a 26 March 2026 post that cited Kozo Okamoto, a Japanese member of the Japanese Red Army who took part in the 1972 attack at Lod Airport, now Ben Gurion Airport. Hassan later deleted the post, according to the same report. Those facts do not by themselves establish an offence. A reference to a historical actor may be condemnation, historical analysis, a quotation, provocation, irony, or praise. The court must read the exact post, not a headline, a screenshot cropped to one sentence, or a later political summary.

French case law nevertheless gives prosecutors a demanding but usable framework. The 2017 decision involved a public display that placed references to victims and an attacker on an equal footing. The Court held that the surrounding public conduct could constitute apology even where the defendant denied an intention to legitimise terrorism. The lesson is not that intent is irrelevant; it is that the objective meaning of a public communication and the defendant’s deliberate act of dissemination can allow the court to infer the required mental element.

A later online case, Cass. crim., 27 November 2018, no. 17-83.602, concerned an interview put online in which the speaker described terrorists as courageous while also claiming to oppose their ideology. The case illustrates why a political debate label is not conclusive. The judges examined the words in the interview as a whole, their public distribution, the speaker’s profile and the way the statement could be understood by its audience. The fact that a communication concerns public affairs protects the debate from careless restrictions; it does not transform an express favourable judgment into a legally protected category.

The most relevant recent authority is Cass. crim., 31 March 2026, no. 24-86.949, published in the Bulletin. The case concerned a Facebook publication describing the 7 October 2023 attacks as an obvious act of resistance. The Court upheld the conviction and stated that the words “conféraient un caractère laudatif” to acts whose terrorist character was not contested, and “ainsi incitaient publiquement à porter sur de tels actes ou sur leurs auteurs un jugement favorable”. That authority is especially significant for Hassan’s case because it addresses online political expression about the same conflict, the effect of a public relay without adequate qualification, and the boundary between contextual argument and laudatory presentation.

The 2026 decision does not decide Hassan’s case. It does, however, show how the prosecution may frame it: not as a demand that the defendant endorse a government narrative, but as an allegation that a particular public reference assigned a favourable meaning to a person connected with a terrorist attack. The defence can contest the factual analogy. Okamoto’s identity, the historical event, the wording of the post, the intended audience, the use of quotation, the surrounding posts and any explicit condemnation may all differ. The court must still perform that comparison rather than treating the recent precedent as an automatic answer.

The constitutional framework also matters. In Decision no. 2018-706 QPC of 18 May 2018, the Constitutional Council upheld the relevant wording of Article 421-2-5 and related penalties, while requiring the offence to be read with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. The ruling means that an argument based only on the abstract existence of the offence is unlikely to succeed. The live dispute will be application: whether the particular communication was sufficiently clear, publicly favourable and intentional, and whether the proposed sanction is proportionate in a political debate.

That is why the word “apology” should not be used as a journalistic synonym for disagreement with France, Israel, Palestine, the European Union or any other state. It is a legal conclusion that must follow from the content and context of the communication. If the October court finds that the publication merely reported, criticised or analysed a historical event without inviting a favourable judgment on a terrorist act or its author, the statutory element may fail. If the court finds that the reference glorified the attack or its perpetrator for a public audience, the same political setting may not prevent conviction.

B. How EU parliamentary immunity meets French territorial jurisdiction

The second threshold is not the merits of the post. It is whether the prosecution can proceed against a sitting Member of the European Parliament. Hassan’s official European Parliament profile identifies her as an MEP. Her status raises a genuine immunity question, but “immunity” has several legal functions and does not necessarily mean that a case disappears.

Protocol No. 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union contains the first layer. Article 8 states that MEPs “shall not be subject to any form of inquiry, detention or legal proceedings in respect of opinions expressed or votes cast by them in the performance of their duties”. This is a non-liability protection for parliamentary opinions and votes. Its application depends on the connection between the expression and the performance of parliamentary duties; the label “political” is relevant but not conclusive. A personal social-media account, a campaign communication and an intervention in parliamentary work may receive different legal treatment.

Article 9 of the same Protocol provides a second, procedural layer. During parliamentary sessions, an MEP enjoys, in the territory of the home Member State, the immunities accorded to members of that state’s parliament and, in another Member State, immunity from detention and legal proceedings. The Protocol also recognises the European Parliament’s power to waive immunity on request. The official English text is available through Protocol No. 7 on EUR-Lex. A French criminal court therefore cannot simply ignore the MEP’s status, but it must also identify which form of protection is invoked and whether the conditions are met.

France’s own constitutional rule must not be confused with the European rule. Article 26 of the French Constitution protects members of the French Parliament, including non-liability for opinions and votes in the exercise of their functions and restrictions on arrest or coercive measures. The official text is reproduced on Légifrance. Hassan is not a member of the French National Assembly or Senate. Article 26 is relevant only through the Protocol’s reference to national parliamentary immunities and by analogy to the constitutional balance; it is not a free-standing French parliamentary shield that can be invoked without analysis.

Article 8 of the Protocol could become central if the defence argues that the post was an opinion expressed in the performance of European parliamentary duties. The court would then have to ask what the post actually did. Did it report a fact relevant to a parliamentary debate? Did it explain a legal or historical position? Did it speak in an electoral capacity? Did it endorse a terrorist act or individual? The protection is designed to preserve the Parliament’s ability to deliberate and represent citizens, not to confer a personal licence for every communication by an MEP.

The European framework also protects the underlying freedom of expression. Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”, including the right to impart information and ideas without interference and regardless of frontiers. The complete provision is available on EUR-Lex. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights supplies the parallel Strasbourg standard. Neither text removes the state’s ability to prevent terrorist propaganda, but each requires the restriction to be prescribed by law and necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.

Territorial jurisdiction supplies the French connection. Article 113-2 of the Penal Code states: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République.” It adds: “L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire.” The full text is on Légifrance. For an online offence, the court must identify the relevant constituent act: the author’s location, the act of uploading or disseminating, a material part of the public communication, or another legally sufficient territorial link. Mere visibility from France should not be treated as a substitute for reasoned jurisdiction, but an online publication can have several territorial anchors.

This is where the cross-border facts become legally relevant rather than merely sensational. Le Monde reported that investigators sought records from Thalys, Air France and a telecommunications operator to reconstruct travel and communications minute by minute. Those requests may bear on where the defendant was, who controlled the account, how the post was disseminated and whether the French courts have a territorial basis. They may also expose a proportionality question: a wide search for travel data must be connected to the offence and handled under the procedural rules governing digital and personal information.

The prosecution must also respect the special procedural route for terrorism matters. Article 706-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the Paris court and the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor concurrent competence for offences within the terrorism chapter, subject to the statutory allocation of cases. That concentration explains why a Paris criminal chamber may hear a case whose social and political effects reach far beyond France. It does not lower the burden of proof or resolve parliamentary immunity.

The practical answer to the question in the headline is therefore conditional. France can potentially prosecute because its Penal Code reaches public online conduct with a sufficient French territorial link, and because MEP status is a protection to be examined through Protocol No. 7 rather than an automatic dismissal. The prosecution remains vulnerable if it cannot establish the territorial connection, if Article 8 non-liability covers the precise opinion, or if the case treats political context as irrelevant when the European proportionality standards require it to be considered.

II. What will the Paris court test before it can convict?

A. How French judges assess speech, context, intent and digital proof

The court will have to separate four questions that public debate tends to merge: what was actually published; what an ordinary member of the public would understand it to mean; whether the publication concerned a terrorist act or its author; and whether the legal response is proportionate to the protected political expression. A conviction should not rest on the defendant’s reputation, the anger caused by the controversy or the political views of the complainants.

First, the court should establish the text and its publication conditions. It should examine the original post, its timestamp, edits, deletion history, linked images, quoted material, translations, replies and the account’s privacy settings. A post that appears favourable when isolated may acquire a different meaning when read with a sentence of condemnation immediately before it. The reverse is also true: a general statement about civilian suffering may be presented alongside an explicit celebration of an attack. The forensic record must preserve both the incriminating material and the exculpatory context.

French criminal evidence is not confined to one formal category. Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, outside statutory exceptions, “les infractions peuvent être établies par tout mode de preuve et le juge décide d’après son intime conviction”; it also requires the evidence to be discussed contradictorily at the hearing. The provision is reproduced on Légifrance. This rule permits screenshots, platform records, witness accounts, account data and expert analysis, but it does not relieve the prosecution of proving authenticity, attribution and meaning.

Second, the prosecution must prove the public and favourable character of the communication. The word “public” can depend on the account, the audience and the technical setting. A public post by a high-profile elected official may have a very different reach from a private message or a closed group. Article 421-2-5 does not require the prosecution to prove that a reader committed an attack after seeing the post, because public apology is not the same offence as direct incitement followed by an attempt. But the absence of a concrete downstream attack remains relevant to how the words functioned and to proportionality.

Third, intent has to be handled with precision. Article 121-3 of the Penal Code states: “Il n’y a point de crime ou de délit sans intention de le commettre.” The official text is available on Légifrance. The prosecution does not necessarily need to prove a private desire to recruit terrorists. It must prove that the defendant deliberately made the communication and that the legally relevant favourable meaning was not merely the product of an accidental transmission or an unauthorised account. The defendant’s explanation, deletion, corrections, prior and subsequent statements, and the circumstances of drafting may all bear on this analysis.

The 2017 Court of Cassation decision shows how intent may be inferred from voluntary public conduct, even where a defendant says that no legitimisation was intended. The 2018 online decision shows why the complete interview and the public profile were considered. These cases should not be simplified into a rule that subjective intent never matters. They establish that a court may infer intention from the act of choosing, publishing and maintaining a favourable presentation when the meaning is objectively apparent.

The recent no. 24-86.949 judgment adds a proportionality method. The Court stated that, after identifying a direct link between the conduct and expression on a matter of general interest, the judge must assess both the conviction and the sentence in light of the nature and form of the words, the context of expression or distribution, and the seriousness of any damage or disturbance. In the Court’s words, “il appartient au juge […] de vérifier le caractère proportionné de la déclaration de culpabilité, puis de la peine”. The method is especially important here because Hassan’s status and the subject matter make the freedom-of-expression link impossible to dismiss at the outset.

Other decisions show that the penalty analysis is not ceremonial. In Cass. crim., 2 December 2025, no. 24-80.893, the Court considered a prison sentence in a political debate and examined exceptional circumstances, the words’ laudatory character, their indirect relationship with violence, the speaker’s profile and their reach. In Cass. crim., 26 July 2023, no. 23-83.109, the Court treated detention for terrorism apology as an interference with expression that required a proportionality assessment. In Cass. crim., 21 February 2023, no. 22-86.760, it likewise examined whether a temporary professional restriction interfered disproportionately with expression. Those authorities do not promise acquittal, but they make the sentencing record part of the legal analysis from the beginning.

The investigation’s digital methods will also be tested. Article 77-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the prosecutor or an authorised judicial police officer to request information from persons, companies, public bodies or administrations likely to hold information relevant to an investigation, including digital data subject to statutory safeguards. The provision says that the officer may “par tout moyen, requérir de toute personne, de tout établissement ou organisme privé ou public” the relevant information. Its full text appears on Légifrance. A lawful power to requisition information is not a blank cheque: relevance, scope, authorisation and the handling of personal data remain open to challenge.

The same applies to secrecy. Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that, subject to legal exceptions and defence rights, “la procédure au cours de l’enquête et de l’instruction est secrète”. It also permits the prosecutor to release objective elements to correct inaccurate information or prevent public disorder, under the conditions set by law. The text is available on Légifrance. Reports about custody, laboratory testing or requisitions may influence public opinion, but media circulation does not replace proof in court. Nor does a leak automatically invalidate the case; the defence would need to identify a concrete procedural prejudice or a breach of a specific safeguard.

One factual point should remain separate. Le Monde’s second report explains that substances found during the April custody were analysed as legal CBD purchased in Brussels, with a separate material containing THC above the legal threshold, and that the narcotics investigation was closed. That episode may raise questions about the secrecy of the investigation and the fairness of the public narrative, but it is not evidence that the online post amounted to terrorism apology. Treating the two stories as one case would invite precisely the contextual confusion a criminal court should avoid.

B. What a defendant should challenge before the hearing

The first challenge concerns the use of a flagrance investigation. Article 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines a flagrant offence as one committed at that moment or that has just been committed; it also covers a suspect pursued by public outcry or found with objects, traces or indices suggesting participation. The official text says: “Est qualifié crime ou délit flagrant le crime ou le délit qui se commet actuellement, ou qui vient de se commettre.” It is available on Légifrance.

According to the public chronology, the post was made on 26 March and Hassan was taken into custody on 2 April. A seven-day interval does not automatically rule out every form of flagrance: the article also refers to the public outcry and physical or digital traces discovered close to the action, and the prosecution may rely on facts not yet public. But the timing gives the defence a concrete argument. The court should ask what was observed immediately, when the investigators learned of it, whether a real-time trace or public pursuit existed, and whether the flagrance route was used to obtain investigative powers that the facts did not justify. If flagrance was not legally established, the defence can seek exclusion or cancellation of acts that depended on it, subject to the applicable procedural rules and proof of prejudice.

The second challenge is the legal basis and necessity of custody. Article 62-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure describes custody as a coercive measure under judicial control, available where there are one or more plausible reasons to suspect an imprisonable offence and where custody is necessary for one of the statutory investigative purposes. The text, available on Légifrance, begins: “La garde à vue est une mesure de contrainte décidée par un officier de police judiciaire, sous le contrôle de l’autorité judiciaire”. The question is not simply whether the post was controversial. It is whether custody was necessary to establish the truth, prevent destruction of evidence, prevent pressure on witnesses or achieve another statutory purpose.

Article 63-1 requires immediate notification of the reasons for custody and of the person’s rights, including access to a lawyer, interpretation where necessary and the right to remain silent. The official provision is on Légifrance. The defence should compare the written notification with the later charge, identify any delay in access to counsel or interpreter, and check whether statements or device examinations were obtained after an incomplete notification. A procedural challenge is strongest when it identifies the act affected, the legal defect and the concrete prejudice rather than relying on the political importance of the defendant.

The third challenge is territorial and attribution evidence. The prosecution should be required to explain why France is competent under Article 113-2, where the post was created and uploaded, who controlled the account, how the French public was reached, and whether a constituent act occurred in France. A platform screenshot can prove that an image existed at a certain time without proving who created it or whether the screenshot is complete. Travel records can place a person in a country without proving who pressed “publish”. Telecom data can corroborate a chronology without proving the meaning of a statement. Each item must be tied to the element it is offered to prove.

The fourth challenge is the integrity of context. The defence should preserve the entire thread, the post to which Hassan responded, the account’s language and audience, prior and later statements, links, images and comments. It should request the original-language material and reliable translations where a French court is asked to interpret an Arabic, Hebrew, English or Japanese reference. It should distinguish historical description from praise, criticism of a legal classification from endorsement of an attack, and support for a population from support for an armed organisation. That distinction is not semantic decoration: it may decide whether the court finds a favourable judgment at all.

The fifth challenge concerns MEP immunity. A defence filing should identify whether it relies on Article 8 non-liability, Article 9 immunity from legal proceedings, or both. It should explain the parliamentary function of the expression, the timing of the alleged act, the session calendar, and any request to the European Parliament. It should not assume that a court can decide the issue by looking only at the defendant’s title. Conversely, the prosecution should not treat the existence of a criminal complaint as proof that the Parliament’s privileges are irrelevant. The purpose of the Protocol is institutional: the question is whether proceedings impair the Parliament’s work or concern conduct outside the protected field.

The sixth challenge is proportionality at both conviction and sentence. The court should account for the exact reach of the post, its duration online, any correction or deletion, the defendant’s response to the accusation, the presence or absence of a call to violence, the harm alleged by complainants, the public-interest context and the specific need for punishment. The 2026 Court of Cassation decision makes clear that a political context does not prevent a conviction, but it also makes clear that context and reach must be reasoned through. An international audience will scrutinise whether the October judgment does that work visibly and carefully.

The potential consequences explain why this preparation cannot wait until the verdict. Article 422-3 of the Penal Code lists additional penalties that may accompany terrorism-related offences, including restrictions on civic, civil and family rights, a prohibition on exercising a public function or professional activity in the relevant conditions, and a residence ban. The provision is available on Légifrance. Article 131-26 defines the civic rights that may be withdrawn, including voting and eligibility, and provides the framework for the maximum duration applicable to a misdemeanour. Its text is on Légifrance. These consequences must be specifically justified; they do not follow mechanically from a news report or a complaint.

The FIJAIT issue also requires exact language. Article 706-25-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the terrorism-offence file and lists the statutory situations in which identity information may be recorded, including specified convictions and other procedural outcomes. The text is available on Légifrance. A pending public prosecution should not be described as an automatic registration or as a conviction. The court, the prosecution and the media should specify the trigger, the decision and the remedy rather than allowing an alarming acronym to substitute for legal analysis.

Finally, the presumption of innocence remains practical, not ornamental. Article 9-1 of the Civil Code allows a person who is publicly presented as guilty before conviction to seek measures protecting that presumption, including a correction or public statement under the conditions set by law. The provision is reproduced on Légifrance. That protection does not prevent robust reporting or lawful criticism. It does require reporters, politicians and legal commentators to distinguish an allegation, a procedural act, a court finding and a final conviction.

For an international reader, the case therefore offers a test of more than French terrorism law. It tests whether an EU Member State can protect public safety without turning a political controversy into a shortcut around evidence, territorial jurisdiction, parliamentary privilege and proportionality. It also tests whether an elected official can invoke the institutional protection of the European Parliament while accepting that a public communication outside the protected parliamentary function may still be reviewed under ordinary criminal law.

Conclusion

Can France prosecute an EU lawmaker for online terrorism apology? Potentially yes. The French courts have jurisdiction when a constituent act is sufficiently connected with France, Article 421-2-5 can apply to public online communications, and Protocol No. 7 does not make every MEP communication immune from criminal process. But the prosecution must clear several independent hurdles: prove the exact publication and its attribution, establish a favourable presentation of a terrorist act or author, respect the digital and custody safeguards, answer the flagrance and territorial arguments, and address whether the expression was protected by Article 8 or Article 9 of the Protocol.

The October hearing should therefore be watched for method as much as result. The important judgment will explain how a Paris court reads a historical reference made during a live international conflict, how it distinguishes criticism from glorification, how it treats the status of a European lawmaker, and why any conviction or penalty is proportionate. The April CBD episode should remain outside that analysis: it was publicly linked to the custody but, according to the reported laboratory outcome, the narcotics investigation was closed. Neither controversy can replace the proof required for the charge scheduled for October.

We can review the charge, the chronology, the online evidence and the procedural options with you.

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