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CJEU C-26/25 “Bukla”: What France Must Reveal Before Deporting a Parent of an EU Citizen Child

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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CJEU C-26/25 “Bukla”: What France Must Reveal Before Deporting a Parent of an EU Citizen Child

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A new Court of Justice ruling puts a precise limit on the use of national-security material in European return proceedings. In CJEU Case C-26/25, Bukla, judgment delivered on 16 July 2026, the Court examined a return decision adopted after a security authority supplied a confidential, unexplained opinion. The person concerned was a third-country national who had lived in Hungary for many years, had a Hungarian partner and had joint parental responsibility for two Hungarian children. The national authorities did not give him, his lawyer or the court access to the decisive material, or even a meaningful account of its substance. The judgment is now relevant to the way Member States handle removal files involving children, cross-border residence rights and allegations that cannot be fully disclosed. It offers a practical test for lawyers and judges: what information must be communicated, what can remain protected, and how can a court review a decision that relies on material the family has never seen?

The ruling is not an automatic right to remain in France for every parent of a French or European child. It is a procedural and substantive warning. Where the proposed removal falls within EU law, the administration must examine the child’s real dependency, the family’s situation and the consequences of departure. It cannot treat a non-reasoned security opinion as an answer that ends the analysis. Nor can it organise the proceedings so that the affected person never learns enough of the decisive case to challenge it. For a parent facing an obligation de quitter le territoire français (OQTF), an entry ban or a return measure connected with public-security allegations, Bukla changes the questions that must be put before the French administrative court.

I. What does CJEU C-26/25 Bukla change for a parent facing a secret-evidence return decision?

A. Why the Court rejected a binding, unexplained security opinion

The central problem in Bukla was not simply that the file contained classified information. European law recognises that certain intelligence, counter-terrorism material and sources may require protection. The decisive problem was that the security assessment operated as an opaque command. The immigration authority treated the specialist security body’s negative opinion as binding, while the opinion itself did not explain the reasons and the affected person could not inspect the underlying material. That combination removed the meaningful possibility of testing whether the decision was lawful, necessary and proportionate.

The Court’s judgment, identified as ECLI:EU:C:2026:593, places the issue in the wider architecture of EU citizenship, the Return Directive and effective judicial protection. The Court did not say that a Member State must disclose every intelligence report. It did say that a national procedure cannot make the security body’s conclusion automatically decisive while preventing the person and the reviewing court from understanding the substance of the case. The official press release captures the practical rule: a return decision based on classified information “must be capable of forming the subject of an effective remedy”. That is the difference between protected evidence and an unreviewable assertion.

The distinction matters in France because an OQTF may be accompanied by a finding that the person represents a threat to public order, an immediate removal decision or an interdiction de retour sur le territoire français (IRTF). The prefect’s reasoning may refer to police, intelligence or diplomatic material without reproducing it. That does not by itself invalidate the measure. But a generic sentence such as “the security services have issued an unfavourable opinion” cannot replace the administration’s own examination of the person’s situation. The decision must still identify the legal basis, the factual allegation in a usable form and the reasoning linking those facts to the removal measure.

Bukla also separates two questions that are often collapsed. The first is whether a document may remain confidential. The second is whether the person has a fair way to contest the legal and factual consequences drawn from that document. The Court accepted that national rules may restrict direct access to the whole file where national security genuinely requires it. It rejected the idea that confidentiality permits the authorities to withhold the essence of the decisive reasons and then ask a court to defer automatically to the undisclosed opinion.

In practical terms, the French administration must be able to explain why its own decision is justified, even if it cannot reveal sources or operational detail. The administrative judge must be able to test the legal classification, the relevance of the grounds, the individual assessment and proportionality. The person concerned must receive enough information to answer the case: the nature of the alleged risk, the period concerned, the conduct relied upon, the link with the person and the reason the risk is said to make removal necessary. A formula that tells the parent nothing but “national security” leaves the remedy formal rather than effective.

The judgment does not turn every classified-file dispute into a disclosure application. It instead changes the remedy strategy. Counsel should ask what the authority actually communicated, which parts of the decision depend exclusively on the confidential opinion and whether the judge has a procedure capable of testing the substance. The question is not “can I see every page?” It is “can I understand and challenge the decisive reasoning, and can the judge review it without treating secrecy as proof?”

The answer is especially important where the security opinion was produced by a body outside the immigration service. A binding referral mechanism may be convenient for the administration, but it cannot transfer the statutory responsibility for individual assessment to an undisclosed third party. The prefect remains responsible for the legal decision. The court remains responsible for reviewing it. Bukla therefore reaches beyond immigration paperwork: it is a rule about institutional accountability whenever an administrative outcome follows an expert or security opinion that the affected person cannot see.

B. Why an EU-citizen child changes the return analysis

The second part of Bukla concerns the child. The person affected was not assessed in isolation. He had lived in the host Member State for a prolonged period, had a partner there and exercised parental responsibility for children who were Union citizens. The Court required the authorities to examine whether the return decision would, in reality, compel the children to leave the territory of the European Union or to lose the effective benefit of their EU citizenship rights.

That analysis flows from Article 20 TFEU and the Court’s case law on the substance of EU citizenship. Formal nationality is only the starting point. The decisive factual question is dependency: who provides day-to-day care, who supports the child financially, who attends medical or school appointments, who has parental authority, and what would actually happen if the third-country parent were removed? If the other parent can provide all care and the child can remain safely in the Union, the Article 20 argument may be weaker. If the child’s real welfare, care or legal status depends on the parent’s presence, the removal analysis becomes more demanding.

In France, the parent should not present Bukla as a slogan that blocks every OQTF. The correct submission is more precise. The prefect had to identify the child’s EU status, assess the relationship of dependency and explain why removal would not deprive the child of the genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship rights. The same facts may also support arguments under private and family life, the best interests of the child and the proportionality of an IRTF. The evidence must make the relationship concrete rather than relying on a birth certificate alone.

The child’s nationality also matters to the legal route. A French child is an EU citizen, but Article 20 arguments require a real risk that the child would be forced to leave the Union or would lose the substance of the rights attached to that status. A child who can remain in France with the other parent is not automatically in that position. Conversely, a parent who is the child’s principal carer, who has joint authority and whose removal would make family life practically impossible must identify those facts directly. The court should not be invited to infer dependency from the label “parent”; it should be shown the daily reality.

The return decision must also be read with Directive 2008/115/EC. Article 5 requires the Member State to take account of the best interests of the child and family life when applying the return rules. Article 12 requires a return, removal or entry-ban decision to state reasons in fact and in law, subject to the limited restrictions permitted by national law for security-sensitive material. Article 13 requires an effective remedy before an impartial body or tribunal, with power to review the decision and, where appropriate, suspend its execution. Bukla reads those safeguards together rather than allowing a security exception to erase them.

The Charter reinforces the same conclusion. Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights says that the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration and protects the child’s relationship with both parents. Article 47 protects an effective remedy and a fair hearing. Those provisions do not create an unconditional residence permit. They do require the decision-maker and the judge to deal with the child as a rights-holder, not as a collateral detail in an adult’s immigration file.

This is the important cross-border dimension. The child may be French, Hungarian or another EU national, and the parent may be subject to a return decision in a different Member State. The legal issue follows the child’s EU status and the actual dependency relationship, not the nationality of the official who signed the decision. A French court applying EU law must therefore ask whether the removal decision respects the child’s effective EU rights even when the security allegation comes from a foreign database, an inter-agency assessment or a confidential exchange.

At the same time, Bukla does not prevent a Member State from protecting public security. A serious, current and individualised threat may justify removal, and family life is not an immunity from public-order law. The ruling insists on the quality of the reasoning and the effectiveness of the review. The administration must confront the family facts, the age and needs of the child, the parent’s role, the seriousness and currency of the alleged threat, and the possibility of less restrictive measures. A conclusion that the child’s interests lose automatically whenever “security” is written in the file is precisely the kind of shortcut the judgment disallows.

II. What can a person challenge in France when the evidence is classified?

A. Which French family-life and proportionality arguments must be tested?

The first French-law question is the legal foundation of the removal measure. Article L. 611-1 of the CESEDA lists the principal situations in which the administrative authority may issue an OQTF, including irregular entry or stay, certain refusals or withdrawals of a residence document and specified public-order situations. The decision must be examined line by line: the entry and residence history, the stated ground, the document allegedly missing or refused, the country of destination, any voluntary-departure period and the security reasoning are separate issues.

A parent’s status must be analysed without relying on outdated blanket statements. Under the current Article L. 611-3 of the CESEDA, the central statutory protection stated on the page is the protection of a foreign minor from an OQTF. That provision does not mean that an adult parent of a French or EU child is automatically immune from removal. The parent’s family relationship remains powerful evidence for the proportionality review, for the child’s best interests and, where the conditions are met, for EU citizenship arguments. It must be pleaded as a factual and legal assessment, not as an automatic exemption.

The decision-maker must then account for the private and family-life consequences. The file should identify the child’s age, nationality, health, schooling, residence, language, care arrangements and relationship with each parent. It should state whether the parent lives with the child, exercises authority, pays support, collects the child, attends appointments, provides accommodation or performs a role that another adult cannot realistically replace. A court is more likely to see the risk of a forced separation when the evidence describes ordinary life in dates and documents rather than simply asserting “strong family ties”.

The French Conseil d’État’s recent decisions show why a case-by-case record is indispensable. In CE, 10 April 2026, no. 504255, the court considered a person born in France who claimed family ties including a French child, but found on the particular record that long imprisonment, the absence of cohabitation with the child and the other circumstances did not establish a disproportionate interference. The lesson is not that a French child is irrelevant. It is that the court tests the intensity and reality of the relationship alongside the public-order facts.

Likewise, in CE, 9 June 2026, no. 506729, the Conseil d’État examined a Bulgarian national who relied on his relationship with a French child. The decision treated the asserted family ties, the evidence of actual relationships and the seriousness of the conduct together. A parent should therefore anticipate the administration’s counterargument: a legal parent may not be the effective carer, a relationship may be sporadic, or a serious and current threat may outweigh the family interests. Bukla strengthens the demand for an individual assessment; it does not remove the need to prove the facts.

The same proportionality logic applies to the IRTF. Article L. 612-8 of the CESEDA governs the possibility of attaching an entry ban to an OQTF in the situations it covers. Article L. 612-10 requires the duration to be assessed with reference to factors including the length of presence in France, the nature and age of the ties, prior removal measures and the public-order risk. The challenge should not attack the OQTF and leave the IRTF untouched. A five-year exclusion from France can intensify the separation of a child and parent, prevent ordinary contact and affect the child’s practical ability to maintain a relationship with both parents.

There may also be a distinction between the security allegation and the legal result. The administration might say that the person’s conduct justifies a refusal of residence, but that does not automatically answer whether the particular OQTF, the lack of a departure period or the maximum IRTF duration is necessary. Each measure needs its own reasoning. If the security material relates to an old event, a third person, a different identity or an untested allegation, the decision should explain why it remains current and personal. If a less restrictive measure could protect public order while preserving the child’s relationship, that option should be addressed.

The Conseil d’État has also insisted, in a different context, that an authority must examine the complete private and family situation rather than freeze its analysis at an earlier administrative event. CE, 17 October 2014, no. 358767, is useful for that general point: the authority must consider the circumstances as they stand when it decides and cannot ignore relevant developments. In a Bukla-type case, that means a later birth, recognised parental responsibility, a stable care routine, a child’s medical needs or a change in the alleged risk may matter. The evidence must reach the date of the challenged decision and, where procedure allows, identify material developments that the judge can take into account.

Finally, the court should be asked to separate EU-law review from the merits of the security claim. Article 20 TFEU does not require the French judge to substitute a view on intelligence operations. It does require the judge to determine whether the legal test was applied, whether the child’s rights were assessed, whether the person received the essence of the case and whether the final measure is proportionate. A national-security label cannot make those questions disappear.

B. Which documents and remedies can make the review effective?

Speed is the first practical issue. Article L. 614-1 of the CESEDA provides the route for challenging an OQTF, the refusal of a voluntary-departure period, the country of destination and an IRTF before the administrative court in the cases covered by that provision. The procedural deadline is not a detail to calculate later. It depends on the form of the decision and on whether the person is free, assigned to residence or detained. Current official guidance describes different short deadlines for those situations. The notification, its date and its annexes should be preserved immediately, and advice should be obtained before the shortest potentially applicable deadline expires.

The place and conditions of detention or assignment matter. Article L. 614-2 of the CESEDA addresses the challenge where the person is assigned to residence, while Article L. 614-3 addresses the detained foreigner in the circumstances covered by the code. A person who waits for the administration to answer an informal letter may lose the route that suspends removal. A request for reconsideration can be useful as evidence of diligence, but it should not replace the court application when the statutory clock is running.

The first document set should include the entire notification: the OQTF, refusal of a residence permit, country-of-return decision, voluntary-departure decision, IRTF, assignment or detention decision, language information and any notice explaining appeal rights. Ask for a translation of the main elements if the person cannot understand the decision. The Return Directive expressly connects reasons and legal remedies. An incomplete scan can hide the legal basis, the deadline, the competent tribunal or a separate entry-ban decision. The lawyer should record when and how the documents were delivered, including a police, prefecture, detention-centre or digital notification.

The second set should prove the child relationship and actual dependency. Useful material may include the child’s birth and nationality documents, proof of parental authority, residence records, school certificates, attendance or collection records, medical appointments, disability or care documents, bank transfers, support payments, messages showing daily coordination, travel records, photographs tied to dates, statements from teachers or professionals and evidence of the other parent’s availability. The goal is not volume for its own sake. It is a clear chronology showing what the parent does, what the child needs and what removal would change.

The third set addresses the security allegation without pretending to know what has not been disclosed. The application should identify every statement the decision actually makes, mark which conclusion is unsupported by communicated facts and ask the court to require the administration to provide the essence of the decisive grounds. If the administration invokes a confidential opinion, ask whether it is the sole basis, whether it was adopted by the legally competent authority, whether the opinion is reasoned, whether it is current and whether the person can answer the underlying allegation. If the court has a protected procedure for handling sensitive material, request that it be used in a way compatible with the right to an effective remedy.

Bukla is helpful because it does not force the reviewing court into an all-or-nothing choice between disclosing intelligence and accepting the administration’s conclusion. The Court indicated that national law may restrict direct access to classified information, but the judge must be able to draw consequences from a refusal to disclose and must review legality on the basis of the reasons and evidence that can be communicated. The remedy may therefore involve a structured judicial review, a redacted summary, a protected file procedure or an adverse inference where the administration refuses to provide what is necessary. The exact mechanism belongs to national procedural law; the result must remain effective.

If removal is imminent, the pleadings should address interim protection expressly. An appeal or an application on the merits does not have the same practical effect in every OQTF procedure. The request should explain the removal risk, the child’s situation, the irreversible harm of separation, the weakness or opacity of the reasoning and the EU-law requirement for a genuine remedy. It should ask for suspension or any available urgent measure under the applicable procedural route. A parent should not assume that a pending administrative appeal, a complaint to the prefect or a later appeal will automatically prevent departure.

The applicant should also distinguish the decision under challenge. An OQTF is an administrative return measure, not an extradition request and not a finding of criminal guilt. If the same facts appear in an Interpol notice, a criminal file or a foreign security exchange, the immigration court still has to review the OQTF under the CESEDA, the Charter and the Return Directive. A criminal challenge, an extradition proceeding and an immigration challenge may interact, but they have different legal tests and deadlines. Confusing them can cause the family-life evidence or the EU-citizenship argument to be filed in the wrong procedure.

For a French or other EU-citizen child, the pleading should have a separate heading for Article 20 TFEU rather than burying the point under a general Article 8 argument. It should state the child’s nationality, residence, ability or inability to leave the Union, the parent’s role, the dependency relationship and the concrete consequence of removal. It should then connect those facts to the authority’s duty to assess them before adopting the decision. If the administration never addressed the child’s EU status or simply copied a security opinion, the court can see the defect in reasoning without needing to decide the entire classified file.

The parent should ask for the decision to be annulled or set aside on every sustainable ground: lack or inadequacy of reasons, failure to examine personal and family circumstances, error in the legal basis, failure to apply EU law, breach of the child’s best-interests requirement, disproportionate interference with family life, unlawful reliance on an unexplained opinion, and any defect in the country-of-return or entry-ban reasoning. The grounds should match the evidence. An inflated allegation that every classified document must be disclosed may distract from the stronger point that the person was never given the essence of the case and the judge could not carry out a genuine review.

The remedy also has a forward-looking dimension. If the OQTF is annulled, the attached measures may fall with it or require reconsideration according to the judgment. If only the IRTF is annulled, the removal question may remain. If the administration must reassess the file, the family should update the child evidence and answer any security allegation that is finally communicated. The parent should keep proof of compliance, identity and contact details. A new decision is not automatically lawful merely because the administration repeats the same conclusion with a new date.

There is a final caution about evidence and confidentiality. Do not publish or circulate alleged intelligence on social media in an attempt to prove that it is false. Do not contact a foreign source or investigator without advice. Preserve the official document, its envelope or electronic metadata, the notification record and the lawyer’s requests for access. In a cross-border case, ask which authority created the opinion, which authority relied on it and which court has jurisdiction over each part of the dispute. The procedural map is often as important as the substantive argument.

Conclusion

Bukla gives a parent facing a French return measure a disciplined way to challenge secrecy. The argument is not that national security is irrelevant, nor that parenthood automatically defeats an OQTF. It is that the administration must make an individual decision, assess the EU-citizen child’s actual dependency and communicate enough of the decisive case for the person and the court to test it. A confidential file may protect sources; it cannot become a conclusive black box.

In a live French case, the immediate priorities are to preserve the notification, identify the exact appeal deadline, challenge every attached measure, document the child’s daily relationship with the parent and ask the administrative court for an effective review of the security reasoning. The French code, the Return Directive, the Charter and the CJEU judgment operate together. The strength of the application will depend less on a general claim of family hardship than on a precise chronology, a complete document set and a direct answer to the question Bukla puts at the centre of the case: can this removal decision be genuinely tested?

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