KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Trump’s Venezuela Oil Deal: What French Companies Must Verify Before Signing a Cross-Border Contract

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Trump’s Venezuela Oil Deal: What French Companies Must Verify Before Signing a Cross-Border Contract

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

The announcement made on 28 August 2026 that the United States had reached an agreement giving it majority control over more than 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan oil reserves has created a legal story far larger than an energy headline. The statement came from President Donald Trump, while Venezuela’s interim government described the proposed development of 17 fields, an investment programme and future tax revenue. The Associated Press reported the competing descriptions and the lack of a published full agreement in its account of the Venezuela oil announcement. “Control” may mean a concession, an offtake right, a production partnership, a security interest, a corporate shareholding or a political commitment that still needs implementing instruments. Those are not interchangeable.

For a French manufacturer, contractor, insurer, shipper, bank or investor, the immediate question is not whether Washington has acquired Venezuelan oil. It is whether a specific counterparty has authority to sign, whether the proposed transaction is permitted by current United States and European measures, whether the asset can be delivered and paid for, and whether a French court could enforce the contract against a state or state-owned entity. The answer will turn on documents that have not yet been made public, the status of the Venezuelan signatory, the ownership of the oilfield and the payment route. This French and European analysis maps those risks while treating the announcement as a reported agreement under development, not as a completed transfer of title.

I. Venezuela’s 65-billion-barrel oil deal: what does “U.S. control” legally mean?

A. Is this a transfer of Venezuelan reserves, a concession, or a project-finance arrangement?

Oil reserves in the ground are not a bank balance that can be handed over by a press release. The commercial rights associated with a reserve usually depend on a chain of instruments: a national law, a licence or concession, a production-sharing or joint-venture agreement, field-development approvals, environmental permits, transport arrangements, export authorisations and contracts with the state oil company. The right to explore is different from the right to produce. The right to produce is different from the right to market. A majority economic interest is different from ownership of the geological resource. A French company considering participation must identify which of those rights the proposed deal actually grants.

The AP report says that the Venezuelan government described an arrangement involving 17 fields with proven potential of 65 billion barrels, anticipated private investment of approximately $100 billion and more than $209 billion in taxes for Caracas. Those figures describe a development project as presented by the parties; they do not establish that 65 billion barrels have been transferred to the United States or that production can begin. A prudent contract should therefore avoid language saying that the buyer “owns Venezuela’s reserves” unless the underlying Venezuelan law and executed instruments support that conclusion. The safer description may be an exclusive development right, an offtake entitlement, a controlling stake in project companies or a long-term supply arrangement.

The first legal diligence question is authority. Who signed for Venezuela? What constitutional, legislative or administrative power permits that person to bind the state? Is the signatory acting for the Republic, the interim government, the national oil company, a ministry, a special-purpose vehicle or a private consortium? Has the Venezuelan parliament, regulator, court or audit body approved the arrangement? Does the signatory have power to grant a security interest over oil revenues, to assign production, to change operators or to promise protection against future sanctions? Every answer must be supported by an official instrument, not by a statement on social media.

The second question is corporate separation. A contract with a private project company may not be a contract with the Republic of Venezuela. A contract with the state oil company may not carry a sovereign payment guarantee. A letter from a ministry may not create a valid assignment of production revenues. The corporate chain must be traced through incorporation records, share registers, board resolutions, power of attorney, beneficial ownership and the authority to pledge or sell the relevant rights. If the project company is incorporated in a third country, the governing law and the law of the place where its assets are located must also be reviewed.

French contract law begins with a strong but limited principle. Article 1103 of the Civil Code says: “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits.” The official text is available in Article 1103 of the French Civil Code. A legally formed contract binds the parties, but the word “legally” does real work. It does not validate a signature by an official who lacked authority, an object prohibited by sanctions, an assignment contrary to mandatory law or a transaction that the parties were not permitted to perform.

Article 1104 adds that “Les contrats doivent être négociés, formés et exécutés de bonne foi.” The rule and its public-order character appear in Article 1104 of the French Civil Code. In a high-risk energy project, good faith requires more than polite negotiations. It requires accurate disclosure of the signatory’s authority, the sanctions status of the counterparties, the source of the right to export, the status of permits, the identities of intermediaries and the circumstances that could prevent performance. A party that withholds a known approval defect and later invokes the contract’s wording may face a serious evidentiary problem.

The third question is the legal character of “majority control”. Control may be exercised through voting rights in a company, appointment of the operator, rights to approve budgets, priority offtake, control of accounts, vetoes over expenditures or a contractual right to direct production. A majority of project-company shares does not necessarily convey control of the state’s subsurface resource. Conversely, a company with a minority equity interest may control operations through a shareholders’ agreement. The deal documentation must describe the control mechanism rather than rely on political shorthand.

The fourth question is whether a French investment is implicated. If the arrangement involves acquiring or controlling a French entity, a French branch or a strategic activity conducted in France, French foreign-investment screening may become relevant. Article L. 151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code subjects certain foreign investments in France to prior authorisation where the activity participates in public authority or falls within protected fields involving public order, public security or national defence. The official text is Article L. 151-3 of the French Monetary and Financial Code. The provision does not authorise a Venezuelan oil project abroad, but it can matter if the transaction includes a French energy-services company, a sensitive technology business, a French data or infrastructure operator, or a French acquisition used to carry out the project.

The implementing rules identify common investment forms, including acquiring control of a French entity, acquiring all or part of a French business line or crossing specified voting thresholds. The current framework is set out in the official French Monetary and Financial Code section on financial relations with foreign countries. A French group should not wait until signing to ask whether a control right is an investment requiring authorisation. The answer can affect closing conditions, warranties, long-stop dates, financing commitments and the validity of a share transfer.

The fifth question is the position of the Republic and its entities before a French court. A contract may contain a Paris forum clause or an arbitration clause and still leave enforcement against state assets difficult. In Civil Chamber One, 28 March 2013, no. 11-10.450, the French Supreme Court held that a waiver of enforcement immunity must be express and specific when an agreement concerns a foreign state. The Court’s reasoning requires an express and special waiver, not a general inference from a dispute-resolution clause. This is decisive for a French creditor who wants to seize a payment account, an oil cargo, receivables or shares after an award.

The same decision also distinguishes jurisdictional consent from enforcement consent. Agreeing to arbitration does not necessarily mean that the state has agreed to every form of seizure. A project contract should therefore address, separately, consent to jurisdiction, consent to arbitration, service of proceedings, interim measures, attachment of receivables, execution against commercial assets and the law governing any waiver. A clause stating only that the Republic “submits to the jurisdiction” may be too general to achieve the commercial protection the parties expect.

Central-bank and sovereign reserve assets receive an even higher level of protection. In Civil Chamber Two, 11 January 2018, no. 16-10.661, the Court examined Article L. 153-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code and held that a creditor seeking enforcement against assets held or managed by a foreign central bank must satisfy the statutory conditions and obtain the required authorisation. The case concerned the Central Bank of Iraq, not Venezuela, and should be used as an analogy rather than as a ruling on the new oil agreement. Its operational message is direct: a judgment does not automatically unlock a foreign central bank’s reserves, and an enforcement plan must identify the asset’s status before the claim is launched.

That principle affects project finance. If repayment depends on a sovereign account, an account of a state oil company, export proceeds held by a central bank or a receivable assigned to a public entity, the lender must know whether the asset serves a public function, whether the state has waived immunity for that category of property and whether local law permits attachment. A promise to pay from oil sales is not the same as a secured interest in a specific cargo. A pledge over shares is not the same as a pledge over the state’s reserve account. The security package must be drafted around the asset that a court could realistically reach.

The sixth question is political continuity. A project approved by an interim authority may be challenged by a later government, a court, a parliament or a public prosecutor. That possibility does not automatically make the agreement void, but it changes the risk of title, permit, payment and regulatory challenge. A French company should ask for representations about the authority in force on the signing date, the history of the licence, pending litigation, parliamentary approval, international recognition, local ownership requirements and any change-of-government clause. Political-risk insurance can allocate financial consequences; it cannot cure a missing title or manufacture authority.

The seventh question is the meaning of “at no cost” or similar political language. A state may describe a project as costing U.S. taxpayers nothing because private companies finance development. That does not tell a French supplier who pays invoices, who bears environmental liabilities, who purchases equipment, who owns the crude while it is in transit or who bears the loss if a licence is withdrawn. Commercial contracts must replace political slogans with payment obligations, milestone dates, credit support and remedies.

B. Which sanctions and European rules apply to Venezuelan oil entering a French transaction?

The current deal announcement does not itself repeal or amend existing sanctions. The European Union already has a Venezuela-specific restrictive-measures framework in the consolidated text of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063. The official EU summary explains that the framework includes an arms embargo, restrictions on equipment that could be used for internal repression, a prohibition on certain surveillance equipment and the freezing of funds and economic resources of designated persons, entities and bodies. France’s Direction générale du Trésor Venezuela page directs operators to the applicable European regulation and related reporting material. The regulation’s scope must be checked against the current consolidated text and implementing acts, including any listing amendments.

The correct legal test is not “the United States supports the project” or “the Venezuelan government signed it”. The test is whether a listed person, entity or prohibited activity is involved, whether the goods or technology fall within an export restriction, whether the payment or service makes funds or economic resources available, whether a circumvention risk exists and whether a licence or exception applies. A French company should run the analysis for every layer: project owner, operator, contractor, lender, insurer, vessel, charterer, port, bank, broker, end-user and ultimate recipient.

The United States side must be examined as well, but a French company should not confuse an OFAC licence with a French or EU authorisation. The official OFAC Venezuela-related sanctions page is a starting point for U.S. measures and licences. The licence number, covered persons, permitted activity, validity period, reporting requirements and territorial reach must be read in the actual instrument. A general authorisation for a defined category does not automatically protect a different payment, a newly designated counterparty or a service performed outside its terms.

Nor does a U.S. approval remove European obligations. EU operators may face a conflict when an American instruction tells them to stop dealing with a person while EU law prohibits them from complying with certain extraterritorial measures. The European Union’s Blocking Statute, Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, must be considered when a U.S. measure is listed in its annex and the facts fall within its scope. Article 5 restricts compliance with specified extraterritorial requirements unless the European Commission has authorised compliance. This is not a blanket answer to every Venezuela transaction: the precise U.S. measure, the operator’s connection to the EU and the relevant Commission guidance must be identified.

French companies also need to understand how a freeze operates under domestic law if a Venezuelan-linked person becomes subject to an applicable European or national measure. Article L. 562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code defines funds broadly, including deposits, financial instruments, interest, dividends and other revenues, and defines freezing as an action intended to prevent a change in the amount, location, ownership, possession, nature or destination of the funds. The official text is Article L. 562-1. The rule reaches more than a payment leaving a French account. It can concern a release of collateral, assignment of receivables, change of beneficiary, set-off or transfer of control.

Article L. 562-4 applies the relevant obligations to persons in France, financial institutions and legal persons formed under French law or conducting operations in France. The official version is Article L. 562-4. The measures must be applied “sans délai”. A bank receiving an instruction cannot treat the hold as a normal service-level delay while commercial teams negotiate. It must identify whether a legal freeze exists and, if it does, prevent the prohibited operation promptly.

Article L. 562-4-1 requires internal organisation and procedures for applying asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available and the prohibition on circumvention. The official wording refers to “une organisation et des procédures internes” and to “l’interdiction de contournement” in Article L. 562-4-1. A French company entering a Venezuelan project should have a written escalation protocol, a sanctions owner, a record of screening decisions, approval rules for third-country intermediaries and a process for documenting why a transaction is or is not covered.

Article L. 562-5 prohibits covered persons from making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to persons whose funds are subject to a freeze, subject to the statutory exceptions. The official text is Article L. 562-5. In an oil project, indirect availability may arise through a prepaid supply contract, an equipment loan, a guarantee, a debt waiver, free technical services, an affiliate’s account or a transaction that allows a designated person to use project revenue. The absence of a direct bank transfer is not decisive.

Article L. 562-6 prohibits participation “sciemment et volontairement” in activities designed to circumvent a freeze. The official text appears in Article L. 562-6. The phrase does not mean that a company can ignore obvious warning signs until it has proof of a complete conspiracy. A request to split invoices, use a nominee, disguise the origin of crude, route payment through a newly created entity or change the description of a sanctioned service should be escalated. The decision file should show the questions asked and the answers received.

The European rule specific to Venezuela also uses the language of claims. The consolidated Regulation 2017/2063 defines claims broadly enough to include performance, bonds, guarantees, indemnities, counterclaims and recognition or enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards. That matters when a French contractor seeks payment for equipment already delivered. Sanctions can affect not only the underlying performance but also the ability to honour a guarantee, pay an indemnity or enforce an award. A contract’s dispute-resolution clause should be reviewed against the regulation’s claim provisions before a demand is sent.

The practical conclusion is that the new deal does not create a safe harbour. It may eventually lead to new licences, a new investment framework or a new U.S.–Venezuela instrument. Until the legal texts are published, French operators must apply the measures already in force and document the gap between an announced policy and an executable transaction. A project that is politically encouraged can still be legally impossible for a French bank to finance or for a French insurer to underwrite.

II. What should French companies and banks do before signing or paying under the Venezuela oil deal?

A. How should a French company document sanctions, payment and supply-chain compliance?

The first practical response is to create a transaction map before signing the term sheet. The map should identify the project, field, operator, production vehicle, state entity, private investors, contractors, technical suppliers, vessel owners, insurers, brokers, banks, payment currencies, ports and final customers. It should show which party has the right to sell the crude and which party receives the money. Every entity should be screened at the time of onboarding, at signing, before shipment, before payment and when a licence or sanctions list changes.

The second response is to separate oil in the ground from oil that can be lawfully exported. A reserve estimate does not prove commercial recoverability. A production right does not prove export permission. Export permission does not prove that the cargo can be insured, financed, transported through a named port and sold to a customer using a French bank. The company should obtain the field licence, environmental approvals, export authorisations, customs documents, origin certificates, transport permissions and evidence of the operator’s entitlement to deliver the cargo. It should require a document update when a permit changes, rather than accepting a one-time representation at signing.

The third response is to examine the payment chain as carefully as the physical supply chain. The contract should identify the account holder, the receiving bank, any correspondent bank, the currency, the invoice issuer, the beneficiary, the owner of any receivable and the legal effect of a blocked payment. Payment through a third-country bank may increase rather than reduce risk. A bank that processes a dollar payment may expose the transaction to U.S. jurisdiction. A euro payment may still be subject to EU restrictions or a French freeze. A cryptocurrency or commodity swap is not an automatic escape from sanctions and may add a circumvention concern.

The fourth response is to avoid relying on a single licence. A project may need separate permissions for exploration, drilling, equipment, software, financial services, insurance, shipping, export, import and payment. The company should build a licence matrix that names each required authorisation, the issuing authority, the covered parties, the covered activity, the expiry date, reporting conditions and the consequence of suspension. The matrix should be attached to the internal approval note. If the project changes operator, field, route, currency, bank or customer, the team must decide whether the existing licence still covers the revised transaction.

The fifth response is a beneficial-ownership investigation that goes beyond the first corporate layer. A listed person may control an entity without appearing as its director. A public entity may have a private intermediary collecting proceeds. A minority investor may hold veto rights over production or accounts. The investigation should consider voting arrangements, shareholder agreements, family or political connections, procurement agents, nominee directors, contractual control and the power to appoint management. The team should document unresolved facts and define a stop rule. “Unable to verify” should not be silently converted into “not sanctioned”.

The sixth response is to protect technical data and intellectual property. A French engineering company may provide drilling software, production data, reservoir models, industrial control systems, encryption, maintenance or remote monitoring. Those services may trigger export-control, sanctions or data-security issues even when the final product is crude oil. The company should classify the technology, identify the end-user, decide where data will be hosted and determine whether remote access by a Venezuelan entity or a third-country contractor is itself a controlled service. A confidentiality clause cannot override an export prohibition.

The seventh response is a board-level approval. The board paper should state what is known, what is not known, which legal texts apply, which licences are pending, who bears the risk of a change in government, what happens if the payment is blocked and whether the project can be suspended without default. It should identify the persons who can approve a shipment, change an account or respond to a sanctions notice. A long contract with a short compliance paragraph is not a substitute for governance.

Article L. 562-4-1’s internal-procedure obligation makes this documentation more than good administration. The organisation should be able to explain why it accepted a counterparty, how it checked the project chain, what warning signs were assessed and who authorised the transaction. The file should contain screen captures or reports from the screening system, the relevant list versions, copies of licences, legal opinions, bank questions and the final decision. If the company relies on an external opinion, it should identify the assumptions and the facts that would require the opinion to be refreshed.

The eighth response is a hold-and-escalate procedure for a bank refusal. If a French bank blocks a payment, the company should request the commercial information it can lawfully receive: whether the bank is relying on a specific EU or French measure, a U.S. risk policy, a missing licence, an intermediary concern or a contractual term. It should not demand that the bank circumvent its own compliance controls. It should provide a structured pack: contract, invoice, goods description, ownership chart, licence, end-user statement, transport route, origin evidence and proposed safeguards. A bank can assess a defined file more efficiently than a series of urgent emails asserting that the project has political approval.

The ninth response is to record the status of frozen or held funds correctly. If money is paid into an account that is frozen, the company should not net it against a separate debt without analysis. Article L. 562-7 permits certain inflows into frozen accounts and requires information to be given to the Minister for the Economy in the statutory situation. The official text is Article L. 562-7. An inflow, a release, a refund, a set-off and a transfer are different operations. Each should be classified and approved separately.

The tenth response is to use authorisation channels carefully. Article L. 562-11 permits the competent ministers, in the circumstances it specifies, to authorise the unfreezing and making available of part of frozen funds or economic resources. The provision begins “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent conjointement autoriser le déblocage” and is available in Article L. 562-11. A request should identify a precise asset and a precise operation, explain the legal basis, state who would receive the value, propose segregation or reporting safeguards and attach evidence of necessity. It should not assume that a request has suspensive effect or that silence equals approval.

If the company acts in good faith, it should preserve that evidence. Article L. 562-13 provides that the State is responsible for the harmful consequences of good-faith implementation of freezes and prohibitions by covered persons. The official text begins “L’Etat est responsable des conséquences dommageables” in Article L. 562-13. The protection is not automatic immunity from every dispute. A company should be able to show that it applied the rule promptly, asked targeted questions, avoided circumvention and followed the appropriate reporting or authorisation route.

The eleventh response is to assess criminal and customs exposure. Article L. 574-3 links certain violations of freeze obligations to the penalties provided by Article 459 of the Customs Code. The official text is Article L. 574-3. It is not necessary to predict a prosecution to justify a stop decision. The existence of a statutory enforcement route means that a compliance hold should be treated as a legal decision, with a responsible officer, a written reason and a controlled next step.

B. How can a French company protect its contract, remedies and financing if the deal changes?

The first drafting priority is a precise condition-precedent package. Closing should depend on the delivery of the final agreement, proof of signatory authority, field and export permits, required sanctions licences, foreign-investment authorisations where relevant, financing commitments, insurance and evidence that the payment route is open. The clause should state what happens if a document is delayed, incomplete, withdrawn or challenged. The parties should agree whether the long-stop date extends automatically, whether either party may terminate, and who pays demobilisation or reservation costs.

The second priority is the force-majeure analysis. Article 1218 of the Civil Code defines contractual force majeure as an event outside the debtor’s control that could not reasonably have been foreseen when the contract was concluded and whose effects cannot be avoided by appropriate measures. The official text is Article 1218 of the French Civil Code. It states that a temporary impediment suspends performance unless the resulting delay justifies termination, while a definitive impediment automatically ends the contract under the conditions set by the Code.

An unexpected sanctions designation may be a force-majeure event in some contractual settings, but it is not automatically one. The court will examine foreseeability at the contract date, the exact obligation prevented, whether the party could avoid the effect through lawful measures, and what the contract itself says. If the project was signed after months of public warnings and the party failed to obtain a required licence, it may be difficult to argue that the obstacle was unforeseeable. If a new designation makes payment legally prohibited despite full diligence, the analysis may be stronger. The contract should therefore distinguish sanctions, licence withdrawal, political change, civil unrest, expropriation, bank refusal, transport interruption and market volatility.

The third priority is an alternative-performance clause. The parties can provide for a segregated account, a replacement bank, a change of currency, a lawful substitute port, a non-sanctioned affiliate, a delayed shipment or a payment into escrow, subject to all applicable laws. The clause should never require a party to use a nominee, hide the origin of the oil or route funds through a bank selected to evade screening. An alternative is useful only if it is legally permissible and operationally defined.

The fourth priority is damages. Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code provides that a debtor may be ordered to pay damages for non-performance or delay unless it shows that performance was prevented by force majeure. The official text is Article 1231-1 of the French Civil Code. A sanctions-related payment failure may therefore raise questions about causation, foreseeability, mitigation and the precise loss. The contractor should preserve evidence of equipment reserved, personnel mobilised, financing costs, alternative sales, storage, demobilisation and lost margin. The buyer should preserve evidence of licence applications, bank refusals, replacement attempts and the legal reason for stopping performance.

The fifth priority is the arbitration and enforcement package. An arbitration clause should name the institution, seat, language and applicable law, but it should also address service on the state, interim relief, confidentiality, the law of the project assets and the effect of sovereign immunity. The contract should identify commercial assets that may be used to satisfy an award, without assuming that any asset connected to Venezuela is available. A state’s consent to arbitration can be separate from its waiver of execution immunity, as the French Supreme Court’s decision in no. 11-10.450 demonstrates.

The sixth priority is the status of central-bank or public assets. A creditor who plans to attach an account should distinguish an account of a project company from an account held by a foreign central bank or monetary authority. The rule applied in Civil Chamber Two, 11 January 2018, no. 16-10.661 required the creditor to satisfy specific conditions before enforcement against central-bank assets. If the payment security relies on public reserves, the financing should be reconsidered before funds are advanced. A strong-looking security package can be illusory if the asset is immune from execution.

The seventh priority is to avoid overclaiming from a forum clause. French courts can hear a dispute while a French bank or enforcement judge still refuses a particular seizure. A contract governed by French law can still be affected by mandatory EU sanctions, Venezuelan public law, U.S. measures relevant to a payment route and the law of the place where property is located. A Paris seat is valuable for procedural neutrality and legal support, but it does not convert a foreign public asset into private property.

The eighth priority is notice. When a transaction is blocked, the party should send a notice that states the date, contract, obligation, legal or banking obstacle, documents requested, proposed mitigation and reservation of rights. It should avoid a definitive statement that the contract is void or that the state has confiscated property unless counsel has verified that conclusion. The notice should request a standstill where needed, preserve evidence and prevent the other party from arguing that silence or delay was accepted. It should also state that no party is being asked to breach sanctions or circumvent a licence.

The ninth priority is urgent relief. If equipment is at a port, a cargo is at risk, a bank guarantee is expiring or an employee safety issue is developing, the company may need an urgent judicial or administrative step. The request should identify the narrowly tailored measure sought: maintain a segregated account, preserve goods, suspend a deadline, prevent onward transfer, protect evidence or require a defined disclosure. It should not ask a French court to order a bank to perform a transaction that European or French law prohibits. The court’s authority and the sanctions regime must be analysed together.

The tenth priority is change-of-control and renegotiation protection. The proposed arrangement may move from a state-backed agreement to a private consortium, from a U.S. operator to a joint venture, or from one Venezuelan entity to another. A French supplier should require consent for assignment, define a change of control, review new beneficial owners, update sanctions screening and make any transfer conditional on permits and licences. A change of control can also affect foreign-investment review, insurance, financing covenants, tax treatment and the identity of the party able to deliver the oil.

The eleventh priority is tax and accounting separation. A development right, production share, royalty, service fee, loan, dividend, guarantee payment and compensation are not the same income. A French group should obtain tax advice on withholding, permanent establishment, transfer pricing, customs value and foreign tax credits. It should keep project revenue separate from a state’s public funds and from amounts held for a designated person. A payment description such as “oil proceeds” should be supported by the underlying invoice, cargo, contract and ownership record.

The twelfth priority is a three-scenario model. Scenario one assumes that the announcement remains political and no project closes. Scenario two assumes that a final agreement is signed but licences, permits or financing remain conditional. Scenario three assumes that production begins and a sanctions, government or court event blocks a payment or cargo. For each scenario, management should identify the funds at risk, the documents needed, the contractual notice, the alternative route and the person with authority to decide. This is not an assumption that the transaction will succeed. It is a way to preserve optionality without treating a press announcement as title.

There is a further litigation lesson from French case law. In Civil Chamber One, 28 March 2013, no. 11-10.450, the Court treated an enforcement-immunity waiver as limited and specific. In Civil Chamber Two, 11 January 2018, no. 16-10.661, the Court treated the protection of foreign central-bank assets as a real procedural barrier requiring proof and authorisation. Together, those decisions tell a French creditor to draft the remedy at the asset level. “We can arbitrate in Paris” is not the same as “we can seize the account that will receive oil revenue”.

The final step is monitoring. The company should track the full Venezuelan agreement when published, implementing regulations, OFAC licences, EU listing amendments, French authority guidance, court challenges, changes to the interim government, project permits, banks’ risk policies and any new restrictions on oil services or export. The AP report describes a political announcement and a Venezuelan statement, not a complete public legal instrument. That evidence status should appear in the board paper and in the contract’s disclosure schedule.

Conclusion

The 65-billion-barrel Venezuela announcement is legally important because it may create a new state-backed energy structure while leaving the most important questions unanswered. “Majority U.S. control” could describe corporate control, a development concession, an offtake right or a financing mechanism. It does not, without the executed documents and applicable Venezuelan law, prove a transfer of the underlying reserves. For French companies, the priority is to identify authority, title, permits, ownership, licences, payment routes and enforceable security before committing capital or equipment.

Existing European and French rules remain in force. EU Venezuela measures, U.S. licences, the Blocking Statute, French asset-freeze provisions, foreign-investment screening and contractual rules may all apply to different parts of one transaction. A French contract can bind the parties while performance remains prohibited or a public asset remains immune from execution. The strongest file is therefore one that separates political statements from legal instruments, principal rights from project revenue, arbitration from enforcement, and a bank’s risk policy from a statutory freeze.

If the deal becomes a final agreement, French operators should update screening, obtain the required licences, verify the new counterparties, refresh the force-majeure analysis and renegotiate payment and security clauses where necessary. If a payment or cargo is blocked, they should preserve evidence, seek a written reason, use a lawful authorisation channel and choose a remedy matched to the act being challenged. That discipline is what allows a French business to pursue a commercial opportunity without turning an uncertain geopolitical announcement into an avoidable sanctions, contract or enforcement dispute.

📄 Official circular