A new Court of Justice opinion has put one of the European Union’s most politically sensitive environmental bills under immediate legal pressure. On 3 September 2026, Advocate General Juliane Kokott delivered her Opinion in Case C-193/25, Republic of Poland v Parliament and Council. The action targets the extended producer responsibility scheme in the recast Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive. The contested mechanism requires pharmaceutical and cosmetics producers to finance at least 80% of the full cost of quaternary treatment designed to remove micropollutants from urban wastewater. The Opinion recommends annulling the core cost-allocation rule and the product list in Annex III. It is not a judgment, and the directive remains applicable while the Court deliberates. Yet the opinion changes the commercial and procedural timetable: producers should preserve the evidence needed to test their exposure, public authorities should explain their national implementation choices, and businesses selling into several Member States should not treat the future contribution as a simple water bill. From a French perspective, the dispute sits at the intersection of EU validity, environmental taxation, producer responsibility, administrative enforcement, medicine affordability and access to urgent judicial relief. The question is no longer only who should pay for cleaner water. It is whether the European legislature demonstrated a sufficiently precise connection between the selected products, the micropollutants requiring advanced treatment and the proportion of the cost imposed on those producers.
I. Why is the EU wastewater levy under challenge in C-193/25?
A. What exactly must pharmaceutical and cosmetics producers finance?
The starting point is the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, Directive (EU) 2024/3019. Its environmental objective is not in dispute in Case C-193/25. Urban wastewater can contain pharmaceutical residues, personal-care ingredients and other micropollutants that are not fully removed by conventional treatment. The directive therefore introduces a fourth treatment stage for the urban wastewater plants covered by its risk and size conditions. The legal controversy concerns the financing architecture attached to that environmental objective.
Article 9(1) establishes the trigger in unusually direct language. The official text states: “Member States shall take measures to ensure that by 31 December 2028, producers who place any of the products listed in Annex III on the market have extended producer responsibility.” The obligation is attached to products placed on a Member State’s market, not only to manufacturing sites located in that Member State. A producer established in France can therefore face obligations in several national systems if its products are marketed across the Union. Conversely, a producer established outside the Union may need a local representative or an equivalent arrangement when it sells into a national market.
The financial core is Article 9(1)(a). It requires covered producers to bear “at least 80 % of the full costs” of complying with the quaternary-treatment requirements in Article 8. The cost basket is wider than the price of a filter or an additional processing unit. It includes investment and operating costs for treatment, monitoring of micropollutants, the collection and verification of product data and other expenses required to operate the extended producer responsibility system. National measures may therefore translate the European rule into contributions to a producer responsibility organisation, charges calculated through a national scheme, contractual payments to a collective body or a combination of those instruments.
Article 9(2) also matters to a producer deciding whether the scheme applies. The directive provides exemptions where the annual quantity of relevant substances placed on the Union market is below one tonne, or where the substances are rapidly biodegradable in wastewater or do not generate micropollutants at the end of the product’s life. Those exemptions are not self-executing in a practical dispute. A company will need a defensible product-by-product record, a methodology for identifying the relevant substances and evidence capable of being audited by a producer responsibility organisation or a public authority.
Article 9(3) makes the model collective. Producers must exercise their responsibility through an organisation meeting the minimum requirements in Article 10. They must report annual quantities, the hazardousness of the relevant substances in urban wastewater, biodegradability information and, where relevant, products that fall within an exemption. Their contributions must be determined by the quantities and hazardousness of substances contained in products placed on the market. That wording is important because it points towards differentiated contributions, while the litigation challenges the premise and scale of allocating at least 80% of the full system cost to only two industrial sectors.
The cross-border detail is not cosmetic. Under Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2024/3019, a Member State must ensure that a producer established in another Member State or in a third country and placing products on its market appoints a person established in that territory as an authorised representative, or takes an equivalent measure. A group that sells the same medicine or cosmetic through several legal entities must therefore map not only its substances and volumes, but also the country-by-country entities responsible for market access, representation, reporting and payment. An invoice raised by one national organisation does not eliminate the need to identify the legal basis and calculation method used in each Member State.
The directive links the funding system to broader safeguards. Producer responsibility organisations must have defined geographical coverage, financial and organisational means, financial guarantees, public information and independent financial audits. Authorities must monitor the organisations and the reliability of the data. The Commission is also instructed to facilitate exchanges between Member States, including on the effects of Article 9 on “the accessibility, availability and affordability of medicines placed on the Union market.” This is why the case has consequences beyond a dispute between Poland and the EU institutions. The measure can affect market-entry decisions, supply-chain contracts, public procurement prices, reimbursement negotiations and the decision to keep low-margin products available in smaller national markets.
The Advocate General’s Opinion is the latest event in a litigation landscape that includes actions brought by industry applicants. Those corporate actions raise standing and admissibility issues that are distinct from Poland’s privileged action for annulment. The distinction is decisive: a company may be unable to obtain direct annulment of a generally applicable directive merely because it bears its economic effects, while a Member State can bring the validity dispute directly before the Court under the Treaties. Producers should not confuse a procedural dismissal of an individual action with a ruling that the financial mechanism is valid on its merits.
The legal effect of the Opinion must also be kept within its limits. It is not binding. It does not suspend Article 9, invalidate Annex III or prevent a national authority from preparing its implementation. The Court can follow the recommendation, adopt a different analysis or decide only part of the action. Until the operative part of a final judgment says otherwise, companies should assume that the directive’s timetable remains relevant, while expressly reserving their rights in contracts, administrative submissions and contribution calculations.
B. Why does Poland say the 80% rule lacks a sufficient evidence base?
Poland’s action attacks the selection of the sectors, the allocation of the cost and the legislative reasoning supporting that choice. The official case notice records pleas based on the polluter-pays principle and equal treatment, as well as proportionality, the duty to state reasons and the requirement to take account of scientific and technical data and the possible benefits and costs of the measure. The challenge is therefore not an argument that micropollutants should remain in rivers. It is an argument about attribution: which products create the relevant burden, how that burden is measured, and whether the evidence supports making pharmaceutical and cosmetics producers pay most of the bill for a public wastewater infrastructure upgrade.
Article 191(2) TFEU says that Union environmental policy is based on the precautionary principle, preventive action, rectification of pollution at source and the principle that the polluter should pay. The official treaty text is available in the consolidated TFEU, Article 191. The phrase does not automatically answer every question about cost distribution. A legislature may design a general financing system to achieve an environmental objective. It must still explain why the selected group is sufficiently connected to the cost being recovered and why the chosen percentage is appropriate to that connection.
That is the pressure point in the Opinion. The case record identifies an evidential tension in the impact assessment: it notes that the assessment “states that over 70% of micropollutants are removed by the existing treatment stages.” That does not prove that the quaternary stage is unnecessary. It does, however, sharpen the question of what additional pollution is actually attributable to the products listed in Annex III, at which stage, in which locations and at what incremental cost. If existing treatment already removes a substantial proportion of micropollutants, a contribution calculated against the full cost of the additional treatment needs a transparent explanation of the residual burden and of the reason two sectors should carry at least four-fifths of that cost.
Equal treatment creates a second analytical test. The measure distinguishes between producers of medicines and cosmetics and producers of other products that may contain substances reaching urban wastewater. A difference in treatment is lawful only if the compared situations are not comparable, or if the distinction is objectively justified by a relevant difference and remains proportionate to the legislative aim. A court does not replace the EU legislature’s technical judgment with its own preferred policy. It does examine whether the legislature identified the relevant differences and acted on a coherent evidential basis.
The proportionality challenge is connected but not identical. The applicable benchmark under Article 5(4) TEU asks whether the content and form of Union action do not exceed what is necessary to achieve the Treaties’ objectives. In practical terms, the Court may ask whether the 80% floor is suitable to reduce micropollutants, necessary in light of less burdensome alternatives and balanced against the costs imposed on producers, patients, water users and public authorities. The presence of a significant environmental benefit does not make every allocation of cost proportionate.
The duty to give reasons adds a procedural dimension. Article 296 TFEU requires Union legal acts to state the reasons on which they are based. The reasons need not answer every technical objection in the legislative record, but they must allow affected parties and the Court to understand the essential logic of the measure. Where the rule selects two sectors, sets a minimum percentage and includes capital, operating and monitoring costs, the explanation must be capable of connecting the choice to the evidence considered by the legislature.
The Polish action also raises Article 191(3) TFEU, which requires the Union to take account of available scientific and technical data, environmental conditions in the various regions of the Union, the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action, and the economic and social development of the Union as a whole and of its regions. For producers, that list provides a useful map for evidence. It points to the difference between a European average and a French plant, between a medicine used by millions of patients and a niche cosmetic, between urban wastewater systems with different treatment technologies and between substances with different persistence and pathways.
The scheme’s design itself may become evidence in the final litigation. Article 9(3)(c) says that each producer’s contribution is determined by the quantities and hazardousness in urban wastewater of substances in the products placed on the market. That formula seems to favour a granular model. A fixed or broadly pooled contribution based mainly on sales value, product class or national market share could be vulnerable if it ignores quantity, hazardousness, biodegradability or the actual route by which residues reach a plant. Conversely, the existence of a differentiated formula may support the institutions if the implementing system genuinely measures those factors and adjusts contributions over time.
The 80% floor also leaves a practical question about the remaining 20% and about the possibility of national over-recovery. The European rule sets a minimum contribution by producers, while the directive’s detailed implementation involves Member States, producer responsibility organisations and wastewater operators. A national system cannot silently turn a European minimum into an unexplained 100% charge without identifying the legal instrument, the cost category and the right of the producer to challenge the calculation. Companies should therefore separate the validity of Article 9 from the legality of each national act applying it.
That distinction prevents a common strategic mistake. A producer cannot ask a French administrative court simply to annul the directive as if it were a French decree. The Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review the validity of an EU act. A national court may review a French implementing measure and, where a serious question of EU validity arises, use the preliminary-reference mechanism rather than declare the EU act invalid itself. The immediate French dispute will often be about an assessment, a registration refusal, a contribution notice, an enforcement decision or a contract with a producer responsibility organisation. The underlying C-193/25 arguments can be preserved in that forum, but they need to be presented through the correct procedural vehicle.
II. What can French producers do before the CJEU judgment?
A. Which French evidence, contracts and cost data should companies assemble?
A French producer should begin with a legal and operational perimeter, not with an estimate copied from a trade association or a wastewater operator. The first file should identify every entity that manufactures, imports, distributes or sells a listed medicine or cosmetic into France and every entity that sells the same product elsewhere in the Union. The file should then map the relevant products and substances to Annex III, the annual quantities placed on each market, the active ingredients or other relevant substances, the product’s end-of-life pathway and any evidence supporting an exemption under Article 9(2).
The second file should address causation and measurement. Preserve product composition data, safety and environmental assessments, biodegradability studies, monitoring results, wastewater sampling, manufacturing discharge records and correspondence with water operators. The company should distinguish ordinary urban use from industrial discharge, because the directive’s extended producer responsibility scheme is not a substitute for controls on a factory’s own discharge. It should also record the treatment technology at the plants likely to serve the relevant markets, the pollutants measured before and after existing stages, the additional treatment proposed and the method used to attribute costs to products rather than to the wider urban wastewater load.
French law already contains several different environmental mechanisms, and their boundaries must be kept clear. Article L110-1 of the French Environmental Code states the domestic polluter-pays principle, under which the costs resulting from prevention, reduction and control of pollution are borne by the polluter. That principle is a useful interpretive and advocacy reference, but it does not by itself decide whether the EU legislature correctly identified the polluter or selected a proportionate percentage under Article 9. The company should cite the provision without treating it as an automatic defence against every contribution.
Nor should a business confuse the new wastewater mechanism with the French waste REP system. Article L541-10 of the French Environmental Code governs producer responsibility in the field of products that generate waste and can require producers to prevent and manage that waste, often through approved eco-organisations and financial contributions. It provides a domestic comparison for governance, data and financing, but the EU wastewater scheme has its own legal basis, product list and cost categories. A producer already paying a French waste contribution should not assume that the payment offsets a future Article 9 contribution, and an authority should not merge the two without a clear legal instrument.
The company should create a cost model that can be audited backwards from the requested contribution. The model should show the covered plants, investment assumptions, depreciation period, operating costs, monitoring costs, data-collection costs, management fees, reserve or guarantee amounts and the allocation key applied to each product. It should show which figures are actual, which are forecast and which come from a European average. It should also test alternative allocation methods: quantity, hazardousness, measured concentration, market placement, product use, biodegradability and the share of the relevant substance reaching the treatment plant. A contribution that cannot be reconciled to a defined cost and an identified allocation rule is a litigation risk even if the directive itself survives.
Medicine availability deserves a separate evidence stream. Article 10(6) expressly directs attention to accessibility, availability and affordability. A French or international producer should preserve margins, tender prices, reimbursement prices, supply commitments, shortages, alternative suppliers, discontinuation analyses and the effect of a contribution on low-volume products. The relevant evidence is not a broad claim that costs may rise. It is a product-level demonstration of what happens if a contribution is passed through, absorbed, allocated to a portfolio or made a condition of continued supply. That record can inform submissions to the French authority, the Commission, a producer responsibility organisation and a court.
Contracts should be reviewed before a contribution notice arrives. A manufacturer, marketing authorisation holder, distributor and authorised representative may each assume that another party will register the product, report quantities, pay the organisation or bear an audit. Those clauses should identify the legal entity responsible in each Member State, the data standard, the audit right, the treatment of confidential information, the allocation of retrospective adjustments and the right to challenge a methodology. A clause that simply passes “all environmental charges” through may not resolve whether the amount is a statutory contribution, a service fee, an estimate or an amount capable of being disputed.
French administrative procedure provides additional safeguards during implementation. If a national authority relies on an environmental decision affecting the company, Article L171-8 of the French Environmental Code supplies a framework for formal notice and administrative sanctions, including the communication of reasons and an opportunity to submit observations. The provision is not a source of immunity from a European contribution. It is a reminder to preserve the procedural file: the notice, the legal basis, the evidence disclosed, the deadline, the observations filed and the reasons given in the final decision.
Where controls, expertise or analyses are ordered, Article L216-1 of the French Environmental Code is relevant to the treatment of water-related compliance measures and the allocation of control costs. The company should ask what is being measured, who selected the laboratory, whether the method is validated, whether the sample represents the relevant activity and whether it can respond to the result. A contribution system built on unverified or non-comparable samples is different from a system built on a transparent product-data methodology.
The company must keep its own discharge exposure separate. Article L214-1 of the French Environmental Code subjects certain non-domestic activities affecting water, including direct or indirect discharges, to the water-protection regime. Article L214-3 addresses environmental authorisation for activities likely to harm water quality or aquatic diversity. Those provisions can apply to a manufacturing installation regardless of whether the producer also owes a contribution through the urban wastewater REP scheme. A company should not use a challenge to Article 9 as a reason to delay a permit, monitoring plan or discharge-control response.
B. Which administrative and judicial routes can protect the business?
The first route is participation and dialogue. Article 10(5) of Directive (EU) 2024/3019 contemplates regular dialogues involving producers, distributors, producer responsibility organisations, wastewater operators, local authorities and civil society. A French producer should use that process to request the methodology, the definition of full costs, the treatment of confidential business information, the calculation of hazardousness and the way national authorities will deal with products sold by entities outside France. Written questions and written answers are more valuable than an informal assurance because they preserve the position for a later administrative or judicial challenge.
National implementation should be monitored as a sequence of legal acts. The company should identify the French authority responsible for registration, the instrument used to recognise producer responsibility organisations, the consultation or participation procedure, the date for data submission, the form of the contribution notice, the available appeal and the consequences of non-payment. For measures with an environmental incidence and no special public-participation procedure, Article L123-19-1 of the French Environmental Code provides an important reference point for electronic public participation. Whether that provision applies to a particular implementing measure will depend on the measure’s legal form and the special rules governing it; the point is to test the procedure, not to assume that every decree follows the same route.
If the French authority issues an individual charge, refusal, order or enforcement measure, the company should calculate the ordinary challenge deadline immediately. It should state the domestic grounds and preserve the EU grounds: lack of competence, inadequate reasoning, error in the factual basis, failure to follow the directive’s data requirements, breach of national procedural rights, disproportionate calculation and inconsistency with the principles raised in C-193/25. The relief sought should be precise. It may be annulment of the national act, a recalculation, disclosure of the cost methodology, a stay of enforcement or a preliminary reference on the validity of Article 9(1)(a) and Annex III.
Urgency may justify a French interim application. Article L521-1 of the French Code of Administrative Justice allows the urgent applications judge to suspend execution of an administrative decision when urgency is established and a serious doubt exists as to its legality. The Conseil d’État described the objective and global assessment of urgency in its Section decision of 22 February 2002, no. 235345, Conseil d’État, Section, 22 February 2002, no. 235345. More recently, its decision of 14 April 2023, no. 460040, Conseil d’État, 14 April 2023, no. 460040, restates the need to connect the urgent relief application to a serious doubt about the legality of the challenged administrative decision.
A business should not present the European Opinion as if it had already annulled the contribution. The better case is fact-specific. The company can show an imminent charge, a non-recoverable payment, a threat to a tender or supply commitment, an obligation to disclose confidential product information, or an enforcement measure that will produce irreversible effects. It can then explain why the national act is not adequately reasoned, why its cost calculation departs from Article 9(3)(c), why the authority ignored the company’s evidence or why the validity question requires a preliminary reference. A court is more likely to engage with a concrete national decision than with an abstract request to suspend the directive itself.
The French administrative case law on environmental cost allocation is useful but must be used carefully. In its decision of 8 March 2024, no. 465044, Conseil d’État, 6th and 5th chambers, 8 March 2024, no. 465044, the court examined a challenge invoking the polluter-pays principle and the statutory framework implementing it. The decision does not decide C-193/25, and it does not establish that any European sectoral allocation is lawful. It does show why a French argument should identify the precise legislation implementing the principle, the operator or producer concerned and the causal and economic logic of the charge.
Wastewater planning offers another French comparator. In its decision of 13 July 2023, no. 454945, Conseil d’État, 13 July 2023, no. 454945, the court considered wastewater sanitation issues in relation to the load generated by population and activity, costs and environmental and public-health considerations. That decision cannot substitute for an analysis of Article 9. It can nevertheless help a company explain why a national implementation should distinguish the activity, the wastewater load, the relevant plants and the cost actually caused by the targeted product group.
Environmental damage is a separate route again. Article L160-1 of the French Environmental Code defines the framework for preventing or repairing damage caused to the environment by an operator’s activity under the polluter-pays principle. It concerns environmental liability and remediation, not the European producer contribution. If a dispute involves a proven release from a plant, an operator’s control or a request for preventive measures, the company should assess that exposure independently rather than bundle it into the Article 9 validity argument.
The criminal and administrative risks of an unlawful discharge also remain distinct. Article L216-6 of the French Environmental Code addresses harmful discharges into surface water, groundwater or territorial waters and provides for criminal penalties and restoration measures. A producer that disputes the EU cost allocation cannot use that dispute to excuse a discharge violation. Conversely, the existence of a regulatory charge does not prove that a specific company committed a discharge offence. The evidence, legal elements and forum are different.
If the Court of Justice follows the Opinion and annuls Article 9(1)(a) and the related product list, national implementation will need to be unwound or redesigned to the extent that it rests on those provisions. That process may raise questions about contributions already collected, contracts signed with producer responsibility organisations, transitional rules, national liability and the treatment of pending proceedings. If the Court rejects the challenge, producers will still be able to contest an incorrect product classification, an unsupported calculation, a failure to apply an exemption, a defective audit or a national measure that exceeds the directive’s terms. In either outcome, the quality of the evidence assembled now will affect the remedy available later.
The prudent French litigation sequence is therefore concrete:
- Identify the EU legal act, the French implementing act and the individual decision or contract that creates the immediate exposure.
- Preserve the product, substance, market, wastewater, cost and medicine-availability evidence before data systems overwrite it.
- Request the methodology and disclose only the information required, while protecting confidential business information through a documented process.
- Submit observations and challenge the calculation within the applicable deadline; do not wait for the final CJEU judgment if a national deadline is running.
- Ask the French court for targeted interim relief where urgency and a serious doubt can be shown, and formulate any request for a preliminary reference around a defined validity question.
That strategy reflects the cross-border nature of the dispute. The same product may be placed on several markets, the relevant treatment plant may serve several communities, and the data may be held by a manufacturer, marketing authorisation holder, distributor, water operator and collective organisation in different countries. The legal answer will depend on the interaction between a Union act and national implementation. A French company that prepares only for a French invoice will be late; a company that maps the act, the evidence, the national decision and the urgent remedy will be able to react whether the Court confirms, narrows or removes the 80% rule.
Conclusion
Case C-193/25 has turned a technical wastewater-financing rule into a major test of EU environmental legislation. The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott on 3 September 2026 supports the challenge to the rule requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetics producers to finance at least 80% of quaternary treatment costs, but the Opinion is not the final judgment and it does not suspend the directive. The immediate legal task for French producers is more practical than rhetorical: identify the exact products and entities covered, test every exemption, demand a traceable cost methodology, preserve evidence about actual micropollutant pathways and protect medicine-supply evidence. If a French authority then issues a contribution, order or refusal, the company should challenge that national act through the correct procedure, seek urgent relief when the facts justify it and ask the national court to engage the Court of Justice on EU validity where necessary. The environmental objective remains legitimate. The contested question is whether the selected sectors and the 80% allocation are supported by sufficient evidence, equal treatment and proportionate reasoning.