On 29 July 2026, France’s Cour de cassation closed one of the longest European Arrest Warrant sagas of the decade. The criminal chamber rejected the appeal of Prince Paul of Romania, known in the case file as M. [W] [M] [N], against the Paris investigating chamber’s decision of 18 June 2026, which had, on referral after cassation, authorised his surrender to the Romanian judicial authorities in execution of a European Arrest Warrant. The warrant enforces a three-year-and-four-month prison sentence imposed by the Brasov Court of Appeal on 27 June 2019 for influence trafficking and complicity in abuse of power. Behind the royal name sits a case every defence lawyer in Europe should study: a first warrant issued on 17 December 2020, an arrest in France on 27 June 2022, a final refusal of surrender in Paris on 29 November 2023, a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union decided on 29 July 2024, a second warrant issued on 30 January 2025 for the same sentence, a new arrest on 7 April 2025, a cassation ruling on 16 December 2025, and finally the rejection of 29 July 2026. For an international audience, the question is practical, not princely: if France can hand over a seventy-seven-year-old man, living in France uninterrupted and regular for five years, after its own courts once refused to do so, what defence still works against a European Arrest Warrant before the French courts, and what would your lawyer need to prove within days of your arrest? This article gives the insider view of French procedure, built exclusively on the two published Cour de cassation rulings and the statutes they apply, with every decisive passage quoted word for word.
I. Can France surrender you on a Romanian European Arrest Warrant after its courts already refused once?
A. What happens when Romania issues a second warrant for the same sentence?
The European Arrest Warrant is, in French law, a judicial decision issued by a Member State of the European Union, called the issuing Member State, with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State, called the executing Member State, of a person wanted for the conduct of criminal proceedings or for the execution of a custodial sentence or detention order. That is the exact definition given by Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which adds that the judicial authority is competent, under the rules and conditions set by the chapter, to send such warrants to the other Member States or to execute them at their request. The Prince Paul file shows how that mechanism behaves across time. The Cour de cassation records the chronology without ambiguity in its ruling of 29 July 2026, appeal no. 26-84.072: a first European Arrest Warrant was issued on 17 December 2020 by the Romanian judicial authorities against the claimant for the enforcement of the Brasov sentence of 27 June 2019, he was arrested on French territory on 27 June 2022 in execution of that warrant, and by a judgment of 29 November 2023, which became final, the Paris investigating chamber refused his surrender. Then a new European Arrest Warrant, for the enforcement of the same sentence, was issued on 30 January 2025, notified on 7 April 2025 after a fresh arrest on French soil. The defence argument was intuitive and, for lay observers, powerful: the same issuing authority, the same person, the same sentence, the same requested State, after a final refusal clothed with res judicata, so the second request should fail. The Cour de cassation answered no, and its reasoning now binds every similar file. The investigating chamber had relied on the Court of Justice’s judgment of 29 July 2024 in the very same case, known as Breian, case C-318/24, holding that a final refusal by one Member State does not deprive the issuing authority of the possibility of maintaining its surrender request, provided the conditions required by European Union law are met. The Paris judges then noted that after issuing the warrant of 30 January 2025, the Romanian authorities communicated material on the composition of the sentencing court, which constituted new material compared with the grounds of the 29 November 2023 refusal. The criminal chamber approved that analysis and added three holding points that every practitioner must memorise. First, the judgment of 29 November 2023 concerned a distinct European Arrest Warrant, so that, for want of an identical object, its authority cannot be opposed to the examination of the warrant at stake in the present proceedings. Second, and decisively for all future cases, the procedure for executing a European Arrest Warrant issued for the enforcement of a sentencing decision does not constitute a new prosecution for the facts covered by that conviction, so that the ne bis in idem principle does not apply to it. The Court states this word for word: “la procédure relative à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis en vue de l’exécution d’une décision de condamnation ne constitue pas une poursuite nouvelle pour les faits objet de cette condamnation, de sorte que le principe ne bis in idem ne lui est pas applicable” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, para. 18). Third, under the above-mentioned judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian, C-318/24, paragraph 88), the executing judicial authority of a European Arrest Warrant issued for the enforcement of a sentence cannot refuse to execute that warrant on the ground that the record of the oath-taking of one of the judges who imposed that sentence cannot be found, or on the circumstance that another judge of the same panel had only taken the oath when appointed as a prosecutor. In French, the Court writes: “l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis en vue de l’exécution d’une peine ne peut pas refuser d’exécuter ce mandat d’arrêt en se fondant sur le motif que le procès-verbal de prestation de serment d’un juge ayant infligé cette peine est introuvable ou sur la circonstance qu’un autre juge de la même formation aurait seulement prêté serment lors de sa nomination en tant que procureur” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, para. 19). For anyone arrested in France on a second warrant after a first refusal, the message is blunt: do not build the defence on the mere existence of the earlier refusal. The file must show either that no new material cures the original defect, or better, that an independent mandatory or optional ground for refusal listed in the Code is made out on the new facts. The earlier refusal is history, not a shield. What counts is the warrant now before the investigating chamber, the sentence it enforces, and the evidence attached to it.
B. Can a second refusal rely on the authority of the first decision or on double jeopardy?
Two related defences collapsed in the 29 July 2026 ruling, and understanding why they collapsed is the difference between a serious opposition to surrender and a hopeless one. The first defence invoked the res judicata of the 29 November 2023 refusal combined with Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the ne bis in idem principle: because France had definitively refused, Romania needed to show a post-dating change of circumstances capable of altering the situation previously recognised by the courts, and the new material on a single Romanian judge’s regular appointment could not cure a refusal founded on the irregular composition of two judges plus the impossibility of annulment or review of the conviction. The Cour de cassation swept that construction aside. Res judicata attaches to a decision on a specific warrant, not to the abstract question of surrender, because each warrant is a distinct enforceable title with its own object. The Court’s formula deserves quotation in full for future pleadings: the refusal of 29 November 2023 concerned a distinct European Arrest Warrant, so that, for want of an identical object, its authority cannot be opposed to the examination of the present warrant. Defence lawyers should note the consequence. After a first refusal, the issuing State is entitled to repair its file and come back. Romania did exactly that, supplying material on the composition of the Brasov panel, and the Paris chamber treated that material as new. The criminal chamber endorsed the approach, holding that on those statements alone the investigating chamber had justified its decision without disregarding any of the texts cited in the plea. The second defence, ne bis in idem, fared no better and its rejection carries beyond this file. The plea argued that executing a second warrant for the same conviction after a final refusal amounted to prosecuting twice for the same facts. The Court replied that surrender proceedings enforce a sentence, they do not prosecute, and therefore double-jeopardy protection simply does not enter the picture. Again the operative sentence is worth learning by heart, because prosecutors will quote it in every contested hearing from now on: “En deuxième lieu, la procédure relative à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis en vue de l’exécution d’une décision de condamnation ne constitue pas une poursuite nouvelle pour les faits objet de cette condamnation, de sorte que le principe ne bis in idem ne lui est pas applicable” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, para. 18). The exhaustive character of refusal grounds reinforces the point. Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the cases in which execution of a European Arrest Warrant may be refused: French proceedings for the same facts or a French decision not to prosecute, French nationality or residence with an enforceable sentence in France, facts committed in whole or in part on French territory, extraterritorial offences France could not itself prosecute abroad, a final decision by a third State for the same facts with the sentence executed or unenforceable, and limitation. The list is limitative, and the companion ruling of 16 December 2025 makes the architecture explicit, as will be seen below. A prior French refusal is not on the list. Double jeopardy as such is not on the list for sentence-enforcement warrants. What is on the list must be proved strictly, document by document. A useful illustration comes from the oath controversy itself. The defence had argued that the Brasov conviction was vitiated because the oath records of the sentencing judges were missing or defective. The Court of Justice had already closed that door in Breian at paragraph 88, and the criminal chamber imported the holding into French law: missing oath records and an oath taken only as a prosecutor do not authorise refusal. The European reference applied by the Paris chamber is the one reported by the Cour de cassation itself: the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 29 July 2024 in the same case, Breian, case C-318/24, paragraph 88, read together with Article 1(3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant. The lesson for requested persons is therefore threefold. First, never assume a past victory protects you against a repaired warrant; ask your lawyer to obtain the new warrant and its annexes immediately and to compare them line by line with the old refusal grounds. Second, do not plead ne bis in idem against a sentence-enforcement warrant; plead instead a listed ground such as French territoriality, French prosecution, limitation, or a third-State final decision. Third, if the attack targets the foreign conviction itself, frame it as a fundamental-rights objection under Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision with concrete, individualised evidence, because abstract claims about an unfair, partial or political trial will be examined and then dismissed, exactly as the Court noted when it recorded that the judges had examined and rejected, in reasoning distinct from that criticised by the plea, the alleged violations of the fundamental rights mentioned in Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. The surrender machine, once repaired, restarts.
II. How does France test detention conditions, health and family life before surrender?
A. Will bad prison conditions or health problems stop a surrender to Romania?
The most emotionally powerful defences, overcrowded cells, a fragile state of health, an elderly requested person, were all raised in the Prince Paul litigation and all failed, but the way they failed teaches precisely what a successful file must contain. The procedural setting matters first. When a wanted person appears before the investigating chamber, the chamber establishes identity and collects statements, of which a record is drawn up, in a public hearing unless publicity would harm the ongoing proceedings, third-party interests or personal dignity. That is the rule of Article 695-30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which continues: “Le ministère public et la personne recherchée sont entendus, cette dernière assistée, le cas échéant, de son avocat et, s’il y a lieu, en présence d’un interprète.” The 29 July 2026 ruling adds a point of hearing discipline that will surprise common-law observers. The defence complained that the wanted person had been heard and questioned, including on whether he consented to surrender, before the reporting judge delivered the report required by Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, allegedly nullifying the proceedings. The criminal chamber disagreed and fixed the order of business for all future surrender hearings. It held word for word: “L’audition de la personne recherchée en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen par la chambre de l’instruction, en application de l’article 695-30 du code de procédure pénale, ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise, de sorte que cette formalité est préliminaire à tout débat” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, para. 9). It continued: “Il résulte de l’article 199 du même code que le rapport du conseiller, nécessaire à l’information de la juridiction saisie et des parties, doit être effectué avant tout débat” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, para. 10). And it concluded: “En procédant à la première de ces formalités avant la seconde, la chambre de l’instruction n’a pas méconnu le texte visé au moyen, dès lors que toutes deux ont été accomplies préalablement aux débats” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, para. 11). In plain terms, the identity-and-consent hearing comes first, the judge-rapporteur’s report comes second, and both must precede the adversarial debate, but the hearing may lawfully precede the report. Defence teams should therefore prepare the client for that opening sequence: identity, observations on the proceedings, consent or refusal, all on the record before any legal argument begins. Consent, once given and maintained after warning, is irrevocable, and Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the chamber finds the legal conditions met, it records consent and grants surrender within seven days of appearance, a decision not subject to appeal, while a refusal to consent leads to a reasoned decision within twenty days open to cassation by the prosecutor general or the wanted person. The filter for cassation itself is tight: under Article 567-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the outcome appears clear, a three-judge panel may declare inadmissible any appeal not based on a serious ground of cassation, which is exactly what happened to most of Prince Paul’s seven pleas, dismissed as incapable of supporting admission. Against that backdrop, the fundamental-rights plea had to clear a high bar. The defence alleged a real risk of violations of several fundamental rights: an unfair, partial and political conviction, detention in Romania incompatible with his health, and interference with private life. The criminal chamber recorded that the Paris judges had examined and dismissed those claims in reasoning distinct from the passages attacked, and that the judgment was therefore justified. The companion ruling of 16 December 2025, appeal no. 25-87.663, which had quashed the Paris refusal of 18 November 2025, explains the substantive standard. The prosecutor general’s appeal criticised the investigating chamber for assessing health evidence under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights rather than Article 3, and for skipping the proportionality analysis between the wanted person’s situation and the gravity of the Brasov conviction. The criminal chamber restated the controlling framework word for word: “Vu les articles 1er, § 3, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative au mandat d’arrêt européen et aux procédures de remise entre les pays de l’Union européenne et 695-22 à 695-24 du code de procédure pénale” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 16 December 2025, no. 25-87.663, para. 12). It then held that surrender may be refused only on the mandatory or optional grounds exhaustively listed in those articles. Health and prison conditions therefore do not operate as free-standing vetoes. As practical guidance for the file your lawyer builds, the decisions point in one direction: health risks must be pleaded under Article 3 of the Convention rather than folded into a general Article 8 complaint, because the criminal chamber quashed a refusal that assessed health-related grievances in the light of Article 8 instead of Article 3, and each alleged violation must be examined individually with reasons given. General hardship statements do not move the chamber on their own. A useful medical bundle contains dated certificates stating the diagnosis, the treatment that cannot be interrupted, and why transfer or detention would endanger health, so the chamber can rule on documented personal facts rather than on assertions. In the Prince Paul file, the health and detention arguments, however extensively pleaded, did not meet that combined test, and the surrender was authorised. The practical checklist for families is therefore concrete. From the day of arrest, commission a full medical expert report, gather prescriptions and hospital records, ask counsel to gather the precise documents on the sentence, the conviction file and the personal situation, and to invite the chamber to use its power to order further information before ruling, a possibility expressly preserved by Article 695-31, so that the evidence is in the file before the Paris hearing, not promised for later. Above all, move fast: the chamber rules within twenty days of appearance absent consent, and cassation review is confined to serious grounds, so the evidence must be in the file before the Paris hearing, not promised for later.
B. Can family life in France block a European Arrest Warrant?
The second great human defence, a life built in France, received its most authoritative answer in the companion cassation of 16 December 2025, and international readers should study it closely because it reverses a common assumption among foreign lawyers that European human-rights law protects settled residents against surrender. The Paris investigating chamber had refused surrender in November 2025 partly on private-and-family-life grounds, citing the wanted person’s age of over seventy, his long residence, his family ties and his health in France. The prosecutor general appealed, and the criminal chamber quashed. Its holding is now the controlling statement of French law and it is quoted here in full because every future pleading will be measured against it: “Il résulte des derniers de ces textes, interprétés à la lumière du premier, que la remise de la personne recherchée ne peut être refusée que pour les motifs de refus, obligatoires ou facultatifs, qui y sont limitativement énoncés. Ne constitue pas un tel motif l’atteinte à la vie privée et familiale en France que causerait à la personne recherchée l’exécution dudit mandat” (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 16 December 2025, no. 25-87.663, para. 13). In other words, harm to private and family life in France caused by executing the warrant is not, as such, a ground for refusal. The Court then stated the only narrow doorway that remains, referring to its rulings of 2 December 2025, appeals nos. 25-87.214 and 25-87.216, published in the Bulletin: when the investigating chamber faces a plea alleging that surrender would harm the wanted person’s private and family life in France, it must ascertain whether the applicant establishes exceptional circumstances allowing the right to respect for private and family life in France to prevail over the legitimate aim pursued by surrender in execution of the European Arrest Warrant, particularly in light of the gravity of the offences. The test is therefore exceptional circumstances weighed against the legitimate aim pursued by surrender, particularly in light of the gravity of the facts, with the warrant here issued for trafficking in influence and complicity in abuse of power punished by three years and four months of imprisonment. The rulings give no catalogue of situations that meet that threshold. They show the negative side: the Paris chamber’s refusal based on age, length of residence, a school-age child and documented health problems was quashed for errors of law, and the case ended in authorised surrender. Whether a given family situation could qualify as exceptional is therefore a question to test with counsel against the abstract test, not against any example in the case law. The 16 December 2025 ruling faulted the Paris chamber on three related fronts that map directly onto advocacy errors: it assessed health under Article 8 instead of Article 3, it omitted the proportionality examination weighing the personal situation against the gravity of the Romanian conviction, and it reasoned in terms too thin to establish a disproportionate interference with private and family life, in breach of the duty to give reasons. That duty is itself codified by Article 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which judgments of the investigating chamber, like final judgments, are void if they lack reasons or if their reasons are insufficient to allow the Cour de cassation to exercise review. The symmetry is elegant and unforgiving: the chamber must give full, individualised reasons for either granting or refusing surrender, and the criminal chamber will quash a refusal whose family-life reasoning is generic, just as it will reject an appeal whose fundamental-rights reasoning was duly answered below. For readers facing a warrant in France, the operational guidance follows. Do not ask the chamber to refuse surrender because life in France would be disrupted; disruption is the normal consequence of every surrender and the law has already priced it in. Instead, build an exceptional-circumstances bundle: civil-status documents proving dependency, school and medical records for children, sworn statements from carers and doctors explaining why no substitute exists, proof of the exact caregiving acts performed daily, and evidence that the Romanian sentence could be served in a way that preserves the family link only if surrender is refused, which will rarely be the case inside the Union. Pair that bundle with the gravity analysis rather than ignoring it: acknowledge the sentence, show rehabilitation, restitution or the passage of time where available, and explain why enforcement by surrender, as opposed to any other mechanism, creates the disproportion. And plead health under Article 3 with medical specificity, not under Article 8 as a makeweight, because the criminal chamber now polices that classification expressly. The Prince Paul file shows how demanding that filter is in practice. The November 2025 refusal had relied on a documented personal situation: a man aged seventy-seven, living in France uninterrupted and regular for five years, father of a fifteen-year-old child raised with his wife, with a fragile state of health on both sides, an eye operation already performed on his wife with a second one pending, and a stroke suffered by the wanted person himself in October 2025. The criminal chamber quashed that refusal for errors of law, and the proceedings ended with the surrender authorised on 18 June 2026 and the appeal rejected on 29 July 2026, once the oath-composition objection had been neutralised by the new Romanian material and the Breian holding. Families who understand that hierarchy before the hearing will spend their limited twenty days on evidence that can move the needle instead of rhetoric that cannot.
Conclusion
The Prince Paul saga leaves French surrender law clearer and stricter than it has ever been. A final refusal of a first European Arrest Warrant does not immunise the requested person against a repaired second warrant for the same sentence, because each warrant has its own object and its own review. Sentence-enforcement surrender is not a second prosecution, so ne bis in idem has no purchase. Missing oath records and irregular-appointment theories about the foreign sentencing panel do not justify refusal after Breian. Private and family life in France is not a standalone ground for refusal, only a plea of exceptional circumstances weighed against the gravity of the offence. Health arguments must be raised under Article 3 rather than folded into Article 8, and each alleged violation must be examined individually with reasons given, as the two rulings require; abstract claims about unfairness or hardship were examined and dismissed in this file. And the hearing itself runs on rails: identity and consent first under Article 695-30, the reporting judge’s account under Article 199, then debate, then a decision within seven days if consent is maintained or twenty days if it is refused, with cassation confined to serious grounds under Article 567-1-1. Anyone arrested in France on a European Arrest Warrant, Romanian or otherwise, should act on that map within hours: instruct counsel experienced before the Paris investigating chamber, refuse or give consent only after understanding irrevocability and specialty, demand the full warrant file plus annexes, commission medical and prison-conditions evidence immediately, and assemble any exceptional-circumstances proof before the hearing rather than after. The Cour de cassation has spoken twice in eight months, on 16 December 2025 and 29 July 2026, and both rulings point the same way: inside the European area of mutual trust, surrender is the rule, refusal the narrowly policed exception, and only a file built to the exact standards above can hope to become the exception. If a warrant with your name on it is already circulating, treat those twenty days as your entire trial.