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Monaco Bombing Suspect Arrested in Germany on Interpol Red Notice: How Extradition Works When the European Arrest Warrant Does Not Apply

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Monaco Bombing Suspect Arrested in Germany on Interpol Red Notice: How Extradition Works When the European Arrest Warrant Does Not Apply

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In the first week of September 2026, the Monaco police announced an unusually dense record: nine people wanted under Interpol Red Notices were located, arrested and surrendered to the Principality within a single week, in cases ranging from organised fraud to violent crime. The announcement, relayed by the international press on 7 September 2026, put the spotlight on one file in particular. A woman suspected of attempted murder, identified by the Monegasque authorities as Viktoriia Berezovska, is accused of placing an explosive device at her victim’s home in Monaco before fleeing abroad. Tracked through Interpol channels, she was located in Germany, with surrender to Monaco reported as the next step.

For an international audience, the case is a live demonstration of machinery that rarely makes headlines: what happens when a fugitive is caught in one country at the request of another, outside the European Arrest Warrant system. Monaco is not a member of the European Union, so the fast-track surrender procedure that moves suspects between EU states in weeks does not apply. Everything instead runs on classic extradition law: Interpol Red Notices, provisional arrest, diplomatic channels, judicial opinions, government decrees and appeals. This article explains, through the lens of French and European procedure as applied daily by a Paris extradition practice, how a Red Notice turns into an arrest in Germany, why the road to Monaco is longer than a European Arrest Warrant, which defences can stop the surrender, and what the exact sequence from arrest to handover looks like. Every decisive legal proposition below is anchored in a verified statutory text or court decision, quoted word for word, because in extradition law an approximation can cost a client their liberty.

I. Why the Monaco Case Runs on Classic Extradition Instead of the European Arrest Warrant

A. How does an Interpol Red Notice lead to an arrest in Germany?

The first misunderstanding to clear up is also the most common: an Interpol Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant. It is a cooperation instrument through which one member country asks the police forces of the other 195 Interpol member countries to locate a wanted person and arrest them with a view to extradition, under national law. No one is arrested by Interpol itself. The arrest is always carried out by national police, under national procedure, and it is the national judge who decides what happens next. When Monaco diffuses a Red Notice for attempted murder and the German police locate the suspect on German soil, the German authorities arrest her under German law, then examine whether surrender to Monaco is legally possible. The Red Notice is the trigger, not the judgment.

French procedure, which mirrors the structure used across continental Europe, shows what that examination looks like once a wanted person is in custody. The French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that any person apprehended following an extradition request must be brought before the competent prosecutor general within a short deadline. Article 696-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states, in its verified wording, that “Toute personne appréhendée à la suite d’une demande d’extradition doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent.” At that hearing, identity is verified, the person is informed of the request in a language they understand, and the right to a lawyer, freely chosen or court-appointed, is notified on pain of nullity. If the prosecutor does not release the person, the statute continues, “Le premier président de la cour d’appel ou le magistrat du siège désigné par lui ordonne l’incarcération et le placement sous écrou extraditionnel de la personne réclamée à la maison d’arrêt du siège de la cour d’appel.” unless appearance at every stage of the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed, in which case supervision measures such as judicial control may be ordered instead. This is article 696-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The architecture is therefore binary from the first hours: extradition detention, or supervised liberty with the possibility of applying for release at any time before the investigating chamber.

Detention following a Red Notice arrest is not open-ended. It is fenced in by strict time limits, and recent French case law shows that courts enforce them ruthlessly, including against the requesting state. On 10 September 2024, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation, in a decision published in the Bulletin under appeal number 24-83.504, quashed a Paris investigating-chamber ruling that had refused to lift the judicial supervision of a woman arrested at China’s request. The Cour held, in a passage that every extradition lawyer should memorise: “Il résulte de ces textes que l’arrestation provisoire prend fin si, dans un délai de soixante jours à compter de l’arrestation de la personne, la Partie requise n’a pas été saisie de la demande d’extradition, laquelle doit comporter l’ensemble des pièces visées à l’article 8 susvisé.” The Court added the operational consequence without ambiguity: “en l’absence desdites pièces en procédure, à l’expiration du délai précité, il doit être mis fin à l’écrou extraditionnel ou à la mesure de contrôle judiciaire prononcée à l’encontre de la personne recherchée.” Late-transmitted supplementary documents cannot retroactively save the detention. That 2024 ruling was made under the France-China bilateral treaty and its sixty-day rule, so its deadline cannot be transplanted as such to a Germany-Monaco surrender governed by different instruments. The transferable lesson for lawyers is methodological: identify from day one which treaty and which domestic provisions govern the arrest, diary every time limit they impose, demand the complete formal file with translations, and test each missing document against the applicable text, because the Cour de cassation has shown that where a treaty makes completeness a condition of continued detention, courts enforce it to the point of ordering release.

A second recent decision confirms how flexibly courts treat Interpol communications once the formal phase is reached, and it matters for the Monaco files. On 16 December 2025, the Criminal Chamber rejected appeal number 25-86.688 in a case where a man detained in France challenged the verification of the specialty principle after his surrender by the United Arab Emirates. The investigating chamber had relied on information transmitted by the French central authority, including the finding that “les autorités émiriennes ont informé les autorités françaises, le 14 juillet 2025, par le canal d’Interpol, que l’extradition avait été accordée par l’autorité compétente et que la remise pouvait être organisée, leur message visant la notice rouge assurant la diffusion du mandat d’arrêt.” The Cour de cassation endorsed that reasoning and added a holding of general scope: “la transmission d’une décision d’extradition n’est pas exigée par la convention bilatérale d’extradition, seul un refus, même partiel, devant faire l’objet d’une décision motivée.” In other words, an Interpol-channel message referencing the Red Notice that diffuses the arrest warrant can be enough to organise surrender, and the absence of a formal foreign surrender decision in the file does not automatically torpedo the procedure. Defence teams must therefore fight on two fronts at once: demand completeness where the law imposes a guillotine deadline, as in the 2024 ruling, while accepting that courts will not invent formal requirements the applicable treaty does not contain, as in the 2025 ruling. Challenging the Red Notice diffusion itself is a separate matter from fighting the surrender before the judge, who examines the request file as transmitted to the court.

B. Why does the surrender to Monaco follow classic extradition instead of the European Arrest Warrant?

The European Arrest Warrant is the fastest surrender instrument on the planet, but its door is narrow: it works only between European Union member states. French law defines it exactly as “une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” That is article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The mechanism rests on mutual recognition of judicial decisions, short judicial deadlines, and a closed list of refusal grounds. Germany uses it daily to surrender suspects to France, Romania or Poland, as the Cour de cassation’s 29 July 2026 decision in appeal 26-84.072 illustrates: a man whose surrender to the Romanian judicial authorities had been authorised challenged the hearing formalities, and the Criminal Chamber confirmed the regularity of the investigating chamber’s procedure, recalling that “L’audition de la personne recherchée en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen par la chambre de l’instruction, en application de l’article 695-30 du code de procédure pénale, ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise, de sorte que cette formalité est préliminaire à tout débat.” Weeks, not years: that is the European Arrest Warrant’s promise.

Monaco cannot issue or receive a European Arrest Warrant because the Principality is not a member of the European Union. Its requests therefore travel through classic extradition, the older and heavier machinery built on bilateral relations, diplomatic channels and government decisions. In France, the governing principle is stated by article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre.” Where a treaty governs, it applies first; where it is silent, the Code fills the gap. The formal request itself must follow a demanding evidentiary standard. Article 696-8 requires that “toute demande d’extradition est adressée au gouvernement français par voie diplomatique et accompagnée soit d’un jugement ou d’un arrêt de condamnation, même par défaut, soit d’un acte de procédure pénale décrétant formellement ou opérant de plein droit le renvoi de la personne poursuivie devant la juridiction répressive, soit d’un mandat d’arrêt ou de tout autre acte ayant la même force et décerné par l’autorité judiciaire, pourvu que ces derniers actes renferment l’indication précise du fait pour lequel ils sont délivrés et la date de ce fait.” Originals or certified copies, the applicable criminal statutes, and optionally a statement of facts must accompany the request. In Germany, the defence must run the same audit against the instruments applicable to a surrender to Monaco: obtain the transmitted file, check it item by item against the governing treaty and statutory requirements, and litigate any gap under those texts.

Classic extradition also carries a protection the European Arrest Warrant has partly streamlined away: the specialty principle, which confines the requesting state to the offence for which surrender was granted. French law states it as a condition of principle in article 696-6: “Sous réserve des exceptions prévues à l’article 696-34, l’extradition n’est accordée qu’à la condition que la personne extradée ne sera ni poursuivie, ni condamnée pour une infraction autre que celle ayant motivé l’extradition et antérieure à la remise.” And where a suspect has already been moved once under a European Arrest Warrant, a second lock applies before any onward surrender outside the Union. The Cour de cassation recalled on 2 December 2020, in appeal 19-87.428 concerning a man surrendered by Belgium to France under a European Arrest Warrant and then claimed by Morocco, that under article 695-21 II of the Code, “lorsque le ministère public qui a délivré un mandat d’arrêt européen a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être extradée vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne sans le consentement de l’autorité compétente de l’Etat membre qui l’a remise.” The Court then drew the decisive procedural line for the defence: “le consentement de l’Etat étranger à l’extradition de la personne remise en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne n’entre pas dans les conditions légales visées par l’article 696-15 du code de procédure pénale.” Translated into courtroom tactics, that holding cuts both ways: the missing consent of the first surrendering state cannot by itself support an unfavourable-opinion block at the investigating-chamber stage, but the consent must still be obtained before any actual onward extradition outside the Union. Any lawyer handling a file in which the suspect reached the arresting state through a prior European surrender must therefore verify the consent chain separately from the extradition conditions, because the two controls live at different stages of the procedure. The same consent logic flows from article 28 of the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, the instrument the French courts apply through article 695-21.

II. How a Suspect Can Fight Surrender, and What the Road to Handover Looks Like

A. What defences can stop an extradition to a non-EU state such as Monaco?

French extradition law lists eight mandatory bars to surrender, and they read like a defence checklist. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the master rule, “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique ; 3° Lorsque les crimes ou délits ont été commis sur le territoire de la République ; 4° Lorsque les crimes ou délits, quoique commis hors du territoire de la République, y ont été poursuivis et jugés définitivement ; 5° Lorsque, d’après la loi de l’Etat requérant ou la loi française, la prescription de l’action s’est trouvée acquise antérieurement à la demande d’extradition, ou la prescription de la peine antérieurement à l’arrestation de la personne réclamée et d’une façon générale toutes les fois que l’action publique de l’Etat requérant est éteinte” The same article continues with three further bars that dominate modern litigation: no surrender where the requesting state’s penalty offends French public policy, where the person would face a tribunal that does not guarantee fundamental procedural safeguards and defence rights, or for purely military offences. Each of these eight grounds is examined by the investigating chamber, and a single established ground is enough: under article 696-15, “Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente.”

Applied to a bombing-attempt file such as the Berezovska case, three of these bars deserve concrete attention from the defence, even though the underlying facts remain allegations at this stage. First, limitation: counsel must compute prescription under both the requesting state’s law and the law of the requested state, because either clock having run out kills the request. Second, the nature of the penalty and the fairness of the trial: where the requesting system is unfamiliar to the requested judge, the defence must document, with official texts and country materials, the exact sentencing regime and procedural guarantees attached to the specific charge, without borrowing arguments from neighbouring offences. Third, the political-offence bar of article 696-4 2°, quoted above, must be tested against the actual facts of the file: counsel must establish either the political character of the offence or that the circumstances show the request pursues a political purpose, and where the facts do not support that test, the serious work shifts to limitation, specialty and procedural regularity. Two further European safeguards complete the shield. The same article 696-4 states three further bars that dominate modern litigation: no surrender “6° Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français ; 7° Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense ; 8° Lorsque le crime ou le délit constitue une infraction militaire prévue par le livre III du code de justice militaire”. The European Arrest Warrant regime contains an explicit discrimination clause of its own: “5° S’il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre, ou qu’il peut être porté atteinte à la situation de cette personne pour l’une de ces raisons”, which is item 5 of article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Each of these grounds must be proved with documents relating to the specific charge, not with general assertions about the requesting state.

The forum that tests these defences in France is the investigating chamber of the court of appeal, and its procedure is itself a source of nullities that skilled lawyers exploit. Where the requested person consents to surrender, article 696-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure. La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de cinq jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général.” Where, as in most fought cases, the person refuses, article 696-15 provides that “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure. La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de dix jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général.” and that “la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition” within one month of the appearance absent further inquiries. The resulting instrument is an opinion, not a judgment: a favourable opinion leaves the final word to the government, while a definitive unfavourable opinion kills the file outright, since article 696-17 states that “Si l’avis motivé de la chambre de l’instruction repousse la demande d’extradition et que cet avis est définitif, l’extradition ne peut être accordée. La personne réclamée, si elle n’est pas détenue pour une autre cause, est alors mise d’office en liberté.” The appeal against that opinion is deliberately narrow: the statute closes article 696-15 with the warning that “Le pourvoi formé contre un avis de la chambre de l’instruction ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis des conditions essentielles de son existence légale.” Defence strategy must therefore be front-loaded: everything substantive, from prescription computations to prison-conditions evidence and specialty reservations, goes into the investigating-chamber file, because the Cour de cassation will only police the formal regularity of the opinion, not reweigh its merits.

B. What is the exact sequence from arrest to handover, and where can liberty be recovered?

Reconstructing the full chain is what turns abstract rights into a litigation calendar, and the French model again supplies the reference timeline that continental practitioners adapt to the requested state. The diplomatic request, once received, is checked and routed: article 696-9 provides that “La demande d’extradition est, après vérification des pièces, transmise, avec le dossier, par le ministre des affaires étrangères au ministre de la justice qui, après s’être assuré de la régularité de la requête, l’adresse au procureur général territorialement compétent.” Arrest and presentation within forty-eight hours follow, then the investigating-chamber phase described above, with its consent and non-consent tracks. If the opinion is favourable, or if no opinion was required, the file returns to the executive: article 696-18 states that “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre pris sur le rapport du ministre de la justice.” and the same article frames the last judicial battle, since “Le recours pour excès de pouvoir contre le décret mentionné à l’alinéa précédent doit, à peine de forclusion, être formé dans le délai d’un mois. L’exercice d’un recours gracieux contre ce décret n’interrompt pas le délai de recours contentieux.” One month, forfeiture for missing it, no suspension of the deadline by a parallel administrative petition: the challenge to the surrender decree before the administrative courts is a sprint that must be prepared while the investigating-chamber phase is still running.

The endgame is governed by handover deadlines that operate as automatic liberty valves. For the case where the requested person is at liberty once the government’s authorisation can no longer be challenged, article 696-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Si la personne réclamée est en liberté lorsque la décision du gouvernement ayant autorisé l’extradition n’est plus susceptible de recours, le procureur général peut ordonner la recherche et l’arrestation de l’intéressé, y compris en faisant application de l’article 74-2 , et son placement sous écrou extraditionnel.” It continues: “La remise à l’Etat requérant de la personne réclamée s’effectue dans les sept jours suivant la date de l’arrestation, faute de quoi elle est mise d’office en liberté.” This seven-day handover-or-release rule is distinct from the one-month rule of article 696-18, which states that “Si, dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la notification de ce décret à l’Etat requérant, la personne réclamée n’a pas été reçue par les agents de cet Etat, l’intéressé est, sauf cas de force majeure, mis d’office en liberté et ne peut plus être réclamé pour la même cause.” Conversely, liberty granted during the proceedings is conditional and revocable. Article 696-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Si la personne réclamée se soustrait volontairement aux obligations du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique ou si, après avoir bénéficié d’une mise en liberté non assortie du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique, il apparaît qu’elle entend manifestement se dérober à la demande d’extradition, la chambre de l’instruction peut, sur les réquisitions du ministère public, décerner mandat d’arrêt à son encontre.” Once the person is apprehended, the same article imposes the hearing deadline: “Lorsque l’intéressé a été appréhendé, l’affaire doit venir à la première audience publique ou au plus tard dans les dix jours de sa mise sous écrou.” Families and counsel should therefore treat any release as a supervised status with strict compliance duties: declared address, immediate notification of any change, and scrupulous respect of control obligations, because a breach rebuilds the detention the defence worked to dismantle.

For the relatives and advisers of someone arrested abroad on a Red Notice, whether in Germany at Monaco’s request or anywhere else in Europe, the practical checklist that Paris extradition specialists apply from the first telephone call is the following. First, secure a criminal lawyer in the arresting state within hours and a correspondent lawyer in the requesting state within days, because the two halves of the file move on different clocks. Second, obtain the complete transmitted file, with certified translations, and audit it against the applicable treaty’s documentary list, hunting for the missing warrant original, the missing judicial authorisation, or the unsigned page that triggers the release case law. Third, compute limitation under both legal systems and map every 696-4-style bar onto documented evidence rather than assertions. Fourth, file specialty reservations expressly and early, so that any post-surrender prosecution beyond the granted offence is challengeable. Fifth, scrutinise the Red Notice diffusion itself for identity errors or factual overreach, since the surrender judge works from the file as transmitted. Sixth, calendar every guillotine: provisional-arrest expiry, opinion deadlines, the one-month decree challenge, and the handover-or-release countdown. Extradition rewards the team that counts days; it punishes the team that counts on general principles.

Conclusion

Monaco’s week of nine surrenders and the Berezovska arrest in Germany tell the same story from two angles. The Interpol Red Notice system, often criticised and sometimes abused, remains capable of locating fugitives across borders within days when the underlying file is serious and the diffusion is diligent. But each arrest only opens a procedure, and that procedure, outside the European Arrest Warrant, is slow, documentary and unforgiving of gaps. The coming months will show whether Monaco’s formal extradition file withstands German judicial scrutiny, whether specialty and consent questions arise from the suspect’s movements between states, and whether the defence converts time limits and documentary requirements into release. For observers, the milestones to watch are public by nature: the German court’s admissibility decision, the executive authorisation and its court challenge, and the handover date. For anyone facing a comparable situation, the message of the verified case law is consistent: demand the complete file immediately, compute every deadline from the day of arrest, plead every bar with documents rather than rhetoric, and never assume that a Red Notice is a conviction in advance. In extradition, the file beats the headline every time.

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