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Netanyahu in New York for UNGA 2026: Can He Be Arrested on the ICC Warrant? What France Would Do

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Netanyahu in New York for UNGA 2026: Can He Be Arrested on the ICC Warrant? What France Would Do

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On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza. Less than a year later, the question dominating international headlines is brutally practical: if Netanyahu flies to New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September 2026, will anyone put handcuffs on him? New York City mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani said in July 2026 that the city would arrest him, adding days later that he personally could not order such an arrest. President Donald Trump answered on 20 July 2026 that Netanyahu would not be arrested on American soil. And on 3 September 2026, the ICC Prosecutor told the judges there was “no basis to withdraw or vacate” the warrants, asking the Appeals Chamber to throw out Israel’s jurisdictional challenge. This article explains, as a French extradition and international criminal law practice sees it, what these warrants truly order, why no arrest is legally possible in Manhattan, and what would happen very differently if the same plane landed in Paris.

I. Why New York cannot — and will not — arrest Netanyahu during the 2026 General Assembly

A. What the ICC warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant actually order, and what the 3 September 2026 prosecution filing changed

The warrants issued on 21 November 2024 by Pre-Trial Chamber I allege criminal responsibility for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and for the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts, committed in Gaza from at least 8 October 2023. They are arrest warrants addressed to the States Parties to the Rome Statute, the treaty that created the ICC: each State Party is bound, under Articles 86 to 89 of the Statute, to cooperate with the Court, to arrest persons named in a warrant found on its territory, and to surrender them to The Hague. The warrant is therefore not an Interpol red notice, not a universal arrest order floating above the planet, and not an instruction that any police officer anywhere must execute. It is a cooperation order directed at a defined circle of states, and outside that circle it has the legal force of a request that the receiving state is free to decline.

That circle matters enormously here. Israel never joined the Rome Statute, and neither did the United States. Washington signed the treaty in 2000 and then “unsigned” it in 2002, and Congress went further with the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, which authorises the President to use “all means necessary” to free US or allied personnel detained at the Court’s request. The United States is therefore not a State Party, owes the ICC no cooperation duty, and treats ICC warrants against its nationals and its allies as legally void on American territory. The sanctions imposed by the Trump administration on ICC personnel — asset freezes and visa bans targeting the Prosecutor and, on 20 August 2026, two sitting ICC judges hearing the Palestine situation — are the coercive translation of that position. Whatever one thinks of the policy, its legal consequence is straightforward: no federal, state or municipal authority in the United States considers itself bound to execute the Netanyahu warrant.

The 3 September 2026 filing sharpened the picture on the judicial side. In a ten-page response, the Office of the Prosecutor told the Appeals Chamber that there was “no basis to withdraw or vacate” the arrest warrants and asked the judges to dismiss Israel’s appeal against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s rejection of its jurisdiction challenge. The Israeli government had argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over its nationals because Israel is not a State Party and Palestine is not a sovereign state capable of delegating jurisdiction. The Prosecutor’s answer restated the position the Court has held since its 5 February 2021 ruling on territorial jurisdiction: Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute in 2015, the UN General Assembly recognised it as a non-member observer state in 2012, and the Court may therefore exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of Palestine, including Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, regardless of the nationality of the alleged perpetrator. The filing changed nothing in the operative force of the warrants — they remain valid and binding on States Parties — but it confirmed that the judicial review Israel requested will not suspend them in the meantime. Appeals against admissibility and jurisdiction decisions do not automatically stay the execution of a warrant unless the Appeals Chamber so orders, and it has not done so.

Two practical consequences follow. First, the warrants are alive, enforceable in The Hague’s 125 States Parties, and unaffected by American sanctions, which bind only persons and assets under US jurisdiction. Second, they remain unenforceable where the suspect actually travels this month: the United States. That gap between validity and enforceability is the defining feature of international criminal justice, and it is precisely what the New York debate illustrates.

The French reader should note the contrast with the European arrest warrant system, which shows what binding interstate surrender machinery looks like when states actually consent to it. Under Article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne” — the European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State of the European Union — for the arrest and surrender of a wanted person by another Member State, for prosecution or for the execution of a custodial sentence. The mechanism works because every Member State accepted, through the 2002 Framework Decision, to surrender its own machinery to the issuing judge, subject only to exhaustively listed grounds for refusal. The ICC system has no equivalent compulsory backbone: Article 98 of the Rome Statute expressly provides that the Court may not request a surrender that would force a state to violate its international-law immunity obligations toward a third state without that state’s waiver. Netanyahu travels as a sitting head of government, and sitting heads of government enjoy personal immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction under customary international law, as the International Court of Justice held in the 2002 Arrest Warrant case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium. Whether Article 27 of the Rome Statute — which strips official-capacity immunity before the ICC itself — overrides that immunity for States Parties arresting on the Court’s behalf is one of the most litigated questions in The Hague, still disputed after the Al-Bashir saga. In a non-party state like the United States, the question does not even arise: there is no cooperation duty to begin with.

B. Why no handcuffs are possible in Manhattan: the Headquarters Agreement, federal exclusivity, and Mamdani’s correction

Mamdani’s initial statement on 1 July 2026 — that New York would arrest Netanyahu if he arrived — triggered a national controversy, then a correction. On 22 July 2026, the candidate told ABC News that as mayor he would order no such arrest, explaining that he could not direct the New York Police Department to enforce an ICC warrant and that his earlier remarks described what he believed the city should do, not what a mayor can lawfully command. The correction was legally sound, for three independent reasons that stack on top of each other.

First, the mayor of New York has no authority to execute foreign or international arrest orders. Criminal arrests in the United States require a warrant issued by a competent American court or a statutory arrest authority; an ICC warrant is neither. No federal statute incorporates ICC arrest warrants into domestic arrest powers, and New York State criminal procedure knows no mechanism for a municipal police force to arrest on the strength of a Hague warrant. A mayor who ordered the NYPD to seize a visiting head of government would be ordering an unlawful arrest, exposing the city to civil liability and the officers to suppression of any resulting proceedings. Mamdani’s revised position — that the city “can’t arrest” on its own motion — simply states the law of police powers.

Second, even the federal government, which alone conducts foreign affairs, could not lawfully arrest Netanyahu for the ICC during a General Assembly visit. When foreign leaders travel to UN headquarters, they enter under Section 11 of the 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States, which obliges the US to allow transit to and from the headquarters district of representatives of member states, regardless of bilateral disputes. The United States has occasionally squeezed that obligation — restricting movement radii or delaying visas — but it has never arrested a visiting head of government for an international court on UN business, and doing so would breach the Headquarters Agreement. Added to this shield is the protective practice for visiting leaders: the Secret Service and the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service secure the visit, not to facilitate arrest but to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of the guest. The federal executive, which in July 2026 publicly promised there would be no arrest, holds both the legal duty to admit and the physical control of the security perimeter.

Third, Congress has legislated hostility to ICC enforcement on US soil. Beyond the 2002 statute, successive executive orders — President Biden’s 2021 order lifting earlier sanctions, then President Trump’s 2025 and 2026 orders re-imposing and extending them — frame ICC action against US and allied personnel as a national-security threat. In August 2026, Washington sanctioned two ICC judges sitting on Palestine-related matters, a step without precedent against sitting international judges. A US Marshals Service execution of an ICC warrant in this context is not merely unlikely; it would contradict the stated policy of the executive branch that commands the Marshals. The media framing of a “race to arrest” therefore misunderstands the legal terrain: in New York in September 2026, there is no competent authority willing to arrest, no domestic legal basis for an arrest, and a treaty obligation to let the visitor reach the podium undisturbed.

None of this affects the warrants’ force elsewhere. Had Netanyahu flown to London, Paris, Madrid or Pretoria — all capitals of States Parties — the local authorities would have faced a genuine cooperation duty, modulated only by the head-of-state immunity debate and by domestic implementing law. South Africa learned this in 2015 when its courts held the government should have arrested then-President Al-Bashir during an African Union summit in Johannesburg. The United Kingdom, France and Germany maintain standing domestic procedures for ICC surrender. The geography of international justice is everything: the same warrant that is a dead letter on the East River is an operational arrest order on the Seine. That is exactly what the second part of this article demonstrates.

II. What a French lawyer watches instead: arrest, surrender and cooperation as Paris would run them

A. If the plane landed at Roissy instead of JFK: France’s ICC cooperation Title and the investigating chamber’s narrow check

France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, which it ratified in 2000, and it implemented cooperation with the Court in a dedicated Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 627 to 627-20. The opening provision sets the principle without ambiguity. Under Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre” — France participates in the punishment of offences and cooperates with that jurisdiction under the conditions laid down in this Title — for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes within the meaning of Articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute. This is not a political declaration; it is a directly applicable cooperation regime that designates the competent French actors, the procedures for arrest, surrender, seizure of assets, enforcement of sentences and transit, and the limited review the French judge performs before surrendering a person to The Hague.

The procedure for surrendering a person to the ICC runs through the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal, and its review is deliberately narrower than in classic extradition. The Prosecutor General receives the ICC request, the person is brought before the chamber, and the chamber verifies identity, the regularity of the request and the absence of manifest error — it does not retry the ICC’s case, reassess the evidence, or rule on the immunities question, which belongs to the ICC itself. Under Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée” — where the investigating chamber finds that there is no obvious error, it orders the surrender of the requested person — and any other question raised is referred to the International Criminal Court for appropriate action. The chamber rules within fifteen days of the person’s appearance, and on appeal the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. The philosophy is one of jurisdictional trust: France surrendered part of its criminal sovereignty to the ICC by ratifying the Statute, and its courts act as the enforcement arm of a jurisdiction it recognises, not as a second trial court.

Provisional arrest pending the formal surrender request follows the same cooperative logic. French law allows the arrest of a person named in an ICC warrant as soon as the request arrives through the proper channels, and conservatory measures to freeze assets and preserve evidence can be ordered immediately. Under Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, protective measures requested under Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute are ordered on French territory by the anti-terrorism public prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request — a tool designed precisely for situations where funds or evidence might vanish while surrender proceedings run their course. A Paris practitioner advising a client named in an ICC warrant therefore works under extreme time pressure: from the moment the warrant becomes executable on French soil, arrest can precede any substantive challenge, and the only avenues are a manifest-error plea before the chambre de l’instruction, an appeal to the Court of Cassation, and parallel applications to the ICC itself — for release, for an admissibility challenge under Article 19 of the Statute, or for a ruling on immunity.

The head-of-state immunity question would dominate any Paris scenario involving a sitting prime minister. France’s position, consistent with its ratification of the Statute and with Article 27, is that official capacity does not exempt a person from the ICC’s jurisdiction, and French courts have recognised the ICC’s authority to determine immunity questions itself. But France also respects the International Court of Justice’s Arrest Warrant jurisprudence on personal immunities before national courts, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute requires the ICC to manage conflicts where surrender would breach a state’s immunity obligations toward a third state. In practice, a surrender to the ICC ordered by the Paris chambre de l’instruction against a sitting foreign leader would trigger immediate litigation before the ICC Appeals Chamber, possible observations by the leader’s state, and intense diplomatic pressure — exactly the procedural storm that surrounded Al-Bashir’s travels through States Parties between 2009 and 2019. The difference with New York is structural: in Paris, the storm would unfold inside courtrooms applying binding cooperation law; in New York, there is no courtroom competent to open the file at all.

French case law on surrender proceedings shows how rigorously, and how swiftly, the Paris courts process these files. On 29 July 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled on a German European arrest warrant case in which, as the judgment records, “les autorités judiciaires allemandes ont émis un mandat d’arrêt européen à l’encontre de Mme [H] [T], en vue de l’exercice de poursuites pénales pour des faits qualifiés d’appartenance à une organisation terroriste basée à l’étranger” — the German judicial authorities issued a European arrest warrant against Ms [H] [T] for the purpose of conducting criminal proceedings for acts classified as membership of a terrorist organisation based abroad (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 29 July 2026, appeal no. 26-84.256, full decision on courdecassation.fr). The case turned on the Paris investigating chamber’s refusal to surrender and the Prosecutor General’s appeal — a reminder that even within the streamlined EAW system, the French judge exercises real control, and that surrender litigation is fought document by document, ground by ground, before the chambre de l’instruction and then the Court of Cassation. Transposed to an ICC surrender, the same judicial seriousness would apply, compressed into the fifteen-day and two-month deadlines of Article 627-8.

B. European arrest warrant versus classic extradition: what French courts actually test before any surrender

Understanding why Paris would treat an ICC warrant, a European arrest warrant and a classic extradition request differently is essential for any international reader facing cross-border proceedings. The three channels obey three different logics, and French courts apply three different levels of scrutiny.

The European arrest warrant is the fastest channel. Within the European Union, surrender is the principle and refusal the exhaustively listed exception. The mandatory grounds for refusal are narrow: Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants” — execution of a European arrest warrant shall be refused in the following cases — amnesty in France, ne bis in idem where the sentence was served or can no longer be enforced, and minority under thirteen years of age. Beyond these, refusal is only optional: Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française” — execution of a European arrest warrant may also be refused where the act covered by the warrant does not constitute an offence under French law — subject to the list of thirty-two serious offences, punishable by at least three years’ imprisonment in the issuing state, for which dual criminality may not be reviewed at all. Terrorism, trafficking, corruption, murder and war crimes all sit on that list, which is why the German warrant in the July 2026 case quoted above proceeded without any dual-criminality debate. The Court of Cassation polices these boundaries strictly: on 29 November 2022 it quashed a surrender decision for misapplying the optional-refusal framework of Article 695-23 (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 29 November 2022, appeal no. 20-86.216, full decision on courdecassation.fr), and on 30 March 2021 it upheld a surrender to Italy on an EAW issued on “Le 20 décembre 2020, les autorités judiciaires italiennes ont délivré à l’encontre de M. G… un mandat d’arrêt européen aux fins de poursuites” — on 20 December 2020, the Italian judicial authorities issued a European arrest warrant against Mr G… for the purposes of prosecution — where the wanted person, arrested on 11 February 2021, had not consented to surrender (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 30 March 2021, appeal no. 21-81.554, full decision on courdecassation.fr). Speed, mutual recognition and minimal grounds for refusal are the system’s signature: most surrenders are executed within weeks.

Classic extradition, outside the European Union, is slower and more protective. Here France retains full sovereign discretion, exercised in two stages: a reasoned opinion of the chambre de l’instruction, then a decree of the Prime Minister granting or refusing surrender. The statute piles up peremptory bars. Under Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “L’extradition n’est pas accordée” — extradition shall not be granted — where the requested person is a French national, where the offence is political or the request pursues a political aim, where the acts were committed on French territory, where they were already finally judged in France, or where prosecution is time-barred or covered by amnesty. The nationality bar is absolute: France never extradites its own citizens, a constitutional-level tradition codified without exception. And the procedure guarantees adversarial debate: under Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the person does not consent, “la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition” — the investigating chamber gives its reasoned opinion on the extradition request — after the person’s appearance within ten working days. The Court of Cassation enforces these guarantees meticulously: on 13 January 2021 it ruled on the file of an Albanian national where “Le 29 octobre 2019, M. T… M…, ressortissant albanais, a été interpellé à Annecy en exécution d’une fiche de recherches relative à une demande d’arrestation provisoire des autorités albanaises” — on 29 October 2019, Mr T… M…, an Albanian national, was arrested in Annecy pursuant to a wanted notice relating to a request for provisional arrest by the Albanian authorities (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 13 January 2021, appeal no. 20-81.359, full decision on courdecassation.fr). Recent 2025 rulings confirm the trend: on 21 January 2025 the Criminal Chamber reviewed a surrender file with the same exacting method (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 21 January 2025, appeal no. 24-87.212, full decision on courdecassation.fr), and on 15 October 2025 it decided a Brazil extradition file the same way (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 15 October 2025, appeal no. 24-86.904, full decision on courdecassation.fr).

The ICC cooperation channel sits between the two: faster and more deferential than classic extradition, because France recognises the Court, but still judicial, because a French chamber verifies identity and manifest error before surrender. Three practical lessons emerge for anyone named in an international warrant who might transit through France. First, know which channel applies: an EAW means weeks and almost no defences; classic extradition means months and the full battery of bars including nationality, political offence and limitation; an ICC warrant means the fifteen-day surrender track with the fight concentrated in The Hague rather than Paris. Second, provisional arrest can come first and questions later: in all three channels, French police can detain on a wanted notice or warrant before the judge rules, so transit planning must account for airport interception at Roissy. Third, the file is everything: French surrender litigation is won on procedural defects, identity errors, competing requests, human-rights risks and time bars, never on relitigating guilt — and the Court of Cassation quashes regularly when chambers overstep, as the November 2022 and July 2026 cases prove.

Conclusion

No one will arrest Benjamin Netanyahu in New York in September 2026, and the reasons are legal, not merely political: the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, no domestic statute empowers any American officer to execute an ICC warrant, the Headquarters Agreement obliges the US to admit UN visitors, and the federal executive that controls the security perimeter has promised there will be no arrest. Mamdani’s correction of his own July statement recognised exactly this distribution of powers. The ICC warrants nevertheless remain fully valid: the Prosecutor’s 3 September 2026 filing asks the Appeals Chamber to confirm jurisdiction and to keep the warrants in force, and in every State Party from Paris to Pretoria they operate as binding arrest-and-surrender orders, subject only to the contested immunity debate for sitting leaders. The paradox is the system working as designed — universal aspiration, consensual enforcement. For travellers, lawyers and journalists, the lesson is geographic: check the landing state, not the headline. In Manhattan, the warrant sleeps; at Roissy, the anti-terrorism prosecutor, the Paris chambre de l’instruction and the fifteen-day clock of Article 627-8 would already be moving. Anyone exposed to cross-border proceedings should map every transit airport against the three French channels — ICC surrender, European arrest warrant, classic extradition — before boarding, because the handcuffs, if they ever close, will close where the law authorises them, not where the cameras wait.

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