KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
South Africa Accuses Israel of Defying ICJ Orders: What Non-Compliance With Provisional Measures Means

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

South Africa Accuses Israel of Defying ICJ Orders: What Non-Compliance With Provisional Measures Means

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 25 August 2026, South Africa lodged with the International Court of Justice a voluminous dossier alleging that Israel is defying the binding provisional measures the Court ordered in 2024 to protect Palestinians in Gaza from a plausible risk of genocide. Pretoria’s foreign ministry says the filing, running to more than a thousand pages with annexes, is intended to demonstrate what it calls a material and continuing breach of the three successive orders. Amnesty International, reacting on 3 September 2026, declared that Israel had failed to comply with the binding provisional measures and openly defied them. Coming in the same week that the Court opened hearings in a parallel case — Nicaragua v. Germany, on military support for Israel — the move puts the question of compliance back at the centre of the Gaza litigation. But what does “non-compliance” with an ICJ order actually mean in law, what can the Court do about it, and where does France come in? As a Paris litigation firm working daily with cross-border criminal procedure, we read this dossier the way international media should read it: not as diplomacy, but as procedure — orders, breaches, remedies, and the very real exposure that ICJ findings create before French and European judges.

I. What Did the ICJ Order Israel to Do in 2024?

A. The Three Binding Orders of January, March and May 2024

South Africa filed its application against Israel on 29 December 2023 under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, asking the Court both to decide the merits and, urgently, to indicate provisional measures. The Court responded with three orders in five months, each of them binding — a point too often lost in press coverage. Since the Court’s 2001 judgment in LaGrand (Germany v. United States), there is no serious doubt left: orders indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute create binding legal obligations, not recommendations. That is the legal baseline against which any “non-compliance” claim must be tested.

The first order, of 26 January 2024, found it plausible that Palestinians in Gaza hold rights under the Genocide Convention warranting protection, and that there was urgency and a risk of irreparable prejudice. The Court ordered Israel, among other measures, to take all measures within its power to prevent any acts falling under Article II of the Genocide Convention, to ensure its military did not commit such acts, to prevent and punish incitement to genocide, to enable urgently needed humanitarian assistance, to preserve evidence, and to report back to the Court on implementation. The reporting requirement matters: it gave the Court a paper trail, and that paper trail is precisely what South Africa now says documents breach rather than compliance.

The second order, of 28 March 2024, was issued after South Africa returned to the Court citing famine and starvation. The Court observed that the catastrophic humanitarian situation had deteriorated and ordered additional measures, notably that Israel ensure the unhindered provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian aid, including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossings. The third order, of 24 May 2024, went further still. Ruling on South Africa’s request linked to the Rafah offensive, the Court ordered Israel immediately to halt its military offensive in the Rafah Governorate, as well as any other action there risking conditions of life capable of bringing about the physical destruction of the Palestinian group in Gaza in whole or in part. It further ordered the opening of the Rafah crossing for humanitarian aid and guaranteed access for investigatory missions. Thirteen judges voted for the halt measure; the Vice-President and Judge ad hoc Barak dissented. The three orders are published on the Court’s official case page, and any serious analysis starts by reading them rather than press summaries of them.

Two features of these orders shape everything that follows. First, provisional measures protect claimed rights pending the final judgment; they do not decide whether genocide has occurred. South Africa’s memorial on the merits was filed in October 2024, Israel’s countermemorial was due in 2025, and the merits judgment remains years away. Non-compliance proceedings therefore run on a parallel track: they concern disobedience to interim orders, not the ultimate finding. Second, the orders bind only the parties to the case — South Africa and Israel — but the Genocide Convention creates obligations erga omnes partes, owed to all states parties. That is why third states, including France, cannot treat the orders as someone else’s business: every Convention party has a legal interest in compliance with the prohibition of genocide, and the Court recalled this architecture when it admitted the plausibility of the rights invoked.

Israel’s position throughout has been that its military campaign targets Hamas, that it facilitates humanitarian aid, and that South Africa’s application abuses the Convention. Israel submitted the implementation reports the Court required and contested the factual premises of each successive South African request. A French lawyer reading this file must keep both narratives in mind: non-compliance is not established by press release, and the Court alone will assess whether the dossier proves breach. But the procedural fact is now fixed — a formal non-compliance submission sits on the Court’s docket, it will draw observations from Israel, and it forces the compliance question into the open at a moment when the Court’s authority is under unusual strain.

B. What Is in South Africa’s 1,000-Page Non-Compliance Dossier?

Pretoria’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation announced that on 25 August 2026 South Africa filed “a comprehensive submission demonstrating Israel’s non-compliance” with the provisional measures, stating that the filing demonstrates, in its words, a material and continuing breach of the binding provisional measures ordered on 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024 and 24 May 2024 (official DIRCO statement of 26 August 2026). According to the department, the submission exceeds a thousand pages including annexes — a scale that signals documentary method rather than diplomatic gesture: incident logs, humanitarian data, satellite material, official statements, and records of aid flows are the typical contents of such filings, assembled to map each ordered measure against facts on the ground.

The legal concept invoked, “material breach”, is borrowed from the law of treaties and state responsibility: not every imperfection in implementation counts, but a repudiation of the order or the violation of a provision essential to its object and purpose does. South Africa’s argument, as presented publicly, is that the continuation of the Rafah operation after 24 May 2024, the restrictions on humanitarian access, and the persistence of conditions of life capable of bringing about the group’s physical destruction amount to exactly that — a sustained course of conduct incompatible with the orders, rather than isolated implementation gaps. Whether the Court agrees will depend on evidence and on Israel’s observations, which the Court will invite before ruling on any additional measures or findings.

Amnesty International’s intervention on 3 September 2026 sharpened the public framing. The organisation stated that Israel had failed to comply with the binding provisional measures and defied them, and urged states to use “all diplomatic, political and economic tools” to press for compliance. Whatever one’s view of advocacy statements, this one matters procedurally for a precise reason: non-governmental documentation frequently feeds state submissions and, later, merits-phase evidence. Human-rights reporting on aid obstruction, destruction of medical infrastructure, and statements by officials has already been cited in the earlier phases of this case. The dossier’s annexes likely consolidate much of that record into a single evidentiary bundle addressed directly to the judges.

The timing is equally significant. The filing landed just as the Court opened hearings from 7 to 10 September 2026 in Nicaragua v. Germany, where Managua challenges German military support for Israel under the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law — a case Germany seeks to have dismissed on preliminary objections. Two Gaza-related cases moving simultaneously, one on compliance and one on third-state responsibility, create a combined pressure that neither respondent can address in isolation. For readers following the wires, the sequence of September 2026 is therefore not a coincidence to note in passing but the story itself: the Court is being asked, in the same month, to police disobedience to its own orders and to define what the Genocide Convention demands of states that arm an ally accused of breaching them.

Caution remains essential. The dossier’s contents are not yet public in full, Israel has not yet responded, and the Court has made no finding. Any report that presents South Africa’s allegations as established fact misleads its readers. What is established as fact is narrower but still newsworthy: a formal, reasoned, thousand-page non-compliance submission now exists on the Court’s docket; it invokes all three 2024 orders; it uses the language of material breach; and it arrives with coordinated public support from major human-rights organisations. That is the verified core of this week’s story, and everything else is procedure waiting to happen.

II. What Happens When a State Defies the World Court?

A. At The Hague: Enforcement Without an Enforcement Arm

The hard truth about the International Court of Justice is structural: it has no bailiff. The ICJ Statute and the United Nations Charter provide only one centralised enforcement route. Article 94 of the Charter allows a party to have recourse to the Security Council when another party fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, in which case the Council may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to the judgment. In practice, this route has been used rarely and has never produced coercive enforcement of provisional measures, not least because a permanent member’s veto — or the protection of an ally — can block any resolution. Readers should understand this plainly: even if the Court formally finds non-compliance, no international police will arrive. The effect of such a finding is legal, political, and evidentiary, not executory in the domestic sense of the word.

That does not make a non-compliance finding toothless; it relocates its teeth. First, the Court can respond within its own procedure: it may issue additional or modified provisional measures, demand fresh reporting, or draw inferences at the merits stage from a party’s attitude toward its orders. A state that ignores interim orders litigates the merits with reduced credibility, and judges notice. Second, a formal finding of breach feeds the law of state responsibility: cessation, assurances of non-repetition, and reparation become due, and every state party to the Genocide Convention acquires a firmer basis for lawful countermeasures and for domestic action. Third, the General Assembly can act where the Council is blocked — requesting advisory opinions, establishing investigative mechanisms, or recommending collective measures, as it has done repeatedly in the Palestinian file, including the 2024 request that produced the advisory opinion on the occupation.

Fourth, and most concretely for practitioners, ICJ material migrates into other courtrooms. Findings of plausibility and ordered measures are already cited before national judges in asylum, extradition, arms-export, and universal-jurisdiction proceedings across Europe. A formal non-compliance finding would be quoted in every such case within weeks. It would also interact with the International Criminal Court track: the ICC Prosecutor’s applications for arrest warrants concerning the situation in Palestine run on criminal responsibility, a different legal plane, but ICJ findings of fact about humanitarian obstruction and conditions of life are precisely the kind of material that corroborates the context in which individual criminal liability is assessed. The two courts do not bind each other, yet they read each other — every international lawyer in Paris knows this, and strategies are already being built on both tracks at once.

France’s own posture illustrates the enforcement dilemma. Paris voted for the June 2025 Security Council resolution demanding a Gaza ceasefire, which Washington vetoed; it has criticised the expansion of operations while maintaining its alliance relationships and its arms-export control regime. If the Court finds material breach, France — as a permanent Council member, a Genocide Convention party, and a European Union member bound by the EU’s own restrictive-measures regimes — will face the question it has so far managed to defer: what follows, in concrete administrative and judicial acts, from a judicial finding that binding orders to prevent genocide and deliver aid are being defied? The answer will not come from New York, where the veto governs. It will come, if it comes, from domestic and European judges applying domestic and European law to facts the World Court has certified. Which is exactly where the French angle of this story begins.

B. In France and Europe: Universal Jurisdiction and Criminal Exposure

This is where a Paris lawyer’s perspective changes the story international media usually tell. France does not need the Security Council’s permission to apply French criminal law to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed abroad. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction” (Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). And the same code goes further for the gravest crimes: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code” (Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The condition is well known to practitioners — the suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed as a sufficient connecting link — and the 2023 reform of that article was precisely intended to make this jurisdiction workable. An ICJ non-compliance finding does not create French jurisdiction by itself, but it transforms the evidentiary landscape in which French prosecutors and investigating judges evaluate complaints: the plausibility findings, the ordered measures, and a certified breach become exhibits, not press clippings.

French substantive law is aligned with the Convention the ICJ is applying. The Criminal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants”, punishable by life imprisonment (Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code). It further provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique” (Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code), and that war crimes consist of offences “commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31” (Article 461-1 of the Criminal Code). Convictions carry accessory penalties as well: “Les personnes physiques coupables des infractions prévues par le présent sous-titre encourent également les peines suivantes” (Article 213-1 of the Criminal Code). For victims and associations considering complaints in Paris, the practical message of September 2026 is therefore precise: frame complaints on these French qualifications, attach the ICJ orders and any non-compliance finding as certified context, and address the habitual-residence and prosecutorial-discretion hurdles head-on, because the Paris judicial pole for crimes against humanity already works exactly this way.

Two further French mechanisms deserve attention. First, cooperation with the International Criminal Court: French law states that “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre” (Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If ICC arrest warrants in the Palestine situation require execution on French soil — arrests, surrenders, asset measures — France must cooperate, and ICJ findings of non-compliance with protective orders form part of the factual background French judges will have in mind when reviewing any challenge to cooperation measures. Second, the general extradition framework itself recalls that “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre” (Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) — a reminder that even classic inter-state surrender proceedings in Paris now unfold in a context where international courts have spoken on the underlying facts, and where the political-offence exception, human-rights bars, and assurances are argued with The Hague’s language.

Beyond criminal courts, the European regulatory consequences are concrete. EU member states operate arms-export controls under the Common Position on military technology and equipment, whose criteria include respect for international humanitarian law and the preservation of regional stability; licenses found incompatible with those criteria must be denied or revoked. Litigation challenging export licenses is already pending or decided in several European jurisdictions, and an ICJ non-compliance finding would be pleaded in each of them the following morning. Asset freezes and targeted sanctions are a parallel lever: the EU’s restrictive-measures practice increasingly tracks ICC and ICJ developments, and banks’ compliance departments treat World Court findings as risk inputs for exposure reviews. None of this happens automatically — each step requires a decision by a national authority or a judge — but each step becomes legally easier once the World Court has certified that its own binding orders are being breached. That is the quiet, cumulative power of a non-compliance procedure: it converts a political controversy into a judicial fact, and judicial facts travel.

Conclusion

South Africa’s August 2026 dossier does not end the Gaza cases, and it does not prove genocide. It does something narrower and, in the short term, more destabilising: it asks the World Court to declare, with reasons and evidence, that a state under binding orders to prevent genocide and deliver humanitarian aid has instead persisted in the conduct those orders prohibited. If the Court agrees, even partially, the judgment will not be enforced by anyone — and it will be used by everyone: by the General Assembly, by arms-license judges in European capitals, by ICC litigants, and by French prosecutors and investigating judges weighing universal-jurisdiction complaints under Articles 689-11, 211-1, and 212-1. If the Court disagrees, or finds breach on some measures but not others, that too will reshape litigation strategies on all sides. Either way, September 2026 marks the moment the Gaza litigation shifted from emergency orders to accountability for disobeying them — and from The Hague’s authority in the abstract to its consequences in concrete courtrooms, including those of Paris. Our firm follows these dockets week by week, in English and in French, because the clients who will need this analysis — officials, companies, journalists, and victims — cannot afford to discover the compliance question after a judge has already answered it.

📄 Official circular