On 10 September 2026, Ireland’s national police said a man in his late thirties, arrested in Lanzarote on 8 April 2026 under a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Irish High Court, had been extradited from Spain after a Spanish judicial process and charged in Dublin in a serious organised crime investigation, becoming the sixth person to appear before the Criminal Courts of Justice in connection with an investigation led by the Garda National Bureau of Criminal Investigation. That short bulletin, published two days before this article, is a useful starting point for a much larger question now pending in The Hague: what happens when the smuggler is not a gang but a State? In May 2025, Lithuania brought Belarus before the International Court of Justice over alleged state-sponsored migrant smuggling into Lithuanian territory, the first case asking the World Court to decide whether the orchestrated channelling of migrants toward a neighbour’s border violates the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Poland and Russia have both intervened in the proceedings, and the European Union has filed observations, which makes this dispute the most watched migration case ever brought before the Court. For an international audience, and in particular for readers with interests in France, the case matters twice: it could produce the first judicial definition of State-sponsored smuggling, and it tests enforcement tools — European Arrest Warrant, extradition, domestic smuggling and trafficking prosecutions — that French courts use every week. This article explains what Lithuania filed and why the legal definition of smuggling is the decisive battle, then shows, as a Paris practitioner would, what France would test if such facts reached a French court.
I. Can a State Be Sued for Pushing Migrants Across a Border?
A. What Lithuania filed at the ICJ and which treaty it invokes
The procedural facts are not in dispute. Lithuania filed its application on 19 May 2025, alleging the smuggling of migrants by Belarus. The Court’s own case page records, under the heading of latest developments, that “Lithuania institutes proceedings against Belarus” on 19 May 2025. The application relies on the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. That treaty choice is itself a legal statement: Lithuania does not sue Belarus for violating refugee law or for closing its borders, but for breaching a criminal-cooperation instrument that obliges States to criminalise smuggling, exchange information, strengthen border measures, control documents and protect smuggled migrants. Published analysis of the filing notes that Lithuania invokes the information-exchange, border-measure, document-control, prevention and migrant-assistance provisions of that instrument.
Jurisdiction rests on the compromissory clause of that same Protocol. Lithuania had entered a reservation to the dispute-settlement clause in Article 20(2) of the Protocol and withdrew it in May 2023, a step that gave the Court the consensual basis for the case. Without that withdrawal, effected two years before the application, the Court would have had no agreed foundation to hear the case. The timing shows a litigation strategy built over several years: first clear the jurisdictional obstacle, then document the facts, then file. An order of 17 July 2025 fixed the time-limits for the memorial and counter-memorial, so the written phase has been running through 2026 while the interventions piled up.
Those interventions are what turned a bilateral dispute into a European precedent in the making. Poland filed its Article 63 declaration of intervention on 30 June 2026. One month later, the Russian Federation filed its Article 63 declaration of intervention, recorded on 21 July 2026. On the same day the Court logged the observations furnished by the European Union under Article 43(2) and Article 69(2) of the Rules of Court. Poland and Russia have thus intervened under Article 63 of the Court’s Statute: their interventions do not make them parties to the case but allow them to submit their views on the interpretation of the treaty, while the European Union has likewise submitted observations. Article 63 intervention is a precise procedural device: a State that considers that the construction of a convention to which it is a party is in question may intervene to submit its interpretation, and the resulting construction given by the judgment is equally binding upon it, although it does not become a party with claims and counterclaims of its own.
The political reading of Russia’s move was stated bluntly by commentators when the intervention was announced: the judges in The Hague were perhaps not the real audience for the Russian filing, and complaints about a litigation campaign would carry little weight in the Court’s legal assessment. But analysts warned that the legal effect is real regardless of motive: the construction of the treaty given in these proceedings will bind Poland and Russia on the interpretation adopted even though they are not parties, and a future claimant could rely on the ruling — an outcome described as far from irrelevant. For France, which sits on the other end of the same migratory pressures on the Channel coast and which applies the same European instruments, a construction of the Smuggling Protocol that binds Poland and Russia as interveners would carry weight far beyond the Lithuanian-Belarusian border. A claimant in a future dispute could refer to the Court’s ruling here, and national prosecutors — including French ones — could invoke the Court’s reading of what State conduct the Protocol covers.
The factual narrative Lithuania put before the Court is summarised in the published analysis and has not been denied in its broad lines: Belarus encouraged and enabled the transit of migrants with the aim of putting pressure on the European Union. The application describes, after the disputed presidential election of August 2020 and the European sanctions that followed, a sequence of measures presented as retaliation: travel agencies authorised to issue visa invitations, simplified tourist-visa procedures for Iraqi nationals, removal of the return-ticket requirement, designated hotels in Minsk for accommodation, and organised transport toward the Lithuanian border. The account continues with Belarusian border guards bringing migrants to the frontier, looking for unguarded sectors, cutting fences and forcing crossings, while migrants who tried to turn back faced violent mistreatment. Whether each of these allegations is proven to the Court’s standard is a matter for the written and oral phases. But the legal question they raise is already clear, and it is the subject of the second half of this first part: do such acts, assuming they are established, meet the treaty definition of the smuggling of migrants?
B. Why the treaty definition of smuggling is the whole battle
The Protocol defines the smuggling of migrants as the procurement, for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material advantage, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which that person is not a national or permanent resident. Three elements therefore condition everything: procurement of illegal entry, a transnational character involving an organised criminal group for the criminalisation duties, and above all the purpose of obtaining a financial or other material advantage. Lithuania’s application, according to the published analysis, moves quickly past the second and third elements. It describes the organised channelling of migrants through Belarus into Lithuania and turns to the transnationality and organised-group conditions, addressing the material-advantage requirement only in passing, as a criterion said to exclude humanitarian assistance or help between family members. That shortcut is the vulnerable point of the whole case, and any lawyer reading the file in Paris would spot it immediately: smuggling, in ordinary criminal law, is an offence built around the exploitation of migrants, typically by charging money for assistance with illegal entry, and the advantage is usually received from the migrants themselves or from persons acting on their behalf. A State that spends its own money to move migrants onward, in order to put pressure on a neighbour, does not obviously act for the purpose of obtaining a financial or material advantage in the sense the drafters had in mind. The commentary puts the difficulty plainly: the question is whether the State’s political benefit — retaliation against sanctions, leverage over the European Union — counts as the other material advantage the Protocol requires, or whether the provision targets only the trafficker’s profit.
The objection goes deeper than one phrase. Smuggling must be distinguished, first, from humanitarian support to persons fleeing and seeking asylum; second, from trafficking in human beings, which involves movement against the person’s will for the purpose of exploitation; and third, from the mere facilitation of transit migration, which international law does not generally prohibit. The commentary recalls the baseline principle that frames the entire case: granting more generous visa conditions is not prohibited, and international law imposes no general obligation to obstruct transit migration. It adds the sentence that condenses the defence Belarus is likely to run: hostile intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct unlawful. Issuing visas more generously, letting people enter national territory even when they intend to travel onward, declining to detain transit migrants — none of that is unlawful as such. A regime can be judged harshly on human-rights grounds while remaining within its rights on the narrow question of whether it obstructed transit. The Court will therefore have to separate two layers that Lithuania’s application tends to merge: the instrumentalisation of migrants as a political tactic, which is largely undisputed as a matter of fact, and the smuggling of migrants as a treaty offence, which requires the specific elements described above.
Lithuania’s answer, as far as the published analysis discloses, is to point to the organised-criminal-group machinery: travel agencies, hotels, transport networks, border guards cutting fences. If Belarusian officials themselves operated that machinery, the argument runs, the State acted through an organised group and the advantage condition should be read functionally — the State obtained the advantage it sought, namely pressure on the European Union and retaliation for sanctions. The commentary notes that the application cites statements attributed to the Belarusian leadership presenting the surge in arrivals as retaliation, and details the progressive organisation of the operation over the months, from initially passive support at the border to proactive channelling. The difficulty remains that the Protocol’s criminalisation duties were drafted for the prosecution of private smuggling rings, not for the attribution to a State of a migration offensive. The Court has never construed the material-advantage element in a State-responsibility context. Its answer will determine whether the Protocol becomes a weapon against State-orchestrated migration pressure — the outcome Lithuania, Poland and the European Union plainly hope for — or whether the case fails on the definition while leaving the political condemnation intact.
Two further doctrinal hurdles deserve mention because they will shape the judgment’s reasoning. First, several of the provisions Lithuania invokes — information exchange, border measures, document controls — are duties of diligent cooperation whose breach requires proof that Belarus failed to take reasonable measures, not merely that smuggling occurred on or through its territory. A State through which smugglers operate is not automatically responsible for each smuggling act; responsibility attaches to its own failure to criminalise, prevent, cooperate or protect. Second, the protective provisions for smuggled migrants cut both ways: to the extent Belarus exposed migrants to violence at the border, those facts support the claim under the assistance provisions, but they also underline that the migrants were victims of coercion rather than customers of a service — which sits uneasily with the classic smuggling paradigm of a paid transaction. None of this means the claim is hopeless. International courts have before adapted criminal-cooperation treaties to State conduct the drafters did not foresee. It means the judgment will be won or lost on treaty interpretation, and that the interventions of Poland, Russia and the European Union on the construction of the Protocol are not decorative. They are the place where the precedent is being written while the main case proceeds.
The calendar gives the measure of what is at stake in the coming months. The written proceedings ordered in July 2025 are unfolding while the Article 63 interveners file their observations on interpretation. The Court will then hold hearings, deliver a judgment on the merits whose construction of the Protocol will bind the interveners as well, and in the meantime the political context — sanctions against Belarus, pressure on the European Union’s eastern border, parallel debates on the Channel and the Mediterranean — keeps feeding the case with new illustrations. That is the bridge to the second part of this article. Whatever the Court decides about a State at the eastern border, the enforcement end of the same phenomenon is handled every day in national courts: smugglers prosecuted, networks dismantled, suspects surrendered under European Arrest Warrants or extradited from third States. France is one of the rooms where that daily enforcement happens, and its procedure offers a concrete mirror of the Hague debate.
II. What France Would Test If Such Facts Reached a French Court
A. How French criminal law punishes smuggling networks and their leaders
French domestic law punishes the facilitation of irregular entry, movement and stay with a severity that many foreign readers underestimate, and it does so in terms that echo the Palermo instruments directly. The central provision states, word for word: “est puni de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d’amende le fait, pour toute personne, de faciliter ou de tenter de faciliter, par aide directe ou indirecte, l’entrée, la circulation ou le séjour irréguliers d’un étranger en France”. That is article L823-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile. The penalties are five years’ imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine, and the same article extends French jurisdiction expressly to acts committed from another Schengen State. The neighbouring provision reaches further outward: it punishes with the same five years and 30,000 euros, and I quote exactly, “est puni de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d’amende le fait, pour toute personne, de faciliter ou de tenter de faciliter l’entrée, la circulation ou le séjour irréguliers d’un étranger”, when the facilitation concerns, among other cases, and I quote, “Sur le territoire d’un autre État partie à la convention signée à Schengen le 19 juin 1990”. That is article L823-2 of the same Code. In other words, a smuggling network operating from abroad toward France already falls within the French criminal statute, provided the acts can be attributed to identifiable perpetrators and the exemptions described below do not apply.
The aggravated form is where State-scale or mafia-scale organisation would be caught. The statute provides, word for word: “Sont punies de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 750 000 euros d’amende les infractions définies aux articles L. 823-1 et L. 823-2 lorsque les faits”, and the first listed aggravating circumstance is that the acts, and I quote, “Sont commis en bande organisée”. That is article L823-3 of the same Code, which also aggravates the penalty to ten years and 750,000 euros where migrants are exposed to a direct risk of death or mutilating injury, subjected to living, transport, working or housing conditions incompatible with human dignity, or moved through the abuse of an official authorisation. A prosecutor in Paris confronted with an organised channelling operation — travel agencies, dedicated accommodation, transport to the border, fence-cutting, coercion of those who turn back — would read these paragraphs as a checklist: organised gang, danger to life, degrading conditions. Each paragraph, once evidenced by interceptions, financial flows, airline and hotel records, and migrants’ testimony, supports the ten-year tariff rather than the five-year one.
The statute also draws the line that protects genuine humanitarian action, and the line is drawn narrowly and precisely. The exemption clause opens with the words, quoted exactly: “L’aide à la circulation ou au séjour irréguliers d’un étranger ne peut donner lieu à des poursuites pénales sur le fondement des articles L. 823-1 ou L. 823-2 lorsqu’elle est le fait”. What follows is an exhaustive list — ascendants, descendants, siblings and spouses, then persons whose act gave rise to no direct or indirect consideration and consisted in legal, linguistic or social advice or support — set out in article L823-9 of the same Code. The structure matters for the Hague parallel: French law, like the Protocol, excludes disinterested humanitarian help from punishment, but it does so through a closed list of exempted situations, not through an open moral judgment. A defendant who organised transport for profit, or under orders within a coercive apparatus, cannot shelter behind the humanitarian exception. Conversely, associations and relatives acting without consideration and within the listed forms of help are shielded. Any French court testing facts comparable to the Lithuanian allegations would therefore ask the same questions the ICJ must ask under the Protocol: was there facilitation, was it organised and for gain or advantage, and does the conduct fall inside or outside the protected humanitarian perimeter?
Where exploitation of the migrants themselves is added to mere movement, French law reaches for the trafficking provisions of the Criminal Code, whose penalties exceed those for smuggling. The definition states, word for word: “La traite des êtres humains est le fait de recruter une personne, de la transporter, de la transférer, de l’héberger ou de l’accueillir à des fins d’exploitation”. That is article 225-4-1 of the Code pénal, which continues, and I quote: “La traite des êtres humains est punie de sept ans d’emprisonnement et de 150 000 € d’amende.” The same article punishes trafficking of a minor, even absent any of the listed means, with ten years and 1,500,000 euros. The aggravated form raises the penalty to ten years and 1,500,000 euros where, among other circumstances, and I quote exactly, “A l’égard d’une personne qui se trouvait hors du territoire de la République ou lors de son arrivée sur le territoire de la République”. That is article 225-4-2 of the Code pénal — a paragraph tailor-made for networks that recruit abroad and exploit on arrival. And where torture or barbaric acts accompany the trafficking, the statute commands, word for word: “L’infraction prévue à l’article 225-4-1 commise en recourant à des tortures ou à des actes de barbarie est punie de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité et de 4 500 000 euros d’amende.” That is article 225-4-4 of the Code pénal. Reports of migrants beaten or forced across borders at night, if attributed to identified organisers within French jurisdiction, would thus move the case from the five-to-ten-year smuggling scale to the ten-year-to-life trafficking scale. The lesson for the Hague debate is symmetrical: the graver the coercion of the migrants, the stronger the criminal response in a domestic court — but also the weaker the analogy with consensual paid smuggling, which is precisely the definitional tension identified in the first part.
Three practical consequences follow for anyone facing such an investigation in France. First, the file is built on finance and logistics: airline manifests, visa invitation records, hotel registers, telephone and messaging data, money transfers, and the testimony of transported persons. Second, the organised-gang aggravation is the lever that extends custodial thresholds, justifies pre-trial detention, and opens the door to special investigative techniques. Third, the humanitarian exemption is argued document by document: kinship, absence of consideration, nature of the help. A defence that invokes solidarity in the abstract, without fitting the closed statutory list, fails. This is the daily, technical side of the phenomenon whose State-sponsored variant the ICJ is now judging at the level of principle.
B. How France surrenders or prosecutes foreign suspects, from the European Arrest Warrant to extradition
The Irish bulletin quoted at the opening of this article is, procedurally, a European Arrest Warrant case: arrest in Lanzarote on 8 April 2026 on foot of a warrant issued by the Irish High Court, judicial process in Spain, surrender, then charge in Dublin. France operates the same instrument every day, in both directions, and its statute defines it in terms that should be quoted in full because they govern thousands of surrenders each year: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” That is article 695-11 of the Code de procédure pénale. The definition contains the whole mechanism: a judicial decision, issued by one Member State, for arrest and surrender by another, for prosecution or for enforcement of a custodial sentence or security measure. Within the European Union, surrender has replaced classic extradition, with short time-limits, direct transmission between judicial authorities, and limited grounds for refusal centred on fundamental rights, double jeopardy, amnesty and the nationality and territoriality protections of the executing State.
Refusal is the exception, and it is codified. The statute opens the refusal chapter with the words, quoted exactly: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants”. That is article 695-22 of the Code de procédure pénale, which then lists amnesty covering the facts, final judgment for the same facts with sentence executed or no longer enforceable, and the other mandatory bars. A French executing authority asked to surrender a smuggling suspect to Lithuania, Poland or any other Member State would test, in order: the validity of the warrant, double criminality where it still applies, the specialty and proportionality guarantees, detention conditions in the issuing State where an individualised, serious risk is alleged with evidence, and any final domestic judgment for the same facts. The Irish-Spanish surrender of April–September 2026 illustrates the ordinary course: arrest on the warrant, judicial examination in the executing State, surrender, prosecution in the issuing State. Delay between arrest and surrender, as here roughly five months, typically reflects judicial review, possible appeals, and logistical organisation — not a finding on guilt.
Outside the European Union, France applies classic extradition, and the bars are broader and older. The cornerstone states, in four words that every extradition lawyer in Paris knows by heart and that I quote exactly: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée”. That is article 696-4 of the Code de procédure pénale. The article then lists the historic prohibitions, beginning with the nationality bar, quoted exactly: “Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise”. It continues with the political-offence exception, offences committed on French territory, cases already finally tried in France, and prescription or amnesty under French law. For a smuggling case with ramifications in Belarus, Russia or a Gulf State, these bars would be decisive in preliminary advice: France does not extradite its own nationals, period; it does not extradite for political offences or requests driven by a political purpose; and it does not extradite where French courts have finally tried the same facts. The procedure itself protects the person claimed: the statute provides, and I quote, “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne réclamée déclare ne pas consentir à être extradée, la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition.” That is article 696-15 of the Code de procédure pénale. The chambre de l’instruction gives a reasoned opinion, the person is heard with counsel, detention pending the decision is reviewed, and the Government decides in light of that opinion. An unfavourable opinion does not automatically free the person from all risk, but in practice it closes the ordinary path to surrender.
Two consequences of this framework matter for the Hague case and its possible French echoes. First, if members of a State-orchestrated smuggling apparatus were ever identified individually and located in France or in a cooperating State, prosecution in France would be legally available through the extraterritorial reach of the smuggling provisions and through the trafficking provisions where exploitation is shown, without any need to wait for the ICJ. The ICJ judges State responsibility; national courts judge individuals. The two tracks are complementary, not alternative. Second, any surrender of such individuals would run through the filters just described: within the Union, the European Arrest Warrant with its mandatory refusal grounds; outside it, classic extradition with the nationality, political-offence and prior-trial bars. A French court asked to surrender a person to a State accused of instrumentalising migrants would examine detention conditions, the reality of a fair trial, and the political-purpose prohibition with particular care. Conversely, a French request for the surrender of a network organiser located in another Member State would benefit from the speed and judicial automaticity of the Warrant — as the Irish-Spanish case of this week demonstrates.
A final enforcement layer completes the picture: sanctions and asset freezes. Since 2020–2021 the European Union has adopted successive sanctions against Belarusian officials and entities over the repression, the diverted airliner and then the instrumentalisation of migration itself, and national authorities freeze the funds and economic resources of listed persons. Sanctions do not replace prosecution, but they immobilise the logistics — accounts, aircraft, companies — that an instrumentalisation operation needs. The ICJ case will not rule on sanctions, which belong to a different legal order, yet the two move together politically: each formal step in The Hague hardens the factual record on which listings, prosecutions and surrender requests rely. For readers with assets, travel or family across the jurisdictions concerned, the practical advice is the same as in any cross-border criminal matter: check listings before any transaction, keep travel documents and proof of lawful activity available, and seek advice at the first summons, warrant or border measure rather than after surrender has been ordered.
Conclusion
Lithuania v. Belarus is the first case to ask the World Court whether a State that channels migrants toward a neighbour’s border commits the smuggling of migrants within the meaning of the Palermo Protocol. The jurisdictional path was cleared when Lithuania withdrew its reservation to the compromissory clause in May 2023. The merits turn on a single definitional knot: procurement of illegal entry for a financial or other material advantage, applied to a State whose benefit is political pressure rather than traffickers’ profit. The cautionary side of the debate holds that granting generous visa conditions is not prohibited, that no general duty to obstruct transit migration exists, and that hostile intent alone cannot make lawful conduct unlawful. The interventions of Poland and Russia under Article 63, and the observations of the European Union, ensure that whatever construction the Court adopts will bind the interveners and guide every future dispute about migration used as leverage. That is why universities, governments and practitioners across Europe are watching a case whose next steps — completion of the written phase, hearings, judgment — will unfold through late 2026 and beyond.
France stands at both ends of the lesson. Its criminal law already punishes what the ICJ is defining in the abstract: five years and 30,000 euros for facilitation, ten years and 750,000 euros in an organised gang or where lives are endangered, up to life where trafficking joins torture or barbarity, with a narrow closed-list shield for disinterested humanitarian help. Its surrender law already moves suspects across borders every week: the European Arrest Warrant within the Union under judicial control and short deadlines, classic extradition outside it with the historic bars for nationality, political purpose and prior trial. The Irish-Spanish surrender announced on 10 September 2026 shows the machinery working on an ordinary organised-crime file. The Hague case will decide whether the same vocabulary — smuggling, organised group, material advantage — can also describe the conduct of a State. If the Court answers yes, prosecutors from Vilnius to Paris will gain a judicial definition they have lacked, and the instrumentalisation of migration will have, for the first time, a name in the law of State responsibility. If it answers no, the political condemnation will remain, but the legal fight will return to where it has always been won or lost: domestic prosecutions, European warrants, extradition hearings, and the patient assembly of evidence, suspect by suspect, transfer by transfer.