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ICC to Deliver the Said Verdict on 23 September 2026: OCRB Crimes, Criminal Responsibility and the French Test

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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ICC to Deliver the Said Verdict on 23 September 2026: OCRB Crimes, Criminal Responsibility and the French Test

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On 23 September 2026 at 11:00 Hague time, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court will deliver its judgment on conviction or acquittal in the case of The Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, a former alleged Seleka commander accused of running a detention and torture operation inside the Office Central de Repression du Banditisme in Bangui during 2013. The announcement, made by the Court on 22 July 2026, closes a judicial arc that began with a sealed arrest warrant in January 2019, passed through surrender, partial confirmation of charges and a trial that heard fifty-eight prosecution witnesses, and now ends with the moment every international criminal case builds toward: three judges reading out guilty or not guilty, count by count, in public. For victims of the Bangui detentions, the hearing is the first authoritative account of what happened inside the OCRB compound. For states, including France, it is a live demonstration of how the Rome Statute system handles command-level cases arising from a non-international armed conflict. And for lawyers, the judgment will be studied for its treatment of imprisonment and persecution as crimes against humanity, of cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity as war crimes, and of the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard applied to insider and documentary evidence. This article explains what the Chamber must decide, how the case reached The Hague, and what a French court would test if the same facts ever landed in Paris.

I. What will the judges decide on 23 September 2026?

The Said trial is one of the longest-running proceedings before the Court arising from the crisis that tore through the Central African Republic in 2013, and the forthcoming judgment is the procedural endpoint of more than five years of ICC proceedings against one man. Understanding what Trial Chamber VI actually has to decide requires separating two questions the Chamber will answer together: what crimes were committed inside the OCRB, and whether Mahamat Said Abdel Kani bears individual criminal responsibility for them.

A. What is Mahamat Said accused of at the OCRB in Bangui?

The Court itself summarises the case in one dense sentence: As a former alleged Seleka commander, Mr Said is accused of crimes against humanity (imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty; torture; persecution and other inhumane acts) and war crimes (torture; cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity) allegedly committed at the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (‘OCRB’) in Bangui (Central African Republic) in 2013. Every element of that sentence will matter on 23 September, so it deserves to be unpacked piece by piece. The time and place are fixed: Bangui, the capital, in 2013, at the height of the Seleka takeover, inside the premises of a police unit, the OCRB, allegedly turned into a detention site. The victims, on the Prosecution case, were persons detained there, perceived opponents and civilians swept up in the security crackdown. The alleged conduct has two legal lives, one as crimes against humanity and one as war crimes, and the Chamber will have to qualify the same physical acts under each heading separately.

The crimes-against-humanity counts allege four underlying acts: imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts. In the architecture of international criminal law, these counts require more than proof that people were locked up and mistreated. They require proof of context: a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with the individual acts forming part of that attack and the accused knowing of the connection. Imprisonment in this sense does not mean any unlawful arrest; it means deprivation of liberty so grave, and so connected to the broader attack, that it rises to the level of an international crime. Persecution adds a discriminatory dimension: the targeting of an identifiable group on political, ethnic or other prohibited grounds. Other inhumane acts is the residual category, capturing suffering of comparable gravity intentionally caused to civilians. The French criminal code describes the same family of offences in strikingly parallel terms: Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique, listing L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international and La torture among the constituent acts (article 212-1 of the French Criminal Code). A Paris lawyer reading the Said charges therefore recognises the vocabulary immediately: concerted plan, civilian population, generalised or systematic attack, imprisonment, torture.

The war-crimes counts allege torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity. These counts live in a different legal universe. They do not require a widespread or systematic attack; they require an armed conflict and a nexus between the acts and that conflict. The Seleka seizure of power and the ensuing fighting in 2013 provide that setting on the Prosecution case, and the OCRB detentions are presented as conduct connected to it. Cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity capture humiliation, degradation and abuse that may not meet the legal threshold of torture but still violate the minimum protections owed to persons in the power of a party to the conflict. French law again mirrors the structure: Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31 (article 461-1 of the French Criminal Code). The non-international character of the conflict changes nothing about the criminality of the acts; it only changes which provisions apply, a distinction French courts handling cooperation files must keep constantly in mind.

The standard of proof the Chamber will apply is the highest known to the law, and the Court states it without ornament: Pursuant to article 74 of the Rome Statute, the judges will either acquit or convict the accused. The accused before the ICC is presumed innocent. Conviction requires the Chamber to be satisfied that each charge is proven beyond reasonable doubt, on only on the applicable law and on evidence submitted and discussed before it at the trial, as the Court puts it: The Chamber bases its decision only on the applicable law and on evidence submitted and discussed before it at the trial. No dossier shortcuts, no reliance on untested material, no deference to the confirmation decision. That discipline explains why international trials take years and hear dozens of witnesses: fifty-eight prosecution witnesses testified in this case, and every one of them was subject to adversarial examination. Whatever the verdict, it will rest on that tested record, and In response to the verdict, the parties will be able to appeal the decision before the ICC’s Appeals Chamber. An acquittal would end the case unless the Prosecutor appeals; a conviction would move the proceedings to sentencing and then to the reparations phase, where victims participate through their legal representatives.

B. How did the case travel from Bangui to The Hague?

The Said case is a textbook illustration of the ICC procedural chain, and each link in that chain is dated and public, which is precisely what makes the forthcoming judgment verifiable rather than rumoured. It began in secrecy: The warrant of arrest against Mr Mahamat Said Abdel Kani also known as “Mahamat Said Abdel Kain” and “Mahamat Saïd Abdelkani” (“Mr Said”) was issued under seal on 7 January 2019 for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Bangui (CAR) in 2013. A sealed warrant is the Court’s answer to flight risk: the suspect learns of the charges only when the arrest is executed. Two years later came the decisive step: Mr Said was surrendered to the ICC on 24 January 2021. Surrender, in ICC vocabulary, is not extradition; it is the transfer of a person by a state to the Court under the cooperation regime of the Rome Statute, and it is the moment the Court physically acquires jurisdiction over the accused. For practitioners, the distinction matters enormously, because surrender to an international court follows different rules, different authorities and different remedies than extradition between states, a point French procedure spells out in a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Once in The Hague, the suspect passes through a filter that has no equivalent in French investigating procedure: confirmation of charges. The initial appearance of Mr Said before the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, took place on 28 and 29 January 2021. At that hearing the suspect is informed of the charges and of his rights, and dates are set. Then The confirmation of charges hearing took place from 12 to 14 October 2021. At confirmation, the Prosecution must show substantial grounds to believe the person committed the charged crimes; the Defence contests the evidence; victims present their views. The result here was mixed, which is itself informative: On 9 December 2021, Pre-Trial Chamber II partially confirmed the charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes brought by the Prosecutor against Mr Said and committed him to trial. Partial confirmation means some charges were thrown out for lack of sufficient evidence while others survived. That filtering function is one of the structural guarantees of the Statute: only charges that clear the substantial-grounds threshold reach a trial chamber, and the trial then starts from a defined, bounded accusation rather than an open-ended investigation.

The trial itself unfolded over three years. The trial opened on 26 September 2022. The Prosecution presented its case first, calling insider witnesses, victims, experts and documentary custodians to reconstruct the OCRB regime from the inside: who commanded, who guarded, who was brought in, what happened to them, and how the Seleka hierarchy above the building functioned. The Prosecution concluded its presentation of evidence on 15 November 2024, the Chamber having heard the testimony of 58 prosecution witnesses. Fifty-eight witnesses is a substantial but not bloated evidentiary base by ICC standards, and it suggests a case built on both testimony and documents rather than on a single insider. On 17 March 2025, the Defence started to present its witnesses. The Defence case ran through the summer: The Defence concluded its presentation of evidence on 2 September 2025. Then came the final confrontation of narratives: The closing statements took place from 25 to 26 November 2025. Statements were made by the Office of the Prosecutor, the Legal Representative of Victims, and the Defence. The presence of the victims’ representative at closings is a signature of the ICC system: victims are not mere witnesses but participants with counsel, entitled to be heard on matters affecting their interests, including, eventually, reparations.

Between the end of closings and the judgment stretch ten months of deliberation, which is normal for a case of this size: the Chamber must review thousands of pages of transcript, rule on the credibility of each witness, determine the context elements of crimes against humanity and the nexus elements of war crimes, and attribute individual responsibility for events thirteen years old. The delivery itself will be a public act: The judgment will be read out in public in ICC Courtroom I and the hearing will be transmitted live through the ICC website. A summary will be read in open court, the full written judgment published, and the clock will start for appeals, for sentencing submissions if there is a conviction, and for the reparations phase in which victims’ counsel will claim redress. International desks should treat 23 September not as an ending but as the opening of the next procedural sequence.

II. Could France prosecute the same facts in a Paris courtroom?

This is where the view from Paris adds something the wires do not. France claims one of the broadest systems of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Europe, and its courts have spent the last decade testing exactly where that jurisdiction stops: Syrian intelligence officers, Liberian commanders, Rwandan génocidaires, French companies operating in war zones, serving foreign ministers invoking immunity. The Said facts, transposed to France, would run through four successive filters: does French law cover the crimes, does it reach conduct abroad, is the suspect sufficiently connected to France, and does any immunity or competing jurisdiction bar the prosecution. Each filter is governed by a precise text and a recent ruling of the Court of Cassation, and together they form the French test.

A. Can French courts try crimes committed in the Central African Republic?

The starting point is the general gateway for extraterritorial cases: Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. (article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Everything else is an application of that alternative: either French law declares itself applicable, or a treaty gives France jurisdiction. For atrocity crimes, the applicable regime is the universal jurisdiction of article 689-11, which deserves to be read in full because every word of it is litigated in practice: Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code. (article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). OCRB-type conduct, imprisonment, torture, persecution as crimes against humanity and cruel treatment as a war crime, falls squarely within the second and third heads of that list.

Coverage is only the first lock. The second is presence: La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France. Mere transit through a Paris airport does not suffice; the suspect must habitually reside in France, assessed through duration of presence, conditions and reasons for it, settled intention, and family, social, material or professional ties. A former Seleka commander living quietly in a French provincial town would cross that threshold; the same man arrested during a stopover would not, and the file would then have to travel by surrender or extradition instead. The third lock is the double-criminality and treaty condition illustrated by the Syrian cases: the facts must be punishable under the law of the place of commission, or that state or the suspect’s state of nationality must be a party to the Rome Statute. Here the Court of Cassation has proven strict. In a Syrian universal-jurisdiction case it quashed an investigating chamber that had been satisfied with murder, torture and rape provisions in Syrian law, holding that Les crimes contre l’humanité sont définis au chapitre II du sous-titre Ier du code pénal, et nécessairement commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique. Because of that definition, the double-criminality test inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 24 November 2021, appeal no. 21-81.344, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:CR01269). Ordinary murder statutes do not satisfy the test; the foreign law must criminalise the contextual element itself, or the Rome Statute condition must be met. Any French file built on Bangui facts would have to clear exactly that hurdle, provision by provision.

A parallel gateway covers torture specifically, and it produced the most important French universal-jurisdiction ruling of recent years: Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention. (article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The Convention definition limits torture to acts by public officials or persons acting in an official capacity, which raised the decisive question for non-state armed groups: can a rebel commander act in an official capacity at all. Sitting in full court, the Court of Cassation answered yes: Cependant, la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire. (Court of Cassation, Full Court, 12 May 2023, appeal no. 22-82.468, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:PL90669). The reasoning is directly transferable to a Seleka-type organisation controlling Bangui in 2013: a movement exercising quasi-governmental authority over a territory can supply the official-capacity element, so its commanders cannot hide behind their non-state status. That ruling closed one of the last structural impunity gaps in French torture prosecutions, and any defence built on the rebel character of the perpetrator now runs headlong into it.

The fourth lock is prosecutorial monopoly and subsidiarity. Universal-jurisdiction prosecutions for these crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne. No victim complaint with civil-party joinder can force the case open; only the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, who houses the specialised crimes-against-humanity unit, can trigger it, and only if no international court seeks surrender and no state seeks extradition. The ICC case therefore has priority by design: while The Hague wants the suspect, Paris must stand back. That is complementarity translated into domestic procedure, and it is the hinge between trying in France and surrendering to the Court.

B. Would France surrender a suspect to the ICC or try him in Paris?

French procedure answers the surrender question in a dedicated title that opens with a statement of principle: Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre. (article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The reference to articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute is the whole substantive map: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the modes of individual responsibility, including ordering, aiding and command responsibility. When an ICC warrant reaches Paris, the French judge does not retry the merits; the judge verifies identity, the existence of the warrant, and the regularity of the arrest, then authorises surrender. The defences available at that stage are narrow and procedural: mistaken identity, ne bis in idem, manifest human-rights obstacle. There is no mini-trial of the Bangui facts, and counsel who promise one mislead their clients about the nature of the hearing.

The subsidiarity clause of article 689-11 completes the mechanism. As long as the Court seeks the person, France cannot open its own universal-jurisdiction prosecution for the same conduct; if the Court definitively declines, or if the suspect’s profile falls outside the cases The Hague selects, the Paris unit may step in, provided the residence, double-criminality and prosecutorial conditions are met. This sequencing explains the everyday reality of French atrocity files: a handful of ICC surrenders executed without drama, and a larger docket of domestic investigations into suspects present in France whom no international court claims. For a suspect arrested on French soil on an ICC warrant, the practical advice is therefore brutally concrete: challenge identity and procedure immediately, because those are the only doors the surrender hearing leaves open; preserve every merits argument for The Hague, where the standard is beyond reasonable doubt and the Defence will call its own witnesses; and prepare for detention pending surrender, because release in ICC surrender proceedings is exceptional. For victims, the mirror advice is to constitute the file early before the specialised unit, so that if The Hague ever closes its doors, Paris can open its own without losing years of evidence.

Two rulings of the summer of 2025 frame the outer limits of any such file: immunity and French complicity abroad. On immunity, the Full Court drew the sharpest line in French case law between the two shields a foreign official might invoke. Personal immunity belongs to a closed circle: L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel. Because it blocks national jurisdiction so completely, Constituant ainsi un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge. (Court of Cassation, Full Court, 25 July 2025, appeal no. 24-84.393, immunity examined of the court’s own motion). But the same ruling recalls the decisive asymmetry: Elle s’applique devant les juridictions nationales. Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale. A Seleka commander holds no ministerial office and enjoys no personal immunity anywhere, but the principle matters for the architecture: before the ICC, immunity arguments that might delay a national court simply do not exist, which is one reason surrender to The Hague can be faster and cleaner than domestic prosecution of well-connected suspects.

Functional immunity, the shield for official acts after office, received the same day a colder treatment. The Full Court reaffirmed that custom bars prosecuting foreign state agents for sovereign acts, recalled that torture, however grave, had not been admitted as an exception, and observed that it had never concretely recognised an exception for crimes against humanity or war crimes either, deciding only cases that concerned neither. The message for counsel is precise rather than comforting: functional immunity remains the law in French courts, its exceptions remain theoretical, and the realistic path against a former regime torturer in Paris runs through the torture and universal-jurisdiction provisions, not through an frontal assault on immunity. The companion ruling of the same day opened the complementary front, French nationals complicit abroad: les dispositions combinées des articles 689 du code de procédure pénale, 113-6 et 121-6 du code pénal permettent de retenir la compétence des juridictions françaises pour connaître d’actes de complicité, commis à l’étranger, par une personne de nationalité française, même si l’infraction a été commise à l’étranger par un auteur principal étranger. (Court of Cassation, Full Court, 25 July 2025, appeal no. 24-84.071, French complicity jurisdiction). Since Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction, au sens de l’article 121-7 (article 121-6 of the Criminal Code) and La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République (article 113-6 of the Criminal Code), a French financier, supplier or adviser who assisted an OCRB-type apparatus could be reached in Paris even if every principal perpetrator was foreign. That is the French accomplice doctrine in one sentence, and companies operating in conflict zones have been on notice since the Syrian-files era.

Conclusion

At 11:00 on 23 September 2026, three judges will read a summary of their findings in open court, and the Said case will cross the line that separates accusation from judgment. Three outcomes are possible, and each opens a different sequence. An acquittal on all counts ends the trial unless the Prosecutor appeals, and it would confirm that even the gravest charges collapse when insider testimony and documents do not survive adversarial testing beyond reasonable doubt. A mixed verdict, conviction on some counts and acquittal on others, would mirror the partial confirmation of December 2021 and show a chamber grading each charge on its own evidence rather than ruling on the man as a whole. A full conviction would move the case to sentencing, where the Chamber weighs gravity, individual circumstances and time served, and then to reparations, where the victims who participated through counsel claim redress for detention, torture and persecution. In every scenario the Appeals Chamber stands ready, and the written judgment, published the same day, will supply the detailed reasoning that scholars, NGOs and national prosecutors will mine for years.

For France, the judgment changes nothing in the statute book and everything in the practice manual. The four locks of the French test remain exactly as the Court of Cassation defined them: covered crimes under articles 689-11 and 689-2, habitual residence in France, double criminality or Rome Statute conditionality verified provision by provision, and the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s monopoly under the subsidiarity rule that gives The Hague priority. The 2023 Full Court ruling on quasi-governmental torturers, the 2021 Criminal Chamber ruling on strict double criminality, and the twin Full Court rulings of July 2025 on personal immunity and French complicity abroad together mean that an OCRB-type file is triable in Paris if the suspect lives here and no international court claims him, surrenderable to The Hague within days if the Court does, and capable of reaching French accomplices even when every principal actor is foreign. Readers should therefore watch the 23 September hearing with two questions in mind rather than one: what did the Chamber find about Bangui in 2013, and which paragraph of the written judgment will the next Paris investigating judge quote. International criminal law advances one reasoned judgment at a time, and the Said verdict is the next one.

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