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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can Selling Arms Mean Complicity in Genocide? Lessons from The Hague for France

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can Selling Arms Mean Complicity in Genocide? Lessons from The Hague for France

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From 7 to 10 September 2026, the Peace Palace in The Hague hosted one of the most closely watched hearings in recent international justice. Under the presidency of Judge Iwasawa, the International Court of Justice heard Germany’s preliminary objections in the case entitled Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany). Nicaragua accuses Berlin of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention by supplying arms to Israel during the war in Gaza. Germany answers that the case should never reach the merits and must be thrown out now. A ruling on these objections is expected later this year, and if the Court rejects them, a full trial on the merits could run until around 2030. The question before the judges is unprecedented in its practical scope: can a State that sells weapons be held responsible for genocide allegedly committed by the buyer? For France, the case is anything but academic. Paris runs one of the largest arms-export licensing systems in Europe, its own administrative courts refuse to review export licences on the merits, and French criminal law claims universal jurisdiction over genocide. This article explains what happened in The Hague last week, what Germany and Nicaragua actually argued, and what the case changes for exporters, NGOs and victims operating under French law.

I. What Happened in The Hague: Can an Arms Supplier Answer for Genocide Before the ICJ?

A. Why did Nicaragua sue Germany over arms exports used in Gaza?

Nicaragua brought its case against Germany in 2024, at the height of the war in Gaza that followed the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023. Its legal thesis is straightforward and radical at the same time: Germany, as the second-largest supplier of arms to Israel after the United States, “facilitated” the commission of genocide in Gaza by continuing to authorise and deliver military equipment, and thereby breached its own obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948. Neither Nicaragua nor Germany is a party to the underlying conflict, which makes the case unusual: it is a dispute between two States parties to the Genocide Convention about the conduct of a third State, litigated entirely through the Convention’s compromissory clause.

That clause is Article IX of the Convention, which sends disputes between contracting parties over the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including disputes over State responsibility for genocide or complicity in it, to the Court at the request of any party to the dispute. Nicaragua’s claim rests on two substantive pillars of the same Convention. First, Article I, under which the parties confirm that genocide, in peace or in war, is a crime under international law that they undertake to prevent and to punish. Second, Article III, which lists the punishable acts and includes, at paragraph (e), “Complicity in genocide.” Nicaragua argues that the duty to prevent genocide is not passive: a State that knowingly keeps feeding weapons into a conflict where, in its assessment, genocide is plausibly being committed, renders itself complicit and violates the Convention directly.

The factual record Nicaragua put forward is quantitative. According to court documents relayed during the hearings, German export licences for military equipment to Israel were worth 378 million dollars in the last three months of 2023, against 45 million dollars in the first three months of that year, a surge that coincided with the first months of the war. Nicaragua’s lead counsel, Carlos Jose Arguello Gomez, told the Court that “it is impossible” Germany was not aware of what he described as a serious risk that acts amounting to genocide were being committed by Israel. Germany’s factual answer, given by its lawyers as early as the April 2024 hearings, is that 98 percent of arms exports to Israel since October 2023 consisted of general equipment such as vests, helmets and binoculars rather than weapons of war. Berlin also points to its own regulatory response: it suspended military exports to Israel in August 2025 as casualty figures rose, then lifted the restrictions a few months later by reference to the stability of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, even though deadly strikes continued.

Procedurally, the case has already produced one major order. Nicaragua initially sought an emergency injunction halting German weapons exports, but by its Order of 30 April 2024 the Court declined to indicate provisional measures, finding that the circumstances did not require it. That refusal was not a dismissal: the Court kept the case on its docket, and the proceedings moved to the written phase, with Nicaragua’s Memorial filed on 21 July 2025, Germany’s preliminary objections lodged on 21 October 2025, and Nicaragua’s written observations in reply submitted on 23 February 2026. Nicaragua’s action also builds on the parallel case of South Africa v. Israel, in which the Court, by Order of 26 January 2024, indicated provisional measures after finding it plausible that Israel had violated certain rights guaranteed under the Genocide Convention. That plausibility finding is the legal springboard from which Nicaragua argues that every Convention party, including Germany, was put on notice and had to act.

B. What did Germany ask the ICJ to throw out on 7 to 10 September 2026?

The September 2026 hearings did not concern who is right on the merits. They concerned whether the Court is even allowed to decide. Germany raised preliminary objections, the procedural device by which a respondent State invites the Court to decline jurisdiction or declare the application inadmissible before any examination of the facts. The hearings followed the Court’s classic sequence: Germany pleaded first on Monday 7 September, Nicaragua answered on Tuesday 8 September, and two further rounds of argument closed on Wednesday 9 and Thursday 10 September, with verbatim records published for each sitting. The press release 2026/23 of 10 September 2026 formally records the conclusion of these public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by Germany.

Germany’s first line of argument is that there was no genuine dispute capable of founding the Court’s jurisdiction, because Nicaragua rushed to The Hague instead of negotiating. Countries bringing a case to the ICJ are generally expected to attempt to resolve their disagreement through diplomacy first, and only then seise the Court. Julia Monar, Germany’s agent, told the judges that Nicaragua had shown no interest in hearing Germany’s view on its allegations and simply wanted to bring Germany before the Court. In this reading, the application was a political gesture dressed as a legal dispute, and the Court should sanction that shortcut by throwing the case out at the threshold. Germany added that its arms-export decisions were documented, published and subject to more stringent checks than most, which, in its view, confirms that no good-faith bilateral dispute over Convention obligations ever crystallised.

Lawyers for Nicaragua denied the charge and pointed to documents sent to the German foreign ministry as well as public press releases describing the dispute, arguing that Berlin had been given every opportunity to engage and chose not to. On the substance of the objections, Nicaragua’s position is that jurisdiction flows directly from the shared status of the two States as parties to the Genocide Convention: both accepted Article IX, and Article IX sends “any of the parties to the dispute” to the Court. Since neither State is directly involved in the Gaza conflict, Germany objects that the Court would in reality be judging Israel’s conduct without Israel being present, a configuration international lawyers call the indispensable-third-party problem. Nicaragua answers that its claim targets Germany’s own conduct, namely the authorisation and continuation of arms transfers in the face of a serious risk of genocide, and that Germany’s responsibility can be assessed without ruling on Israel’s.

What happens next is a matter of calendar and leverage. A ruling on the preliminary objections is expected later this year. If Germany wins, the case ends and Berlin obtains a judicial stamp confirming that supplier States cannot be dragged before the ICJ on this theory. If Nicaragua wins, the case proceeds to full pleadings on the merits, a phase the parties and commentators expect to last until around 2030, running in parallel with the slow-moving South Africa v. Israel merits phase on which much of the legal reasoning will depend. Either way, the objections judgment will become a leading authority on three questions every arms-exporting State cares about: whether the duty to prevent genocide creates justiciable obligations for supplier States, whether diplomatic negotiation is a hard precondition to suing, and whether a Court can judge complicity without judging the principal perpetrator. That is precisely where France enters the picture.

II. What the Case Changes for France: Can You Challenge a French Arms Export Licence?

A. How does France license arms exports, and who controls the decision?

France operates one of the strictest arms-export licensing regimes on paper in Europe, and one of the most politically sheltered in practice. The starting point is Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code, which lays down the prohibition: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” No export of war material outside the European Union without prior authorisation. The same article entrusts the administrative authority with defining the list of controlled equipment and the applicable exemptions. The licences themselves come in three forms under Article L2335-3 of the Defence Code: general export licences directly authorising any qualifying exporter established in France to ship listed equipment to defined categories of recipients, global licences granted on request for identified recipients over a fixed period without quantity or value limits, and individual licences granted on request for a specific operation. Every file is examined at interministerial level, weighing the recipient country, the nature of the equipment, the stated end use, and France’s international commitments.

The decisive provision for the Nicaragua scenario is Article L2335-4 of the Defence Code, which provides that “L’autorité administrative peut à tout moment, dans les conditions fixées par un décret en Conseil d’Etat, suspendre, modifier, abroger ou retirer les licences d’exportation qu’elle a délivrées, pour des raisons de respect des engagements internationaux de la France, de protection des intérêts essentiels de sécurité, d’ordre public ou de sécurité publique ou pour non-respect des conditions spécifiées dans la licence.” In other words, French law expressly gives the executive the power, at any moment, to suspend or withdraw an export licence where France’s international commitments so require. The Genocide Convention, ratified by France, is plainly one of those commitments, alongside the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, whose criteria the French authorities must apply when assessing each licence file. The Nicaragua v. Germany hearings therefore test, at the ICJ level, exactly the kind of decision Article L2335-4 entrusts to the French executive: when reports of atrocities accumulate, at what point does continuing to authorise arms exports breach the State’s own international obligations?

The comparison with Germany is instructive. Berlin argued in The Hague that its export practice was documented and strictly controlled, and that it even suspended deliveries in 2025 before resuming them under the ceasefire. France has followed comparable sequences in recent conflicts, adjusting licence policy country by country without ever publishing the underlying assessments. The difference is judicial: Germany’s licensing choices are now dissected in public pleadings before the World Court, with verbatim transcripts available to everyone, whereas the equivalent French decisions remain covered by defence secrecy and governmental privilege. A French victim, journalist or competitor cannot obtain the file, cannot read the risk assessment, and cannot force the administration to explain why a licence was maintained. That opacity is not an accident of classification; it is the deliberate product of French case law, confirmed at the highest level in 2023.

B. What can victims, NGOs and exporters actually do before the French courts?

The leading French precedent is brutal in its clarity. After the outbreak of the war in Yemen, two associations, ASER and ACAT, asked the Prime Minister to suspend export licences for war material destined for the countries of the Saudi-led coalition, then challenged the implied refusal before the administrative courts. The Paris administrative tribunal rejected the claim by judgment of 8 July 2019, the Paris administrative court of appeal confirmed by two ordinances of 26 September 2019, and the Conseil d’Etat closed the debate by its decision of 27 January 2023, Nos. 436098 and 436099, rejecting both appeals. The associations had deployed the full arsenal of international arguments: Articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty, the EU Common Position 2008/944, Article L2335-4 of the Defence Code, Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the right to an effective remedy. None of it mattered, because the Court held that the claim never belonged before a judge at all.

The operative reasoning, set out in the decision of 27 January 2023, deserves to be read in full: “Le refus implicite opposé à cette demande de portée générale n’est pas détachable de la conduite des relations internationales de la France, sans que puissent être utilement invoquées à cet égard les stipulations des articles 6 et 7 du traité sur le commerce des armes, de l’article 2 de la charte des Nations-Unies et de l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, ainsi que les dispositions des articles 1 et 2 de la position commune n° 2008/944/PESC du Conseil du 8 décembre 2008 et de l’article L. 2335-4 du code de la défense.” The implied refusal to suspend licences of general scope is, in the Court’s words, not severable from the conduct of France’s international relations. It is an act of government, immune from judicial review for excess of power, and no international treaty or EU instrument invoked can usefully displace that characterisation. The Conseil d’Etat even refused to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the compatibility of that immunity with the right to an effective remedy. For NGOs and victims, the message is stark: in France, unlike before the ICJ, the substance of an arms-export decision cannot be litigated at all.

Two side doors remain, and both are narrow. The first is criminal. French law defines genocide in Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code as committing, under a concerted plan to destroy a protected group in whole or in part, acts such as wilful attacks on life, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, or the imposition of conditions of existence likely to bring about the group’s destruction, punishable by life imprisonment. And Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives French courts universal jurisdiction over genocide, the other crimes against humanity defined in Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code and war crimes committed abroad, complementing the general treaty-based jurisdiction of Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on condition that the suspect has habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link with French territory. In theory, a complaint with civil-party petition against executives of an exporting company or officials involved in a licensing chain is conceivable. In practice, prosecutors and investigating judges apply these provisions with extreme caution, the habitual-residence condition excludes most foreign decision-makers, and complicity in genocide by arms supply has never produced a French conviction. The criminal route exists, but it is a marathon through a minefield, not a remedy.

The second side door is political and European rather than judicial: parliamentary questions, media investigations based on customs and SIPRI data, EU-level pressure through the Common Position evaluation mechanisms, and, for companies, the growing weight of compliance and banking de-risking. Exporters established in France should read the Nicaragua hearings as a compliance warning rather than a distant diplomatic spectacle. If the ICJ holds that continuing arms transfers in the face of a judicially recognised serious risk of genocide engages State responsibility, the next step will be pressure on licensing States to suspend earlier and explain publicly, exactly what Article L2335-4 already allows the French administration to do “à tout moment”. Companies whose licences depend on that discretion have every interest in documenting end-use assurances, monitoring conflict-zone reporting, and preparing suspension scenarios, because a licence maintained too long can become both a reputational liability and, in extreme configurations, a criminal exposure for the individuals who operated it. Victims and NGOs, for their part, should understand the French paradox the case exposes: the broader the violation they denounce, the more surely the French judge will declare himself incompetent, while the narrowest door, an individual criminal complaint anchored in France, is the only one the courts will even open.

Conclusion

The Hague hearings of 7 to 10 September 2026 will not end the Gaza war, and they may not even produce a trial: if Germany’s preliminary objections succeed, Nicaragua v. Germany dies this year on jurisdiction. But the case has already forced into the open the question every arms-exporting democracy preferred to keep in confidential licensing committees. The Genocide Convention does not only punish those who pull the trigger; through Article I’s undertaking “to prevent and to punish” and Article III’s incrimination of “complicity in genocide”, it speaks to those who supply the weapons with knowledge of the risk. Germany chose to fight that reading at the threshold, arguing that Nicaragua never negotiated in good faith and that the Court cannot judge a supplier without judging the buyer. Nicaragua answered that notice was given, documents were sent, and 378 million dollars of licences in three months speak louder than procedural objections. The judges will decide who is right on jurisdiction before the end of the year. For France, the lesson is already written, and it is double-edged. Internationally, French licensing practice sits under the same Convention obligations Germany is defending, and a Nicaraguan victory would put Paris under immediate political and legal pressure the next time it maintains licences toward a conflict zone under ICJ scrutiny. Domestically, the Conseil d’Etat’s 2023 acte de gouvernement doctrine means no French court will perform the review the ICJ is performing now, leaving victims with universal-jurisdiction complaints of near-impossible difficulty and leaving exporters dependent on an executive discretion that Article L2335-4 frames but never explains. That gap between The Hague’s transparency and Paris’s secrecy is the true stakes of the case, and it will outlast whatever the Court decides on the objections.

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