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Doha Strike of 9 September 2026: Can the ICC or the ICJ Act, and What French Courts Can Do About It

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Doha Strike of 9 September 2026: Can the ICC or the ICJ Act, and What French Courts Can Do About It

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On 9 September 2026, Israeli warplanes struck a residential compound in Doha, Qatar, targeting the political leadership of Hamas while its delegation was meeting to discuss the latest American ceasefire proposal for Gaza. The Hamas negotiators survived, according to the movement, but five lower-level members of the delegation were killed, including the son and the office manager of chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya, alongside a Qatari security officer. Within forty-eight hours, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned a flagrant violation of Qatari sovereignty, High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk denounced a shocking breach of international law, and the Security Council convened an urgent briefing at which France co-sponsored a press statement condemning the strike. Qatar, the indispensable mediator of the Gaza ceasefire talks alongside Egypt and the United States, called the attack state terrorism and carried its complaint to New York in a letter registered as S/2025/563.

Nine days later, the outrage has not produced a courtroom. No international judge has seized the file, no arrest warrant has been issued, and the Arab-Islamic summit convened in Doha on 15 September 2026 has so far produced declarations rather than referrals. Yet the legal questions raised by the strike are exactly the ones this publication follows every day: which court is competent when bombs fall on the territory of a state that never joined the International Criminal Court, what the International Court of Justice can do without the consent of the respondent, and, above all, what the courts of France, a State Party to the Rome Statute with one of the most developed universal-jurisdiction regimes in Europe, can do when The Hague cannot act. This article answers those three questions in order, from the standpoint of French procedure, so that victims, counsel and journalists understand which doors are open, which are locked, and which key France itself holds.

I. Can the ICC prosecute the Doha strike of 9 September 2026?

The short answer is that the International Criminal Court has no obvious jurisdictional hook for the Doha strike, and every route its supporters mention runs into a structural obstacle. That conclusion follows directly from the text of the Rome Statute and from the membership map of the Court, which must be read before any talk of arrest warrants. The strike occurred on the territory of Qatar, against persons who include Qatari and Palestinian nationals, allegedly ordered by the authorities of Israel. None of the territorial logic that usually feeds the Court applies cleanly here, and the two fallback routes, a Palestinian-nationality argument and a Security Council referral, each carry a heavy burden that honest counsel must disclose to clients.

A. Why ICC territorial jurisdiction fails in Qatar, and the Palestinian-nationality argument lawyers will test

The International Criminal Court exercises jurisdiction only where the Rome Statute says it may. Article 12, paragraph 2, sets the preconditions for a State Party referral or a proprio motu investigation by the Prosecutor: the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3, namely the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred, or the State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. The full sentence on territoriality reads, in the authentic English text published by the United Nations: the Court may act if a relevant State is a Party, and paragraph (a) designates the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred. The strike occurred in Doha, and Doha is Qatari territory. Qatar, however, is not a Party to the Rome Statute. It appears on the official list of the Assembly of States Parties nowhere among the member states, and it sits instead in the Wikipedia-recapitulated treaty-status table under the heading of non-party, non-signatory states, alongside Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Lebanon. Because Qatar never signed nor ratified the Statute, paragraph (a) of Article 12 cannot anchor jurisdiction, and Qatar has not lodged any ad hoc declaration either. Article 12, paragraph 3, provides that if the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. No such Qatari declaration exists on the public record, and nothing in Doha’s diplomatic posture since 9 September suggests one is coming: Qatar has pursued the political track at the Security Council, not the judicial track at The Hague.

The nationality prong of Article 12 fares no better on the suspects’ side. Paragraph (b) designates the State of which the person accused of the crime is a national, and the persons who would be accused of ordering or executing the strike are Israeli nationals. Israel signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but notified the Secretary-General in 2002 that it no longer intended to become a party, so that, in the words of the treaty-status record, it has no legal obligations arising from its signature. With neither the territorial state nor the suspects’ national state being Parties, the classic Article 12 gateway stays shut, and a Prosecutor acting proprio motu under Article 15, who may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, would still need jurisdiction first: proprio motu power expands who can trigger the Court, not where the Court may look.

Creative counsel will nevertheless test one argument, and readers should know it before they read it elsewhere. Several of the victims of the Doha strike were reportedly Palestinian nationals, members of a Hamas delegation, and the State of Palestine is a Party to the Rome Statute, listed by the Assembly of States Parties among its Asian-group members. The argument runs that Article 12, paragraph 2(b), the State of which the person accused of the crime is a national, has a passive-personality mirror in some readings, or that the Palestinian nationality of victims pulls the case into the Palestine situation already open before the Court. Counsel must be told plainly that this reading stretches the Statute: Article 12(2)(b) speaks of the nationality of the accused, not of the victim, and the Prosecutor’s settled practice ties the Palestine situation to conduct on Palestinian territory or by Palestinian actors, not to attacks suffered by Palestinians abroad. The Office of the Prosecutor has never endorsed jurisdiction over an extraterritorial strike merely because the victims held the nationality of a State Party. The argument may be pleaded, it may generate headlines, but no practitioner should sell it as an open door. It is, at best, a door that the judges have never opened and that the text does not obviously contain.

A second preliminary filter compounds the difficulty: the substantive qualification. An ICC case needs crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or aggression, and each carries contextual elements. War crimes require a nexus with an armed conflict, and while the Gaza war is an armed conflict, the strike hit negotiators in a non-belligerent Gulf capital, so the nexus question would be litigated fiercely. Crimes against humanity require a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population pursuant to a policy, and a single targeted strike on a negotiating delegation, however unlawful under the law on the use of force, does not obviously meet that threshold. The unlawfulness of a cross-border strike under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner both denounced, is a matter of state responsibility, not automatically a matter of individual criminal responsibility before the ICC. Conflating the two is the most common error in press commentary on the Doha strike, and it must be avoided: a flagrant violation of sovereignty opens the docket of the International Court of Justice, not the cells of the ICC detention centre.

B. The only realistic ICC path: a Chapter VII Security Council referral, and the American veto

Article 13 of the Rome Statute lists three trigger mechanisms, and its English text is worth quoting in full because it structures everything that follows: The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14, or a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15. The first and third triggers both depend on Article 12 preconditions, which, as shown above, are missing for Doha. That leaves the second: a referral by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. A Chapter VII referral would cure all jurisdictional defects at once, binding even non-party states, exactly as Resolution 1593 did for Darfur in 2005 and Resolution 1970 did for Libya in 2011.

The Council already met on the strike, but what it did on 11 September 2026 shows how far a referral remains. Algeria, Pakistan and Somalia requested an urgent briefing under the Middle East agenda item, France and the United Kingdom supported the request, Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo briefed, the Qatari Prime Minister participated under rule 37, and the members agreed beforehand on a press statement proposed by France and the United Kingdom that condemns the strike, expresses solidarity with Qatar and recalls the mediation role. A press statement is not a resolution, still less a Chapter VII referral: it creates no mandate, imposes no obligation, and refers nothing to any Prosecutor. The elected members were already negotiating a draft Gaza ceasefire resolution when the strike landed, and Washington’s posture, President Trump called the targeting of Hamas a worthy goal while insisting the strike did not advance American objectives and that the United States took no part in it, signals that any text with teeth would face the American veto. A referral resolution needs nine affirmative votes and no veto from a permanent member; the United States, which hosts its largest Middle East air base in Qatar yet remains Israel’s closest ally, has never allowed a Chapter VII referral touching Israeli conduct, and nothing in the 11 September debate suggests that calculation has changed. France’s constructive role in securing condemnatory language is diplomatically significant, and French diplomats deserve credit for it, but counsel must not confuse a press statement with a jurisdictional act. Until a permanent member drafts a referral and survives the veto, the ICC file on Doha does not exist.

The International Court of Justice looks more promising at first glance, because state responsibility for violating Qatari sovereignty is precisely its business, but it demands something the ICC does not: the consent of the respondent state. The Court itself states the rule on its official site: The jurisdiction of the Court in contentious proceedings is based on the consent of the States to which it is open. And Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it. Qatar could therefore sue only if Israel consented by special agreement, which is inconceivable in the current posture, or if a treaty containing a compromissory clause connected the strike to the Court. No such treaty obviously covers a cross-border air strike on negotiators: the Montreal Convention governs civil aviation sabotage, the Geneva Conventions have no compromissory clause, and the Genocide Convention clause would require pleading genocidal intent for a strike that killed six people, a pleading no serious advocate would sign. The remaining ICJ avenue is advisory: the General Assembly or the Security Council may request an opinion on any legal question, as the Assembly did for the 2004 wall opinion and the 2024 occupation opinion. An advisory opinion on the Doha strike would carry immense moral and political weight, France would likely vote for the request, but it would bind no one and jail no one. The honest hierarchy is therefore this: the ICJ can speak about Doha only if the political organs ask it to, and even then it speaks without handcuffs.

II. What France and French courts can do when The Hague cannot act

France matters in this story twice over: as a diplomat and as a forum. As a diplomat, Paris backed the Council meeting, co-drafted the condemnation, and publicly denounced the strike, aligning itself with the Secretary-General’s finding of a flagrant violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a forum, France offers what neither the ICC nor the ICJ currently offers for Doha: courts that can open a criminal file on the basis of a victim’s complaint, judges who have already mapped the outer limits of universal jurisdiction in plenary rulings, and a specialised prosecution service that handles every ICC-related case in the country. No one should imagine that a Paris investigating judge will issue warrants next week for foreign ministers; but anyone advising victims of the strike, journalists covering the accountability track, or counsel weighing where to file should understand the French machinery in detail, because it is the only machinery currently capable of moving.

A. How French universal jurisdiction covers torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad

French criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial atrocity crimes rests on a layered architecture whose general principle sits in Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: persons who commit offences outside the territory of the Republic may be prosecuted and tried by French courts either where French law applies under the Penal Code or another statute, or where an international convention or an act adopted under the European Communities treaty gives French courts competence over the offence. The French text reads: Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. Below that umbrella, three specialised provisions do the heavy lifting for Doha-type facts.

First, Article 689-2 extends French jurisdiction to torture as defined by the New York Convention of 10 December 1984, and the Cour de cassation, sitting in plenary assembly on 12 May 2023 under appeal number 22-82.468, gave that provision a scope that matters directly for non-state actors like Hamas and for state agents alike. The plenary Court held that the notion of a person having acted in an official capacity, within the meaning of the national text’s reference to the Convention, must be understood as also covering a person acting for or on behalf of a non-governmental entity where that entity occupies territory and exercises quasi-governmental authority over it. In French: la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire. The ruling, published in the Bulletin and available at the Court’s official portal, concerned the Jaysh al-Islam file arising from the Syrian conflict, and its reasoning is drafted in general terms: any organised entity controlling territory with quasi-governmental authority falls within the test. Whether that test captures the perpetrators or the victims’ captors in any Doha follow-on litigation would be for the investigating chamber to decide on the facts, but the legal tool exists, it is plenary authority, and it post-dates the strike by three years, so no retroactivity objection can touch it.

Second, Article 689-11 governs genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes falling under the Rome Statute, and its current version, in force since 22 November 2023, provides that, apart from ICC cooperation cases, any person suspected of having committed abroad genocide as defined in the Penal Code, other crimes against humanity, or war crimes defined in Articles 461-1 to 461-31 may be prosecuted and tried by French courts. The French text states: Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes, followed by the three categories. Three cumulative filters then apply, and each must be explained honestly. The suspect must have habitual residence in France, now defined as a sufficient link with the country assessed through the duration and conditions of presence, the demonstrated will to settle, and family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution may be initiated only at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor in Paris, and only if no international court requests surrender and no state requests extradition, after the prosecution verifies the absence of ICC proceedings, of any other competent international court’s surrender request, and of any extradition request. For Doha, the residence filter is the steepest: unless a suspect later settles in France, Article 689-11 cannot bite, and counsel who promise otherwise mislead their clients.

The plenary assembly clarified the older version of that same article the same day, 12 May 2023, under appeal number 22-80.057, and the clarification retains interpretive value. The Court held that the double-criminality condition then required by Article 689-11 does not imply that the criminal classification of the facts be identical in both legal systems, but only requires that they be criminalised by each. The official summary states: La condition de double incrimination, exigée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale pour la poursuite des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes et délits de guerre, n’implique pas que la qualification pénale des faits soit identique dans les deux législations, mais requiert seulement qu’ils soient incriminés par l’une et l’autre. The 2023 legislative reworking has since simplified the conditions, but the ruling remains the authoritative statement that French judges read foreign criminalisation flexibly, through the underlying ordinary-law offence where needed. For Doha facts, that means French courts would not demand that Qatari law know a crime-against-humanity label: Qatari murder and assault provisions would satisfy the comparative exercise for the underlying killings.

Third, the substantive definitions in the Penal Code map cleanly onto a lethal cross-border strike. Genocide under Article 211-1 covers the intentional killing of members of a protected group pursuant to a concerted plan to destroy it in whole or in part, punishable by life imprisonment: Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants, including atteinte volontaire à la vie. Crimes against humanity under Article 212-1 cover wilful killing, extermination, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts committed pursuant to a concerted plan against a civilian population group within a widespread or systematic attack, likewise punishable by life imprisonment. War crimes under Article 461-1 cover offences committed during an international or non-international armed conflict and in relation to it, in violation of the laws and customs of war or the applicable conventions, against protected persons or property: Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit. Each definition is in force and freely consultable on the official public legal database. The analytical consequence is that French law lacks no substantive box for Doha: what it may lack, depending on the file, is the jurisdictional hook, and that is where the fourth provision enters.

That fourth provision is Article 113-7 of the Penal Code, the passive-personality clause: French criminal law applies to any felony, and to any misdemeanour punished by imprisonment, committed by a French or foreign national outside the territory of the Republic where the victim holds French nationality at the time of the offence. In French: La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction. If any person killed or wounded in the Doha compound held French nationality, a French prosecution could proceed without any residence, treaty or reciprocity condition, on the sole basis of the victim’s passport. No public source has identified a French victim to date, and this article asserts none; but every newsroom and every victims’ association should be checking nationality lists now, because a single French passport among the casualties would transform the French forum from theoretical to mandatory, and the Paris prosecutor’s office would have no discretion to look away.

B. How victims trigger a French case from Paris: complaint, civil-party petition and cooperation with the ICC

French procedure gives victims tools that international courts do not. A victim of the Doha strike, or a French association acting for victims, can file a criminal complaint with constitution de partie civile before the Paris judicial court, forcing the appointment of an investigating judge unless the prosecutor’s office takes over the case itself. Where the anti-terrorism prosecutor classifies a complaint without further action, Article 689-11 itself organises a remedy: when the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal hears an appeal under Article 40-3 against a dismissal by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, the complainant who reported the facts must be heard upon request, and an unfounded appeal draws a reasoned written decision. The current text provides: Lorsque, en application de l’article 40-3 du présent code, le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris est saisi d’un recours contre une décision de classement sans suite prise par le procureur de la République antiterroriste, il entend la personne qui a dénoncé les faits si celle-ci en fait la demande. This is not abstract architecture: the Paris specialised pole has opened, pursued and tried universal-jurisdiction cases arising from Syria, Liberia and Rwanda, and its docket proves that well-documented complaints with identified suspects lead to investigations, arrest warrants and, where the suspect enters France, to trials.

France also serves as the ICC’s operational arm on French soil, which matters for any future Hague warrants connected to the region. Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure channels ICC cooperation requests to the competent authorities, transmitting them to the anti-terrorism prosecutor, who gives them all useful effect, including in emergencies directly and by any means: Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles. En cas d’urgence, ces documents peuvent être transmis directement et par tout moyen à ce magistrat. Article 627-3 adds that conservatory measures requested under Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute are ordered on French territory by the same prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request. In practice, if the ICC ever issued warrants for persons involved in the Doha decision chain and those persons travelled to France, French police could arrest, French judges would control detention, and surrender to The Hague would follow the dedicated statutory track, not ordinary extradition. The same machinery already processes every ICC surrender request concerning suspects found in France, which is why the nationality of travellers and the screening of border alerts matter more than ministerial speeches.

One recent ruling shows how seriously French courts take the procedural rights of persons sought by foreign states, and it belongs in any Doha advice memo. On 3 September 2025, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation, appeal number 24-86.757, quashed a Bordeaux investigating chamber’s favourable extradition opinion in a Swiss-request case, recalling the Petruhhin doctrine: where a Member State receives a third-state extradition request concerning a Union citizen who is a national of another Member State, it must inform that state of nationality of the request and of all legal and factual material supplied by the requesting state, so that the home state may prosecute and issue a European Arrest Warrant instead. The Court stated: il incombe à l’État membre requis d’informer les autorités compétentes de l’État membre dont la personne réclamée a la nationalité non seulement de l’existence d’une demande d’extradition la visant, mais encore de l’ensemble des éléments de droit et de fait communiqués par l’État tiers requérant dans le cadre de cette demande d’extradition. Transposed to a Doha scenario, the lesson is that any suspect moving through France under a third-state request benefits from layered European protections, while any victim moving through France can activate the complaint machinery above. France is simultaneously a shield for the sought and a sword for the victims, and competent counsel must work both edges.

Practical conclusions follow for each audience. Victims and their families should preserve every document now: death certificates, hospital records, employment proofs placing relatives in the compound, photographs, messages exchanged with the delegation, and any evidence of nationality, residence or travel. French nationals among them should consult counsel immediately about a Paris complaint, because passive personality under Article 113-7 has no residence precondition. Associations should coordinate rather than multiply filings, designating one Paris lawyer to centralise the civil-party strategy before the specialised pole. Journalists should stop announcing ICC warrants that the jurisdictional map excludes, and start asking the questions that matter: has Qatar considered an Article 12(3) declaration, will any State Party refer the situation, will the General Assembly seek an advisory opinion, and has France’s anti-terrorism prosecutor received any complaint. And officials who ordered, authorised or executed the strike should understand that European travel now carries a legal risk premium: an ICC warrant would be executed in every State Party including France, and a French universal-jurisdiction file, once opened, supports European Arrest Warrants across the Union.

Conclusion

The Doha strike of 9 September 2026 sits at the intersection of two truths that must be held together. The first is that the international system reacted as designed at the political level: the Secretary-General named the violation, the High Commissioner named the breach of international law, the Security Council met within forty-eight hours, and France helped put condemnation on the record. The second is that the judicial level remains empty by design as well: the ICC lacks territorial and nationality jurisdiction over Qatar, the Palestinian-nationality argument stretches the Statute past its text, a Chapter VII referral faces a known veto, and the ICJ cannot hear a contentious case without consent it will not receive. Between those two truths lies the forum that this article has mapped in full: France, whose courts can try torture by quasi-governmental non-state actors under plenary authority, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under Articles 211-1, 212-1 and 461-1 combined with Article 689-11, any felony against a French victim under Article 113-7, and ICC cooperation requests through Articles 627-1 and 627-3, all under the control of the Paris anti-terrorism prosecution and the Paris investigating judges. The Hague may one day open a Doha file; Paris can open one tomorrow morning, on a victim’s signature. In cross-border criminal law, forum is strategy, and the strategy for Doha runs through Paris.

📄 Official circular