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UN Finds US Strikes on Iran Schools Were War Crimes: Can France Prosecute When the ICC Cannot?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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UN Finds US Strikes on Iran Schools Were War Crimes: Can France Prosecute When the ICC Cannot?

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On 17 September 2026, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran published the finding every international criminal lawyer had been waiting for since the February war: it has reasonable grounds to believe that the United States was behind two air strikes on a primary school and a sports facility in Iran, and that these strikes constituted war crimes. The report, issued under United Nations document symbol A/HRC/61/60, will be debated by the Human Rights Council in Geneva on Monday, and its conclusions already trigger a precise legal question far beyond Geneva: before which court could the alleged perpetrators actually stand trial?

According to reporting by Reuters and The Guardian, the school strike hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, in Hormozgan province, on 28 February, killing 156 civilians including 120 children when a United States Tomahawk missile collapsed the roof of a building the mission describes as clearly identifiable. The same day, a second strike hit a clearly identifiable sports complex and residential area in the southern city of Lamerd with a weapon that scattered tungsten pellets. The Pentagon declined to comment on what it called a report by an outside organization, while a White House spokeswoman replied that the Human Rights Council had accomplished nothing for human rights and that Iran was the only party to the conflict that had committed war crimes. The mission, for its part, also found that the Iranian authorities committed crimes against humanity during the crackdown on anti-government protests, so the report distributes criminal exposure to both sides.

This analysis explains what the mission really established, why the International Criminal Court in The Hague cannot take the American part of the case, and why France — through its universal jurisdiction statute and two landmark plenary rulings of the Cour de cassation of 12 May 2023 — is one of the few countries where a prosecution could lawfully be opened, provided strict conditions are met. For victims, witnesses and non-governmental organizations, understanding that narrow path now determines which evidence to preserve and where to file it.

I. What the United Nations mission established on 17 September 2026

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran is an investigative body created by the Human Rights Council. It is not a criminal court: as Reuters recalled, its missions do not open criminal cases themselves, but their findings can be used by national courts or by international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court. States will discuss this report in Geneva on Monday. To measure what a prosecutor could do with it, the facts must be stated exactly as the mission found them, distinguishing what is proven, what is attributed, and what remains disputed.

A. The Minab school strike: what happened on 28 February

The central finding concerns the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab. The Guardian reports that 156 civilians were killed, including 120 children, when a Tomahawk missile collapsed the school roof on 28 February. The building stood adjacent to a naval complex of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the United States relied on intelligence suggesting that a senior Iranian military commander was present at the site. According to The Guardian, that information was never adequately verified before the strike was launched, and there have been reports that senior American commanders had been warned that the targeting data used during the war, including for Minab, was dangerously outdated. The Pentagon’s own internal investigation into the incident is understood to have concluded several months ago, although its conclusions have not been made public.

The mission’s legal characterization is severe. It concluded that the attack constituted an indiscriminate attack causing civilian deaths and damage to civilian infrastructure, amounting to a war crime under international law. On the question of intent, the report goes further than mere negligence. Reuters quotes the mission’s reasoning as follows:

Rather, the U.S. directed the strikes at the building of the school while being aware of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object and acting recklessly as regards the possibility that this would happen.

In the mission’s own public formulation, reported by The Guardian, the team found after the American and Israeli attacks of 28 February that there were reasonable grounds to believe the United States had committed the war crime of indiscriminate attacks causing civilian death, injury and damage to civilian objects. The second strike, on the sports complex and residential area of Lamerd the same day, falls under the same qualification, with the added evidentiary detail of tungsten pellets scattered over a civilian area.

Two factual disputes will decide any future trial. First, the American account points to the adjacent military complex and the alleged presence of a commander, which, if true, would feed a proportionality and precautions debate rather than a targeting ban. Second, the mission answers that the school was clearly identifiable, that the targeting database had not been updated, and that the alleged commander’s presence was never verified. Under the law applied by the mission, a failure to do everything feasible to verify that a target is a military objective, combined with awareness of a substantial risk to civilians, is what turns an operational error into the war crime of indiscriminate attack. The Pentagon says its operations comply with the law of armed conflict; the White House denies any American war crime. A court, not a press statement, would have to resolve that contradiction — which is exactly why the question of the competent forum matters.

French criminal law anticipates precisely this configuration. The war crimes defined at article 461-9 of the Criminal Code punish with life imprisonment “Le fait de lancer des attaques délibérées contre la population civile en tant que telle ou contre des personnes civiles qui ne prennent pas part directement aux hostilités”, and article 461-13 of the Criminal Code punishes with twenty years of criminal imprisonment “Le fait de lancer des attaques délibérées contre des bâtiments consacrés à la religion, à l’enseignement, à l’art, à la science ou à l’action caritative, des monuments historiques, des hôpitaux et des lieux où des malades ou des blessés sont rassemblés, pour autant que ces bâtiments ne soient pas alors utilisés à des fins militaires”. That final reservation is the hinge of the Minab case: a school used for military purposes can lose its protection, but the mission’s finding is that no such use was verified and that the building was clearly identifiable as a school. Article 461-14 of the Criminal Code adds a fifteen-year penalty for deliberate attacks on civilian property that is not a military objective. The jurisdictional nexus required by article 461-1 of the Criminal Code — offences “commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit” — is satisfied on the mission’s account, since the strikes occurred during an international armed conflict opposing the United States and Israel to Iran.

B. Can a United Nations reasonable-grounds finding lead to a war crimes trial?

Short answer: yes, but only if a competent prosecutor picks it up. “Reasonable grounds to believe” is the standard of proof used by United Nations investigations at the pre-trial stage. It does not mean guilt is established, and it is deliberately lower than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. It means that a credible body, after collecting testimony, satellite imagery, medical records and remnants, considers that a crime appears to have been committed and that identified forces appear responsible. For a prosecutor, that finding is not a conviction, but it is a solid referral file: it names the incidents, preserves the chain of custody of key evidence, and gives victim and witness contacts that would otherwise scatter.

Fact-finding reports have no coercive power. They cannot order arrests, compel testimony, or freeze assets. Their strength is evidentiary and political. Evidentiary, because international investigators document scenes quickly, while national prosecutors may be blocked from the territory — no Western prosecutor can currently investigate in Minab or Lamerd, so the mission’s file may be the only structured evidence available for years. Political, because a public finding of war crimes raises the cost for any authority that refuses to investigate its own forces, and gives third states the factual basis to open their own cases under universal jurisdiction. The Human Rights Council debate on Monday will show which states call for accountability and which shield the alleged perpetrators, and that vote will shape every later judicial step.

For victims, relatives and witnesses, the practical consequence is immediate and concrete. Evidence degrades fast: bodies are buried, rubble is cleared, phone footage is deleted, and witnesses disperse or are intimidated. Anyone connected to the Minab or Lamerd strikes should preserve medical certificates, death certificates, photographs of the sites before clearing, missile remnants, geolocated videos, and the names of witnesses, and should transmit copies to trusted organizations or lawyers outside the country rather than keeping a single original. The mission’s investigation continues, and additional material can still be submitted. A well-documented victim file is what transforms a paragraph of a Geneva report into an exhibit in a Paris or The Hague courtroom, and that work starts now, not when a prosecutor eventually calls.

The report’s second half must not be overlooked. The mission also found that the Iranian authorities committed crimes against humanity in the deadly repression of the protest movement that began in late December. French law defines these crimes at article 212-1 of the Criminal Code as acts committed pursuant to a concerted plan against a civilian population group in the context of a widespread or systematic attack, punishable by life imprisonment, and article 211-1 of the Criminal Code defines genocide in similar terms. Any future accountability process in France could therefore concern suspects from both camps, under the same jurisdictional regime, and the evidentiary file built today serves both hypotheses.

II. The International Criminal Court is blocked, but French courts are not

The instinctive reflex after a war-crimes finding is to look to the International Criminal Court. That reflex fails here for a structural reason that has nothing to do with the gravity of the facts: the Court simply has no jurisdiction over American strikes on Iranian territory. France, by contrast, has built over fifteen years a universal jurisdiction mechanism that the Cour de cassation clarified in two plenary judgments of 12 May 2023, and that mechanism fits this case almost point by point. The two forums must be compared honestly, including the obstacles that remain in Paris.

A. Why the International Criminal Court cannot prosecute American strikes in Iran

The International Criminal Court exercises jurisdiction only under the conditions of article 12 of the Rome Statute: the state on whose territory the conduct occurred, or the state of nationality of the accused, must be a party to the Statute, unless the Security Council refers the situation. The French Cour de cassation recalled this rule word for word in its plenary judgment on universal jurisdiction: “il résulte de l’article 12 du Statut de Rome que la Cour pénale internationale peut exercer sa compétence si est partie audit Statut l’État sur le territoire duquel le comportement en cause a eu lieu, ou l’État dont la personne accusée du crime est un ressortissant.” Neither condition is met here. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, a position documented for years including by Human Rights Watch, and Iran does not appear on the Court’s official Assembly of States Parties list of member states either. The territorial state and the nationality state are both outside the treaty, so the Prosecutor cannot open an investigation on his own motion or at the request of a State Party.

The only remaining door to The Hague would be a referral by the United Nations Security Council, which can give the Court jurisdiction over non-party situations. In a case directly implicating an American military operation, that route requires the assent of a permanent member whose own forces are accused — an assent that will not come, as Washington already rejects the mission’s conclusions and dismisses the Human Rights Council itself. The political context confirms the closure: in August 2026 the United States administration imposed sanctions on the Court’s president and senior officials, according to Reuters, which makes any American cooperation with The Hague unthinkable in the near term. The Court’s judges have challenged those sanctions in court, but that litigation does not create jurisdiction over the Iran strikes.

Complementarity — the principle that the Court acts only when national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute — therefore never even comes into play: there is no admissibility debate to have when jurisdiction is absent from the start. This is precisely the configuration in which the French courts have said universal jurisdiction must take over. In the same plenary judgment, the Cour de cassation held that “le mécanisme de la compétence universelle constitue une alternative au mécanisme de coopération pénale qu’est l’extradition et trouve à s’appliquer dans le cas où l’État étranger est défaillant dans son obligation de poursuivre les crimes internationaux.” When the territorial state cannot or will not prosecute, and the international court cannot hear the case, the French forum becomes not a luxury but the default remedy — if its statutory conditions are fulfilled.

A final clarification protects readers against false hope: the Court could still, in theory, prosecute Iranian suspects for crimes committed on the territory of a State Party, or prosecute any suspect of any nationality brought before it through a Council referral. None of these hypotheses covers American aircrew or commanders for strikes on Iranian soil. Victims’ associations that file in The Hague alone will receive a jurisdictional rejection. The file must be directed to Paris, where the Cour de cassation has already answered every objection the defence would raise.

B. How France could prosecute under universal jurisdiction

France punishes war crimes committed abroad by foreigners against foreign victims through article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, listing genocide, other crimes against humanity, and “Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code”. The Minab and Lamerd strikes, if proven as the mission describes them, fall squarely within that list through articles 461-9, 461-13 and 461-14 cited above. The general gateway of article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confirms the principle: French courts may try perpetrators of offences committed outside France when an international convention gives them jurisdiction. Four cumulative conditions then decide whether the Paris prosecutor can act, and the plenary case law has settled each of them in a way that favours this file.

First, double criminality. The defence reflex is to argue that the foreign state does not criminalize crimes against humanity or war crimes as such, so France cannot prosecute. The Cour de cassation, sitting in plenary assembly on 12 May 2023 in case 22-80.057 (judgment no. 668), destroyed that argument. It held that “la condition de double incrimination, exigée pour la poursuite des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes et délits de guerre, n’implique pas que la qualification pénale des faits soit identique dans les deux législations, mais requiert seulement qu’ils soient incriminés par l’une et l’autre”, adding that “La condition d’incrimination par la loi étrangère peut être remplie au travers d’une infraction de droit commun constituant la base du crime poursuivi, tels le meurtre, le viol ou la torture”. The full judgment is published by the Court at Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, pourvoi no. 22-80.057. Applied to Minab, the test is easily satisfied: the deliberate killing of 156 civilians maps onto ordinary homicide in every legal system, and no serious lawyer will argue that American law leaves murder unpunished. The Court even warned that some offences, such as persecution as a crime against humanity, may genuinely lack a foreign equivalent — but indiscriminate bombardment of a school is not one of them.

Second, the absence of a competing forum. Article 689-11 allows prosecution only if no international or national court requests surrender or extradition of the suspect, and the prosecutor must verify that the International Criminal Court has not taken the case. Here the Cour de cassation has already answered the question in advance. In the same 2023 judgment it ruled: “La Syrie n’étant pas un État partie, il ne saurait être exigé que le ministère public s’assure auprès de la Cour pénale internationale qu’elle décline expressément une compétence dont elle est à l’évidence dépourvue.” Replace Syria with Iran and the United States — both non-parties — and the reasoning applies identically: the Paris prosecutor cannot be required to seek an express waiver from a Court that is manifestly without jurisdiction. Nor has any state requested extradition of the personnel involved. This condition is therefore met on the current facts, subject to re-verification if proceedings ever open.

Third, the monopoly of the anti-terrorism prosecutor and the rights of victims. Under article 689-11, prosecution “ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste”, the Paris prosecutor specialized in crimes against humanity and war crimes. Victims cannot directly trigger a trial by filing a civil-party complaint with an investigating judge, as they can for ordinary crimes; they must report the facts — the statute expressly provides for “la personne qui a dénoncé les faits” — and the prosecutor decides. But a refusal is not the end: when the Paris prosecutor general reviews an appeal against a dismissal decision under article 40-3, “il entend la personne qui a dénoncé les faits si celle-ci en fait la demande”, and if he considers the appeal unfounded “il en informe l’intéressé par une décision écrite motivée”. In practice, this means Iranian victims, their families, and French-based associations should file detailed, documented reports with the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s office in Paris now, attaching the mission’s findings and their own evidence, and be ready to challenge a dismissal with a reasoned appeal. That is the procedural door, and it is open today.

Fourth, habitual residence — the heaviest practical obstacle. Article 689-11 requires that “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France”, assessed on the duration of presence, its conditions and reasons, the person’s intent to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. The second plenary judgment of 12 May 2023, case 22-82.468 (judgment no. 669, published at Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, pourvoi no. 22-82.468), shows how courts apply this test: investigators found the suspect mostly staying in his flat, going out only to the mosque or to eat, “se comportant ainsi comme un résident effectif et non comme un touriste”, and the judges concluded that “ces différents éléments montrent une stabilité certaine de résidence durant une période de plus de trois mois et que le critère de résidence habituelle est ainsi rempli”. Mere transit through France is not enough, and an American aircrew member who never sets foot in the country cannot be tried in Paris. But the net is wider than it looks: pilots, intelligence officers, private contractors, dual nationals or officials who live, study, own property, receive medical treatment or regularly travel in France can satisfy the test, and each future trip by a person named in a complaint creates an arrest opportunity. Non-governmental organizations that track the movements of alleged perpetrators know this work well, and the Minab file gives them a documented list of functions — aircrew, targeting officers, commanding officers — to watch for.

Two honest reservations complete the picture. Immunity remains a serious hurdle: incumbent senior officials enjoy personal immunity before foreign courts, and whether functional immunity shields official military acts from war-crimes prosecution abroad is one of the most contested questions in international law. France has not settled it definitively, and any complaint must target its legal strategy accordingly, distinguishing planners who may claim official status from executors and private contractors. And the prosecutor’s discretion is real: the anti-terrorism prosecutor may consider the evidence insufficient or the suspects unreachable, and shelve the file. None of this makes the French path illusory. It makes it conditional, documented, and — unlike The Hague — legally available. The mission’s report supplies the factual foundation; the plenary case law supplies the jurisdictional answers; what is missing is a suspect on French soil and a prosecutor willing to act.

Conclusion

The 17 September 2026 report changes the legal landscape of the February war. A credible United Nations body now attributes to the United States the war crime of indiscriminate attacks on a school and a sports facility, with 156 dead in Minab including 120 children, and documents crimes against humanity by the Iranian authorities in the protest crackdown. The International Criminal Court cannot hear the American part of the case, because neither the territorial state nor the nationality state is a party to the Rome Statute and no Council referral will come. France can, under article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as interpreted by the two plenary judgments of 12 May 2023, provided the suspect has a genuine residential link with France and the anti-terrorism prosecutor takes up the file. Watch three milestones in the coming weeks: the Human Rights Council debate on Monday, which will reveal whether any state demands accountability or moves to bury the report; any disclosure from the Pentagon’s internal investigation, whose reported warnings about outdated targeting data corroborate the mission; and the first criminal complaints filed in Paris, which will test whether the French universal jurisdiction mechanism built for Syrian cases now extends to the nationals of a great power. International justice has often stopped at that frontier. The Minab school file will show whether it still does.

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